Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History, 1987.

The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissidents1

The movement of intellectual-political dissent which surfaced in Ukraine in the 1960s has evoked much interest among foreign students of Soviet affairs. Western scholars, however, have paid little attention so far to the content of the ideas formulated by Ukrainian dissidents. How is this omission to be accounted for? After half a century of massive and relentless repression, the very fact of a vocal opposition movement emerging in Ukraine appeared almost miraculous. Something of this amazement still lingers on today. Most Western analysts have been satisfied with registering instances of Ukrainian dissent, but have been slow to scrutinize the dissidents' pronouncements as documents of political thought.2

This neglect is regrettable, because an ideologically oriented study of the Ukrainian dissidents is by no means merely a theoretical exercise. Ideas do have consequences. Under the conditions of an imposed conformity, heterodox ideas act as catalysts to forces of change. The statements of the dissidents may serve as an indication of the currents stirring in the depths of Ukrainian society, and they point to the direction in which Ukraine is likely to move should the iron lid of repression become loosened.

The approach I propose is to place the dissidents' ideas in historical perspective by relating them to older trends in Ukrainian socio-political thought. Within the scope of this paper, it will be necessary to limit the discussion to a few of the most important topics and representative cases.

In an article published in 1963, I surveyed the Soviet Ukrainian scene; this was before the existence of the emerging dissident movement became known in the West. Noting the many instances of the post-Stalin cultural revival in Ukraine, I concluded by making two predictions. The first was: "It is possible to predict that if this process of reconstruction and expansion continues for another few years, it is bound to enter into a phase in which it will assume the form of political demands." The second prediction was: "These [political] postulates will, in all likelihood, follow a 'national-communist' line—not, of course, because communist ideas, as such, are close to the hearts of the Ukrainian people, but because a policy must proceed from certain given data. Under Soviet conditions, a realistic point of departure for Ukrainian politics is the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a body nominally endowed with the rights of a sovereign state. ... "3

Indeed, the first outstanding programmatic document of Ukrainian dissent was Ivan Dziuba's treatise, Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia? (Internationalism or Russification?), written in 1965, only two years after the above prognosis had been made.4 As an American reviewer, Professor John A. Armstrong, noted, "the book constitutes a massive, expert work of research scholarship. . . . While . . . it appears established that Dziuba wrote the manuscript, it also seems probable that he developed it (perhaps over many years) through exchange of information and ideas with other intellectuals in the Soviet Ukraine. If this last hypothesis is correct, it indicates an extremely sophisticated and erudite opposition to Soviet policy among Ukrainian intellectuals."5

For our inquiry, the significant aspect of Dziuba's treatise is the fact that it is written from a Marxist-Leninist position. Dziuba denounced the deviation in Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine from true Leninist principles and called for the restoration of these principles. The work is addressed to Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who at the time were, respectively, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The book's last chapter bears the programmatic title "The Government of the Ukrainian SSR as the Spokesman of National Integrity: Its Responsibility for the Nation."

It is, therefore, legitimate to evaluate Dziuba as a new incarnation of the "national" communist trend which in the 1920s played a prominent role in Ukrainian political life not only in the Ukrainian SSR, but also in Western Ukraine (then under Polish rule) and in the Ukrainian diaspora. But we must take notice of one important difference between the original Ukrainian "national" communism of the 1920s and its recent revival by Dziuba. The former was inspired by genuine revolutionary fervour, by a utopian faith in an imminent world-wide social upheaval and transformation of mankind, or—to use Mykola Khvylovy's poetic image—a vision of the "commune beyond the hills" (zahirna komuna). No trace of this revolutionary chiliasm is to be found in Dziuba, whose strictly rational deductions resemble a legal brief. Without questioning the sincerity of Dziuba's Marxist-Leninist convictions, there is no doubt that the intellectual and emotional strength of his work lies entirely in its patriotic appeal, and not in the lengthy quotations from Lenin's writings and party resolutions.

Under pressure, Dziuba retracted his heresies in 1973 after some vacillation.6 He is the only prominent Ukrainian dissident (discounting some minor and marginal figures) to have capitulated to the regime. His recantation has been a bitter disappointment to his numerous admirers both in Ukraine and abroad. Still, it is important to fathom his motives. A plausible interpretation has been advanced by Mykhajlo Savaryn.7 Let me elaborate his argument in my own terms: Dziuba was a mouthpiece for that segment of the Soviet Ukrainian establishment which, during Petro Shelest's tenure as First Secretary of the CPU (1963-72), was pushing for the extension of the autonomy of the Ukrainian republic and for increased Ukrainian cultural rights. Dziuba's demands were a theoretical extrapolation of what certain Soviet Ukrainian leaders were doing in practice during the era of the "revival of controlled Ukrainian autonomism."8 These circles possibly encouraged Dziuba; they certainly tolerated him and, for several years, shielded him from extreme penalties. Thus, Dziuba's opposition was fully an opposition within the framework of the system. After the purge of Shelest and his coterie in 1972, this stance became untenable. It lost its political raison d'etre, and this accounts for Dziuba's capitulation.

While Ivan Dziuba may be considered a continuator of the "national" communist trend in Ukrainian political thought, another prominent dissident, Valentyn Moroz, is a lineal descendant of the integral-nationalist movement, represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which flourished in the western Ukrainian lands in the 1930s.9 Moroz could not overtly advertise his allegiance to integral nationalism in his samvydav writings, but perspicacious readers had little difficulty in detecting the sources of his inspiration; certain passages in Moroz sound like paraphrases of Dmytro Dontsov, the ideologist of Ukrainian integral nationalism. What connected Moroz with the Dontsovian-OUN tradition was his philosophical voluntarism, his insistence on the maintenance of the pure national ideal at all costs, his scornful rejection of any pragmatic accommodation to existing conditions, his cult of the strong, heroic, self-sacrificing individual, and, finally, his anti-intellectualism and advocacy of oderzhymist, which means approximately "frenzy" or "holy madness."

Within a society paralyzed by fear, Moroz's defiant call was bound to have a profound emotional impact. Leonid Pliushch has compared Moroz's essay, "Amid the Snows," with Vissarion Belinsky's celebrated open letter to Gogol. In 1847, Belinsky castigated Gogol's spiritual subservience to the reactionary regime of Nicholas I; similarly, Moroz pilloried Dziuba for his capitulation to the KGB. It is to be kept in mind that Pliushch represented a tendency within the dissident movement opposed to that of Moroz. Nevertheless, he paid Moroz the following well-earned tribute: "There appeared a new letter of Belinsky to Gogol—and one a thousand times more terrible to Gogol-Dziuba, a thousand times more convincing and soul-inspiring. This was Valentyn Moroz's 'Amid the Snows.' By merging the logic of facts and ideas with the passion of a fighter against any concessions to the KGB, Moroz proved that Dziuba has delivered a blow to his own ideas and to the Ukrainian opposition movement. . . . "10 This testimony must not be forgotten, especially in view of later events that have tarnished Moroz's image.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that of all the dissidents it was precisely Moroz who became the favourite of the Ukrainian diaspora. Right-wing emigre circles correctly perceived his affinity with their own ideology. Ukrainian student groups in North America, although they had largtly become detached from OUN-type nationalism, also idolized Moroz. This cult of Moroz fulfilled the young people's psychological need for hero worship. Spearheaded by student activists, Ukrainians in Western countries mounted a large-scale "release Moroz" campaign. But the Ukrainian diaspora failed to realize that Moroz's views were by no means representative of the mainstream of Soviet Ukrainian dissent. Furthermore, it displayed no awareness of Moroz's serious personal failings. Several prominent dissidents of proven integrity who had unpleasant encounters with Moroz in Soviet prisons and labour camps transmitted to the West warnings about his egotism, arrogance and caddishness. But these messages were not publicized in time.11

The aftermath is common knowledge. Released to the West in April 1979 as part of a Soviet-American exchange of political prisoners for Soviet spies, Moroz was given a hero's welcome by the entire Ukrainian diaspora. Very soon, however, he created universal dismay by his bizarre and scandalous behavior. Politically, he at first allied himself with the most reactionary and obscurantist emigre faction, the so-called World Ukrainian Liberation Front, but soon fell out even with them. Furthermore, since his expatriation Moroz's writings and public pronouncements have displayed an abysmal intellectual vacuity.

Thus, two prominent Ukrainian dissidents, Ivan Dziuba and Valentyn Moroz, each proceeding along his own tragic route, have come to a dead end. Their failure cannot be ascribed simply to personal frailties; it is rather of a broader symptomatic significance. Dziuba and Moroz represented a revival within Ukrainian dissent of two powerful currents—"national" communism and integral nationalism—that dominated the Ukrainian political scene during the inter-war era. Dziuba's and Moroz's disgrace illustrates the bankruptcy of these two currents in modern Ukrainian political thought.

Although standing at opposite poles and fiercely hostile to each other, Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism have shared many common characteristics. They both have extolled revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of a single party acting in the name of the masses; both have been illiberal and have rejected civil rights, a pluralistic order of the body politic, the rule of law, and Western-type representative government; both have been motivated by an exclusive ideology and a Manichean vision of society, with all the psychological hallmarks of a militant, quasi-religious secular faith. A historian will have no difficulty in identifying them as the Ukrainian variants of the two great, world-wide totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, communisn and fascism. This is not the place to discuss the origins and development of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism (fascism). Let it be said, however, that I acknowledge the indigenous character of both trends in Ukraine, and that I do not deny that in the past they have made some positive contributions to their nation. But I also think that both totalitarian trends were essentially historical aberrations and that they have led the Ukrainian people into cul-de-sacs. The experience of Stalinism, on the one hand, and of the Nazi occupation during World War II, on the other, exploded the foundations on which Ukrainian "national" communism and integral nationalism were built.

Still, it was in the nature of things that the unfreezing of Ukrainian political thought in the 1960s brought forth these throwbacks to the prevalent ideologies of the inter-war period. The lesson to be learned from the falls of Dziuba and Moroz is that "national" communism and integral nationalism have ceased to be, philosophically and politically, viable alternatives for the Ukrainian people in search of a better future.

The mainstream of Ukrainian dissent has been represented by the samvydav journal Ukrainskyi visnyk (Ukrainian Herald), eight issues of which appeared between 1970 and 1974,12 and the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (in simpler terms, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group), which was formed in 1976.13 The difference between these two exponents of the Ukrainian opposition is that the Ukrainian Herald was an underground publication, with anonymous or pseudonymous editors and contributors, whereas the Ukrainian Helsinki Group acted overtly. But there are reasons to assume that the Ukrainian Herald originated within the same circle as that to which the founders and members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group belonged. In terms of ideas, there is an evident continuity between the Herald and the subsequent documents of the Helsinki Group.

In trying to define the political philosophy of contemporary Ukrainian dissent, a quotation from the memoirs of its veteran, Danylo Shumuk, may serve as a suitable introduction:

Only democracy can save mankind from the dangers of the rightist as well as of the leftist brands of tyranny. Only the unrestricted right, guaranteed by law, for all citizens to express, advertise, and defend their ideas will enable the people to control and direct the policy of the government. Without such a right, there can be no tald of democracy and of democratic elections to a parliament. Where there is no legal opposition endowed with equal rights in the parliament and among the people, there is no democracy.... Where an opposition does not exist, there can be no control over government policy.... I have reached these conclusions after many years of thinking, stock-taking, and analysis, and they have led me... to adopt a critical attitude to both communists and Dontsovian nationalists.14
Shumuk, a man of the older generation (born in 1914), has himself passed through a communist and an integral-nationalist stage. He was a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine in pre-war Polish Volhynia, and he joined the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the period of the German occupation. Most of his life has been spent in Polish and Soviet prisons. He declared his adherence to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1979, while in a Soviet labour camp. His dearly won democratic convictions are also those of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group as a whole.

The platform of the contemporary Ukrainian resistance can, therefore, be fairly described as democratic patriotism. (I would say "nationalism" if that term had not become ambiguous because of its fascist connotations.) Its most characteristic feature is the linking of the struggle against national oppression with the struggle for democratic human rights. This signifies a return, in a rejuvenated form, to the noblest traditions of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian liberation movement, whose basic orientation was democratic and humanist, as well as a return to the tradition of the independent, democratic Ukrainian state of 1917-20. This does not imply a total rejection of the achievements of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism, but rather their sublimation, cleansed of totalitarian perversions. For instance, the dissidents have shown the greatest respect for the heroic struggle of the wartime Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was a creation of the OUN, while rejecting the latter's addiction to dictatorship and one-party rule.

Ukrainian dissidents have formulated as their immediate objective the implementation in their country of the civil liberties contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki, August 1975).15 Their long-range goal is the "decolonization" of the USSR through free elections to be conducted in Ukraine under the supervision of the United Nations.16 In contrast to the "national" communists, contemporary Ukrainian dissidents do not oppose a "good" Lenin to a "bad" Stalin. They assert that Lenin's hypocritical policy toward Ukraine was in essence identical with the Soviet armed interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which also were disguised as "brotherly help" to the respective peoples.17 "The Ukrainian people did not want to follow the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 and demonstrated a strong will to build their own state."18

In contradistinction to the xenophobic nationalism of the OUN, the ardent patriotism of contemporary Ukrainian dissent does not imply hostility to other peoples, even the Russians. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group has maintained friendly co-operation with the Moscow Helsinki Group and democratic Russian dissidents. Petro Grigorenko (Hryhorenko), a former Soviet Army major-general and a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, has become internationally renowned for his defence of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars. The 1980 programmatic declaration of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement, the most recent offshoot of the Ukrainian opposition, states:

... freedom for Ukraine will bring freedom for th Russian and other nations enslaved by the existing regime. A free Ukraine guarantees all rights to all peoples living in Ukraine: Russians and Poles, Jews and Tatars, Romanians and Hungarians. We understand what it means to live under colonial oppression and therefore proclaim: the people who live in our country will be assured the broadest political, economic, and social rights. All the rights of national minorities and various religious associations will be guaranteed unconditionally.18
Another significant aspect of the Ukrainian dissidents' thinking is its legalistic colouring. In fact, Ukrainian dissent is known under the self-chosen name of the "movement for the defence of right" (pravozakhysnyi rukh). One might be inclined to view this as merely a tactical device, an attempt to take shelter under the nominal civil liberties that the Soviet constitution and laws grant to citizens on paper. Without denying that such tactical considerations also play some role, one can be sure that the manifest legalism of the Ukrainian dissidents is for them a matter of principle. All of their writings and pronouncements are permeated by the idea of the rule of law. This is a novel phenomenon in the history of Ukrainian political thought. The pre-revolutionary Ukrainian national movement was undoubtedly libertarian, but because of its populist orientation, its legalistic sense was underdeveloped. (Mykhailo Drahomanov, with his strong interest in constitutional problems, was an exception, and in this respect he founded no school.) It seems that long experience with a regime based on lawlessness and the perversion of legality has imbued contemporary Ukrainian freedom fighters with the conviction that liberty can exist only under the rule of law.20 Thus, while they are intellectual rebels in regard to the present system, they are at the same time also partisans of law and order. I would not hesitate to call this a conservative strand—in the positive meaning of the term—in the ideology of Ukrainian dissent.

One should note certain philosophical divergences within Ukrainian dissent. On the one hand, Leonid Pliushch and Iurii Badzo profess an alliance to humanist democratic Marxism.21 (I personally think that "democratic Marxism" is a contradiction in terms. Because of this, I view Pliushch's and Badzo's profession of Marxism as a symptom of intellectual confusion. This complex problem would require a separate discussion.) On the other hand, there are symptoms of a religious revival among segments of the contemporary Ukrainian intellectual elite.22 The poems of Mykola Rudenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, reveal his newly rediscovered Christian faith.23 Another founding member of the group, Oles Berdnyk, has been influenced by Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary spiritualism. These differences in world-view do not detract from the unity of political commitment to the double goals of pluralistic democracy and national independence. It is fitting to round off this brief survey of the ideas of the Ukrainian opposition by quoting two of its recent programmatic documents:

My social position is socialist, my political position is democratic. I formulate it as a concept of democratic socialism.... [There ought to be] ideological, cultural, and political pluralism. The working class and the peasantry should have separate class representations in the organs of state power. There should be freedom under law to establish democratic parties.... Only then will the Party be a party, and not the dominant stratum in society.24

The so-called government of Ukraine has now been implementing a policy of national genocide for sixty years.... For this reason, we, the victims of political repression in Ukraine, proclaim to our nation, to the governments of all the countries of the world, and to the United Nations our desire to secede from the USSR, to lead our people out of communist slavery.25

In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian dissent, it is helpful to compare it with its Russian counterpart. Russian dissidents are divided into several irreconcilable factions, and the communist reformers, Western-type liberals, and neo-Slavophiles do not speak the same political language. In contrast, the Ukrainian opposition appears much more united. The common denominator of all Ukrainian dissidents is, undoubtedly, the national factor. One can also assume that Ukrainian dissent possesses a much stronger potential popular appeal than Russian dissent. In Russia, patriotism or nationalism works basically in favour of the present regime, which has elevated the Russian state to a pinnacle of power and prestige. Russian popular nationalism is likely to become divorced from the Soviet regime only in the event of serious setbacks internationally. In Ukraine, which suffers from manifest national discrimination and oppression, patriotic sentiment tends to be spontaneously oriented against the status quo. This gives Ukrainian dissent a powerful potential constituency. The regime is well aware of this danger, and this explains why it has been more ruthless in the persecution of the Ukrainian than of the Russian dissidents.

An area in which Ukrainian dissent is markedly inferior to the Russian is intellectual sophistication.26 We do not find among Ukrainian dissidents such world-renowned figures as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. On the average, the intellectual level and range of the Ukrainian dissidents' writings is comparatively lower and narrower, despite some very respectable individual achievements, such as the works of Ivan Dziuba, Helii Snehirov, Mykhailo Osadchy, Leonid Pliushch, Iurii Badzo, Vasyl Lisovy, and a few others. This state of affairs reflects the general provincialism of contemporary Ukraine's cultural life: the lack of contacts with the outside world, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, and the limited access to non-Soviet books. Furthermore, because of continual purges directed primarily against elite elements of Ukrainian society, present-day Ukraine's intelligentsia is sociologically very young and hence culturally immature. In examining the family backgrounds of Ukrainian dissidents, one finds in most cases that they are first-generation intellectuals. This causes a cultural handicap that even gifted individuals find difficult to overcome.

Mykola Rudenko's Ekonomichni monolohy (Economic Monologues) may serve as an illustration of the preceding remarks.27 Rudenko is perhaps the archetypical Ukrainian dissident: a coal miner's son from the Donets Basin region, a Communist Party member since his youth, a decorated veteran of the Soviet army and a war invalid; later a popular novelist, editor of the Kiev literary monthly Dnipro, secretary of the party organization of the Writers' Union of Ukraine; and finally, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, condemned in 1977 to a term of seven years of imprisonment and five years of post-prison exile. The first part of Rudenko's book is a moving autobiographical account of the quest that turned him from an establishment man into a dissident. The second part is a critique of Marxist economics, and it reads as if it were written by an intellectual Robinson Crusoe. For instance, Rudenko comments on Marx's value theory without the slightest awareness that the topic has been discussed by economists for the past hundred years and that this debate has generated a mountain of scholarly literature. One wonders about the reasons for this embarrassing ignorance. A different impression is created by the book's conclusion, where Rudenko suggests practical remedies for the Soviet Union's economic impasse. He proposes a return to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, that is, the restoration of market relations and the unleashing of private initiative. These sound recommendations derive not from Rudenko's naive theorizing but from his personal observations and common sense. They have been endorsed by the author of the book's preface, a fellow member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Petro Grigorenko.

Let us ask, in conclusion, what the chances are of Ukrainian dissent being transformed from a movement of ideas (composing and circulating samvydav literature, writing letters of protest to authorities, engaging in "subversive" talk and correspondence) into an actual political force. Here we leave the realm of the past and the present, which can be studied empirically. Historians are reluctant to prognosticate because they are conscious of the large part the contingent plays in human affairs. Still, one can venture some cautious predictions while guarding against wishful thinking.

The exact number of Ukrainian dissidents is unknown, but in any case, it is microscopic in proportion to Ukraine's population of fifty million. Bohdan Krawchenko has compiled a list of 975 individuals known to have taken part in dissident activities in the Ukrainian SSR between 1960 and 1972.28 The Ukrainian Helsinki Group had thirty-seven members.29 The tiny numbers are compensated by the persistence of dissent, which continues to assert itself against tremendous odds, and by the fact that in the movement various occupational groups and all geographical sections of Ukraine, from Transcarpathia to the Donets Basin and from Kharkiv to Odessa, are represented. As noted above, we have the right to assume that the potential constituency of the Ukrainian opposition is vast. But these potential forces are immobilized by a system in which outlets for autonomous civic action do not exist, communications among individuals are restricted to a minimum, and the entire society is kept in check by fear and universal surveillance—whoever steps out of line exposes himself to swift retribution.

To break this deadlock, the first impulse would probably have to come from the outside, for instance, in the form of a divisive power struggle within the Kremlin oligarchy or a major setback for the Soviet Union in its relations with other socialist-bloc countries. The second step would have to be the creation of an organizational structure capable of channelling the now atomized forces of popular discontent. It seems likely that such a structure would not consist initially of a political party, but, rather, of associations representing the social interests of various strata of society. Some tentative moves in this direction have already occurred. Thus, in 1977, the Donets Basin miner Vladimir Klebanov organized an independent trade union that, prior to its suppression, had a membership of several hundred workers.30 In November 1980, an imprisoned Kiev worker, Mykola Pohyba, circulated an open letter calling for the formation of free trade unions based on the Polish model.31 Circumstances permitting, such tendencies could easily escalate, because in the Soviet Union there exist widespread socio-economic grievances which in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics are compounded by national frustrations.

While it is impossible to predict when and how these potentialities could become actualities, the testimonial significance of the Ukrainian dissidents is beyond doubt. The sacrifice of these courageous men and women bears witness to the unbroken spirit of the Ukrainian nation. Their struggle for human and national rights conforms with the tendency of mankind's progress in the spirit of freedom. The Ukrainian dissidents have faith that the truth of freedom will prevail. It would be shameful for those whose good fortune it is to live in free countries to be of lesser faith.


1.  Paper presented at the Thirteenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 20-23 September 1981, Pacific Grove, California.

2.  A bibliographical guide to documents and writings of the Ukrainian dissidents and to Western studies on that subject is G. Liber and A. Mostovych, comp., Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975: An Annotated Bibliography (Cambridge, Mass. 1978). Two English-language anthologies of Ukrainian dissident documents and literature are: V. Chornovil, comp., The Chornovil Papers (New York, Toronto and London 1968) and M. Browne, ed., Ferment in the Ukraine (New York and Washington 1971). These three publications do not cover the more recent expressions of Ukrainian dissent.

3.   "Ukraina v evoliutsii radianskoi systemy" (1963), in I. L. Rudnytsky, Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (Munich 1973), 303.

4.  I. Dzyuba [Dziuba], Internationalism or Russification?: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem (London 1968).

5.  J.A. Armstrong's review of Dziuba's book in Slavic Review 28, no. 3 (September 1969), 504.

6.  Dziuba's recantation appeared in Literaturna Ukraina, 9 November 1973.

7.  M. Savaryn, "Why Capitulate?: Ivan Dziuba's Trauma," Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies 2, no. 2 (Fall 1977), 54-61.

8.  J. Pelenski, "Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963- 1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism," Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. P.J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont. 1975), 283-305.

9.  The writings of V. Moroz are available in two parallel English editions: Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz, ed. Y. Bihun (Baltimore, Paris and Toronto 1974); and Report from the Beria Reserve, ed. and trans. J. Kolasky (Toronto 1974).

10.  L. Pliushch's afterword to the French edition of Dziuba's work, Internationalisme ou Russification? (Montreal and Paris 1980). The quotation is from the Ukrainian version, "Trahediia Ivana Dziuby," Diialoh, no. 1 (Spring 1977):56.

11.  See the excerpts from the letters of V. Chornovil, Mykhailo Osadchy, Iryna Kalynets and Zynovii Antoniuk in "The Valentyn Moroz Saga: A Conspiracy of Silence," Student, no. 61 (February 1980), 11.

12.  Ukrainskyi visnyk was reprinted by Smoloskyp Publishers in several volumes between 1971 and 1975. Available in English are the sixth issue, as Dissent in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 6, trans, and ed. L. Jones and B. Yasen (Baltimore and Toronto 1977), and the final, double, issue, as Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.: The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 7-8, trans, and ed. O. Saciuk and B. Yasen (Baltimore, Paris and Toronto 1979).

13.  L. Verba and B. Yasen, eds. The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1976-1980 (Baltimore, Washington and Toronto 1980).

14.  D. Shumuk, Za skhidnim obriiem (Paris and Baltimore 1974), 423-4.

15.   "Declaration of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords," dated 9 November 1976, in The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 19-22.

16.  The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 7-8, 160. See also a recent document, "Decolonization of the USSR Is the Only Guarantee of World Peace," dated January 1980, in Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement 1980, supplement to Herald of Repression in Ukraine, no. 7 (New York 1980), 3-8.

17.  The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 7-8, 48-9.

18.  Ibid., 47.

19.  "Decolonization of the USSR" in Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement, 1.

20.  This concept is expressed with particular strength in "A Manifesto of the Ukrainian Human Rights Movement 1977" in The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 117-35, written by Oles Berdnyk on behalf of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

21.  L. Plyushch [Pliushch], History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography (New York and London 1977), esp. 377; Iu. Badzo, Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezydii Verkhovnoi Rady URSR ta Tsentralnoho Komitetu KPRS (New York 1980).

22.  A. Chernenko, "The Birth of a New Spiritual Awareness," Canadian Slavonic Papers 16, no. 1 (March 1974):73-88.

23.  M. Rudenko, Prozrinnia (Toronto and Baltimore 1978). Cf. A. Chernenko's review in Canadian Slavonic Papers 22, no. 2 (June 1980):309- 11.

24.  Badzo, Vidkrytyi lyst, 24-5.

25.  "Decolonization of the USSR" in Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement, 6.

26.  The intellectual shortcomings of the Ukrainian dissidents have been discussed by J.-P. Himka in his "Leonid Plyushch: The Ukrainian Marxist Resurgent," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 5, no. 2 (Fall 1980):61-79.

27.  M. Rudenko, Ekonomichni monolohy (New York and Munich 1978).

28.  B. Krawchenko, "Social Mobilization and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine," unpublished manuscript, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton.

29.  Biographical data on all members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group can be found in The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 251-65.

30.  V. Haynes and O. Semyonova, ed., Workers Against the Gulag: The New Opposition in the Soviet Union (London 1979).

31.  Pohyba's letter has been reprinted in Ukrainskyi robitnyk, no. 1 (New York and Munich 1981). It has also appeared in several Ukrainian newspapers in the West and in English in The Ukrainian Weekly (Jersey City), 7 June 1981.