C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 1930. [143]

CHAPTER VI

Sidgwick

      Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics seems to me to be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to be one of the English philosophical classics. This does not of course imply that Sidgwick was a better man or an acuter thinker than the other writers with whose theories we have been dealing; for he inherited the results of their labours, and he thus had over them an advantage of the kind which any contemporary student of mathematics or physics has over Newton and Faraday. But, even when this advantage has been discounted, Sidgwick must continue to rank extremely high. He combined deep moral earnestness with complete coolness and absence of moral fanaticism. His capacity for seeing all sides of a question and estimating their relative importance was unrivalled; his power of analysis was very great; and he never allowed the natural desire to make up one's mind on important questions to hurry him into a decision where the evidence seemed inadequate or conflicting. Those who, like the present writer, never had the privilege of meeting Sidgwick can infer from his writings, and still more from the characteristic philosophic merits of such pupils of his as M'Taggart and Moore, how acute and painstaking a thinker and how inspiring a teacher he must have been. Yet he has grave defects as a writer which have certainly detracted from his fame. His style is heavy and involved, and he seldom allowed [144] that strong sense of humour, which is said to have made him a delightful conversationalist, to relieve the uniform dull dignity of his writing. He incessantly refines, qualifies, raises objections, answers them, and then finds further objections to the answers. Each of these objections, rebuttals, rejoinders, and surrejoinders is in itself admirable, and does infinite credit to the acuteness and candour of the author. But the reader is apt to become impatient; to lose the thread of the argument: and to rise from his desk finding that he has read a great deal with constant admiration and now remembers little or nothing. The result is that Sidgwick probably has far less influence at present than he ought to have, and less than many writers, such as Bradley, who were as superior to him in literary style as he was to them in ethical and philosophical acumen. Even a thoroughly second-rate thinker like T. H. Green, by diffusing a grateful and comforting aroma of ethical "uplift" , has probably made far more undergraduates into prigs than Sidgwick will ever make into philosophers. If I can give in my own words an intelligible critical account of Sidgwick's main argument, which will induce some people to read or re-read the Methods of Ethics and will furnish them with a guide to it, I shall have done a useful bit of work. They will then be able to study at leisure and without confusion the admirable details, and to fill in those lights and shades which are so important and so characteristic of Sidgwick but are necessarily omitted in the sketch which I offer them.

      I will begin with a synopsis of the work, taking the topics in my own order and stating the conclusions in my own words. I shall then give a more detailed critical discussion of each of the main points in the synopsis.

      (A) Logical Analysis of Ethical Terms . -- We constantly make judgments which involve the terms right, wrong, ought, good, bad, etc. These may be called "ethical judgments" . We must begin by seeing whether the terms right and ought, on the one hand, and good, on the other, are analysable into simpler factors or are logically ultimate.

1. In the case of ought we must distinguish between a merely hypothetical and a categorical sense. We certainly do seem to use "ought" in a categorical sense sometimes, and all attempts to define it when used in this sense have failed. It is therefore likely that the categorical ought is a logically primitive term, though it may well be that the notion of it has arisen in the course of human history or pre-history from psychological pre-conditions in which it was not present.
2. In the case of good we must distinguish between good-as-means and good-as-end, and we may confine our discussion to the latter. There is a long and complex argument, which is not easy to summarise, on the question whether good-as-end is logically analysable. The upshot seems to be that it can be defined in a very complicated way by means of relations to hypothetical desires, and that it does not involve in its analysis any obligation to seek it.

      (B) Epistemological Questions. -- The main question here is as to which of our cognitive faculties is involved in the cognition of ethical terms and propositions. From the discussion of the term ought it appears probable that this is an a priori concept. Now the recognition of a priori concepts and the making of judgments which involve such terms have always been ascribed to Reason. Again, although we no doubt start with singular ethical judgments, such as "that act is wrong", we never regard them as ultimate and [146] as neither needing nor being capable of justification. On the contrary we should always expect to be able to justify our singular judgment by a statement of the form: "that act has such and such a characteristic, and any act which had that characteristic would ipso facto be wrong."these universal ethical judgments are derived by intuitive induction from inspecting the particular cases which are described in the singular judgments. and this process of seeing that a particular conjunction of characteristics is an instance of a universal and necessary connexion between characteristics has always been ascribed to reason. So reason plays an essential part in ethical cognition.

      (C) Psychological Questions about Motives and Volitions. --

1. Can Reason affect our actions in any other way than by suggesting new means to already desired ends and by calling attention to remote probable consequences? Sidgwick holds that there is a perfectly definite way, in addition to these two, in which Reason can and does affect our actions. Human beings have an impulse or desire to do what they judge to be right and to shun what they believe to be wrong as such. It is only one motive among others, and it may be, and often is, overcome by others. But it exists and it affects our actions. And it is a motive which could act only on a rational being; for only such a being could have the a priori concept of right or ought.
2. As he holds this view, it is important for him to refute a certain psychological theory which is inconsistent with it and which has been very widely held. This is the doctrine called Psychological Hedonism. According to this theory the only motive which can move any human being is the expectation of pleasure or of pain. Sidgwick first clearly distinguishes this from the theory called Ethical Hedonism, which asserts [147] that pleasantness and painfulness are the only characteristics in virtue of which any state of affairs is intrinsically good or bad. He discusses the relations between the two wholly different theories, and shows that Ethical Hedonism cannot be inferred from Psychological Hedonism and can be held consistently by a man who denies Psychological Hedonism. He then discusses and refutes Psychological Hedonism itself.

     (D) Free-will and Determinism. -- The question of motives naturally leads us to that of freedom and determinism. For ethics the question comes to this: "Is there always a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner which I now judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my past actions and experiences may have been?" There are two points to be considered.

1. What is the right answer to the question?
2. To what extent is ethics concerned with the question and its answer?

On the first point Sidgwick contends that all argument and analogy is in favour of the determinist view, but that direct inspection is in favour of free-will. Although every yielding to temptation makes it harder to do what one judges to be right, yet at the moment of choice between an alternative which he judges to be right and one which he judges not to be so he cannot doubt that he can choose the former. "The difficulty seems to be separated from impossibility by an impassible gulf." On the second point his view is that a deterministic answer to the question would make very little ethical difference in practice, far less than libertarians have thought. But it would be inconsistent with certain elements in the common-sense notions of merit and demerit, praise and blame, reward and punishment, and remorse for wrong-doing. [148]

      (E) Classification of the Methods of Ethics. -- The subjects which have so far been mentioned are common to all types of ethical theory, though different theories might give different answers to some of the questions which have been raised. We come now to the main purpose of the book, viz., a discussion of the most important Methods of Ethics. By a "method of ethics" Sidgwick means roughly any type of general theory which claims to unify our various ethical judgments into a coherent system on some principle which is claimed to be self-evident. In the end he comes to the conclusion that the really important methods of ethics reduce to three, which he calls Intuitionism, Egoistic Hedonism, and Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism. (In this context of course "hedonism" is to be understood as "ethical", not as "psychological", hedonism.) I think that there is a good deal to be criticised in this classification, but I must reserve my criticisms for the present. Intuitionism is, roughly speaking, the view that there are a number of fairly concrete ethical axioms of the general form: "Any action of such and such a kind, done in such and such a kind of situation, would be right (or wrong) no matter whether its consequences were good, bad, or indifferent." E.g., common sense would hold that any action which was an instance of deliberate ingratitude to a benefactor would ipso facto be wrong, and that this can be seen by direct inspection without any consideration of the consequences of this action or of the prevalence of similar actions.

     Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism agree in rejecting the view that there are such concrete self-evident ethical axioms as these. Sidgwick points out, what most Egoists and Utilitarians seem to have failed to notice, that Egoism and Utilitarianism cannot do without self-evident ethical [149] propositions altogether. Both would hold it to be self-evident that nothing is ultimately worth aiming at but pleasure and absence of pain. The Egoist finds it self-evident that an individual ought to aim at a maximum balance of happiness for himself, and that, if necessary, he ought to be ready to sacrifice any amount of other men's happiness in order to produce the slightest nett increase in his own. The Utilitarian, on the other hand, finds it self-evident that each individual ought to aim at the maximum balance of happiness for all sentient beings present and future, and that, if necessary, he ought to be ready to sacrifice any amount of his own happiness provided that he will thereby produce the slightest nett increase in the general happiness. And there might be other very general principles, mainly about the proper distribution of a given amount of happiness, which either Egoists or Utilitarians or both would accept as self-evident . But neither Egoists nor Utilitarians would admit more concrete ethical intuitions than these. Those specific ethical principles, such as the principles of truth-speaking, gratitude to benefactors, etc., which common-sense regards as self-evident and independent of consequences, would be regarded by Egoists and Utilitarians as mere empirical generalisations which tell us what types of action have been found on the whole to maximise individual or general happiness in various commonly recurring types of circumstances. They are thus hypothetical, and not categorical, imperatives; and, when obedience to them would dearly involve a nett sacrifice of individual or general happiness as compared with the results of breaking them, it is our duty to break them.

     (F) Detailed Discussion of each of the Three Methods. -- Each of the three methods is discussed, so far as possible [150] by itself. The order which Sidgwick takes is Egoism, Intuitionism, and Utilitarianism. This does not seem to me to be the best order, since a great deal of the argument that is used in connexion with Egoistic Hedonism has to be assumed in dealing with Universalistic Hedonism, and the reader is rather liable to forget what has been established in connexion with the former when he emerges into the latter after the very long and complicated discussion on Intuitionism which is sandwiched between the two. I prefer the order (1) Intuitionism, and (2) Hedonism. The latter can then be subdivided into (2, I) Hedonism in General, (2, 2) Egoistic Hedonism, and (2, 3) Universalistic Hedonism.

     (1) Intuitionism. -- The treatment of this method begins with a discussion of certain general questions, of which the following are the most important. What is the nature of ethical intuitions, and do they in fact occur? What relation, if any, is there between the psycho-genetic history of the occurrence of intuitions and their validity when they have occurred? What is the subject-matter of ethical judgments; are they about acts or intentions or motives or character? Sidgwick then undertakes an extremely elaborate detailed investigation into the morality of common-sense. He takes in turn those types of action which seem to common-sense to be self-evidently right (or wrong) without regard to consequences in certain types of situation; his object being to see whether critical reflexion can extract from common sense morality a coherent system of self-evident principles connected with each other in a logically satisfactory way. The upshot of the discussion is that, so long as we confine our attention to fairly normal cases and do not try to analyse our terms very carefully, there is a great deal of agreement about what ought and what ought not to be [151] done in given types of situation, and our duties seem self-evident. But no sooner do we bring the principles of common-sense morality face to face with difficult and unusual situations than this agreement and this apparent self-evidence vanish. Terms which seemed clear and simple are found to cover a multitude of alternatives; and, when these alternatives are explicitly introduced into the statement of an alleged self-evident principle, the latter is liable to reduce to a tautology or to cease to be self-evident, according to which alternative we substitute. Then again the axioms of common-sense morality seem to conflict with each other in marginal cases. If we try to enunciate higher principles, which will harmonise the lower ones in a rational way when they conflict and will tell us how far each is to be followed in such cases, we find either that we cannot do it, or that the higher principle is so complicated that we should hesitate to ascribe self-evidence to it, or that we are frankly beginning to take account of remote consequences and thus deserting pure Intuitionism.

      As we have already remarked, Sidgwick himself holds that every method of ethics must involve at least one intuition; for at any rate the judgment that we ought to aim at so and so as an ultimate end must be intuitive. In addition to such intuitions as these he recognised as self-evident a few very abstract principles about the right distribution of happiness. But these few highly abstract a priori principles serve only to delimit an enormous field outside which no action can be right, just as the Conservation of Energy only sets limits to the changes that are physically possible. Within this field innumerable alternative courses of action are possible, just as there are innumerable possible changes which would satisfy the Conservation of Energy. [152] To determine which of these alternatives is right we need supplementary and more concrete ethical principles, just as we need the specific laws of physics and mechanics to determine which of the changes compatible with the Conservation of Energy will actually happen. And, on Sidgwick's view, no such concrete ethical principles are intrinsically necessary and self-evident. They are, as Egoism and Utilitarianism teach, mere hypothetical imperatives, to be accepted only as general prescriptions for gaining ends which are judged to be intrinsically desirable.

      (2, I) Hedonism in General. -- Under this heading two very different questions have to be discussed. One is purely ethical, the other is purely factual and mainly psychological.

      (2, 11) The Ethical Problem. It seems intuitively certain that we ought to aim at realising the greatest nett balance of good that we can. But this at once leads to the question: "In virtue of what characteristics is a thing, or person, or event, or state of affairs intrinsically good?" Prima facie there would seem to be several characteristics which give intrinsic value to anything that has them. E.g., it would be plausible to hold that a virtuous character has intrinsic value in respect of its virtue, that an acute intellect has intrinsic value in respect of its acuteness, that a beautiful person has intrinsic value in respect of his beauty, and so on. Now the pure ethical hedonist has to show that this is a mistake. He has to show that nothing is intrinsically good or bad except experiences, that no characteristic of an experience has any bearing on its intrinsic value except its pleasantness or painfulness, and that the measure of its intrinsic value is the nett balance of pleasantness over painfulness which characterises it. Sidgwick claims that, when all the numerous sources of illusion which tend to [153] cloud the issue have been removed and we view the alternatives quite clearly, we are bound to agree with the ethical hedonist.

      (2, 12) The Factual Problem. Even if ethical hedonism be in fact true, it will be of no use as a practical guide to right conduct unless we can compare pleasures and pains with a fair degree of accuracy and can reach fairly accurate estimates of the nett balance of pleasure in various alternative future experiences which we can initiate by our present choice of action. For the Egoistic Hedonist the problem is confined to his own future experiences during the rest of his life. The Utilitarian is faced with all the problems of the Egoistic Hedonist and with others in addition. For he has to consider how his actions will affect the happiness of all present and future sentient beings throughout the whole of their lives from now onwards. Sidgwick discusses the alleged and the real difficulties of such estimation very elaborately. The uncertainties of direct comparison are very great; and he concludes that various indirect methods which have been suggested as easier and more accurate cannot dispense with the direct method and have difficulties of their own. Still, we all do make such comparisons and estimates constantly in ordinary life, and we do regard them as reasonably trustworthy when due precautions have been taken. And ethical hedonism only asks us to do in connexion with all our conduct what we admittedly do in connexion with a large part of it.

      The greater part of Sidgwick's discussion of (2, 2) Egoistic Hedonism is concerned with this problem of estimation, which is really common to it and to Universalistic Hedonism.

      (2, 3) Universalistic Hedonism. -- Sidgwick's arguments [154] for Utilitarianism are of two different kinds. The first is an abstract argument from principles which claim to be self-evident. The second is based on his criticisms of the morality of common-sense.

      The essence of the direct abstract argument is this.

1. There is a Total or Universal Good. This is composed of the Goods which reside in individuals and their experiences, and it has no other components.
2. Our primary duty is to aim at maximising this Universal Good. We can of course do this only by affecting the amount of Good which resides in this, that, or the other individual. But we ought to aim at the Good of any individual only as a factor in the Universal Good. It can therefore never be right to increase the amount of Good which resides in a certain individual or group of individuals if this can be done only at the expense of a reduction in the Universal Good.
3. Now it has been argued in connexion with Hedonism in general that nothing is intrinsically good except pleasant experiences, and that the intrinsic goodness of any experience is determined simply by the nett balance of pleasantness over painfulness in it.
4. It is therefore my primary duty to aim at increasing the total amount and intensity of pleasant experience and decreasing the total amount and intensity of unpleasant experience in the universe as much as can. I can do this only by affecting the nett balance of happiness in this, that, and the other individual, including myself. But I must recognise that the happiness of any individual (e.g., myself) or of any group of individuals (e.g., my family or country men) is to be aimed at only as a component of the Universal Happiness; and that, as such, it is in no way to be preferred to the equal happiness of any other individual or group of individuals. Consequently it is never right to increase the [155] nett happiness of an individual or a limited group at the expense of a reduction in universal happiness.

      It will be seen that in the above argument (a) and (b) are directed against Egoists, whilst (c) is addressed to people who take a non-hedonistic or a not purely hedonistic view of Good. It remains to deal with Intuitionists, in the sense of people who hold that we can see directly that certain types of action would ipso facto be right (or wrong) in certain types of situation without regard to the goodness or badness of their consequences. Sidgwick does this by following up his negative treatment of the claims of common sense morality to furnish a coherent system of self-evident ethical principles with an equally detailed positive discussion of these principles regarded as rules for maximising general happiness in constantly recurring types of situation. The conclusion which he reaches after a very careful examination is that the resemblance between the rules accepted as intuitively certain by common-sense and those which would be reasonable on Utilitarian grounds is close and detailed. In the ordinary cases, where common-sense feels no doubts about its principles, the Utilitarian grounds for the rule are strong and obvious. In the marginal cases, where common sense begins to feel doubtful about a principle, there are nearly always strong Utilitarian grounds both for obeying the rule and for breaking it. In such cases the Utilitarian solution seems to be generally in accord with the vague instincts of common-sense, and common-sense often explicitly appeals to Utilitarian considerations in such difficulties. Again, the differences between the moral judgments of men of different races or periods about the same type of action can often be explained by Utilitarian considerations. On the whole too the relative importance which common-sense [156] ascribes to the various virtues is the same as that which would be ascribed to them on Utilitarian grounds.

      Sidgwick does not conclude from these facts that our remote ancestors were consciously and deliberately Utilitarians, and that they laboriously derived by observation, induction, and hedonic calculation those general rules which now seem to us directly self-evident. On the contrary, the further we go back in the course of history the less trace do we find of deliberate Utilitarian calculation and inference, and the more immediate and direct do moral judgments become. Still, the distribution of praise, blame, admiration, etc., for character and conduct is very accurately proportional to its apparent effect on general happiness. It seems fair to conclude that common-sense has always been implicitly and unconsciously Utilitarian, and that it tends to become more and more explicitly so as intelligence, sympathy, and experience grow.

     This extensive and detailed agreement between Utilitarianism and the morality of common-sense should no doubt help to give us confidence in the former. But, on the present hypothesis, the rules of common-sense morality are traditional prescriptions for maximising general happiness which grew up among our remote ancestors and have been handed down to us. The cirmumstances under which they arose must have been widely different from those in which we live; the persons among whom they grew up did not consciously aim at the Utilitarian end; and, even if they had done so, they must have had a very limited insight into remote consequences, a very restricted range of sympathy, and many superstitious beliefs which would affect their estimates of the happiness to be gained from various courses of action. It is therefore most unlikely that there [157] would be complete agreement between the rules of common sense morality and those which an enlightened Utilitarian would lay down at the present day in Western Europe. And, if one is persuaded of the truth of Utilitarianism, one will naturally hold that, where the morality of common sense differs from that of Utilitarianism, the former is mistaken and ought to be corrected.

     It had been fashionable with Utilitarians before Sidgwick's time to insist with a good deal of fervour on this point, and to talk as if Utilitarianism could and should produce a new ethical heaven and earth at very short notice. Sidgwick examines with extreme care and subtlety the duty of a Utilitarian living in a society of non-Utilitarians and convinced that certain of the rules of the current morality are out of accord with his principles. He pours buckets of cold water on the reforming fires of such Utilitarians. When all relevant facts are taken into consideration it will scarcely ever be right on Utilitarian grounds for a Utilitarian openly to break or to recommend others to break the rules of morality commonly accepted in his society.

     (G) The Relations between the Three Methods. -- Sidgwick thinks that in the daily practice of ordinary men all three methods are accepted and used in turn to justify and correlate moral judgments. And it is vaguely assumed that they are mutually consistent, that "honesty in the long run is the best policy", and that on the whole I shall find my greatest happiness in what produces the greatest happiness for every one. These comfortable assumptions have no doubt a good deal of truth in them so long as one is living a normal life in peaceful times in a well-organised society with fairly decent laws and a fairly enlightened public opinion. But even in these circumstances cases arise from [158] time to time in which the alternative which would be right according to one method would be wrong according to another. And in less favourable conditions such conflicts might be frequent and glaring. Now, as regards possible conflicts between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism, Sidgwick has no difficulty in deciding. He accepts no moral principles as self-evident except the general principle of Ethical Hedonism and a few highly abstract rules about the right distribution of happiness. The morality of common-sense, so far as it can be justified, must be justified by the Utilitarian method; and, where it cannot be thus justified, it must be rejected by the moralist in his private thinking, though not necessarily or usually in his public speaking or overt action. If then the choice had lain simply between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism, Sidgwick would definitely have been a Utilitarian, though his utilitarianism would have involved a few highly abstract intuitions.

     But unfortunately the position for him was not so simple as this. He had also to consider the relation between Egoistic and Universalistic Ethical Hedonism, and here he finds an insuperable difficulty. If it be admitted that there is a Total or Universal Good, then it is no doubt my duty to aim at maximising this and to regard the Good which resides in me and my experiences as important only in so far as it is a part of the Total Good. In that case I must be prepared to sacrifice some or all of my Good if by that means and by that only I can increase the Total Good. But the consistent Egoist will not admit that there is a Total or Universal Good. There is my Good and your Good, but they are not parts of a Total Good, on his view. My duty is to aim at maximising my Good, and to consider the effects of my actions on your Good only in so far as [159] they may indirectly affect mine. Your duty is to aim at maximising your Good, and to consider the effects of your actions on my Good only in so far as they may indirectly affect yours. It is plain that there is no logical inconsistency in this doctrine. And Sidgwick goes further. He says that it is plain that X is concerned with the quality of X's experiences in a way in which he is not concerned with the quality of Y's experiences, whoever Y may be. And it is impossible to feel certain that this distinction is not ethically fundamental. Thus Sidgwick is left in the unfortunate position that there are two principles, each of which separately seems to him self-evident, but which when taken together seem to be mutually inconsistent.

      To this logical difficulty he does not, so far as I can see, profess to be able to give any solution. For he proceeds to discuss what is clearly a different point, viz., whether there is any way of convincing an Egoist that he ought always to act as if he were a Utilitarian. Even if this could be done, it would of course be no disproof of the truth of Egoism. Nor would it alter or explain the fact that there are two fundamental ethical principles which are mutually incompatible though each seems self-evident. The only sense in which Egoism and Utilitarianism would have been "reconciled" would be that we should have shown that the fundamental theoretical difference between the two should make no difference in practice. We must show that the Universe is so constituted that, wherever obedience to Utilitarian principles would seem to demand a greater sacrifice of happiness on the part of an agent than disobedience to them, this sacrifice is recouped from some source of happiness which escapes the notice of the superficial observer. Such attempted "reconciliations" have [160] taken two forms, viz.:

1. Psychological, and
2. Metaphysical.

Each is discussed by Sidgwick.

      The psychological attempt at reconciliation has been based on the pleasures and pains of sympathy. Sidgwick discusses this solution elaborately and reaches the conclusion that, whilst sympathetic pleasures and pains are extremely important and would go far towards making Egoistic and Utilitarian conduct coincide, yet they will not produce complete identity. Indeed there are certain respects in which the growing intensity of sympathy, when combined with its inevitable limitation of range, would increase the divergence between Egoistic and Utilitarian conduct.

     The metaphysical attempt at reconciliation has in Westem Europe generally taken the theistic form that there is an all-powerful God who desires the greatest Total Good of all living beings. By rewards and punishments in a future life he will make it worth the Egoist's while to act in such a way as to subserve this end, even when, if this life alone be considered, it would be his duty to act otherwise. Sidgwick recognises that it is not essential that the metaphysical reconciliation should take this theistic form; it would be secured equally well by the Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation. Sidgwick puts aside, as out of place in an ethical treatise, the question whether the existence of a celestial Jeremy Bentham (if we may use the expression with becoming reverence) has been revealed supernaturally or can be established by reasoning from non-ethical premises. But he thinks that it is in place to consider whether anything can be determined on this subject from purely ethical premises. His conclusion seems to be as follows. The hypothesis that the universe is so constituted that to act as a Utilitarian will always be consistent with [161] the dictates of Egoism is necessary and sufficient to avoid a contradiction in ethics, which is a fundamental department of human thought. Is this any ground for accepting the hypothesis? If we hold that, in other departments of human thought, it is reasonable to accept certain general principles (e.g., the Uniformity of Nature), which are not self-evident nor capable of proof by problematic induction, simply because they introduce order and coherence which would otherwise be lacking, then it would seem to be in consistent to object to moralists for doing likewise. But Sidgwick expresses no opinion here as to whether in other departments of thought men do in fact assume such principles; or whether, if they do, they are justified.

*     *     *

     I have now completed what I hope is a fair and clear account of the main contents of Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. I have refrained from all criticism, and I have not entered into the details of his arguments. I propose now to take the main points of the synopsis in order; to give a somewhat more detailed account of Sidgwick's views on each; and to make such criticisms or comments as seem to me desirable.

1. LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL TERMS.
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS.
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES AND VOLITIONS.
4. FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM.
5. CLASSIFICATION OF THE METHODS OF ETHICS.
6. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF EACH OF THE THREE METHODS.
7. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE THREE METHODS.