Teaching Theory of Knowledge

11. Naturalistic Epistemology

      In "Epistemology Naturalized" (1968), Quine said, "The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science; it would construct it somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology." A growing number of philosophers and other theorists of knowledge have turned away from the positivistic conception of epistemology as rational reconstruction and justification of our knowledge, and have turned to psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary theory, history of science and other areas as sources for answering the questions about the nature and acquisition of knowledge.

      Naturalistic epistemology rejects a purely a priori or "arm-chair" view of the field, seeing it instead as a branch of empirical science, or at least interdependent with the sciences. In a slightly different vein, naturalism can be understood as a philosophy that focuses on facts as opposed to norms or values. This can lead to an opposition between naturalistic and normative epistemology. For purposes of this unit, however, even an evaluative brand of epistemology is counted as naturalistic if it enlists the sciences, e.g., the cognitive science in the enterprise (as in Alvin Goldman's "epistemics"). Epistemology need not be replaced by the sciences, but may draw on them to construct epistemic rules or make epistemic judgments.

Cross References

For additional readings on the relationship between naturalized epistemology and the philosophy of science, see the sample course "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science" in the "Bridge Courses" section.

For examples of how epistemologists are using scientific data in their work, see also ''Rationalily'' in this section, and the sample courses, "Epistemology and Psychology" in the "Bridge Courses" section.

Readings

1. Conceptions of Naturalistic Epistemology

   Kornblith, H. "What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?" In Kornblith, 1986, 1-13.

   Quine, W. V. "Epistemology Naturalized." In Quine's Ontological Relativity, Columbia University Press, 1969, 69-89. Reprinted in Kornblith, H. (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology. Bradford Books, MIT Press., 15-29. Hereafter cited as 'Kornblith'. Also in Moser and vander Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Hereafter cited as 'Moser and vander Nat'.

   Quine, W. V. "The Nature of Natural Knowledge." In Guttenplan, S. (ed.), Mind and Language, Oxford, 1975.

   Sosa, E. "Nature Mirrored, Epistemology Naturalized."

   Stroud, B. "The Significance of Naturalistic Epistemology." In Kornblith, 1981, 71-89. Reprinted in Moser and vander Nat.

2. Evolutionary Epistemology

   Campbell, D. "Evolutionary Epistemology." In Schilpp, P. (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle: Open Court, 1974.

   Quine, W. V. "Natural Kinds." In Ontological Relativity, op. cit. Reprinted in Kornblith, 1969, 31-49.

   Sober, E. "The Evolution of Rationality." Synthese 46 (1981), 95-120.

3. Epistemology and Cognitive Science

   Dretske, F. "Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information." In Kornblith, 1983, 169-88.

   Harman, G. "Positive Versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision." In Kornblith, 1984, 231-48.

   Harman, G. Change in View. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press 1986.

   Goldman, A. I. "Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition." In Kornblith, 1978, 217-30, and in Moser and vander Nat.

   Goldman, A. I. Episternology and Cognition. Harvard, 1986. See especially the introduction, and chapters 5, 6, 9-17.

4. Epistemology and the History of Science

   Boyd, R. "Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology." Philosophy of Science, 1980.

   Giere, R. "Naturalistic Philosophy of Science." Philosophy of Science. 1985.