Rollins

Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Epistemology and Cognitive Psychology

CONTRIBUTOR: Mark Rollins.
In this module, two different approaches are used to illustrate how a course examining the overlap between epistemology and cognitive psychology might be developed. The first begins with cognitive psychology, and considers a variety of topics which bear upon epistemology. It then moves to selected works in epistemology to see how psychological research and theory have influenced the way philosophers consider knowledge. Materials in this course are denoted by a '+'. The second approach is topical, and lists both philosophical and psychological literature under each topic. Items in this course are denoted by a '*'.

Division of the bibliography:

Introduction
Epistemology

Reliabilism
Information Theory
Explanatory Coherence

Psychology

Methodological Issues
Perception
Memory
Imagery
Belief Revision

Cross References
For additional readings on perception, see also "Perception" in the "Contemporary Sources" section, and the syllabus "Perception, Perceptual Belief and Knowledge" in this section.
For additional readings on memory, see "Memory" in the "Contemporary Sources" section.

Readings

I. Introduction
+ Goldman, A. I. "The Relation Between Epistemology and Psychology." Synthese 64 (1985), 29-68.
+ Sosa, E. "Nature Unmirrored, Epistemology Naturalized." Synthese 55 (1983). 49-72.
+ *Quine, W. V. "Epistemology Naturalized." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. 1969. 69-90.
Quine, W. V. "Natural Kinds." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. 1969, 114-38.

II. Epistemology
A. Reliabilism
+ Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1986. Introduction, chapters 1, and 3-6.

B. Information Theory
+ Dretske, F. "The Epistemology of Belief." Synthese 55, 3-19.
+ Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Informanon. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981. Chapters 4-6.

C. Explanatory Coherence
+ Harman, G. Change in View. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1986. Chapters 1-4.

III. Psychology
A. Methodological Issues
Fodor, J. "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1 (1980), 63-73. Argues for a formality condition on mental state individuation, insisting on the necessity of computational versus naturalistic psychology. See also "Commentary and Replies."
+ * Haugeland J. "The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (1978),215-60. Distinguishes three modes of explanation: deductive-nomological, morphological, and systematic; and argues that the latter isdistinctive of cognitive sciences. See also "Commentary and Replies."
+ Pylyshyn, Z. "Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Cognitive Science." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 111-32. Defines two methodological conditions -- strong equivalence and cognitive penetrability -- on mental representation as a construct in psychological theory. See also "Commentary and Replies."

B. Perception
* Dretske, F. "The Role of the Percept in Visual Cognition." In Savage, C. W. (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978.
* Goldman, A. I. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 771-91
* Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. See especially chapter 9.
+ Gibson, J. J. "The Perception of Affordance." In Gibson (ed.) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1979.
Harman, G. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. See especially chapter 11.
+ * Lindsay, P. and Norman, D. Human Information Processing: An Introduction to Psychology. 2nd ed. New York: Academic Press, 1972. See especially chapter 1, "Human Perception". An account of feature analysis.
+ Pinker, S. "Visual Cognition: An Introduction." In Pinker S. (ed.), Visual Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1985. An overview: templates, features Fourier analysis, Marr-Nishihara, parallel models. Theories of recognition and imagery.
+ *Marr, D. and Nishihara, H. K. "Representation and Recognition of the Spatial Organization of Three-Dimensional Shapes." Proceedings of Royal Society of London 200 (1978), 269-94. Computational approach.

C. Memory
+ * Anderson, J. R. Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications. (2nd ed.) New York: W. H. Freemont Co, 1985. See especially chanters 6 and 7.
+ * Cherniak, C. "Rationality and the Structure of Human Memory." Synthese 57 (1983), 163-86.
* Dretske, F. and Yourgrau, P. "Lost Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), 356-67.
Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. op. cit. See especially chapter 10.
Martin, C. B. and Deutscher, M. "Remembering." Philosophical Review 75 (1966), 161-96.
Miller, G. A. "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two." Psychology Review 63 (1986), 81-97.
Neisser, U. "Memory: What Are the Important Questions?" In Neisser, U. (ed.), Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1978.

D. Imagery
+ Block, N. "What Is the Issue?" In Block, N. (ed.), Imagery. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1981. Hereafter cited as 'Block'. An analysis of articles aimed at identifying the issues and defining positions.
Brown, R. and Herrnstein, R. "Icons and Images." In Block, 1981. A summary of recent empirical studies, particularly Shepard, Cooper, Metzler and colleagues.
* Dennett, D. "The Nature of Images and the Introspective Trap." In Block, 1981. Philosophical arguments for a version of Descriptionalism .
* Fodor, J. "Imagistic Representation." The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975. Reprinted in Block. Arguments against an iconic mentalese with some indication of how there might be restricted roles for images.
Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. See especially chapter 12, "Internal Codes." Distinguishes two versions of the debate, the pictorial versus descriptional form and the perceptual-similitude form. Discusses applications of imagery to tasks.
+ * Kosslyn, S. M. and Pomeranz, J. R. "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations." In Block, N. (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books. A well-developed Pictorialism on the computational model. Answers objections to earlier writings.
+ * Pylyshyn, Z. "The Imagery Debate: Analog Media Versus Tacit Knowledge." Psychological Review 88 (1981), 16 45. A critique of Kosslyn and a defense of Descriptionalism as essential to the computational model, largely on metatheoretical grounds.
Schwartz, R. "Imagery -- There's More to It Than Meets the Eye." In Block. Identifies complexities in the debate by considering similarities and dissimilarities between pictures and propositions.

E. Belief Revision
Feldman, R. forthcoming. "Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection." Philosophy of Science.
Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. See especially chapter 14.
+ McCarthy, J. and Hayes, P. "Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence." In B. L. Webber and N. J. Nilsson (eds.), Readings in Artificial Intelligence. Palo Alto: Tiago Publishing Co., 1981. Hereafter cited as 'McCarthy and Hayes'.
McCarthy, J. "Epistemological Problems of Artificial Intelligence." In McCarthy and Hayes.
+ * Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. See especially chapter 2.
* Stich, S. "Could Man be an Irrational Animal?" In Naturalizing Epistemology. Kornblith, H. (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Press, 1985.
+ * Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heurishcs and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 3-20.