Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1942.
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Habit: (Lat. habitus from habere, to have) In psychology: An acquired mental function reinforced by repetition.

In metaphysics, one of Aristotle's 10 categories, Hume's ground for causality ("custom of the mind") and Peirce's leading principle or basis of natural law. -- L.W.

Habit Memory: The retention and reproduction of something learned e.g. a poem, a geometrical demonstration -- without the recognition characteristic of memory proper. See Memory. -- L.W.
Hades: (Gr. Haides) In Greek mythology the god of the underworld, the son of Cronos and Rhea and the brother of Zeus, hence the kingdom ruled over by Hades, or the abode of the dead. -- G.R.M.
Haeberlin, Paul: (1878-) A well known Swiss thinker whose major contributions until recent years were in the field of education. In his hands phenomenology has become existential philosophy. A transcendental-idealistic tone pervades his philosophy. He combines in theory the advantages of existential phenomenology with those of psychologism. -- H.H.
Haecceity: (Lat. haecceitas, literally thisness) A term employed by Duns Scotus to express that by which a quiddity, or general essence, becomes an individual, particular nature, or being. That incommunicable nature which constitutes the individual difference, or individualizes singular beings belonging to a class; hence his principle of individuation. -- J.J.R.
Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich: (1834-1919) Was a German biologist whose early espousal of Darwinism led him to found upon the evolutionary hypothesis a thoroughgoing materialistic monism which he advanced in his numerous writings particularly in his popular The Riddle of the Universe. Believing in the essential unity of the organic and the inorganic, he was opposed to revealed religions and their ideals of God, freedom and immortality and offered a monistic religion of nature based on the true, the good and the beautiful. See Darwin, Evolutionism, Monism. -- L.E.D.
Ha-Levi, Judah: (b. ca. 1080, d. ca. 1140) Poet and philosopher. His Kuzari (Arabic Kitab Al-Khazari), written in dialogue form, has a double purpose. First, as its subtitle, A Book of Proofs and Arguments in Defense of the Humiliated Religion, indicates, it aims to prove the dignity and worth of Judaism. Secondly, he endeavors to show the insufficiency of philosophy and the superiority of the truths of revealed religion to those arrived at by logic. The admission of both Christianity and Islam that Judaism is their source proves the first. The exaltation of intuition as a means of certainty in matters of religion, and the claim that the prophet is the highest type of man rather than the philosopher purposes to substantiate the second. He endows the Jewish people with a special religio-ethical sense which is their share only and constitutes a quasi-biological quality. He assigns also a special importance to Palestine as a contributory factor in the spiritual development of his people, for only there can this religio-ethical sense come to full expression. -- M.W.
Hallucination: (Lat. hallucinatio, from hallucinari, to wander in mind) A non-veridical or delusive perception of a sense object occurring when no object is in fact present to the organs of sense. See Delusion, Illusion. -- L.W.
Hallucination, Negative: The failure to perceive an object which is in fact present to the organs of sense. See Hallucination. -- L.W.
Hamann, Johann Georg: (1730-1788) Kant's extreme pietist friend, and, like him, a native of Königsberg, he saw in the critical philosophy of Kant an unsuccessful attempt to make reason independent of all tradition, belief and experience. -- H.H.
Han Fei Tzu: (d. 233 B.C.) Was a pupil of Hsun Tzu. The greatest Chinese philosopher of law (fa chia), he advocated government by law and statecraft. Delegated by his native state, he appealed to the king of Chin (Shih Huang-ti) not to invade his country. At first he was cordially entertained but later was ordered to commit suicide by the premier of Chin, his former schoolmate, Li Ssu, who became jealous of him. (Han-fei Tzu, Eng. tr. by W. K. Liao: Han Fei Tzu, Complete Works.) -- W.T.C.
Happiness: (in Kant's ethics) Kant is more concerned with happiness in terms of its ideal possibility than with its realization in actual human experience. Its ideal possibility rests on the a priori laws of intelligible freedom (vide), by which the individual through self-determination achieves unity: the self-sufficiency and harmony of his own being. "Real happiness rests with my free volition, and real contentment consists in the consciousness of freedom." (Kant.) -- P.A.S.
Harmony, Pre-Established: The perfect functioning of mind and body, as ordained by God in the beginning. The dualism of Descartes (1596-1650) had precluded interaction between mind or soul and body by its absolute difference and opposition between res cogitans and res extensa. How does it happen, then, that the mind perceives the impressions of the body, and the body is ready to follow the mind's will? The Cartesians, in order to correct this difficulty, introduced the doctrine of "occasionalism", whereby when anything happens to either mind or body, God interferes to make the corresponding change in the other. Leibniz (1646-1716) countered by suggesting that the relation between mind and body is one of harmony, established by God before their creation. Earlier than mind or body, God had perfect knowledge of all possible minds and bodies. In an infinite number of creations all possible combinations are possible, including those minds whose sequence of ideas perfectly fits the motions of some bodies. In the latter, there is a perfect and pre-established harmony. A parallelism between mind and body exists, such that each represents the proper expression of the other. Leibniz compares their relation to that of two clocks which have been synchronized once for all and which therefore operate similarly without the need of either interaction or intervention. Expressed by Leibniz' follower, C. Wolff (1679-1754) as "that by which the intercourse of soul and bodv is explained by a series of perceptions and desires in the soul, and a series of motions in the body, which are harmonic or accordant through the nature of soul and body." -- J.K.F.
Hartley, David: (1705-1757) Was an English physician most noted as the founder of the associationist school in psychology. His theory of the association of ideas was prompted by the work of John Gay to which he gave a physiological emphasis and which, in turn, influenced the Utilitarians, Bentham and the Mills. See Bentham, Gay, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism.

D. Hartley, Observations of man: his frame, his duty and his expectations, 1749. -- L.E.D.

Hartmann, Eduard von: (1842-1906) Hybridizing Schopenhauer's voluntarism with Hegel's intellectualism, and stimulated by Schelling, the eclectic v.H. sought to overcome irrationalism and rationalism by postulating the Unconscious, raised into a neutral absolute which has in it both will and idea in co-ordination. Backed by an encyclopaedic knowledge he showed, allegedly inductively, how this generates all values in a conformism or correlationism which circumvents a subjective monistic idealism no less than a phenomenalism by means of a transcendental realism. Writing at a time when vitalists were hard put to be endeavored to synthesize the new natural sciences and teleology by assigning to mechanistic causility a special function in the natural process under a more generalized and deeper purposiveness. Dispensing with a pure rationalism, but without taking refuge in a vital force, v.H. was then able to establish a neo-vitalism. In ethics he transcended an original pessimism, flowing from the admittance of the alogical and dis-teleological, in a qualified optimism founded upon an evolutionary hypothesis which regards nature with its laws subservient to the logical, as a species of the teleological, and to reason which, as product of development, redeems the irrational will once it has been permitted to create a world in which existence means unhappiness.

E. von Hartmann, Philos. des Unbewussten, 3 vol. 1869 (Eng. tr. Philosophy of the Unconscious, 1931); Die Religion des Geistes, 1882; Aesthetik, 1886; Kategorienlehre, 1897; Geschichte der Metaphysik, 1900; Das Problem des Lebens, 1906; System der Philosophie in Grundriss, 1906-10. -- K.F.L.

Hartmann, Nicolai: (1882-) A realist in metaphysics, he refutes nineteenth century idealism and monism, and attacks medieval super-naturalism and the various forms of theism. As exponent of a philosophic humanism, he made extensive contributions to ethics.

N. Hartmann, Platos Lehre vom Sein, 1909; Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 1921; Ethik, 1926 (Eng. tr. 1932); Die Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I, 1923; II, 1929; Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, 1935; Möglichkeit u. Wirklichkeit, 1938. See his own exposition of his views in Deutsch Syst. Philos. nach ihr. Gestalten, 1931. -- H.H.

Hauber's law: Given a set of conditional sentences A1 ⊃ B1, A2 ⊃ B2, . . . , An ⊃ Bn, we may infer each of the conditional sentences B1 ⊃ A1, B2 ⊃ A2, . . . , Bn ⊃ An, provided we know that A1, A2, . . . , An are exhaustive and B1, B2, . . . , Bn are mutually exclusive -- i.e., provided we have also A1 ∨ A2 ∨ . . . ∨ An and ∼[B1B2], ∼[B1B3], . . . , ∼[Bn-1Bn]. This form (or set of forms) of valid inference of the propositional calculus is Hauber's law. -- A.C.
Hedonic: Possessing pleasurable or painful affective quality. See Algedonic. -- L.W.
Hedonic Calculus: View, ascribed to Jeremy Bentham, that the ends of mankind may be calculated by determining the preponderance of the pleasurable over the painful in order to evaluate the useful. See Utilitarianism. -- L.F.D.
Hedonism, Ethical: (Gr. hedone, pleasure) A doctrine as to what entities possess intrinsic value. According to it pleasure or pleasant consciousness, and this alone, has positive ultimate value, that is, is intrinsically good and has no parts or constituents which are not intrinsically good. The contrary hedonic feeling tone, displeasure or unpleasant consciousness, and this alone has negative ultimate value, that is, is intrinsically bad and has no parts or constituents which are not intrinsically bad. The intrinsic value of all other entities is precisely equivalent to the intrinsic value of their hedonic components. The total value of an action is the net intrinsic value of all its hedonic consequences. According to pure hedonism either there are no differences of quality among pleasures or among displeasures or else such differences as exist do not affect the intrinsic values of the different hedonic states. These values vary only with the intensity and duration of the pleasure or displeasure.

Ethical Hedonism is usually combined with a teleological view of the nature of right action. It may be combined with Ethical Egoism as in the view of Epicurus, or with Ethical Universalism, as in the views of J. Bentham, J. S. Mill, and H. Sidgwick. -- C.A.B.

Hedonism, Psychological: (Gr. hedone, pleasure) Theory that psychological motivation is to be explained exclusively in terms of desire for pleasure and aversion from pain. (See W. James' criticism of psychological hedonism, The Principles of Psychology, II pp. 549 ff.) Psychological hedonism, as a theory of human motivation in contrast with ethical hedonism which accepts as the criterion of morality, the pleasure-pain consequences of an act. -- L.W.
Hedonistic Aesthetics: Theories reducing beauty to the pleasure of seeing, hearing and playing, to the satisfaction of sensual enjoyment. -- L.V.
Hedonistic Paradox: A paradox or apparent inconsistency in hedonistic theory arising from (1) the doctrine that since pleasure is the only good, one ought always to seek pleasure, and (2) the fact that whenever pleasure itself is the object sought it cannot be found. Human nature is such that pleasure normally arises as an accompaniment of satisfaction of desire for any end except when that end is pleasure itself. The way to attain pleasure is not to seek for it, but for something else which when found will have yielded pleasure through the finding. Likewise, one should not seek to avoid pain, but only actions which produce pain. -- A.J.B.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Born at Stuttgart in 1770 and died at Berlin in 1831. He studied theology, philosophy and the classics at Tübingen, 1788-93, occupied the conventional position of tutor in Switzerland and Frankfort on the Main, 1794-1800, and went to Jena as Privatdocent in philosophy in 1801. He was promoted to a professorship at Jena in 1805, but was driven from the city the next year by the incursion of the French under Napoleon. He then went to Bamberg, where he remained two years as editor of a newspaper. The next eight years he spent as director of the Gymnasium at Nürnberg. In 1816 he accepted a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, from which position he was called two years later to succeed Fichte at the University of Berlin. While at Jena, he co-operated with Schelling in editing the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, to which he contributed many articles. His more important volumes were published as follows:
Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807;
Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812-16;
Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, 1817;
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 1820.
Shortly after his death his lectures on the philosophy of religion, the history of philosophy, the philosophy of history, and aesthetics were published from the collated lecture-notes of his students. His collected works in nineteen volumes were published 1832-40 by a group of his students. -- G.W.C.
Hegelianism: As expounded in the writings of Hegel, Hegelianism is both a doctrine and a method. The two are held to be logically inseparable: the method is precisely the formulation of the doctrine, and the doctrine is precisely the detailed expression of the method. This integration of the two aspects of the philosophy presents a formidable obstacle to interpretation and to summary presentation of Hegelianism as conceived by its founder.

The method is, of course, the dialectic. On its formal side, it is constituted by the triadic dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In his logical writings Hegel is very fond of manipulating this formal apparatus, which he does in great detail. From his practice here one might be led to suppose that in his opinion the dialectic itself constitutes the essence of the method. In his other writings, however, little if any use is made of the schematism, except for the purpose of presenting the larger patterns of the subject-matter; and in his remarks on method its formal aspect is hardly referred to. In these remarks Hegel is concerned with emphasizing the logical structure underlying the machinery, namely, the relationship of contrariety and its resolution. Everywhere, the method is grounded in system, and the transition from thesis and antithesis to synthesis is held to be necessitated by the structure of the system within which it is grounded. Consequently the dialectical advance exhibits pari passu the structure of the system which is its matrix; the synthesis is positive throughout. This characteristic of the method, its "holding fast the positive in the negative," is what Hegel calls its negativity; and this characteristic is to him the essence of the dialectic.

The sort of system which grounds the method is not the sort within which the principle of contradiction obtains. Contradictories cannot be dialectically resolved; between them there is no ground of synthesis. But such systems are abstract, that is, exemplified only in formal deductions; they are lacking in factual content. Dialectical analysis is possible only within systems which are factual, that is, constituted by statements of fact and statements of possibility grounded in fact. Here the principle of contrariety, not the principle of contradiction, obtains; and dialectical analysis is identical with the resolution of contraries. Here, and here alone, is the dialectical method applicable; and it alone is applicable here.

Thus the method is the delineation of systems which are real, and the doctrine of reality nothing other than a detailed statement of the result. Such a statement is the final category of dialectical analysis, the Absolute Idea, this is the "truth" of Being. What this category is in detail can be specified only by the method whereby it is warranted. In general it is the structure of fact, possibility and value as determined by dialectical negation. It is the all-comprehensive system, the "whole," which harmoniously includes every statement of fact, possibility and value by "sublating" (through dialectical negation) every such statement within its own structure. It is also of the nature of "subject" in contradistinction to "substance" as defined by Spinoza; Hegel sometimes speaks of it as Absolute Spirit. If this doctrine is to be called absolute idealism, as is customary, its distinguishing characteristic should not be submerged in the name: the system which is here identified with reality is structured precisely as disclosed in the process of dialectical negation which exhibits it.

The later thinkers commonly referred to in the histories as Hegelians fall mainly into two groups. One is the group more or less indifferent to the method of Hegel and interested primarily in the ramifications of his doctrine; the other is the group committed in principle to the method, to its "negativity" and not to its categories, and concerned by its means to build independently. The early Hegelians in Germany belong to the former group; outstanding representatives of the latter are the recent British and American philosophers sometimes called neo-Hegelians.


Hegel-Archiv, ed. G. Lasson;
K. Fischer,
Hegel's Leben, Ukrke und L'ehre, 2 vols. (1901, 1911);
W. Dilthey,
Gesamm. Schr. IV;
B. Croce,
What is Living and What is Dead of Hegel, 1915;
G. Lasson,
Hegel als Geschichtsphilosoph, 1920;
Th. Haering,
Hegel sein Wollen u. s. Werk, I (1929); II (1939);
H. Glockner,
S. Hook,
From Hegel to Marx, 1938.
-- G.W.C.
Heidegger, Martin: (1889-) Trained in Husserl's radical structural analysis of pure consciousness, Heidegger shares with phenomenology the effort to methodically analyze and describe the conceptual meanings of single phenomena. He aimed at a phenomenological analysis of human existence in respect to its temporal and historical character. Concentrating on the Greek tradition, and endeavoring to open a totally different approach from that of the Greek thinkers to the problem of being, he seeks to find his way back to an inner independence of philosophy from the special sciences. Before a start can be made in the radical analysis of human existence, the road has to be cleared of the objections of philosophical tradition, science, logic and common sense. As the moderns have forgotten the truths the great thinkers discovered, have lost the ability to penetrate to the real origins, the recovery of the hard-won, original, uncorrupted insights of man into metaphysical reality, is only possible through a "destructive" analysis of the traditional philosophies. By this recovery of the hidden sources, Heidegger aims to revive the genuine philosophizing which, not withstanding appearances, has vanished from us in the Western world because of autonomous science serious disputing of the position of philosophy. As human reality is so structured that it discloses itself immediately, he writes really an idealistic philosophy of homo faber. But instead of being a rationalistic idealist reading reason into the structure of the really real, he takes a more avowedly emotional phenomenon as the center of a new solution of the Seinsfrage.

Under Kierkegaard's influence, he pursues an "existential" analysis of human existence in order to discuss the original philosophical question of being in a new way. He explores many hitherto unexplored phenomena which ontology disregarded. Sorge (concern), being par excellence the structure of consciousness, is elevated to the ultimate. Concern has a wholly special horizon of being. Dread (Angst), the feeling of being on the verge of nothing, represents an eminently transcendental instrument of knowledge. Heidegger gives dread a content directed upon the objective world. He unfolds the essence of dread to be Sorge (concern). As concern tends to become obscured to itself by the distracted losing of one's selfhood in the cares of daily life, its remedy is in the consideration of such experiences as conscience, forboding of death and the existential consciousness of time. By elevating Sorge to the basis of all being, he raised something universally human to the fundamental principle of the world. It is only after an elementary analysis of the basic constitution of human existence that Heidegger approaches his ultimate problem of Being and Time, in which more complicated structures such as the existential significance of death, conscience, and the power of resolute choice explain the phenomena of man's position in daily life and history.

Main works:

Kategorien -- u. Bedentungslehre d. Duns Scotus, 1916;
Sein u. Zeit, 1927;
Was ist Metaphysik?;
Kant u. d. Probl. d. Meta., 1929;
Vom Wesen des Grundes, 1929.
See J. Kraft, Von Husserl zu H., 1932. -- H.H.
Helvetius, Claude Adrien: (1715-1771) A French philosopher, he developed on the basis of Condillac's sensationalism his superficial materialistic philosophy. His theories of the original mental equality of individuals, of the egoism or self-interest as the sole motive of human action, and of the omnipotence of education, stress the basic determining influence of circumstances.

C. A. Helvetius, De l'Esprit, 1758; De I'Homme, de ses facultes et de son education, 1772. -- H.H.

Heraclitus: ("The Obscure") Of Ephesus, about 536-470 B.C. In opposition to the Milesians, from whom he is separated by a generation, he held that there is nothing abiding in the world. All things and the universe as a whole are in constant, ceaseless flux, nothing is, only change is real, all is a continuous passing away. For this reason the world appeared to him to be in ever-living fire, a consuming movement in which only the orderliness of the succession of things, or, as Heraclitus called it, the "reason"' or "destiny" of the world remains alway the same. Heraclitus thus foreshadowed the modern conception of the uniformity of natural law. Cf. Diels, Frag, d. Vor, I, ch. 12. -- M.F.
Herbart, Johann Friedrich: (1776-1841) Best known as the "father" of scientific pedagogy centrally based upon psychology, a general tenet that still has weight today, Herbart occupies as educational philosophical theorist a position strikingly similar to that of John Dewey, the nestor of American philosophy.

Objecting to Fichte, his master's method of deducing everything from a single, all-embracing principle, he obstinately adhered to the axiom that everything is what it is, the principle of identity. He also departed from him in the principle of idealism and freedom. As nnn is not free in the sense of possessing a principle independent of the environment, he reverted to the Kantian doctrine that behind and underlying the world of appearance there is a plurality of real things in themselves that are independent of the operations of mind upon them. Deserving credit for having developed the realism that was latent in Kant's philosophy, he conceived the ''reals" so as to do away with the contradictions in the concepts of experience. The necessity for assuming a plurality of "reals" arises as a result of removing the contradictions in our experiences of change and of things possessing several qualities. Herbart calls the method he applies to the resolution of the contradictions existing between the empirically derived concepts, the method of relations, that is the accidental relation between the different "reals" is a question of thought only, and inessential for the "reals" themselves. It is the changes in these relations that form the process of change in the world of experience. Nothing can be ultimately real of which two contradictory predicates can be asserted. To predicate unity and multiplicity of an object is to predicate contradictions. Hence ultimate reality must be absolutely unitary and also without change. The metaphysically interpreted abstract law of contradiction was therefore central in his system. Incapability of knowing the proper nature of these "reals" equals the inability of knowing whether they are spiritual or material. Although he conceived in his system that the "reals" are analogous with our own inner states, yet his view of the "reals" accords better with materialistic atomism. The "reals" are simple and unchangeable in nature.

Metaphysics and psychology are not distinct in Herbert's view. In his day psychology was also philosophy. It was still a metaphysical science in the sense that it is differentiated from physical science. It was only later that psychology repudiated philosophy. Accepting Kant's challenge to make psychology a mathematical science, he developed an elaborate system of mathematical constructions that proved the least fruitful phase of his system. As a mathematical science psychology can use only calculation, not experiment. As the mind or soul is unitary, indivisible. science, including philosophy, is neither analytical nor experimental. Bv denying analysis to psychology, Herbart combatted the division of mind into separate faculties. Psychology is not the mere description of the mind, but the working out of its mathematical laws.

J. F. Herbart,
Hauptpunkte d. Logik, 1808;
Hauptpunkte d. Metaphysik, 1806-1808;
Allgem. prakt. Philos., 1808;
Lehrb. z. Psychologie, 1816;
Psychol. als Wissensch. neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik u. Mathematik, 1824;
Allgemeine Metaphysik, 1828-9.
See Sämmtliche Werke, 19 vols. (ed. Fluegel, 1887-1912). -- H.H.
Herbartianism: The philosophical, but particularly the psychological and pedagogical doctrines of Johann Friedrich Herbart (q.v.) as expounded in modified and developed form by his disciples, notably M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal in psychology, T. Zillcr and W. Rein in pedagogy, M. Drobisch in religious philosophy and ethics. In America, the movement was vigorous and influential, but shortlived (about 1890-1910) and confined mainly to education (Charles De-Garmo and Charles A. McMurry). Like Herbart, his disciples strove for a clarification of concepts with special emphasis on scientific method, the doctrine of apperception, and the efficacy of a mathematical approach even in their psychology which was dominated by associational thinking; yet they discarded more or less the master's doctrine of reals. -- K.F.L.
Herder, Johann Gottfried: (1744-1803) A founder of modern religious humanism, he explained human history as a consequence of the nature of man and of man's physical environment. Held implicitly to the view that society is basically an organic whole. Accounted for the differences in culture and institutions of different peoples as being due to geographical conditions. Although history is a process of the education of the human species, it has no definite goal of perfection and development. The vehicle of living culture is a distinct Volk or Nation with its distinct language and traditions. As a child of the Enlightenment, Herder had a blind faith in nature, in man and in the ultimate development of reason and justice.

J. O. Herder,
Ideen z. Philos. d. Gesch. d. Menschheit, 1784-91;
Gott. Gespräche über Spinoza's System, 1787;
Briefe z. Beförderung d. Humanität, 1793;
Metakritik, 1799;
Kalligone, 1800;
last two works directed against Kant's Critiques (q.v.). -- H-H.
Hereditary property: See Recursion, proof by.
Hermeneutics: The art and science of interpreting especially authoritative writings, mainly in application to sacred scripture, and equivalent to exegesis. -- K.F.L.
Herrenmoral: (German) A concept popularly used as a blanket term for any ruthless, non-Chnstian type of morality justly and unjustly linked with the ethical theories of Friedrich Nietzsche (q.v.) as laid down by him especially in the works of his last productive period fraught as it was with iconoclast vehemence against all plebeian ideals and a passionate desire to establish a new and more virile aristocratic morality, and debated by many writers, such as Kaftan, Kronenberg, Staudinger, and Hilbert. Such ideas as will to power, the conception of the superman, the apodictic primacy of those who with strong mind and unhindered by conventional interpretations of good and evil, yet with lordly lassitude, are born to leadership, have contributed to this picture of the morality of the masters (Herren) whom Nietzsche envisaged as bringing about the revaluation of all values and realizing the higher European culture upon the ruins of the fear-motivated, passion-shunning, narrowly moral world of his day. -- K.F.L.
Heterogeneity: (Lat. Heterogeneitas) The condition of having different parts; diversity of composition; distinction of kind. Hamilton's law: "that every concept contains other concepts under it; and therefore, when divided proximately, we descend always to other concepts, but never to individuals; in other words, things the most homogeneous -- similar -- must in certain respects be heterogeneous -- dissimilar." Employed by H. Spencer (1820-1903) to denote the presence of differentiation in the cosmic material. Opposite of: homogeneity (q- v.). -- J.K.F.
Heteronomy: (Gr. hetero, other + nomos, law) See Autonomy.
Heteronomy of Ends: (Kant) Just as autonomy of the will is that state of affairs in the life of a rational being in which the will is determined in its choices by no ends other than itself, so heteronomy of the will is the state in which the will is determined by ends other than itself, e.g. happiness or gain either for self or others. In autonomy the will is its own end, and is determined only by its own laws. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality, Kant affirms, and heteronomy is the source of all spurious principles of morality. For in heteronomy the will, being attracted by external ends, is obeying laws not of its own making. In autonomy, however, the will obeys only its own laws, it makes only those choices of action which may also be regarded as instances of laws of its own choosing. The principle of the Autonomy of the Will, and the Categorical Imperative, are thus one and the same thing. -- F.L.W.
Hetero-psychological Ethics: Ethics based on mental categories other than the conscience, as contrasted with idio-psychological ethics, or ethics based on the inner facts of conscience. Introduced as terms into ethics by J. Martineau (1805-1899) in 1885. -- J.K.F.
Heterotelic: (from Gr. heteros, another, and telos, end) Said of any activity having a conscious or implied reference to the accomplishment of some end. In aesthetics applied to creative art and play in which a useful purpose may be discerned or may constitute the motive. See also Autotelic. -- K.F.L.
Heterozetesis: (Gr. heteros, other + zetein, inquiry) In logic, ignoratio elenchi, an argument which does not prove the conclusion wanted. The fallacy of irrelevant conclusion; the general name for fallacies due to irrelevancy. -- J.K.F.
Heuristic: (Gr. heuriskein, to discover) Serving to find out, helping to show how the qualities and relations of objects are to be sought. In Kant's philosophy, applying to ideas of God, freedom and immortality, as being undemonstrable but useful in the interpretation of things and events in time and space. In methodology, aiding in the discovery of truth. The heuristic method is the analytical method. Opposite of: ostensive. -- J.K.F.
Hexis: (Gr. hexis) In Aristotle's philosophy a state or condition of a thing; particularly an acquired disposition or habit, not easily changed, and affecting the welfare of its possessor, such as the moral virtues and the intellectual skills. -- G.R.M.
Hierarchy of types: See Logic, formal, § 6.
Hilbert, David, 1862-, German mathematician. Professor of mathematics at the University of Göttingen, 1895-. A major contributor to many branches of mathematics, he is regarded by many as the greatest mathematician of his generation. His work on the foundations of Euclidean geometry is contained in his Grundlagen der Geometrie (1st edn., 1899, 7th edn., 1930). Concerning his contributions to mathematical logic and mathematical philosophy, see the articles mathematics, and proof theory. -- A. C.

Gesammelte Abhandlungen. three volumes, with an account of his work in mathematical logic by P. Bernays, and a life by O. Blumenthal, Berlin, 1932-1935.

Hillel of Verona: (1220-1295) Physician and philosopher. His principal philosophic work, the Tagmule ha-Nefesh (Heb.) The Reward of the Soul, is devoted to two problems, that of the soul and that of reward and punishment. In his theory of the soul he follows partly Averroes (q.v.) and assumes with him that the universal Active Intellect acts upon the soul of the individual and helps to realize its powers. He rejects, though, the former's view of immortality which consists of a union of the human intellect with the universal Active Intellect. -- M.W.
Hindu Ethics: See Indian Ethics.
Hindu Aesthetics: See Indian Aesthetics.
Hindu Philosophy: See Indian Philosophy.
Historical materialism: The social philosophy of dialectical materialism. The application of the general principles of dialectical materialism to the specific field of human history, the development of human society. One of the chief problems Marx dealt with was that of the basic causal agent in the movement of human history. He states his thesis as follows:

"In the social relations which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensible and independent of their will. These relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. . . . At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." (Marx: Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 12.) -- J.M.S.

Historicism: The view that the history of anything is a sufficient explanation of it, that the values of anything can be accounted for through the discovery of its origins, that the nature of anything is entirely comprehended in its development, as for example, that the properties of the oak tree are entirely accounted for by an exhaustive description of its development from the acorn. The doctrine which discounts the fallaciousness of the historical fallacy. Applied by some critics to the philosophy of Hegel and Karl Marx. -- J.K.F.
Historiography: (Gr. histor + graphein, to write) The art of recording history (q.v.).
History: (Gr. histor, learned) Ambiguously used to denote either (a) events or (b) records of the past. The term historiography (q.v.) is used for (b). Also ambiguous in denoting natural as well as human events, or records of either.
History of Art: Vasari (16th century) began the history of the artists. Winckelmann (18th century) began the history of art, that is of the development of the clements comprised in works of art. The history of art today is directed towards a synthesis of the personalities of the artists and of their reaction to tradition and environment. -- L.V.
History, Philosophy of: History investigates the theories concerning the development of man as a social being within the limits of psychophysical causality. Owing to this double puipose the philosophy of history has to study the principles of historiography, and, first of all, their background, their causes and underlying laws, their meaning and motivation. This can be called the metaphysics of history. Secondly, it concerns itself with the cognitive part, i.e. with historic understanding, and then it is called the logic of history. While in earlier times the philosophy of history was predominantly metaphysics, it has turned more and more to the methodology or logic of history. A complete philosophy of history, however, ought to consider the metaphysical as well as the logical problems involved.

I. Logic of History The historical objects under observation (man, life, society, biological and geological conditions) are so diverse that even slight mistakes in evaluation of items and of the historical whole may lead to false results. This can be seen from the modern logic of history. In the 18th century, G. B. Vico contended, under the deep impression of the lawfulness prevailing in natural sciences, that historical events also follow each other according to unswerving natural laws. He assumed three stages of development, that of fantasy, of will, and of science. The encyclopedists and Saint-Simon shared his view. The individual is immersed, and driven on, by the current of social tendencies, so that Comte used to speak of an "histoire sans noms". His three stages of development were the theological, metaphysical, and scientific stage. H. Spencer and A. Fouillee regard social life as an organism unfolding itself according to immanent laws, either of racial individuality (Gobineau, Vocher de Lapauge) or of a combination of social, physical, and personal forces (Taine). The spirit of a people and of an age outweigh completely the power of an individual personality which can work only along socially conditioned tendencies. The development of a nation always follows the same laws, it may vary as to time and whereabouts but never as to the form (Burkhardt, Lamprecht). To this group of historians belong also O. Spengler and K. Marx; "Fate" rules the civilization of peoples and pushes them on to their final destination.

Idealists regard such an equalization of physical laws and psychological, historical laws as untenable. The "tvpical case" with which physics or chemistry analyzes is a result of logical abstraction; the object of history, however, is not a unit with universal traits but something individual, in a singular space and at a particular time, never repeatable under the same circumstances. Therefore no physical laws can be formed about it. What makes it a fact worthy of historical interest, is iust the fullness of live activity in it; it is a "value", not a "thing". Granted that historical events are exposed to influences from biological, geological, racial and traditional sources, they aie always carried by a human being whose singularity of character has assimilated the forces of his environment and surmounted them There is a reciprocal action between man and society, but it is always personal initiative and free productivity of the individual which account for history. Denying, therefore, the logical primacy of physical laws in history, does not mean lawlessness, and that is the standpoint of the logic of history in more recent times. Windelband and H. Rickert established another kind of historical order of laws. On their view, to understand history one must see the facts in their relation to a universally applicable and transcendental system of values. Values "are" not, they "hold"; they are not facts but realities of our reason, they are not developed but discovered. According to Max Weber historical facts form an ideally typical, transcendental whole which, although seen, can never be fully explained. G, Simmel went further into metaphysics: "life" is declared an historical category, it is the indefinable, last reality ascending to central values which shaped cultural epochs, such as the medieval idea of God, or the Renaissance-idea of Nature, only to be tragically disappointed, whereupon other values rise up, as humanity, liberty, technique, evolution and others.

This opposition of natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and cultural or socio-historical sciences (Geistestvtssenschaften) is characteristic of idealistic philosophies of history, especially of the modern German variety. See Max Weber, Gesamm. Aufrätze z. Sozio u. Sozialpolitik, 1922; W. Windelband, Geschichte u. Naturwissenschaft, 1894; H. Rickert, Die Grenzen d. Naturwiss. Begriffsbildung, eine logische Einleitung i. d. histor. Wissenschaften, 1899; Dilthey (q.v.); E. Troeltsch, Der Histortsmus u. s. Probleme, 1922; E. Spranger, Die Grundlagen d. Geschichteswissensch., 1905.

For the opposing, more empirical approach and criticisms of the idealistic, organismic philosophies of history, see M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, 1939; F. J. E. Teggart, The Method of History; Ph. P. Wiener, "Methodology in the Phtlos. of Hist.", Jour. of Philos. (June 5, 1941).

II. Metaphysics of History: The metaphysical interpretations of the meaning of history are either supra-mundane or intra-mundane (secular). The oldest extra-mundane, or theological, interpretation has been given by St. Augustine (Civitas Dei), Dante (Divma Commedia) and J. Milton (Paradise Lost and Regained). All historic events are seen as having a bearing upon the redemption of mankind through Christ which will find its completion at the end of this world. Owing to the secularistic tendencies of modern times the Enlightenment Period considered the final end of human history as the achievement of public welfare through the power of reason. Even the ideal of "humanity" of the classic humanists, advocated by Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Rousseau, Lord Byron, is only a variety of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and in the same line of thought we find A. Comte, H. Spencer ("human moral"), Engels and K. Marx. The German Idealism of Kant and Hegel saw in history the materialization of the "moral reign of freedom" which achieves its perfection in the "objective spirit of the State". As in the earlier systems of historical logic man lost his individuality before the forces of natural laws, so, according to Hegel, he is nothing but an instrument of the "idea" which develops itself through the three dialectic stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. (Example. Absolutism, Democracy, Constitutional Monarchy.) Even the great historian L. v. Ranke could not break the captivating power of the Hegelian mechanism. Ranke places every historical epoch into a relation to God and attributes to it a purpose and end for itself. Lotze and Troeltsch followed in his footsteps. Lately, the evolutionistic interpretation of H. Bergson is much discussed and disputed. His "vital impetus" accounts for the progressiveness of life, but fails to interpret the obvious setbacks and decadent civilizations. According to Kierkegaard and Spranger, merely human ideals prove to be too narrow a basis for the tendencies, accomplishments, norms, and defeats of historic life. It all points to a supra-mundane intelligence which unfolds itself in history. That does not make superfluous a natural interpretation, both views can be combined to understand history as an endless struggle between God's will and human will, or non-willing, for that matter. -- S.V.F.


(a) Harmony; being "neither too weak nor too strong." "When the passions, such as joy, anger, grief, and pleasure, have not awakened, that is our central self, or moral being (chung). When these passions awaken and each and all attain due measure and degree, that is harmony, or the moral order (ho). Our central self or moral being is the great basis of existence, and harmony or moral order is the universal law in the world." See Chung.

(b) Change and transformation in the proper order,

(c) Peace; meekness; amiability.

-- W.T.C.

Ho: Co-existence, one of the proofs of agreement. See Mo che. -- W.T.C.
Hobbes, Thomas: (1588-1679) Considering knowledge empirical in origin and results, and philosophy inference of causes from effects and vice versa, regarded matter and motion as the least common denominators of all our percepts, and bodies and their movements as the only subject matter of philosophy. Consciousness in its sensitive and cognitive aspects is a jarring of the nervous system; in its affectional and volitional, motor aspects, a kick-back to the jar. Four subdivisions of philosophy cover all physical and psychological events: geometry describing the spatial movements of bodies; physics, the effects of moving bodies upon one another; ethics, the movements of nervous systems; politics, the effects of nervous systems upon one another. The first law of motion appears in every organic body in its tendency, which in man becomes a natural right, to self-preservation and self-assertion. Hence the primary condition of all organic as of all inorganic bodies is one of collision, conflict, and war. The second law of motion, in its organic application, impels men to relinquish a portion of their natural right to self-assertion in return for a similar relinquishment on the part of their fellows. Thus a component of the antagonistic forces of clashing individual rights and wills is established, embodied in a social contract, or treaty of peace, which is the basis of the state. To enforce this social covenant entered into, pursuant to the second law of motion, by individuals naturally at war in obedience to the first, sovereignty must be set up and exercised through government. Government is most efficient when sovereignty, which has in any case to be delegated in a community of any size, is delegated to one man -- an absolute monarch -- rather than to a group of men, or a parliament.

Main works: De corpore (On bodies); De homine (On Man), De cive (On the state) . The Elements of Law, 1640; Leviathan, 1650. -- B.A.G.F.

Hocking, William Ernest: (1873) Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard. Has endeavored to blend idealism vvith pragmatism while making some concessions to realism, even is in current theory he strives for a reconciliation between laissez faire liberalism and collectivism through a midground found in the worth of the individual in a "commotive union in the coagent state," a notion comparable to the "conjunct self" of George Herbert Palmer only with a more individualistic emphasis and a current flavor. Among his works are: The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Man and the State, Types of Philosophy, Lasting Elements of Individualism and Living Religions and a World Faith. -- L.E.D.
Hodgson, Shadworth: (1852-1913) English writer who had no profession and who held no public office. He displayed throughout a long life a keen devotion to philosophy. He was among the founders of the Aristotelian Society and served as its president for fourteen years. His earlier work was reshaped in a monumental four volume treatise called The Metaphysic of Experience. He viewed himself as correcting and completing the Kantian position in his comparatively materialistic approach to reality with a recognition of the unseen world prompted by a practical, moral compulsion rather than speculative conviction. -- L.E.D.
Höffding, Harald: (1843-1931) Danish philosopher at the University of Copenhagen and brilliant author of texts in psychology, history of philosophy and the philosophy of religion. He held that the world of reality as a whole is unknowable although we may believe that conscious experience and its unity afford the best keys to unlock the metaphysical riddle. His svstem of thought is classified on the positive side as a cautious idealistic monism (his own term is "critical monism").

Main works: Philosophy of Religion, 1901; Kierkegaard; Rousseau; History of Modern Phtlosophy. -- V.F.

Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d': (1723-1789) One of the Encyclopedists (q.v.) and a prominent materialist. He is the probable author of Le systeme de la Nature, known as "the Bible of Atheism." -- R.B.W.
Holism: See Emergent Evolutionism.
Holy: (AS. halig) The symbolically universal value of things. That aspect of value which reflects the totality, or God. The totality of value. -- J.Z.F.
Hominism: (Lat. homo, Man) German term (proposed by Windelband) for pragmatic humanism or psychologism. -- W.L.
Homoeomeries: (Gr. homoiomere) In Aristotle's philosophy those bodies that are divisible into parts qualitatively identical with one another and with the whole, such as the metals and the tissues of living organisms; in distinction from bodies whose parts are qualitatively unlike one another and the whole, such as the head of an animal or the leaf of a plant. -- G.R.M.

See Anaxagoras.

Homogeneity: (Lat. homogeneitas) The condition of having similar parts; uniformity of composition; identity of kind. Hamilton's Law of, "that however different any two concepts may be, they both are subordinate to some higher concept -- things most unlike must in some respects be like". Employed by H. Spencer (1820-1903) to denote the absence of differentiation in the cosmic material. Opposite of heterogeneity (q.v.). -- J.K.F.
Homotheism: (Lat. homo, man; Gr. theos, god) another name for anthropomorphism (q.v.) coined by Ernst Häekel.
Howison, George Holmes: (1834-1916) A teacher at the University of California. He regarded the tendency of monistic thinking as the most vicious in contemporary philosophy. Opposed absolute idealism or cosmic theism for its thoroughgoing monism because of its destruction of the implications of experience, its reduction to solipsism and its resolution into pantheism. His "personalistic idealism", unlike absolute idealism, did not negate the uniqueness and the moral nature of finite selves. Moreover, a priori consciousness is a human, not a divine original consciousness within the individuil mind. -- H.H.

(a) Phenomenon,

(b) Form or image.

(c) Secondary Modes (or Forms), namely, Major Yang, Minor Yang, Major Yin, and Minor Yin, which are engendered by the Two Primary Modes, Yin and Yang, products of the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi).

(d) Hexagram, which, in the system of changes (i), is a symbol representing a phenomenon noted or perceived in nature, and suggestive of an idea or form according to which a thing or an activity may be realized. -- W.T.C.

Hsiao: Filial piety; love of parents; serving and supporting one's parents in the best way. It is "the standard of Heaven, the principle of Earth, and the basis for the conduct of Man," "the basis of morality and the root of culture." "It begins with serving one's parents, extends to the duties towards one's sovereign, and ends in the establishment of one's personal character." "It is the beginning of morality, as respect for elders (ti) is the order of morality;" it is "the actuality of benevolence (jen)" as respect for elders is "the actuality of righteousness (i)." As such "it involves loving kindness to relatives, respect to associates, benevolence to friends, and good faith to acquaintances." "True manhood, (jen) means to make filial piety the basis of manhood; righteousness (i) means to give it proper application; being true to the nature of the self (chung) means to make it the central moral ideal; moral order (li) is to put it to actual practice, and truthfulness (hsin) means to make it strong." -- W.T.C.
Hsiao i: "The little unit" is the smallest that has nothing within itself. See Pien che. (Sophists.) -- H.H.
Hsiao jen: (a) The inferior man, the small man, the mean man, the vulgar man. The opposite of the superior man. See Chün tzu.

(b) Common man; little man; uneducated man; particularly as distinguished from the ruling class and the literati. -- W.T.C.

Hsiao ku: Minor cause. See Ku.
Hsiao t'i: The senses which man shares with animals are "the part of man which is small", making him not merely an inferior man, but a mere animal. Not man's nature, but his animal nature. (Mencius.) -- H.H.
Hsiao t'ung i: The little similarity-and-difference; a great similarity differs from a little similarity. See Pien che. (Sophists.) -- H.H.
Hsiao yao yu: The happy excursion, that is, roaming outside of the realm of matter, following nature, and drifting in the Infinite, resulting in transcendental bliss. (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Hsi ch'ang: Practicing the Eternal; i.e., "seeing what is small," "preserving one's weakness," "employing the light," and "reverting to enlightenment to avoid disaster to life." (Lao Tzu.) -- W.T.C.
Hsien: The Confucians and Mohists demand that people of "superior moral character" should be rewarded and put in power, irrespective of their previous achievements; or "better", someone above the normal level of human capacity, almost a sage. -- H.H.
  1. Heart; mind.
  2. The original or intuitive mind of man which is good (Mencius).
  3. Human desires (the hsin of man as different from the hsin of the Confucian Moral Law or tao).
  4. The Mind which is identical with the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi). (Shao K'ang-chieh, 1011-1077.)
  5. One aspect of the Nature (hsing). "When the Nature is viewed from its goodness, it is the Moral Law (tao); when it is viewed from its essence, it is the Destiny (ming) ; when it is viewed from its natural state or spontaneity, it is Heaven (T'ien); and when it is viewed from its manifestations, it is the Mind (hsin)." (Ch'eng I-ch'uan( 1033-1107.)
  6. "The pure and refined portion of the vital force, ch'i." Being such it "has the Great Ultimate as its Reason (li) and Yin and Yang as its passivity and activity." It is the spiritual faculty or consciousness of man. (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200.)
  7. The mind conceived as identical with the Universe and Reason (li). (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193.)
  8. The mind conceived as identical with Reason (li) and intuition. (Wang Yang-ming, 14-73-1529.)
-- W.T.C.
  1. Good faith, one of the Five Cardinal Confucian Virtues (wu ch'ang); honesty; sincerity; truthfulness; truth. (Confucianism.) "Actualization of honesty (chung)." (Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1086.) See Chung.
  2. Belief; trust.
  3. Power, or the efficacy of the essence of Tao. (Lao Tzu.)
-- W.T.C.
Hsin chai: "Fasting of the mind" is a state of pure experience in which one has no intellectual knowledge, in which there is immediate presentation; the attainment of the mystical state of unity. (Chuang Tzu between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- H.H.
Hsing: The nature of man and things, especially human nature, understood as "what is inborn," or "what is created." It is what is imparted by Heaven, whereas what is received by man and things is fate (ming). The original state of the nature is tranquil. In its aroused state, when it comes into contact with the external world, it becomes feelings (ch'ing).

To Kao Tzu, contemporary of Mencius, human nature is capable of being good or evil; to Mencius (371-289 B.C.), good; to Hsi'm Tzu (c 355-c 238 B.C.), evil; to Tung Cchung-shu (177-104 B.C.), potentially good; to Yang Hsiung (d. 18 B.C.), both good and evil; to Han Yu (676-82+ A.D.), good in some people, mixed in some, and evil in others; to Li Ao (d. c 844), capable of being "reverted" to its original goodness. To the whole Neo-Confucian movement, what is inborn is good, but due to external influence, there is both goodness and evil. Chang Heng-ch'u (1020-1077) said that human nature is good in all men. The difference between them lies in their skill or lack of skill in returning to accord with their original nature. To Ch'eng I-ch'uan (1033-1107) and Ch'eng Ming-tao (1032-1193), man's nature is the same as his vital force (ch'i). They arc both the principle of life. In principle there are both good and evil in the vital force with which man is involved. Man is not born with these opposing elements in his nature. Due to the vital force man may become good or evil. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) regarded the nature as identical with Reason (li). Subjectively it is the nature; objectively it is Reason. It is the framework of the moral order (tao), with benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (ssu tuan) inherent in it. Evil is due to man's failure to preserve a harmonious relation between his nature-principles. Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529) identified the nature with the mind, which is Reason and originally good. -- W.T.C.

Hsing (erh) hsia: What is within the realm of corporeality. See Hsing (erh) shang.
Hsing li hsueh: Philosophy of the Nature and Reason of man and things. See Li hsueh. -- W.T.C.
Hsing ming (chia): The school which advocated government by law (which includes punishment, hsing) and insisted on the correspondence of names (ming) to reality, as represented by Shen Tzu (fourth century B.C.), Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C.), etc. Another name for the Legalist School (fa chia). When hsing is interpreted in the sense of shape to which names must correspond, the term is also applied to the Sophists (ming chia). -- W.T.C.
Hsing (erh) shang: What is above corporeality, such as The Moral Law (tao), Reason (li), etc., the general principle of which is the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi), as contrasted with what is within the realm of corporeality, such as the vital force (ch'i), a material thing (ch'i), etc., the general principles of which are the active (yang) and passive (yin) cosmic forces. (Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism.) -- W.T.C.
Hsiu shen: Cultivating one's personal life, which involves investigation of things, extension of knowledge, sincerity of the will, and rectification of the heart, and which results in the harmony of family life, order in the state, and world peace. (Confucianism.) -- W.T.C.

(a) Emptiness, non-existence, a major characteristic of Tao.

(b) Emptiness of mind in the sense of absolute peace and purity (Taoism), and also in the sense of "not allowing what is already in the mind to disturb what is coming into the mind." (Hsun Tzu, c 335-c 288 B.C.) -- W.T.C.


(a) Mysterious; profound; abstruse.

(b) Another name for Tao, understood in the sense of "Mystery of mysteries, the gate to all existence." (Lao Tzu.)

(c) The Supremely Profound Principle. See T'a hsuan.

(d) The heavens. -- W.T.C.

Hsuan chiao: The Doctrine of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion. -- W.T.C.
Hsuan chieh: Emancipation, to let nature take its course, to be at home with pleasant situations and at ease with misfortune, and not to be affected by sorrow and joy. (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Hsuan hsueh: The system of profound and mysterious doctrines, with special reference to Taoism from the third to the fifth centuries A.D. -- W.T.C.
Hsuan te: (Profound Virtue) "The Way produces things but does not take possession of them. It does its work but does not take pride in it. It rules over things but does not dominate them. This is called Profound Virtue." (Lao Tzu.)

Profound Virtue and Mysterious Power, through the cultivation of one's original nature and the returning to the character of Tao. Thus one "becomes identified with the Beginning, attains emptiness and vastness, and enters into mystic union with the Universe." (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- W.T.C

Hsuan tsung: The Religion of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion. -- W.T.C.
Hsuen men: The School of Mystery, another name for the Taoist religion. -- W.T.C.
Hsun Tzu: (Hsun Ch'ing, Hsun Kuan, c. 335-286 B.C.) For thirty years travelled, offered his service to the various powerful feudal states, and succeeded in becoming a high officer of Ch'i and Ch'u. A great critic of all contemporary schools, he greatly developed Confucianism, became the greatest Confucian except Mencius. Both Han Fei, the outstanding Legalist, and Li Ssu, the premier of Ch'in who effected the first unification of China, were his pupils. (Hsun Tzu, Eng. tr. by H. H. Dubs: The Works of Hsun Tze.) -- W.T.C.
Hsu wu:

(a) Emptiness and non-existence referring to Tao which is so full and real that it appears to be empty and non-existent. "It is in the empty and the non-existent where Tao is found." (Huai-nan Tzu, d. 122 B.C.)

(b) Absence of desire and egotism. (Taoism) -- W.T.C.

Hua: Change, whether natural or infra-natural, transformation, the culmination of the process of change (pien), change from non-ens to ens; sudden change. -- W.T.C.
Huai-nan Tzu: (Liu An, Prince of Huai-nan, d. 122 B.C) Grandson of the founder of the Han dynasty, was a man of Confucian traditions with Taoist inclinations. Thousands of scholars, experts and Taoist magician-priests gathered around him. When his rebellion failed, he committed suicide, leaving Huai-nan Hung-lieh (partial Eng. tr. by E. Morgan: Tao the Great Luminant) and other works now extinct. -- W.T.C.
Huang Lao: The teachings of the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu which emphasized the nourishing of one's original nature and which were very influential in the Han dynasty (206 B.C-220 A.D.). -- W.T.C.
Huang T'ien: August Heaven, identical with Shang Ti.
Hugo of St. Victor: (1096-1141) He was among the leading mystics and presented his summary of theological arguments in his contribution to the popular summa of the so-called summists in his "Summa sententiarum." -- L.E.D.
Huizinga, Johan: (1872) Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leyden, Holland. He has been a pronounced exponent of the philosophy of culture which he describes as a condition of society in which there is a harmonious balance of material and spiritual values and a harmonious ideal spurring the community's activities to a convergence of all efforts toward the attainment of that ideal. His best known work is Homo Ludens. -- L.E.D.
Humanism: (Lat. humanus, human)
  1. Any view in which interest in human welfare is central.
  2. Renaissance revival of classical learning as opposed to merely ecclesiastical studies.
  3. An ethical and religious movement culminating in Auguste Comte's "Worship of Humanity," better known as Humanitarianism.
  4. Philosophical movement represented by F. C. S. Schiller in England, better known as Pragmatism. See Pragmatism.
  5. Literary Humanism, movement led in America by Irving Babbit, Paul Elmer More, Norman Foerster protesting against extreme emphasis on vocational education and recommending return to a classical type of liberal education or study of "the Humanities."
  6. Sociological term for tendency to extend ideals, such as love, loyalty, kindness, service, honesty, which normally prevail in primary or intimate groups to guide conduct in non-primary or impersonal groups.
  7. Religious Humanism is any view which does not consider belief in a deity vital to religion, though not necessarily denying its existence and not necessarily denying practical value to such belief. Represented by a group of left-wing Unitarian ministers and university professors who, in May, 1933, published "The Humanist Manifesto," wherein religion is broadly viewed as a "shared quest for the good life" and social justice and social reform are stressed as important in religious endeavor.
-- A.J.B.
Humanitarianism: (Lat. humanus, human)
  1. Any view in which interest in human values is central.
  2. Any moral or social program seeking to lessen suffering and increase welfare of human beings, often involving intense emotional devotion to social reform, sometimes extending to prevention of cruelty to animals. Philanthropy. Altruism.
  3. Worship of Humanity. Comtean doctrine, based on posit ivistic science, that Humanity, rather than God or Nature is the Great Being worthy of worship.
  4. Theological doctrine denying the divinity of Christ.
-- A.J.B.
Human nature: The limited range of human possibilities. The human tendency toward, or the human capacity for, only those actions which are common in all societies despite their acquired cultural differences. See Primitivism. -- J.K.P.
Hume, David: Born 1711, Edinburgh; died at Edinburgh, 1776. Author of A Treatise of Human Nature, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, Enquiry Concerning the Passions, Enquiry Concerning Morals, Natural History of Religion, Dialogues on Natural Religion, History of England, and many essays on letters, economics, etc. Hume's intellectual heritage is divided between the Cartesian Occasionalists and Locke and Berkeley. From the former, he obtained some of his arguments against the alleged discernment or demonstrability of causal connections, and from the latter his psychological opinions. Hume finds the source of cognition in impressions of sensation and reflection. All simple ideas are derived from and are copies of simple impressions. Complex ideas may be copies of complex impressions or may result from the imaginative combination of simple ideas. Knowledge results from the comparison of ideas, and consists solely of the intrinsic resemblance between ideas. As resemblance is nothing over and above the resembling ideas, there are no abstract general ideas: the generality of ideas is determined by their habitual use as representatives of all ideas and impressions similar to the representative ideas. As knowledge consists of relations of ideas in virtue of resemblance, and as the only relation which involves the connection of different existences and the inference of one existent from another is that of cause and effect, and as there is no resemblance necessary between cause and effect, causal inference is in no case experientially or formally certifiable. As the succession and spatio-temporal contiguity of cause and effect suggests no necessary connection and as the constancy of this relation, being mere repetition, adds no new idea (which follows from Hume's nominalistic view), the necessity of causal connection must be explained psychologically. Thus the impression of reflection, i.e., the felt force of association, subsequent to frequent repetitions of conjoined impressions is the source of the idea of necessity. Habit or custom sufficently accounts for the feeling that everything which begins must have a cause and that similar causes must have similar effects. The arguments which Hume adduced to show that no logically necessary connection between distinct existences can be intuited or demonstrated are among his most signal contributions to philosophy, and were of great importance in influencing the speculation of Kant. Hume explained belief in external existence (bodies) in terms of the propensity to feign the independent and continued existence of perceptual complexes during the interruptions of perception. This propensity is determined by the constancy and coherence which some perceptual complexes exhibit and by the transitive power of the imagination to go beyond the limits afforded by knowledge and ordinary causal belief. The sceptical principles of his epistemology were carried over into his views on ethics and religion. Because there are no logically compelling arguments for moral and religious propositions, the principles of morality and religion must be explained naturalistically in terms of human mental habits and social customs. Morality thus depends on such fundamental aspects of human nature as self-interest and altruistic sympathy. Hume's views on religion are difficult to determine from his Dialogues, but a reasonable opinion is that he is totally sceptical concerning the possibility of proving the existence or the nature of deity. It is certain that he found no connection between the nature of deity and the rules of morality. -- J.R.W.

(a) Jocose imagination; sympathetic wit.

(b) Romantic irony, equivalent of the triumph of the creative power of the artist's soul over all content and all form (Hegel). -- L.V.

Hun: (C.) The active, positive, or heavenly (yang) part of the soul, as contrasted with the passive, negative, or earthly (yin) part of the soul called p'o. Hun is the soul of man's vital force (ch'i) which is expressed in man's intelligence and power of breathing, whereas p'o is the spirit of man's physical nature which is expressed in bodily movements. In heavenly spirits, hun predominates, whereas in earthly spirits, p'o predominates. When hun is separated from p'o in man or things, change ensues. -- W.T.C.
Hung fan: The Grand Norm. See Chiu ch'ou.
Hun mang: The Taoist conception of the Golden Age, in which there was in the beginning, in the time of the primeval chaos, a state of absolute harmony between man and his surroundings, a life as effortless and spontaneous as the passage of the seasons, the two cosmic principles of yin and yang worked together instead of in opposition. -- H.H.
Husserl, Edmund: 1859-1938. See Phenomenology.

Main works of Husserl:

Philosophie der Anthmetik, 1891;
Logische Untersuchungen, 1900;
Ideen z. e. reinen Phänomenologie u. Phenomologische Philos., 1913;
Vorlesungen z. Phanom. d. inneren Bewusstseine, 1928;
Formale u. transz. Logik, 1929;
Meditations Cartesiennes Introd. a la Phenomenologie, 1931;
Die Krisis der europäischen Wissensch u.d. transz. Phanomenologie, I, 1936;
Erfahrung u. Urteil. Untersuch. u. Genealogie der Logik, 1939.

Hussism: The Reformatory views of John Hus (1370-1415). A popular agitator and finally martyr, Hus stood between Wycliffe and Luther in the line of continental Protestant Reformers. He rested authority upon Scripture and defied ecclesiastical bans. The Hussite wars (1419-1432) following his death epitomized the growing nationalism and desire for religious reform. -- V.F.
Hutcheson, Francis: (1694-1746) A prominent Scottish philosopher. Born in Drumalig, Ulster, educated at Glasgow, died in Dublin. The influence of his doctrine of "moral sense," stressing inborn conscience, or "moral feeling," was very wide, he was also the original author of the phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," utilized by J. Bentham (q.v.) for the development of utilitarianism (q.v.) His principal work is Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. -- R.B.W.
Huxley, Thomas Henry: (1825-1895) Was a renowned English scientist who devoted his mastery of expository and argumentative prose to the defense of evolutionism. An example of his scintillating style can be found in his famous essay on "A Piece of Chalk." His works touched frequently on ethical problems and bore much of the brunt of the raging controversy between religion and science. He is credited with having invented the word "agnosticism", adopted by Herbert Spencer. See Evolutionism. -- L.E.D.

Cf. H. Peterson, Thomas Huxlty, for biography and bibliography.

Hyle: See Matter.
Hylomorphism: (also hylemoiphism. Gr. hyle, matter, and morphe, contour, form) A theory that all physical things are constituted of two internal principles: the one of which remains the same throughout all change and is the passive basis of continuity and identity in the physical world, called prime matter; the other of which is displaced, or removed from actuation of its matter, in every substantial change, called substantial form. See Aristotelianism, Thomism, Suarezianism. -- V.J.B.
Hylons: This name (combining the Greek words hyle matter and on being) was given by Mitterer to the heterogeneous subatomic and subelemental particles of matter (electrons, neutrons, protons, positrons) which enter into the composition of the elements without being elements themselves. The natural elements represent distinct types or species of natural bodies, while the hylons do not. These matter-particles have an important role in the exposition of the cosmological doctrine of hylosystemism. -- T.G.
Hylosis: The material states concomitant with a psychosis. (Montague.) -- H.H.
Hylosystemism: A cosmological theory developed by Mitterer principally, which explains the constitution of the natural inorganic body as an atomary energy system. In opposition to hylomorphism which is considered inadequate in the field of nuclear physics, this system maintains that the atom of an element and the molecule of a compound are reallv composed of subatomic particles united into a dynamic system acting as a functional unit. The main difference between the two doctrines is the hylomeric constitution of inorganic matter: the plurality of parts of a particle form a whole which is more than the sum of the parts, and which gives to a body its specific essence. While hylomorphism contends that no real substantial change can occur in a hylomeric constitution besides the alteration of the specific form, hvlosystemism maintains that in substantial change more remains than primary matter and more changes than the substantial form. -- T.G.
Hylotheism: (Gr. hyle matter, and theism q.v.). A synonym for either pantheism or materialism in that this doctrine identifies mattei and god, or has the one merge into the other. -- K.F.L
Hylozoism: (Gr. hyle, mattei -- zoe, life) The doctrine that life is a property of matter, that matter and life are inseparable, that life is derived from matter, or that matter has spiritual properties. The conception of nature as alive or animated, of reality as alive. The original substance as bearing within itself the cause of all motion and change. The early Greek cosmologists of the Milesian school made statements which implied a belief in life for their primary substances. For Straton of Lampsacus each of the ultimate particles of matter possesses life. For the Stoics the universe as a whole is alive. For Spinoza different kinds of things possess life in different grades. -- J.K F.
Hyperaesthesia: (Gr. hyper + aesthesis, sensation) Excessive sensitivity, either sensory or affective. -- L.W.
Hyperbole: (Gr. hyperbole, over-shooting, excess) In rhetoric, that figure of speech according to which expressions gain their effect through exaggeration. The representation of things as greater or less than they really are, not intended to be accepted literally. Aristotle relates, for example, that when the winner of a mule-race paid enough money to a poet who was not anxious to praise half-asses, the poet wrote. "Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds" (Rhetoric, III. ii. 14). -- J.K.F.
Hypnosis: (Gr. hypnos, sleep) A trance-like state characterized by an exaggerated suggestibility and an alteration of the normal functions of memory, of personality and perhaps also of perception. The state is ordinarily induced by another person, but may also be self-induced and then the phenomenon is called auto-hypnosis. -- L.W.
Hypnotism: A general term used to designate hypnotic phenomena including the techniques for inducing hypnosis (see Hypnosis), the therapeutic uses of hypnotic suggestion, etc -- L.W.
Hypostasis: Literally the Greek word signifies that which stands under and serves as a support. In philosophy it means a singular substance, also called a supposite, suppositum, by the Scholastics, especially if the substance is a completely subsisting one, whether non-living or living, irrational or rational. However, a rational hypostasis has the same meaning as the term, person. -- J.J.R.
  1. In general, an assumption, a supposition, a conjecture, a postulate, a condition, an antecedent, a contingency, a possibility, a probability, a principle, a premiss, a ground or foundation, a tentative explanation, a probable cause, a theoretical situation, an academic question, a specific consideration, a conceded statement, a theory or view for debate or action, a likely relation, the conditioning of one thing by another.
  2. In logic, the conditional clause or antecedent in a hypothetical proposition. Also a thesis subordinate to a more general one.
  3. In methodology, a principle offered as a conditional explanation of a fact or a group of facts; or again, a provisional assumption about the ground of certain phenomena, used as a guiding norm in making observations and experiments until verified or disproved by subsequent evidence. A hypothesis is conditional or provisional, because it is based on probable and insufficient arguments or elements; yet, it is not an arbitrary opinion, but a justifiable assumption with some foundation in fact, this accounts for the expectation of some measure of agreement between the logical conclusion or implications drawn from a hypothesis, and the phenomena which are known or which may be determined by further tests. A scientific hypothesis must be
    1. proposed after the observations it must explain (a posteriori),
    2. compatible with established theories,
    3. reasonable and relevant,
    4. fruitful in its applications and controllable,
    5. general in terms and more fundamental than the statements it has to explain.
    A hypothesis is descriptive (forecasting the external circumstances of the event) or explanatory (offering causal accounts of the event). There are two kinds of explanatory hypotheses
    1. the hypothesis of law (or genetic hypothesis) which attempts to determine the manner in which the causes or conditions of a phenomenon operate and
    2. the hypothesis of cause (or causal hypothesis) which attempt to determine the causes or conditions for the production of the phenomenon.
    A working hypothesis is a preliminary assumption based on few, uncertain or obscure elements, which is used provisionally as a guiding norm in the investigation of certain phenomena. Often, the difference between a working hypothesis and a scientific hypothesis is one of degree; and in any case, a hypothesis is seldom verified completely with all its detailed implications.
  4. The Socratic Method of Hypothesis, as developed by Plato in the Phaedo particularly, consists in positing an assumption without questioning its value, for the purpose of determining and analyzing its consequences only when these are clearly debated and judged, the assumption itself is considered for justification or rejection. Usually, a real condition is taken as a ground for inferences, as the aim of the method is to attain knowledge or to favor action. Plato used more specially the word "hypothesis" for the assumptions of geometry (postulates and nominal definitions) Anstotle extended this use to cover the immediate principles of mathematics. It may be observed that the modern hypothetico-deductive method in logical and mathematical theories, is a development of the Socratic method stripped of its ontological implications and purposes.
-- T.G.
Hypothetical sentence or proposition is the same as a conditional ( q.v.) sentence or proposition. -- A.C.
Hypothetical dualism: In epistemology, the theory that the external world is known only by inference. Absolute dualism of mind and external world. Opposite of. presentational realism. -- J.K.F.
Hypothetical imperatives: Term due to Kant which designates all statements of the form, "If you desire so and so, you must, should, or ought to do such and such " In such cases the obligatoriness of the action enjoined depends on the presence in the agent of the desire mentioned. See Categorical imperative. -- W.K.F.
Hypothetical morality: In ethics, any moral imperative stated in hypothetical form. For instance, if thou dost not desire certain consequences, thou shalt not commit adultery. Kant's categorical imperative, stated in hypothetical form. See Hypothesis, Morality. -- J.K.F.
Hypothetical syllogism: See Logic, formal, § 2.
Hysteron proteron: (Gr. hysteron proteron) Literally, making the consequent an antecedent; inverting the logical order by explaining a thing in terms of something which presupposes it. -- G.R.M.