Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1942.
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Saadia, ben Joseph: (Arabic Sa'id Al-Fayyumi) (892-942) Born and educated in Egypt, he left his native country in 915 and settled in Babylonia where he was appointed in 928 Gaon of the Academy of Sura. He translated the Bible into Arabic and wrote numerous works, both in Hebrew and Arabic, in the fields of philology, exegesis, Talmudics, polemics, Jewish history, and philosophy. His chief philosophical work is the Kitab Al-Amanat wa'l-Itikadat, better known by its Hebrew title, Emunot we-Deott, i.e., Doctrines and Religious Beliefs. Its purpose is to prove the compatibility of the principles of Judaism with reason and to interpret them in such a way that their rationality be evident The first nine sections establish philosophically the ten fundamental articles of faith, and the tenth deals with ethics. Philosophically, Saadia was influenced by the teachings of the Mutazilia. See Jewish Philosophy. -- Q.V.
Sabda: (Skr.) Sound, an Indian metaphysical concept; word, particularly the cosmic or divine word (see vac), testimony, a valid source of knowledge in some philosophic systems. -- K.F.L.
Sabellianism: The view of Sabellius who taught in the first half of the third century the doctrine that there is one God but three (successive) modes or manifestations of God: as creator and governor God is Father, as redeemer God is the Son, as regenerator and sanctifier God is the Holy Spirit -- one and the same God. The view approximated the later orthodox Trinitarian conception (see Trinitarianism) but was too harsh to be maintained. Further clarification was needed Sabellianism has been called by several names, Modalism, Modalistic Monarchianism and Patripassianism (Father suffering). -- V.F.
Sacerdotalism: (Lat sacerdotalis pertaining to a priest) A religious system revolving about a priestly order. The term, when employed in a derogatory sense, means the unwholesome preference for ecclesiastical and sacramental observances in contrast to the more valid personal and moral values. -- V.F.
Sadducee-ism: Both a party and a belief so named after the Zadokites, sons of Zadok, the family and temple hierarchy, advocates of the written Torah (teaching) in Judaism, the partv and attitude opposite to the Pharisees and scribes, who prized oral and developing thought as well as the Torah. In general, Sadducee-ism, holding the Law (Pentateuch) to be explicit and its language straight-forward, rejected the Messianic doctrine as regards the House of David, but not as regards a priestly source, and also that of resurrection of the body, but not that of the soul. On the whole, however, Jesus and Paul both proved to be the enemies of Pharisee-ism and in effect sided with the Sadduccees against traditional law. -- F.K.
Saguna: (Skr.) "possessed of qualities" (see guna), predicated of the Absolute from the exoteric point of view of the worshipper, according to Sankara (q.v.; see Nirguna). -- K.F.L.
Saint-Simon, Claude Henry, Count De: (1760-1825) French philosopher who fought with the French army during the American Revolution. He supported the French Revolution. He advocated what he termed a new science of society to do away with inequalities in the distribution of property, power and happiness. Love for the poor and the lowly was basic for the reform he urged. He greatly influenced Comte and Positivism. -- L.E.D.

Main work: L'Industrie on discussions politiques, morales, et philosophiques, dans l'interet de tous les hommes livres a des travaux utiles et independants, 1817. Cf. Oeuvres de Saint-Simon, 46 vols., 1865-77.

Sakti: (Skr.) Strength, might, of feminine gender, the word designates in Tantric (see Tantra) literature the female generative power of energy in the universe, worshipped by the religious as the wife of some deity or other, e.g., as Durga, wife of Shiva. See Shaktism. -- K.F.L.
Samadhi: (Skr.) The final stage in the practice of Yoga (q.v.) according to the Yogasutras (q.v.) in which individuality is given up while merging with the object of meditation; thus producing a state of unqualified blissfulness and unperturbed consciousness, which is moksa (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Samanya: (Skr. similar, generic, etc.) Generality, universality, the universal in contrast to the particular. The universal is understood in the realist manner by the Nyaya- Vaisesika to be eternal and distinct from, yet inherent in the particular, in the nominalist manner, by the Buddhists, to have no intrinsic existence; in the manner of universalia in re by the Jainas and Advaita Vedanta. -- K.F.L.
Same and Other: One of the "persistent problems" of philosophy which goes back at least to Parmenides and Heraclitus (q.v.). In its most general form it raises the question: Is reality explicable in terms of one principle, ultimately the same in all things (monism), or is reality ultimately heterogeneous, requiring a plurality of first principles (pluralism)? Plato really developed the problem (in the Sophist, Parmenides and Timaeus) by suggesting that both sameness and otherness are required for a complete explanation of things. It is closely related to the problems of One and Many, Identity and Difference, of Universal and Individual in Mediaeval Scholasticism. With Hegel and Fichte the problem becomes fused with that of Spirit and Matter, or of Self and Not-self. -- V.J.B.
Samnyasin: (Skr.) A wise man, philosopher. -- K.F.L.
Samsara: (Skr.) "Going about", the passage of the soul in the cycle of births and deaths, the round of existence, transmigration, a universally accepted dogma in India, early justified philosophically on the basis of karma (q.v.). and the nature of atman (q.v.), but its modus operandi variously explained. It is the object of practically every Indian philosophy to find a way to escape from samsara and attain moksa (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Samskara: (Skr. putting together) Mental impression, memory. Also the effects of karma (q.v.) as shaping one's life. -- K.F.L.
San cheng: The Three Rectifications, also called san t'ung, which means that in the scheme of macrocosmos -- microcosmos relationship between man and the universe, the vital force (ch'i) underlying the correspondence should be so directed and controlled that, first of all, the germination of things, its symbolic color, black, and all governmental and social functions corresponding to it; secondly, the sprouting of things together with its symbolic color, white, and social and political correspondences; and, thirdly, the movement of things and its color, red, and correspondence in human affairs -- all become correct. Applied to the interpretation of history, this theory means that the Hsia dynasty (2207-1766 B.C.?) was the reign of Man, the Shang dynasty (1765-1122 B.C.?) that of Earth, and the Chou dynasty (1122?-249 BC ) that of Heaven. (Tung Chung-shu, 177-104 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
San chiao: The three systems, doctrines, philosophies, or religions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. -- W.T.C.
Sanction: A sanction is anything which serves to move (and, in this sense, to oblige) a man to observe or to refrain from a given mode of conduct, any source of motivation, and hence, on a hedonistic theory, any source of pleasure or pain. Gay and Bentham distinguished four such sanctions:
  1. the natural or physical sanction, i.e., the ordinary course of nature,
  2. the virtuous or moral sanction, i.e., the ordinary actions and judgments of one' fellows,
  3. the civil or political sanction, i e , the threat of punishment or the promise of reward made by the government,
  4. the religious sanction, i.e., the fear of God, etc.
J. S. Mill labelled these external, and added an internal sanction, viz., the desire or the feeling of obligation to do the kind of conduct in question. See Obligation. -- W.K.F.
Sanga: (Skr. sticking to) Attachment, especially to material things, or entanglement in earthly cares, considered an impediment to spiritual attainment or moksa (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
San kang: The Three Standards, i.e., the sovereign is the standard of the minister, the father the standard of the son, and the husband the standard of the wife, on the ground that the active or male cosmic principle of the universe (yang), to which the sovereign, the father, and the husband correspond, is the standard of the passive or female cosmic principle (yin) to which is his commentary on the Vedanta (q.v.) respond. (Tung Chung-shu, 177-104 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Sankara: One of the greatest of Indian philosophers, defender of Brahamism, who died about 820 AD., after having led a manysided, partly legendary, life as peripatetic teacher and author of numerous treatises, the most influential of which is his commentary on the Vedanta (s.v.) in which he established the doctrine of advaita (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Sankhya: Perhaps the oldest of the major systems of Indian philosophy (q.v.), founded by Kapila. Originally not theistic, it is realistic in epistemology, dualistic in metaphysics, assuming two moving ultimates, spirit (purusa, q.v.) and matter (prakrti, q.v.) both eternal and uncaused. Prakrti possesses the three qualities or principles of sattva, rajas, tamas (see these and guna), first in equipoise. When this is disturbed, the world in its multifariousness evolves in conjunction with purusa which becomes the plurality of selves in the process. The union (samyoga) of spirit and matter is necessary for world evolution, the inactivity of the former needing the verve of the latter, and the non-intelligence of that needing the guidance of conscious purusa. Successively, prakrti produces mahat or buddhi, ahamkara, manas, the ten indriyas, five tanmatras and five mahabhutas (all of which see). -- K.F.L.
Sankhya-karika: (Skr.) The earliest extant text of the Sankhya by Isvarakrsna; a famous commentary on it is that of Gaudeapada. -- K.F.L.
San piao: The three laws in reasoning and argumentation, namely, that "there must be a basis or foundation" which can be "found in a study of the experiences of the wisest men of the past," that "there must be a general survey" by "examining (its compatibility with) the facts of the actual experience of the people," and that "there must be practical application" by "putting it into law and governmental policies, and see whether or not it is conducive to the welfare of the state and of the people." (Mo Tzu, between 500 and 396 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Santayana, George: For Santayana (1863-), one of the most eminent of contemporary naturalists, consciousness, instead of distorting the nature of Reality immediately reveals it. So revealed, Reality proclaims itself an infinity of essences (Platonic Ideas) subsisting in and by themselves, some of which are entertained by minds, and some of which are also enacted in and by a non-mental substratum, substance or matter, which adds concrete existence to their subsistence. The presence of this substratum, though incapable of rational proof, is assumed in action as a matter of animal faith. Furthermore, without it a selective principle, the concrete enactment of some essences but not of others is inexplicable.

Matter, among other things, is external to and independent of consciousness, spatially extended, unequally distributed (corporeal), subject to locomotion and perhaps to intrinsic alteration in its parts, and capable of becoming conscious. Its selective and progressive enactment of essences is not teleological or intelligent, but is actuated by efficient causation and predetermined by antecedent situations.

In organic bodies matter may become conscious. Mind, being an activity of the body, and unsubstantial, is not causally effective, but simply entertains and contemplates essences both enacted and unenacted. Its registration of the natural functions and drives of the body of which it is the aura, is desire, which gives values like truth, goodness, and beauty to the essences entertained. The desire to know, satisfied by intelligibility, creates science, which is investigation of the world of enacted essences, where alone the explanation of things is to be found.The natural desire to experience social harmony and to contemplate beauty creates morality, art, poetry and religion, which entertain in imagination and seek to make concrete by action, combinations of essences, often unenacted and purely ideal.

These desires and drives, however, tend to stray beyond their proper provinces and to become intermingled and confused in attempts to identify truth, goodness, and beauty, to turn justifications into explanations, to regard subsistent ideals as concretely existent facts, and to distort facts into accordance with desired ideals. It is the business of reason and philosophy to clear up this confusion by distinguishing human drives and interests from one another, indicating to each its proper province and value, and confining each to the field in which it is valid and in which its appropriate satisfaction may be found. By so doing, they dispel the suspicion and antagonism, with which the scientist, the moralist, the artist, and the theologian are wont to view one another, and enable a mind at harmony with itself to contemplate a world in which subsistent and the existent form a harmonious whole. --

Main works:

Sense and Beauty, 1896;
Interpret. of Poetry and Religion, 1900;
Life of Reason, 5 vols , 1905-6 (Reason in Common Sense, Reason in Society, Reason in Religion, Reason in Art, Reason in Science);
Winds of Doctrine, 1913;
Egotism in German Philosophy, 1915;
Character and Opinion in the U. S., 1920;
Skepticism and Animal Faith, 1923;
Realms of Being, 4 vols., 1927-40 (Realm of Essence, Realm of Matter, Realm of Truth, Realm of Spirit).
-- B.A.G.F.
Sarva-darsana-sangraha: (Skr.) A work by Madhvavacarya, professing to be a collection (sangraha) of all (sarva) philosophic views (darsana) or schools. It includes systems which acknowledge and others which reject Vedic (s.v.) authority, such as the Carvaka, Buddhist and Jaina schools (which see). -- K.F.L.
Sarvakartrtva: (Skr.) "All makingness", descriptive of the ultimate principle in the universe, conceived dynamically. -- K.F.L.
Sarvam khalv idam brahma: (Skr.) "Indeed, all this is brahman", a famous dictum of Chan-dogya Upanishad 3.14.1, symptomatic of the monistic attitude later elaborated in Sankara's Vedanta (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Sarvasti-vada: (Skr.) The doctrine (vada) of Hinayana Buddhism according to which "all is" (sarvam asti), or all is real, that which was, currently is, and will be but now is, potentially. -- K.F.L.
Sastra: (Skr.) A Sanskrit textbook. -- K.F.L.
Sat: (Skr.) Being, a metaphysical concept akin to Eleatic thinking, which a school of thinkers regards as fundamental, as in Chandogya Upanishad 6.2.1 "In the beginning . . . this world was just being, one only, without a second." It refutes the theory of non-being. (See asat). -- K.F.L.
Sat-cit-ananda, saccidananda: (Skr.) "Being-awareness-bliss", a Vedantic (s.v.) definition of the highest, all-inclusive reality, also of the atman (q.v.) insofar as it has attained its full realization. -- K.F.L.
Satire: Art holding vice or folly up to ridicule, or lampooning individuals through the use of irony or sarcasm. -- L.V.
Sattva: (Skr. "be-ness") Being, existence, reality, etc. Also one of the three gunas (q.v.) of the Sankhya (q.v.) and as such the quality of buoyancy, pleasure, and goodness of matter or prakrti (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Satya: (Skr.) Actual, real, true, valid, truth, reality, the real. -- K.F.L.
Sautrantika: A Buddhist school of representationalism, same as Bahyanumeya-vada (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Scepticism: (1) a proposition about the limitations of knowledge: that no knowledge at all or that no absolute, unquestionable, trustworthy, certain, complete, or perfect knowledge (or rationally justifiable belief) is attainable by man; or that such is not attainable by any knower, or that none of these kinds of knowledge, if attained, would be recognizable as such; or that no such knowledge is attainable about certain subjects, e g , questions about cxistence, ultimate reality, certain religious beliefs, or the existence or nature of certain entities (e.g., God, one's self, other selves, values, an external world, or causal connections); or that one or more or all of these types of knowledge is not attainable by certain methods or media, e g, reason, infeience, revelation, any non-empirical method, direct observation, or immediate experience (hence identification of scepticism variously with inti-rationalism, anti-supernaturalism, or doctrines of relativity of the senses or relativity of all knowledge);

(2) a proposition about a method of obtaining knowledge: that every hypothesis should be subjected to continual testing; that the only or the best or a reliable method of obtaining knowledge of one or more of the above kinds is to doubt until something indubitable or as nearly indubitable as possible is found; that wherever evidence is indecisive, judgment should be suspended; that knowledge of all or certain kinds at some point rests on unproved postulates or assumptions;

(3) a proposition about values: that morality is entirely a matter of individual preference; or that there are no fixed and eternal values; or that all values are relative to time, place, or other circumstance (these propositions, properly or improperly, have been called scepticism because of their association with certain other propositions here mentioned);

(4) a method of intellectual caution; systematic suspense of judgment on the basis of some criteria of certainty or truth; criticism, particularly in absence of conclusive evidence; questioning or doubting as a means to gaining absolute or relative certainty;

(5) an attitude, belief, postulate, assumption, assertion, or tendency favoring any of the above propositions or methods; an attitude of complete or dogmatic disbelief, an attitude involving greater inclination to disbelief than to belief; an attitude involving no greater inclination to belief than to disbelief nor to disbelief than to belief, but favoring dispassionate consideration. Scepticism may be treated as such attitudes, beliefs, etc., as applied to all or only certain particular propositions;

(6) a proposition negating the sincerity, rectitude, or existence of motives of human conduct other than selfish or at least negating their significance in human affairs, or a proposition expressing lack of confidence in the worth or hope of success of any one or all of man's enterprises (cynicism), or an attitude, belief, postulate, assumption, assertion, or tendency favoring such propositions, or moroseness, surliness, or pessimism growing out of cynicism or any of the aforesaid attitudes, beliefs, etc. Confusion of cynicism with other conceptions of scepticism may result in great misunderstanding and harm. See Pyrrhonism, agnosticism. -- M.T.K.

Scepticism, Fourteenth Century: At the beginning of the 14th century, Duns Scotus adopted a position which is not formally sceptical, though his critical attitude to earlier scholasticism may contain the germs of the scepticism of his century. Among Scotistic pre-sceptical tendencies may be mentioned the stress on self-knowledge rather than the knowledge of extra-mental reality, psychological voluntarism which eventuallj made the assent of judgment a matter of will rather than of intellect, and a theory of the reality of universal essences which led to a despair of the intellect's capacity to know such objects and thus spawned Ockhamism. Before 1317, Henry of Harclay noticed that, since the two terms of efficient causal connection are mutually distinct and absolute things, God, by his omnipotent will, can cause anything which naturally (naturaliter) is caused by a finite agent. He inferred from this that neither the present nor past existence of a finite external agent is necessarily involved in cognition (Pelstex p. 346). Later Petrus Aureoli and Ockham made the sime observation (Michalski, p. 94), and Ockham concluded that natural knowledge of substance and causal connection is possible only on the assumption that nature is pursuing a uniform, uninterrupted course at the moment of intuitive cognition. Without this assumption, observed sequences might well be the occasion of direct divine causal action rather than evidence of natural causation. It is possible that these sceptical views were suggested by reading the arguments of certain Moslem theologians (Al Gazali and the Mutakallimun), as well as by a consideration of miracles. The most influential sceptical author of the fourteenth century was Nicholas of Autrecourt (fl. 1340). Influenced perhaps by the Scotist conception of logical demonstration, Nicholas held that the law of noncontradiction is the ultimate and sole source of certainty. In logical inference, certainty is guaranteed because the consequent is identical with part or all of the antecedent. No logical connection can be established, therefore, between the existence or non-existence of one thing and the existence or non-existence of another and different thing. The inference from cause to effect or conversely is thus not a matter of certainty. The existence of substance, spiritual or physical, is neither known nor probable. We are unable to infer the existence of intellect or will from acts of intellection or volition, and sensible experience provides no evidence of external substances. The only certitudes properly so-called are those of immediate experience and those of principles known ex terminis together with conclusions immediately dependent on them. This thoroughgoing scepticism appears to have had considerable influence in its time, for we find many philosophers expressing, expounding, or criticizing it. John Buridan has a detailed criticism in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics (in 1 I, q. 4), Fitz-Ralph, Jacques d'Eltville, and Pierre d'Ailly maintain views similar to Nicholas', with some modifications, and there is at least one exposition of Nicholas' views in an anonymous commentary on the Sentences (British Museum, Ms. Harley 3243). These sceptical views were usually accompanied by a kind of probabilism. The condemnation of Nicholas in 1347 put a damper on the sceptical movement, and there is probably no continuity from these thinkers to the French sceptics of the 16th century. Despite this lack of direct influence, the sceptical arguments of 14th century thinkers bear marked resemblances to those employed by the French Occasionalists, Berkeley and Hume.

Michalski, C.,
Les sources du criticisme et du scepticisme dans la philosophie, du XIV e s., (Cracovie, 1924).
Pelster, F.,
Heinrich v. Harclay u. seine Quaestionen, Miscel. Fr. Ehrle, I, 307-355.
Rashdall, H.,
"Nicholas de Ultricuria, a medieval Hume," Proc. Aristotel. Soc. (Lond. 1907) N. S. VIII, 1-27.
-- V.J.B.
Scheler, Max (1874-1928) was originally a disciple of Rudolf Eucken, but joined early -- at the University of Munich -- the Husserl circle of phenomenologists, of which school he became one of the leading exponents. Moving from Kantianism and Eucken-personalism into phenomenology, he later espoused successively positions which may be called a synthesis between phenomenology and Catholic philosophy, sociological dynamism, and ideo-realistic humanism. He was the psychologist, ethicist, and religious and social philosopher of the phenomenological movement. In common with other phenomenologists, Scheler's doctrine begins with the assertion of an inherent correlation of the essences of objects with the essences of intentional experience. His unique contributions lie in the comprehensiveness of his vision, in his interpretation of the value-qualities of being; of emotional experience, especially love, as the key for the disclosure of being; of a hierarchy of concrete ("material" as against formal) values; of an analysis of "resentment" as a thorough grudge (rancour) perverted emotional attitude towards the values of life; of his definition of "person" as the concrete unity of acts; of his acknowledgment of total personality beyond individual persons; of his definition of "ethos" as a preferential system of values determinative for the validity of any specific thought-form; of his development of the sociology of knowledge as a distinct discipline within cultural sociology; and of his working out of a philosophical anthropology showing man's position in and towards the whole of being. His most important works include:
Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (1900);
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1916);
Vom Ewigen in Menschen (1921); Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1923);
Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (3 vols., 1923-1924);
Die Wissensformen und dte Gesellschaft (1926);
Die Stellung des Menschen in Kosmos (1928);
Philosophische Weltanschauung (1929);
Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre (1933).
-- P.A.S.
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775-1854) Founder of the philosophy of identity which holds that subject and object coincide in the Absolute, a state to be realized in intellectual intuition. Deeply involved in romanticism, Schelling's philosophy of nature culminates in a transcendental idealism where nature and spirit are linked in a series of developments by unfolding powers or potencies, together forming one great organism in which nature is dynamic visible spirit and spirit invisible nature. Freedom and necessity are different refractions of the same reality. Supplementing science -- which deals with matter as extinguished spirit and endeavors to rise from nature to intelligence -- philosophy investigates the development of spirit, theoretically practically, and artistically, converts the subjective into the objective, and shows how the world soul or living principle animates the whole. Schelling's monism recognizes nature and spirit as real and ideal poles respectively, the latter being the positive one. It is pantheistic and aesthetic in that it allows the world process to create with free necessity unconsciously at first in the manner of an artist. Art is perfect union of freedom and necessity, beauty reflects the infinite in the finite. History is the progressive revelation of the Absolute. The ultimate thinking of Schelling headed toward mysticism in which man, his personality expanded into the infinite, becomes absorbed into the absolute self, free from necessity, contingency, consciousness, and personality. Sämmtliche Werke, 14 vols. (1856, re-edited 1927). Cf. Kuno Fischer, Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre; E. Brehier, Schelling, 1912; V. Jankelevitch, L'Odysee de la conscience dans la derniere philosophie de Schelling, 1933. -- K.F.L.
Schema: (Gr. schema) Figure, external form or structural plan, specifically, in Aristotle's logic, a syllogistic figure. -- G.R.M.

In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Analytic): The procedure of the imagination by which the categories of the understanding are applied to the manifold of sensuous intuitions. Imagination, working with the pure form of time, connects sense and understanding. This is possible because the imagination contains an element of both sense and understanding, and thus is capable of formulating the rules and procedures by means of which sensuous representations may be subsumed under pure concepts. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.

Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott: (1864-1937), unwilling to accept the idealism current at Oxford in his day on grounds that it was "absolutist", sought by a metaphysical pluralism not only to account for the unity and multiplicity of things, but also to furnish the basis for evolution theory. His developed philosophical position was generally known as "personal idealism", or "humanism", though it was closely akin to the pragmatism of William James. The kinship may be seen in Schiller's thesis that a theory of knowledge cannot be formed by abstracting from man's total experience, and may be seen further in his advocacy of the "logic of discovery" over the "logic of proof." Main works: Riddles of the Sphinx, 1891; Humanism, 1903; Logic For Use, 1930. -- C.K.D.
Schism: The withdrawal of a party from an established group and its inclination to form a new order. The term may also mean "dissension." The former meaning, however, is the usual one. Thus, the separation of the Greek and the Roman Catholic churches (culminating in 1054) is known as the ''Great Schism." -- V.F.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel (1768-1834): Religion, in which Schleiermacher substitutes for a theology (regarded impossible because of the unknowableness of God) the feeling of absolute dependence, is sharply delineated from science as the product of reason in which nature may ultimately attain its unity. Schleiermacher, a romanticist, exhibits Fichtean and Schellingean influence, and transcends Kant by proclaiming an ideal realism. Nature, the totality of existence, is an organism, just as knowledge is a system. Through the unity of the real and the ideal, wisdom, residing with the Absolute as the final unity, arises and is ever striven for by man. A determinism is evident in religion where sin and grace provide two poles and sin is regarded partly avoidable, partly unreal, and in ethics where freedom is admitted only soteriologically as spontaneous acknowledgment of identity with the divine in the person of Christ. However, the right to uniqueness and individuality in which each attains his real nature, is stressed. An elaborate ethics is based on four goods: State, Society, School, and Church, to which accrue virtues and duties. An absolute good is lacking, except insofar as it lies in the complete unity of reason and nature. -- K.F.L.

Complete works: Werke 32 vols., 1835-64. Cf. W. Dilthey: Das Leben Schleiermachers.

Schlick, Moritz: (1882-1936) Taught at Rostock, Kiel, Vienna, also visit, prof.; Stanford, Berkeley. Founder of the Vienna Circle (see Scientific empiricism.) Called his own view "Consistent Empiricism." Main contributions: A logically revised correspondence view of the nature of truth. A systematic epistemology based on the distinction of (immediate) experience and (relational) knowledge. Clarified the analytic -- a priori character of logic and mathematics (by disclosing the "implicit definitions" in postulate systems). Repudiation of Kantian and phenomenological (synthetic) apriorism. Physicalistic, epistemological solution of the psycho-physical problem in terms of a double language theory. Earlier critical-realistic views were later modified and formulated as Empirical Realism. Greatly influenced in this final phase by Carnap and especially Wittgenstein, he considered the logical clarification of meanings the only legitimate task of a philosophy destined to terminate the strife of systems. Important special applications of this general outlook to logic and methodology of science (space, time, substance, causality, probability, organic life) and to problems of ethics (meaning of value judgments, hedonism, free-will, moral motivation). An optimistic, poetic view of the meaning of life is expressed in only partly published writings on a "Philosophy of Youth."

Major publications: Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin 1925; Gesammelte Aufsätze, Wien, l938; Problems of Ethics (Rynin, transl.), New York 1939. -- S.S.S.

Scholasticism: Scholasticism is both a method and system of thought. The name is derived from its proponents who were called doctores scholastici. This term, in turn, came from scholazein, which originally meant to have leisure or spare time but later, as in Xen. Cyr. 7. 5, 39, took the meaning to denote oneself to pupils or, conversely, to a master. The term Skolastikos is used for the first time by Theophrastus as recorded by Diog. L. 5. 37 (or V. 50 according to Ueberweg). From Roman antiquity the expression was handed down to the ninth century, when doctores scholastici came into general usage and was applied indifferently to those who taught the seven liberal arts or theology in the cloister and cathedral schools.

Hence in its widest sense Scholasticism embraces all the intellectual activities, artistic, philosophical and theological, carried on in the medieval schools. Any attempt to define its narrower meaning in the field of philosophy raises serious difficulties, for in this case, though the term's comprehension is lessened, it still has to cover many centuries of many-faced thought. However, it is still possible to list several characteristics sufficient to differentiate Scholastic from non-Scholastic philosophy.

  1. While ancient philosophy was the philosophy of a people and modern thought that of individuals, Scholasticism was the philosophy of a Christian society which transcended the characteristics of individuals, nations and peoples. It was the corporate product of social thought, and as such its reasoning respected authority in the forms of tradition and revealed religion.
  2. Tradition consisted primarily in the systems of Plato and Aristotle as sifted, adapted and absorbed through many centuries.
  3. It was natural that religion, which played a paramount role in the culture of the middle ages, should bring influence to bear on the medieval, rational view of life. Revelation was held to be at once a norm and an aid to reason. Since the philosophers of the period were primarily scientific theologians, their rational interests were dominated by religious preoccupations. Hence, while in general they preserved the formal distinctions between reason and faith, and maintained the relatively autonomous character of philosophy, the choice of problems and the resources of science were controlled by theology.
  4. The most constant characteristic of Scholasticism was its method. This was formed naturally by a series of historical circumstances,
    1. The need of a medium of communication, of a consistent body of technical language tooled to convey the recently revealed meanings of religion, God, man and the material universe led the early Christian thinkers to adopt the means most viable, most widely extant, and nearest at hand, viz. Greek scientific terminology. This, at first purely utilitarian, employment of Greek thought soon developed under Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origin, and St. Augustine into the "Egyptian-spoils" theory; Greek thought and secular learning were held to be propaedeutic to Christianity on the principle: "Whatever things were rightly said among all men are the property of us Christians." (Justin, Second Apology, ch. XIII). Thus was established the first characteristic of the Scholastic method: philosophy is directly and immediately subordinate to theology.
    2. Because of this subordinate position of philosophy and because of the sacred, exclusive and total nature of revealed wisdom, the interest of early Christian thinkers was focused much more on the form of Greek thought than on its content and, it might be added, much less of this content was absorbed by early Christian thought than is generally supposed. As practical consequences of this specialized interest there followed two important factors in the formation of Scholastic philosophy:
      1. Greek logic en bloc was taken over by Christians;
      2. from the beginning of the Christian era to the end of the XII century, no provision was made in Catholic centers of learning for the formal teaching of philosophy. There was a faculty to teach logic as part of the trivium and a faculty of theology.
      For these two reasons, what philosophy there was during this long period of twelve centuries, was dominated first, as has been seen, by theology and, second, by logic. In this latter point is found rooted the second characteristic of the Scholastic method: its preoccupation with logic, deduction, system, and its literary form of syllogistic argumentation.
    3. The third characteristic of the Scholastic method follows directly from the previous elements already indicated. It adds, however, a property of its own gained from the fact that philosophy during the medieval period became an important instrument of pedogogy. It existed in and for the schools. This new element coupled with the domination of logic, the tradition-mindedness and social-consciousness of the medieval Christians, produced opposition of authorities for or against a given problem and, finally, disputation, where a given doctrine is syllogistically defended against the adversaries' objections. This third element of the Scholastic method is its most original characteristic and accounts more than any other single factor for the forms of the works left us from this period. These are to be found as commentaries on single or collected texts; summae, where the method is dialectical or disputational in character.
The main sources of Greek thought are relatively few in number: all that was known of Plato was the Timaeus in the translation and commentary of Chalcidius. Augustine, the pseudo-Areopagite, and the Liber de Causis were the principal fonts of Neoplatonic literature. Parts of Aristotle's logical works (Categoriae and de Interpre.) and the Isagoge of Porphyry were known through the translations of Boethius. Not until 1128 did the Scholastics come to know the rest of Aristotle's logical works. The golden age of Scholasticism was heralded in the late XIIth century by the translations of the rest of his works (Physics, Ethics, Metaphysics, De Anima, etc.) from the Arabic by Gerard of Cremona, John of Spain, Gundisalvi, Michael Scot, and Hermann the German, from the Greek by Robert Grosseteste, William of Moerbeke, and Henry of Brabant. At the same time the Judae-Arabian speculation of Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avencebrol, Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides together with the Neoplatonic works of Proclus were made available in translation. At this same period the Scholastic attention to logic was turned to metaphysics, even psychological and ethical problems and the long-discussed question of the universals were approached from this new angle. Philosophy at last achieved a certain degree of autonomy and slowly forced the recently founded universities to accord it a separate faculty.

Though the roots of Scholasticism are to be found in the preoccupation of the Patristical (vide) period, its proper history does not begin until the Carolingian renaissance in the ninth century. From that date to the present day, its history may be divided into seven divisions.

I. Period of Preparation (9-12 cent.). Though he does not belong in time to this period, the most dominant figure in Christian thought was St. Augustine (+430), who constructed the general framework within which all subsequent Scholastic speculation operated. Another influential figure was Boethius (+525) whose opuscula sacra established the Scholastic method and who furnished many of the classical definitions and axioms. The first great figure of this period was John Scottus Erigena (+c. 877) who introduced to Latin thought the works of Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite, broadened the Scholastic method by his glossary on Boethius' opuscule sacra and made an unfruitful attempt to interest his contemporaries in natural philosophy by his semi-pantheistic De Divisione Naturae. Other figures of note: Gerbert (+1003) important in the realm of mathematics and natural philosophy; Fulbert of Chartres (+1028) influential in the movement to apply dialectics to theology; Berengar of Tours (+1088) Fulbert's disciple, who, together with Anselm the Peripatetic, was a leader in the movement to rationalize theology. Peter Damiani (+1072), preached strongly against this rationalistic spirit. More moderate and more efficacious in his reaction to the dialectical spirit of his age was Lawfranc (+1089), who strove to define the true boundaries of faith and reason.

II. Early Scholastics (12 cent.) St. Anselm of Canterbury (+1109) did more than anyone else in this early period to codify the spirit of Scholasticism. His motto: credo, ut tntelligam taken from St. Augustine, expressed the organic relation that existed between the supernatural and the natural during the Middle Ages and the interpretative and the directive force which faith had upon reason. In this period a new interest was taken in the problem of the universals. For the first time a clear demarcation was noted between the realistic and the nominalistic solutions to this problem. William of Champeaux (+1121) proposed the former and Roscelin (+c. 1124) the latter. A third solution, concepiualistic in character, was proposed by Abelard (+1142) who finally crystalized the Scholastic method. He was the most subtle dialectician of his age. Two schools of great importance of this period were operating at Chartres and the Parisian Abbey of St. Victor. The first, founded by Fulbert of Chartres in the late tenth century, was characterized by its leanings toward Platonism and distinguished by its humanistic tendencies coupled with a love of the natural sciences. Many of its Greek, Arabian and Jewish sources for studies in natural sciences came from the translations of Constantine the African (+c. 1087) and Adelard of Bath. Worthy to be noted as members of or sympathizers with this school are Bernard and Thierry of Chartres (+c. 1127; c. 1150); William of Conches (+1145) and Bernard Silvestris (+1167). The two most important members of the School were Gilbert de la Poiree (+1154) and John of Salisbury (+1180). The latter was a humanistic scholar of great stylistic skill and calm, balanced judgment. It is from his works, particularly the Metalogicus, that most of our knowledge of this period still derives. Juxtaposed to the dialectic, syllogistic and rationalistic tendencies of this age was a mystical movement, headed by St. Bernard of Clairvaux (+1153). This movement did not oppose itself to dialectics in the uncompromising manner of Peter Damiani, but sought rather to experience and interiorize truth through contemplation and practice. Bernard found a close follower and friend in William of St. Thierry (+1148 or 1153). An attempt to synthesize the mystic and dialectical movements is found in two outstanding members of the Victorine School: Hugh of St. Victor (+1141) who founded its spirit in his omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse supervuum and Richard of St. Victor (+1173), his disciple, who introduced the a posteriori proof for God's existence into the Scholastic current of thought. Finally, this century gave Scholasticism its principal form of literature which was to remain dominant for some four centuries. While the method came from Abelard and the formulas and content, in great part, from the Didascalion of Hugh of St. Victor, it was Robert of Melun (+1167) and especially Peter the Lombard (+1164) who fashioned the great Summae sententiarum.

III. Golden Age (13 cent.). The sudden elevation of and interest in philosophy during this period can be attributed to the discovery and translation of Aristotelian literature from Arabian, Jewish and original sources, together with the organization of the University of Paris and the founding of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders. Names important in the introduction and early use of Aristotle are Dominic Gundisalvi, William of Auvergne (+ 1149), Alexander Neckam (+1217), Michael Scot (+c. 1234) and Robert Grosseteste (+ 1253). The last three were instrumental in interesting Scholastic thought in the natural sciences, while the last (Robert), if not the author of, was, at least, responsible for the first Summa philosophiae of Scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy has now reached the systematizing and formularizing stage and so on the introduction of Aristotle's works breaks up into two camps: Augustinianism, comprising those who favor the master theses of Augustine and look upon Aristotle with varying degrees of hostility; Aristotelianism, comprising those who favor Aristotle, without altogether abandoning the Augustinian framework.

Augustinianism. Alexander of Hales (+1245) is the founder of this line and the first great Scholastic to utilize all of Aristotle's works, whose terminology and concepts he adopted rather than the spirit. Others worthy of mention are John de la Rochelle (+1145), Adam of Marsh (+1258) and Thomas of York (+1260). The Metaphysica of this latter constitutes a milestone in philsophy's fight for autonomy. The outstanding representative of this group is Bonaventure (+1274), who combined great constructive ability with profound psychological and mystical insight. Prominent among his pupils were Matthew of Aquasparta (+1302), John Peckham (+1292), William de la Mare (+1298) and Walter of Brügge (+1306). Also prominent in this line are Roger of Marston, Richard of Middleton (+1308), a forerunner of Duns Scotus, William of Ware, Duns Scotus' master, and Peter Johannis Olivi (+1298). Among the Dominicans who belonged to this group should be mentioned Roland of Cremona, Peter of Tarantaise (+1276), Richard Fitzacre (+1248) and Robert Kilwardby (+1279). Among the secular clergy, although more independent in their allegiance, we may place here Gerard of Abbeville and Henri of Ghent (1293).

Aristotelianism. In this group there are two broad currents of thought. The first attempted to harmonize Aristotle with St. Augustine and the Church's dogmas. This line was founded by St. Albert the Great (+1280), who amassed the then known Aristotelian literature but failed to construct any coherent synthesis. His pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas (+1274) succeeded to a remarkable degree. From the standpoint of clarity and formularization, St. Thomas marks the apex of medieval Scholasticism. Pupils and adherents worthy of note among Albert's, Hugo and Ulrich of Strassburg, this latter (+c. 1277), together with Dietrich of Freiberg (+c. 1310) revealing marked Neo-platonic tendencies; among Thomas', Aegidius of Lessines (+1304), Herveus Natalis (Herve Nedelec, +1318), John (de Regina) of Naples (+c. 1336), Aegidius Romanus (+1316), Godfrey of Fontaines ( + 1306 or 1309), quite independent in his allegiance, and the great Dante Alighieri (+1321).

The second broad current of thought is Latin Averroism. This movement, accepting Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle and his doctrine of separated orders of truth, gave birth to the two-truth theory which eventually led to rationalism and which together with nominalism brought about the first decline of Scholasticism. The main proponents of this period were Siger of Brabant (+1282), Boece of Dacie and perhaps Bernier of Nivelles.

Another movement of thought worthy of note was Neoplatonism. Grounded by Ulrich of Srassburg on texts found in Albert the Great, this movement gathered momentum, particularly in Germany under Dietrich of Freiberg until it ended in the mysticism of Meister Eckehart (+1327).

Other figures worthy of mention who fit wholly into none of the above currents of thought are Raymond Lull (+1315), an active opponent of Averroism and the inventor of the famous Ars magna which intrigued young Leibnitz; Roger Bacon (+c. 1293) who under the influence of Platonism, furthered the mathematical and experimental methods; William of Moerbeke (+1286), one of the greatest philologists of the M.A., who greatly improved the translations of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic literature by consulting directly Greek sources; the first proponents of the via moderna doctrine in Logic, William Shyreswood (+1249) and Petrus Hispanus (+1277).

Finally the period ends with the great John Duns Scotus (+1308), whose thought is characterized by great acuteness and a fine critical sense. In opposition to that of St. Thomas, his synthesis lays greater stress on the traditional Augustinian theses.

IV. First Decline. (14-16 cent.) St. Thomas' position in many points had been so radical a departure from the traditional thought of Christendom that many masters in the late XIII and early XIV centuries were led to reexamine philosophy in the light of Aristotle's works. This gave rise to a critical and independent spirit which multiplied systems and prepared for the individualism of the Renaissance. Noteworthy in this movement are James of Metz, Durand de St. Pourcain (+1334), Peter Aureoli (+1322) and Henry of Harclay (+1317). The greatest figure, however, is William of Occam (+1349), founder of modern thought, who renewed the Nominalism of the XI and XII cent., restricted the realm of reason but made it quite independent in its field. In reaction to this critical and independent movement, many thinkers gathered about the two great minds of the past century. Thomas and Duns Scotus, contenting themselves with merely reproducing their masters' positions. Thus Scholasticism broke up into three camps: Thomism, Scotism and Nominalism or Terminism; the first two stagnant, the third free-lance.

Nominalism: critical and skeptical, this is the largest and most influential school of the period. Important members are, first, Occam's pupils Adam Wodham (+1358), Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot (+1349), then come Gregory of Rimini (+1358), John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, a medieval Hume, John Buridan (+c. 1360) and Nicholas of Oresme (+1382), two forerunners of modern physics and astronomy, Albert of Sachsen (+1390), first Rector of University of Vienna, Peter d'Ailly (+1420), John Gerson (+1429), Marsilius of Inghen (+1396), first Rector of Heidelberg, and Gabriel Biel (+1495), who introduced Luther to Occamism.

Scotism: from the standpoints of number and influence, this was the next most important school of this period. Among the pupils of Duns Scotus, may be mentioned Anthony Andreas (+1320), Francis of Meyronnes (de Mayronis) (+1325) and John de Bassolis (+1347). Walter Burleigh (+1343) was a vigorous opponent of Nominalism; Thomas Bradwardine (+1349), a mathematician and philosopher whose determinism influenced John Wiclif (+1384), John Hus and the German reformers. In the XV cent., this school is represented by William of Vaurouillon (+1464), Nicholas of Orbelhs (+1455), John Anglicus, Thomas Bricot and the great Peter Tartaret (+1494).

Thomists: John Capreolus, Thomistarum princeps, (+1444), Denis the Carthusian (+1471) and Peter Nigri (+c. 1484). Two other important schools of this period are the Latin Averroists and the Mystics. In the first group we find Peter d'Abano (+1315) who made Padua the center of this movement, John of Jandun (+1328), John Baconthorp (+1348), Averroistarum princeps, Paul of Perusio, Paul of Venice (+1429), Cajetan of Tiene (+1465).

The mystical school, dominated by Eckehart, and the famous Peter Pomponazzi (+1525), is represented by Tauler (+1361) and Seuse (+1366), who tried to conform the Master's teaching with the Church's dogmas, and Jan van Ruysbroeck (+1381). From this school stemmed the anonymous "Deutsche Theologie" which Luther edited (1516). Gerson belonged to this group and also Nicholas of Cusa (+1464), the first systematic philosopher of modern times.

V. Spanish Renaissance (16-17 cent.). This renaissance took place in the Thomistic school and was remotely prepared for by such figures as Thomas del Vio (Cajetan) (+1534), Peter Crockaert (+1514), Francis de Sylvestris (+1528), Conrad Koellin (1536) and Chrysostom Javellus (+1550). It began as a concerted movement under Francis Victoria (+1566) at Salamanca and Ignatius Loyola (+1556), founder of the Society of Jesus. Dominicans of note were: Dominic Soto (1560), Melchior Cano (+1560), de Medina (+1581), and Banez (+1604). Jesuits: Francis Toledo (+1596), Fonseca (+1599), Molina (+1600), Vasquez (+1604), Lessius (+1623), de Valentia (+1603), B»llarmine (+1625), Francis Suarez (+1617), the greatest philosopher and jurist of this period, whose Disputationes Metaphysicae constitutes perhaps the greatest philosophical work produced by Scholasticism. Others worthy of mention: Cosmas de Lerma (+1642), John a S. Thoma (+1644), Goudin (+1695), Philip a SS. Trinitate (+1671), Ruiz de Montoya (+1632), Cosmas Alamannus (+1634), Hurtado de Mendoza (+1651), De Lugo (+1660), Arriaga (+1667), Sylvester Maurus (+1687).

Among the Scotists active during this period: Maurice a Portu (+1513), Francis Lychetus a Brixia (+1520), John Poncius (+1660), Bellutus (+1671) and Mastrius (+1673).

In the second half of the XVII cent, a group of Scholastics attempted to modify the traditional system by adopting some of the modern theses particularly from Cartesianism. This tendency, together with the conservative reaction which accompanied it, brought about the second decline of Scholasticism. Two leaders in this movement were Emmanuel Maignau (+1676) and Honoratus Fabri (+1688).

VI. Second Decline (18-19 cent.). This group and its tendencies were continued by Du Hamel (+1706), Tolomei (+1726), Fortunatus a Brixia (+1754), Steinmeyer (+1797) and Reuss (+1798). Among the conservatives: Louis de Lossada (+1748). In 1773 the Society of Jesus was suppressed. This disaster completed the downfall of Scholasticism. Not until its restoration in 1814 did the Church's traditional philosophy revive. Prominent in preparing for this second renaissance was the Jesuit-trained Vincent Bruzzetti (+1824). Others: Taparelli (+1862), Liberatore (+1872), Sanseverino (+1865), Kleutgen (+1883), Zigliara (+1893) and Gonzalez (+1895). For the first time in the modern period, history began to play an important part in Scholasticism. Karl Werner (+1888) and Al. Stoeckl (1895) were the first figures in this movement.

VII. Leonine Restoration (1879). The Encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII gave this new movement a conscious direction. Since Leo XIII's time to the present day, Catholic Scholars have been active both in the fields of speculation and history. Numerous reviews have been founded and Scholasticism has raised its voice even in the non-sectarian Universities of America. -- W.G.

Schopenhauer, Arthur: (1738-1860) Brilliant, manysided philosopher, at times caustic, who attained posthumously even popular acclaim. His principal work, The World as Will and Idea starts with the thesis that the world is my idea, a primary fact of consciousness implying the inseparableness of subject and object (refutation of materialism and subjectivism). The object underlies the principle of sufficient reason whose fourfold root Schopenhauer had investigated previously in his doctoral dissertation as that of becoming (causality), knowing, being, and acting (motivation). But the world is also obstinate, blind, impetuous will (the word taken in a larger than the dictionary meaning) which objectifies itself in progressive stages in the world of ideas beginning with the forces of nature (gravity, etc.) and terminating in the will to live and the products of its urges. As thing-in-itself, the will is one, though many in its phenomenal forms, space and time serving as principia individuationis. The closer to archetypal forms the ideas (Platonic influence) and the less revealing the will, the greater the possibility of pure contemplation in art in which Schopenhauer found greatest personal satisfaction. Propounding a determinism and a consequential pessimism (q.v.), Schopenhauer concurs with Kant in the intelligible character of freedom, makes compassion (Mitleid; see Pity) the foundation of ethics, and upholds the Buddhist ideal of desirelessness as a means for allaying the will. Having produced intelligence, the will has created the possibility of its own negation in a calm, ascetic, abstinent life.

Sämmtliche Werke, ed. P. Deussen, 14 vo!s. -- K.F.L.

Schröder, (Friedrich Wilhelm Karl) Ernst, 1841-1902. German mathematician. Professor of mathematics at Karlsruhe, 1876-1902. His three-volume Algebra der Logik (1890-1895, with a posthumous second part of vol. 2 published in 1905) is an able compendium and systematization of the work of his predecessors. With contributions of his own, and may be regarded as giving in nearly all essentials the final form of the Nineteenth Century algebra of logic (q.v.), including the algebra of relatives (or relations). -- A.C.

J. Lüroth. Ernst Schröder, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, vol. 12 (1903). pp. 249-265; reprinted in Schröder's Algebra der Logik, vol. 2, part 2.

Science of Science: The analysis and description of science from various points of view, including logic, methodology, sociology, and history of science. One of the chief tasks of the science of science is the ana1ysis of the language of science (see Semiotic). Scientific empiricism (q.v.) emphasizes the role of the science of science, and tries to clarify the different aspects. Some empiricists believe that the chief task of philosophy is the development of the logic and methodology of science, and that most of the problems of traditional philosophy, as far as they have cognitive meaning (see Meaning, Kinds of, 1, 5), may be construed as problems of the science of science. -- R.C.
Science, philosophy of: That philosophic discipline which is the systematic study of the nature of science, especially of its methods, its concepts and presuppositions, and its place in the general scheme of intellectual disciplines.

No very precise definition of the term is possible since the discipline shades imperceptibly into science, on the one hand, and into philosophy in genetal, on the other. A working division of its subject-matter into three fields is helpful in specifying its problems, though the three fields should not be too sharply differentiated or separated.

1. A critical study of the method or methods of the sciences, of the nature of scientific symbols and of the logical structure of scientific symbolic svstems. Presumably such a study should include both the empirical and the rational sciences. Whether it should also include the methods of the valuational studies (e.g., ethics, esthetics) and of the historical studies, will depend upon the working definition or science accepted by the investigator. Valuational studies are frequently characterized as "normative" or "axiological" sciences. Many of the recognized sciences (e.g., anthropology, geology) contain important historical aspects, hence there is some justification for the inclusion of the historical method in this aspect of the philosophy of science. As a study of method, the philosophy of science includes much of the traditional logic and theory of knowledge. The attempt is made to define and further clarify such terms as induction, deduction, hypothesis, data, discovery and verification. In addition, the more detailed and specialized methods of science (e.g., experimentation, measurement, classification and idealization) (q.v.) are subjected to examination. Since science is a symbolic system, the general theory of signs plays an important role in the philosophy of science.

2. The attempted clarification of the basic concepts, presuppositions and postulates of the sciences, and the revelation of the empirical, rational, or pragmatic grounds upon which they are presumed to rest. This aspect of the philosophy of science is closely related to the foregoing but includes, in addition to the logical and epistemological subject-matter, a large portion of metaphysics. Roughly, the task here is two-fold. On the one hand it involves the critical analysis of certain basic notions, such as quantity, quality, time, space, cause and law, which are used by the scientist but not subjected to examination. On the other hand it includes a similar study of certain presupposed beliefs, such as the belief in an external world, the belief in the uniformity of nature, and the belief in the rationality of natural processes.

3. A highly composite and diverse study which attempts to ascertain the limits of the special sciences, to disclose their interrelations one with another, and to examine their implications so fir as these contribute to a theory either of the universe as a whole or of some pervasive aspect of it. This aspect of the philosophy of science is the least precise and definite of the three, and employs the more speculative methods. One of the most characteristic of its problems is that of the classification of the sciences. This involves the attempt to construct a general table, or diagram, or map of the sciences which will properly integrate the sciences according to method, subject-matter, or some other principle of organization. Another characteristic problem is that of the implications of science for some general theory of the universe, e.g., idealism, materialism, positivism, mechanism, teleology, monism, or pluralism. In recent years a new type of problem has appeared which, if it is properly part of the philosophy of science at all, belongs to this aspect of the subject. This is the problem of the social relations of science. It examines such problems as the place of science in a given cultural scheme, e.g., its relations to government, business, art, religion and morality.


Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, 1892.
Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, 1905.
W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, 1907.
J. A. Thomson, An Introduction to Science, 1911.
N. Campbell, What is Science?, 1921.
C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, 1923.
A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method, 1923.
E. W. Hobson, Domain of Natural Science, 1923.
A. S. Eddington, Nature of the Physical World, 1929.
M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 1931.
A. C. Benjamin, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 1937.
W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science, 1940.
-- A.C.B.
Scientific Empiricism; Unity of Science Movement: A philosophical movement originated by the movement of Logical Positivism but including many other groups and persons (see II below).

I. Vienna Circle; Logical Positivsm, Logical Empiricism.

  1. The Vienna Circle, founded by M. Schlick (q.v.) in 1924, ending with his death in 1936. Among its members: G. Bergmann, R. Carnap (q.v.), H. Feigl, Ph. Frank (q.v.), K. G&oUML;del (q.v.), H. Hahn (d. 1934), O. Neurath, F Waismann.
  2. Seen historically, the movement shows influences from three sides
    1. the older empiricism and positivism, especially Hume, Mill, Mach;
    2. methodology of empirical science, as developed by scientists since about the middle of the 19th century, e.g., Helmholtz, Mach, Poincare. Duhem, Boltzmann, Einstein;
    3. symbolic logic and logical analysis of language as developed especially by Frege, Whitehead and Russell, Wittgenstein.
    Russell (q.v.) was the first to combine these trends and therefore had an especially strong influence.
  3. The views developed in the V. C. have been called Logical Positivism (A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, J. Phil. 28, 1931); many members now prefer the term "Logical Empiricism". Among the characteristic features: emphasis on scientific attitude and on co-operation, hence emphasis on intersubjective (q.v.) language and unity of science. Empiricism: every knowledge that is factual (see Meaning, Kinds of, 1), is connected with experiences in such a way that verification or direct or indirect confirmation is possible (see Verification).

    The emphasis on logical analysis of language (see Semiotic) distinguishes this movement from earlier empiricism and positivism. The task of philosophy is amlysis of knowledge, especially of science; chief method: analysis of the language of science (see Semiotic; Meaning, Kinds of).

  4. Publications concerning the historical development of this movement and its chief views: Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, Wien 1929 (with bibliography). O. Neurath, Le Developpement du Cercle de Vienne, et l'Avenir de l'Empirisme Logique, 1935. C. W. Morris, Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism, Paris 1937. E. Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe", I, II, tic Empiricism in Germany, and the Present State of its Problems. Ibid. E. Nagel, "The Fight for Clarity: Logical Empiricism", Amer. Scholar, 1938. Many papers by members of the group have been published in "Erkenntnis" since 1930, now continued as "Journal of Unified Science".

    Compare M. Black, "Relations between Logical Positivism and the Cambridge School of Analysis", J. Un. Sc. 8, 1940.

II. Scientific Empiricism. A wider movement, comprising besides Logical Empiricism other groups and individuals with related views in various countries. Also called Unity of Science Movement.

Among its members W. Dubislav (1937), K. Grelling, O. Helmer, C. G. Hempel, A. Herzberg, K.. Korsch, H. Reichenbach (q.v.), M. Strauss.

  1. Many members of the following groups may be regarded as adherents of Scientific Empiricism: the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy, the W arsaw School, the Cambridge School for Analytic Philosophy (q.v.), further, in U. S. A., some of the representatives of contemporary Pragmatism (q.v.), especially C. W. Morris, of Neo-Realism (q.v.), and of Operationalism (q.v.).

    Among the individual adherents not belonging to the groups mentioned: E. Kaila (Finland), J. Jörgensen (Denmark), A. Ness (Norway); A. J. Ayer, J. H. Woodger (England); M. Boll (France); K. Popper (now New Zealand); E. Brunswik, H. Gomperz, Felix Kaufmann, R. V. Mises, L. Rougier, E. Zilsel (now in U. S. A.); E. Nagel, W. V. Quine, and many others (in U.S.A.).

  2. The general attitude and the views of Scientific Empiricism are in esential agreement with those of Logical Empiricism (see above, 1). Here, the unity of science is especially emphasized, in various respects
    1. There is a logical unity of the language of science; the concepts of different branches of science are not of fundamentally different kinds but belong to one coherent system. The unity of science in this sense is closely connected with the thesis of Physicahsm (q.v.).
    2. There is a practical task in the present stage of development, to come to a better mutual adaptation of terminologies in different branches of science.
    3. There is today no unity of the laws of science. It is an aim of the future development of science to come, if possible, to a simple set of connected, fundamental laws from which the special laws in the different branches of science, including the social sciences, can be deduced.
  3. Here also, the analysis of language is regarded as one of the chief methods of the science of science. While logical positivism stressed chiefly the logical side of this analysis, it is here carried out from various directions, including an analysis of the biological and sociological sides of the activities of language and knowledge, as they have been emphasized earlier by Pragmatism (q.v.), especially C. S. Peirce and G. H. Mead. Thus the development leads now to a comprehensive general theory of signs or semiotic (q.v.) as a basis for philosophy
  4. The following publications and meetings may be regarded as organs of this movement.
    1. The periodical "Erkenntnis", since 1930, now continued as "Journal of Unified Science"
    2. The "Encyclopedia of Unified Science", its first part ("Foundations of the Unity of Science", 2 vols.) consisting of twenty monographs (eight appeared by 1940). Here, the foundations of various fields of science are discussed, especially from the point of view of the unity of science and scientific procedure, and the relations between the fields. Thus, the work intends to serve as an introduction to the science of science (q.v.).
    3. A series of International Congresses for the Unity of Science was started by a preliminary conference in Prague 1934 (see report, Erkenntnis 5, 1935). The congresses took place at Pans in 1935 ("Actes", Pans 1936; Erkenntnis 5, 1936); at Copenhagen in 1936 (Erkenntnis 6, 1937); at Paris in 1937; at Cambridge, England, in 1938 (Erkenntnis 7, 1938); at Cambridge, Mass., in 1939 (J. Unif. Sc. 9, 1941); at Chicago in 1941.

Concerning the development and the aims of this movement, see O. Neurath and C. W. Morris (for both, see above, I D), further H. Reichenbach, Ziele and Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, 1931; S. S. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of Science", Psych. Bull. 36, 1939 (with bibliography). Bibliographies in "Erkenntnis": 1, 1931, p. 315, p. 335 (Polish authors); 2, 1931, p. 151, p. 189; 5, 1935, p. 185, p. 195 (American authors), p. 199 (Polish authors), p. 409, larger bibliography: in Encycl. Unif. Science, vol. II, No. 10 (to ippetr in 1942). -- R.C.

Scotism: The philosophical and theological system named after John Duns Scotus (1266? -1308), Doctor Subtilis, a Franciscan student and later professor at Oxford and Paris and the most gifted of the opponents of the Thomist school. The name is almost synonymous with subtlety and the system generally is characterized by excessive criticism, due to Duns Scotus' predilection for mathematical studies -- the influence, perhaps, of his Franciscan predecessor, Roger Bacon, upon him. This spirit led Scotus to indiscriminate attack upon all his great predecessors in both Franciscan and Dominican Schools, especially St. Thomas, upon the ground of the inconclusiveness of their philosophical arguments. His own system is noted especially for its constant use of the so called Scotist or formal distinction which is considered to be on the one hand less than real, because it is not between thing and thing, and yet more than logical or virtual, because it actually exists between various thought objects or "formalities" in one and the sime individual prior to the action of the mind -- distinctio formalis actualis ex natuta rei. e g., the distinction between the essence and existence, between the animality and rationality in a man, between the principle of individuation in him and his matter and form, and between the divine attributes in God, are all formal distinctions. This undoubtedly leaves the system open to the charge of extreme realism and a tendency generally to consider the report of abstract thought with little regard for sense experience. Further by insisting also upon a formal unity of these formalities which exists apart from conception and is therefore apparently real, the system appears to lead logically to monism, e.g., the really distinct materiality in all material things is formally one apart from the abstracting and universalizing activity of the mind. By insisting that this formal unity is less than real unity, the Scotists claim to escape the charge.

The general superiority of theology in this system over the admittedly distinct discipline of philosophy, makes it impossible for unaided reason to solve certain problems which Thomism claims are quite within the province of the latter, e.g., the omnipotence of God, the immortality of the soul. Indeed the Scotist position on this latter question has been thought by some critics to come quite close to the double standard of truth of Averroes, (q.v.) namely, that which is true in theology may be false in philosophy. The univocal assertion of being in God and creatures; the doctrine of universal prime matter (q.v.) in all created substances, even angels, though characteristically there are three kinds of prime matter); the plurality of forms in substances (e.g., two in man) giving successive generic and specific determinations of the substance; all indicate the opposition of Scotistic metaphysics to that of Thomism despite the large body of ideas the two systems have in common. The denial of real distinction between the soul and its faculties; the superiority of will over intellect, the attainment of perfect happiness through a will act of love; the denial of the absolute unchangeableness of the natural law in view of its dependence on the will of God, acts being good because God commanded them; indicate the further rejection of St. Thomas who holds the opposite on each of these questions. However the opposition is not merely for itself but that of a voluntarist against an intellectualist. This has caused many students to point out the affinity of Duns Scotus with Immanuel Kant. (q.v.) But unlike the great German philosopher who relies entirely upon the supremacy of moral consciousness, Duns Scotus makes a constant appeal to revelation and its order of truth as above all philosophy. In his own age, which followed immediately upon the great constructive synthesis of Saints Albert, Bonaventure, and Thomas, this lesser light was less a philosopher because he and his School were incapable of powerful synthesis and so gave themselves to analysis and controversy. The principal Scotists were Francis of Mayron (d. 1327) and Antonio Andrea (d. 1320); and later John of Basoles, John Dumbleton, Walter Burleigh, Alexander of Alexandria, Lychetus of Brescia and Nicholas de Orbellis. The complete works with a life of Duns Scotus were published in 1639 by Luke Wadding (Lyons) and reprinted by Vives in 1891. (Paris) -- C.A.H.

Scottish philosophy: Name applied to the current of thought originated by the Scottish thinker, Thomas Reid (1710-1796), and disseminated by his followers as a reaction against the idealism of Berkeley and empiricism and skepticism of Hume. Its most salient characteristic is the doctrine of common sense, a natural instinct by virtue of which men are prompted to accept certain fundamental principles as postulates without giving a reason for their truth. Reason is subordinated to the role of a servant or able assistant of common sense. Philosophy must be grounded on common sense, and skepticism is a consequence of abandoning its guidance. -- J.J.R.
Secondary Qualities: Those sensible qualities which are "nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities." This is the definition of John Locke. Such qualities (colors, sounds, tastes, smells) are distinguishable from primary in that they are highly variable, less constant. They appear in human consciousness in various forms, whereas the primary ones remain the same. See Primary Qualities. -- V.F.
Secunda Petri: Literally, the second of Peter, that is the second part of a work on logic, Institutiones Dialecticae, of Pierre de la Ramee, latinized Petrus Ramus (1515-1572), which treated of judgments, de iudicio. Hence a stupid person was said to be deficient in secunda Petri, or sound judgment. -- J.J.R.
Secundi adjacentis: Latin expression employed to describe a proposition which consists solely of a subject and a predicate without even a copula. -- J.J.R.
Secundum quid: (Lat.) Relatively, in some respect, in a qualified sense, contrasted with simpliciter, absolutely. -- V.J.B.

Secundum quid, or more fully, a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, is any fallacy arising from the use of a general proposition without attention to tacit qualifications which would invalidate the use made of it. -- A.C.

Selective Theories of Sensa: A selective in contrast to a creative theory, holds that sensa experienceable by any mind under all possible conditions of perception; preexists the act of sensing and that, consequently the function of the mind in relation to the sensa is selective rather than creative. The selective theory has been advanced by such contemporary Realists as B. Russell (The Analysis of Mind), E. B. Holt (The Concept of Consciousness), J. Laird (A Study in Realism). See Creative Theory of Sensa. -- L.W.
Self: 1. Ego, subject, I, me, as opposed to the object or to the totality of objects; may be distinguished from "not-me," as in W. James' statement (Principles of Psychology, I, 289) "One great splitting of the whole universe into two halves is made by each of us, and for each of us almost all of the interest attaches to one of the halves; but we all draw the line of division between them in a different place. When I say that we all call the two halves by the same names, and that those names are 'me' and 'not-me' respectively, it will at once be seen what I mean."

2. The quality of uniqueness and persistence through changes (Lat. ipse), by virtue of which any person calls himself I and leading to the distinction among selves, as implied in such words as myself, yourself, himself, etc. (By transfer, this applies to the uniqueness of my thing, as in 'itself').

3. The metaphysical principle of unity underlying subjective experience, which may be conceived as dependent upon the given organism or as distinct in nature; sometimes identified with the soul.

Some philosophers doubted or even denied the existence of the self. Thus, Hume pointed out (Treatise of Human Nature, I, pt. 4) that, apart from the bundle of successive perceptions, nothing justifying the concept of self can be discerned by introspection.

The meaning of self, with its metaphysical, linguistic and psychological distinctions has become so ambiguous that it may be useful to distinguish between

(a) the self as applied to the bearer of subjective experience, or the physical or somatic (G. S. Hall, The American Journal of Psychology, 1897-1898) self; and

(b) the self as applied to the contents of that experience, or the psychological self, which is "an organization of experiences in a dynamic whole." (W. Pillsbury, Attention, 217). -- R.B.W.

Self-Consciousness: The knowledge by the self of itself. The term is usually restricted to empirical self-consciousness. (See Empirical Ego) -- L.W.
Self-determination: a) In political theory the working out by a people or nation of its own problems and destiny, free from interference from without. It is often said that peoples and nations have a right to self-determination, at least under certain conditions

b) In ethics the notion of self-determination is used by self-determimsts to solve the free-will problem. H. Rashdall, e.g., uses the notion of a "causality of a permanent spiritual self" as mediating between the indeterminists on the one hand and the mechanical determinists on the other, his view being that our actions are indeed determined but determined by "the nature or character of the self" and not just mechanically, and that it is in this determination by the self that our moral freedom consists. -- W.K.F.

Self-Evidence: That property of a proposition by which its truth is open to direct inspection and requires no appeal to other evidence. See Intuition. -- A.C.B.
Selfhood: The unique individuality possessed by a self or person. -- L.W.
Self-love: The term may be used to denote self-complacency or self-admiration (see Spinoza, Ethics, Book III, Prop. 55, note), but in ethical discussion it usually designates concern for one's own individual interest, advantage, or happiness. Taking the term in this latter sense philosophers have debated the question whether or not all of our actions, approvals, etc., are motivated entirely by self-love. Hobbes holds that they are. Spinoza, similarity, holds that the endeavor to conserve oneself is the basis of all of one's actions and virtues. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, and Hume, in opposition to Hobbes, argued that benevolence or sympathy and the moral sense or conscience are springs of action which are not reducible to self-love. Butler also pointed out that self-love itself presupposes the existence of certain primary desires, such as hunger, with whose satisfaction it is concerned, and which therefore cannot be subsumed under it. See Egoism. -- W.K.F.
Self-Realization: A notion central to the ethics of recent Idealism, e.g., T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, J. Seth, J. H. Muirhead. These writers hold that self-realization is the end, and that right action is action which conduces to self-realization.. -- W.K.F.
Selves, Knowledge of other: The knowledge by one self of another. See Intersubjective Intercourse. -- L.W.
Semantics: (1) "The studv of the relation of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable" (C. W. Morris). A department of semiotic.

(2) The study of signs and symbolism. In this sense equivalent to semiotic (q.v.). -- M.B.

The theory of the relation between the formulas of an interpreted logistic system (semantical system in Carnap's terminology) and their meanings. See Name relation; Semiotic 2; and Truth, semantical. -- A.C.

C. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 1, no 2, Chicago, 1938. R. Carnap. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol 1, no 3, Chicago, 1939.

Semasiology: Noun derived from the Greek, semasia, signification of a term, the equivalent of semantics, the science of the meanings of words. -- J.J.R.
Semiosis: The process in which something functions as a sign. It involves that which acts as a sign (the sign vehicle), that which the sign refers to (the designatum), and that effect upon some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter. See also Semiotic.
Semiotic; Theory of Signs: A general theory of signs and their applications, especially in language, developed and systematized within Scientific Empiricism (q.v. II C). Three branches: grammatics, semantics, syntactics.

1. Pragmatics. Theory of the relations between signs and those who produce or receive and understand them. This theory comprehends psychology, sociology, and history of the use of signs, especially of languages.

2. Semantics. Theory of the relations between signs and what they refer to (their "designata" or "denotata"). This theory contains also the theory of truth (q.v., semantical definition) and the theory of logical deduction.

3. Syntactics. Theory of the formal relations (see Formal 2) among signs. Logical Syntax is syntactics applied to theoretical language (language of science); it contains the theory of formal calculi (q.v.), including formalized logic. Compare C. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory or Signs, 1938; R. Carnap, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, 1939. -- R.C.

Semi-Pelagianism: A movement in Christian theology which attempted to find a middle ground between the extreme doctrine of total depravity and predestination as over against the doctrine of the determinative character of the human will in the matter of salvation. The Semi-Pelagian view held that regeneration was the result of the cooperation of divine grace and the human will. Although the view was condemned by church councils in favor of predestination (q.v.), Semi-Pelagianism has continually reappeared in Christian theology without its label. -- V.F.
Sempiternal: (Lat. semper, always; aeternus, eternal) Everlasting, endless, having no beginning and no ending. -- V.F.
Sempiternity: (Lat. semper, always) Eternity conceived as everlasting existence or perpetuity. May have a beginning, but no end; an end, but no beginning; neither a beginning not end. -- R.B.W.
Seneca: (4-65 A.D.) A Roman Stoic and instructor of Nero, who ernphasised the distinction between the soul and body and developed the ethical elements of Stoicism. -- R.B.W.

Main works: Naturalium quaestionum libri septem; Dialogorum libri duodecim.

Sensa: Plural of sensum (q.v.). The transitory particulars or objcctive constituents of perceptual situations that have spatial characteristics, colors, shapes, sizes, privacy and are body-dependent. (Broad) -- H.H.
Sensationalism: (Lat sensatio, from sentire, to feel or perceive) Subvariety of empiricism which asserts that all knowledge is ultimately derived from sensations. Hobbes (De Corpore, 1655) is considered the founder of modern sensationalism and Condillac (Traite des Sensations, 1754) is most typical exponent. Sensationalism is usually combined with associationism. See Associationism. -- L.W.
Sensation: (Ger. Empfindung) In Kant: The content of sensuous intuition, or the way in which a conscious subject is modified by the presence of an object. Kant usually employs the term to designate the content sensed instead of the process of sensing. The process he calls 'intuition' (q.v.); the faculty he names 'sensibility' (q.v.). See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Sense and denotation: See descriptions.
Sense Datum (pl. sense data): (Lat. sensus, a feeling -- datum, a gift from dare, to give). A datum conditioned by one of the outer senses. See Datum. -- L.W.
Sense, internal: The mind's supposed ability to scrutinize reflectively its own inner operations. The term was suggested by J. Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, Bk. II, ch. 1, 4.) -- L.W.
Sense Manifold: See Manifold of Sense.
Sensibility: (Kant. Ger. Sinnlichkeit) The faculty by means of which the mind receives sensuous intuitions (q.v.). The sensibility is receptive (passive), while understanding and reason are spontaneous (active). See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Sensing: The mental act of apprehending a sensum or sense datum. See Sense Datum. -- L.W.
Sensum (Pl. sensa) (Lat. sensus, pp of sentiore to feel or discern by sense) Equivalent to sense datum. See Sense Datum. -- L.W.
Sensum-Theory: Epistemological theory which explains perception and other higher forms of knowledge by means of inferences and constructions from sensa. See Sensum. -- L.W.
Sentence: Denotes a certain class of complex symbols in a language. Which combinations of symbols are to be regarded as sentences in the language is normally determined (a) by certain specifiable formation rules (e.g. in English, that any proper name followed by verb in the singular constitutes a sentence), (b) by the presence of certain specific "morphemes" or symbolic features indicating form (e.g., the characteristic falling intonation-pattern of English declarative sentences).

There is little agreement as to the correct analytical definition. To define a sentence as a complete utterance (Bloomfield, Language, 27) merely shifts the difficulty to that of deciding when symbols are not incomplete. A similar objection applies to Gardiner's definition (Speech and Language, 182) "those single words or combinations of words which taken as complete in themselves give satisfaction by shadowing forth the intelligible purpose of a speaker."

An exact definition is of some importance in view of the tendency of some contemporary logicians to replace the use of the term proposition by that of sentence.

Like all designations of symbols, the term is subject to Type-Token Ambiguity (q.v.).

References: J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz? 208, ff. (for quoted definitions). R. Carnap, Logical Syntax of language, 26. -- M.B.

In connection with logic, and logical syntax, the word sentence is used for what might be called more explicitly a declarative sentence -- thus for a sequence of words or symbols which (in some language or system of notation, as determined by the context) expresses a proposition (q.v.), or which can be used to convey an assertion. A sequence of words or symbols which contains free variables and which expresses a proposition when values are given to these variables (see the article variable) may also be called a sentence.

In connection with logistic systems, sentence is often used as a technical term in place of formula (see the explanation of the latter term in the article logistic system). This may be done when, under the intended interpretation of the system, sentences in this technical or formal sense become sentences in the sense of the preceding paragraph. -- A.C.

Sentences (Scholastic): Sententiae were originally collections of various propositions and explanations thereof; e.g., the Sententiae divinitatis of Anselm of Laon. Peter Lombardus condensed the main theological and philosophical ideas of his time into the famous Quattuor libri sententiarum which became the textbook for the medieval universities and had to be studied and expounded by everyone aspiring to highei academic honors. The student had to pass the degree of sententiarius, and as such he had to read on the sentences. From these expositions developed the many commentaries on the four books of sentences. Practically every scholar of renown has left such a commentary. Peter's books are divided into "distinctions" which division is conscientiously followed by the commentators. -- R.A.
Sentential calculus: Same as propositional calculus (see logic, formal, § 1). -- A.C.
Sentential function has been used by some as a syntactical term, to mean a sentence (q.v.) containing free variables. This notion should not be confused with that of a propositional function (q.v.), the relationship is that a propositional function may be obtained from a sentential function by abstraction (q. v.) -- A.C.
Sentience: (Lat. sentiens, from sentire, to feel) Consciousness at a rudimentary sensory level. -- L.W.
Sentimentalism: An exaggerated and distorted expression of sentiment, revealing a lack of, or a superficiality of feeling. -- L.V.
Sextus Empiricus: A physician who lived about 200 A.D. His writings contain numerous arguments of a sceptical empiricistic variety drawn from Pyrrho (q.v.) and directed against dogmatic claims to absolute truth, especially in the sciences and ethics. His Adversus Mathematicos (Against the Mathematicians) is an important source for the history of the sciences of astronomy, geometry, and grammar as well is of the Stoic theology of the period. -- M.F.
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of: (1671-1713) He was a pupil and later a patron of Locke although in the field of morals, for which he remains best known, he was opposed to the Lockean position. He advocated the so-called moral sense view which finds a sense of right and wrong in man, guiding him with social or natural affections to the good of the species rather than to seif-interest. He was a lover of liberty in thought and in political affairs. He was numbered among the deists but remained a churchman throughout his life. His most famous work was his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. -- L.E.D.
Shaktism, Saktism: The philosophy, supported by liturgy and ritual of various degrees of purity, of the believers in the Tantra (q.v.). It explains Brahma as absolute spirit which, on becoming Shiva and Shakti, the male and female principles, produces through maya (q.v.) from itself as the One in a series of 36 tattvas (q.v.) the Many, a process which at the end of the world is made to retrogress and again progress periodically. -- K.F.L.
Shamanism: (from Tungusic shaman) A type of religion common in Siberia and neighboring regions without systematic beliefs but entirely inspired by the shaman (priest or priestess) who, working up a frenzy bv dancing, puts himself in touch with the spirits of animals or deceased humans for purposes of magic or divination. -- K.F.L.
Shan: Goodness, "the practice of virtue." (Confucianism). It is antecedent to the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi) and motion, although it is involved in the Reason of the universe. (Neo-Confucianism) -- W.T.C.
Shang ti: Anthropomorphis, Supreme Emperor or Ruler or High, who as the highest authority, presides over an elaborate hierarchy of spirits; the supreme object of veneration used interchangeably with the above. Also called Heaven (Tien'ien), August Heaven (Huang T'ien), and Sovereign (Ti). -- H.H.
Shang t'ung: 'The principle of agreement with the superior' by Mo Tzu that all people must without the slighest divergence put themselves in agreement with their superior. -- H.H.
Shao K'ang-chieh: Shao K'ang-chieh (Shao Yung, Shao Yao-fu, 1011-1077) was son of a scholar (Ch'eng I-ch'uan's teacher). Although he served in the government in a few minor capacities, in general, his life was that of quietude and poverty. But his reputation of integrity and scholarship grew so high that scholars far and near regarded him as their "teacher," and people "warned one another to refrain from evil for fear that Master Shao might know." His Huang-chi Ching-shih, (Supreme Principles for the States and for Society) is a standird Neo-Confucian (li hsueh) work. -- W.T.C.
Shao vin: The Minor Mode of Passivity. See T'ai Chi.
Shao yang: The Minor Mode of Activity. See T'ai Chi.
Shen: (a) In religion: Spirits, heavenly spirits as against earthly spirits (kuei), spiritual power which is unfathomable in the movement of yin and yang or passive and active cosmic forces; the active or yang aspect of the soul (hun) is against the passive aspect (p'o).

(b) In philosophy: god-like power, spiritual power, or creative power, mystery, the divine man, a spirit man, god-like man, a sage who is beyond our knowledge, vital force, the mind, the animal spirit, energy, the operation of the active cosmic principle yang (as in Neo-Confucianism).

(c) In aesthetics: Rhythmic vitality; expression; wonderful quality; style full of spirit, energy or vivacity. -- W.T.C.

(d) What is given by nature. -- W.T.C.

Sheng (jen): (a) A person of the highest wisdom.

(b) A sage (Confucianism). A great man who exercises a transforming influence (as in Mencius).

(c) Confucius.

(d) The ideal ruler. (Lao Tzu).

(e) One who "regards nature as the essential, the character of Tao (te) as the basis, Tao as the way, and follows the indications of changes." (Taoism) -- W.T.C.

Shen Jen: 'The spiritual man', one who has reached a state of mystical union with the universe, or "who has not separated from the pure and the mysterious." (Chang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- H.H.
Shen tu: Being watchful over himself when one is alone. This is important in Confucian moral training, because "there is nothing more evident than that which cannot be seen by the eyes and nothing more palpable than that which cannot be perceived by the senses." It is a way of "making one's will sincere," and of exhausting one's heart and nature. -- W.T.C.
Shih: Actuality, substance, to which a name must correspond. -- W.T.C.
Shih: (a) Authority and power natural to the position of a ruler, especially the power of reward and punishment as in Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C.). See fa chia. (Legalists).

(b) External force; tending force; circumstances, such as that which completes things after Tao engenders them and the Individual Principle (te) develops them. (Lao Tzu).

(c) Movement, tendency. -- W.T.C.

Shih fei: Right and wrong, with reference to both opinion and conduct, a distinction strongly stressed by the Confucians, Neo-Confucians, Mohists, Neo-Mohists, Sophists, and Legalists alike, except the Taoists who repudiated such distinction as superficial, relative, subjective, unreal in the eyes of Tao, and inconsistent with the Taoist idea of the absolute equality of things and opinions. To most of the ancient Chinese schools, correspondence of name to actuality, both in the social sense and the logical sense, served as the standard of right and wrong. The Sophists often employed the result of argumentation as the standard. The one who won was right and the one who lost was wrong. The Neo-Mohists emphasized logical consistency, whereas the Legalists insisted on law. The early Confucians emphasized conformity with the moral order. "Whiterer conforms with propriety is right and whatever does not conform with propriety is wrong " As Hsun Tzu (c 335-c 288 B.C.) put it, "Whatever conforms with the system of the sage-kings is right and whatever does not conform with the system of the sage-kings is wrong." To the Neo-Confucians, "Whatever is in accord with Reason (li) is right." "The right is the expression of justice and impartiality based on the Universal Reason, and the wrong is the expression of selfishness and partiality based on human desire." -- W.T.C.
Shiites: A collective name for countless groups of an Islamic sect, small in number, whose basic dogma is that Ali and his descendants are the sole legitimate successors of Mohammed. They are the rallying point for all revolutionary and heterodox tendencies among Islamic peoples outside Arabia -- H.H.
Shiva, Siva: (Skr. the kind one) Euphemistic name of the God Rudra, the ultimate destructive principle in the philosophies of Shivaism (q.v.). One of the trimurti (q.v.) -- K.F.L.
Shivaism, Sivaism, Saivism: One of the major groups of Hinduism which has evolved, in addition to religious doctrines and observances, also philosophical systems of note, based upon certain Agamas (q.v.). Shiva, as one aspect of the trimurti (q.v.), has inspired cosmological speculations no less than psychological and logical ones. As philosophy it attained its greatest flower in the Kashmirian Trika (q.v.) -- K.F.L.
Shu: "The benevolent exercise of the principle of human nature in relation to others;" "the extension of the principle of the self to other people and things;" "the application of the principle of true manhood (jen);" "the application of the principle of the central self (chung);" "putting oneself in the position of others;" "measuring others by oneself;" consideration; altruism; reciprocity; the Confucian "central thread" (i kuan) with respect to social relationship, as being true to the principles of one's nature (chung) is with respect to the self. -- W.T.C.
Shu: (a) Statecraft, craft, tact, or method for a ruler to keep the ministers and the people under control, "to award offices according to their responsibilities, to hold actualities in accordance with their names, to exercise the power of life and death, and to make use of the ability of the ministers." See fa chia. (Legalists).

(b) Magic. See shu and shu shu. -- W.T.C.

Shu: Number, which gives rise to form (hsiang) according to which things become. This philosophy was based on the I Ching (I. Book of Changes), developed in the medieval interpretation of it (chan wei), and culminated in Neo-Confucianism, especially in Shao K'ang-chieh (1011-1077). According to this philosophv, to Heaven belong the odd numbers which represent the active principle (yang) and are characterized by the tendency to increase, and to Earth the even numbers, which represent the passive principle (yin) and are characterized by the tendency to decrease, forming two series of five numbers. The numbers of Heaven add up to twenty-five and those of Earth to thirty, making a total of fifty-five. It is by these that the changes and transformations are effected and the heavenly and earthly spirits have their movements. The system of numbers begins with 1, which represent the Great Ultimate ('ai Chi) and is completed with 5, which corresponds to the Five Elements (wu hsing) out of the interplay of which all things are what they are. Thus, in the final analysis, everything's comes from number, by which it can be understood, evaluated, and adjusted to other things with a corresponding number. -- W.T.C.
Shuo: Inference, one of the methods of knowledge of the Neo-Mohists (Mo che). -- W.T.C.
Shu shu: (a) Divination and magic in ancient China, including astrology, almanacs, the art of coordinating human affairs by the active and passive principles of the universe (yin yang) and the Five Elements (wu hsing), fortune telling by the use of the stalks of the divination plant and the tortoise shell, and miscellaneous methods such as dream interpretation, the regulation of forms and shapes of buildings, etc.

(b) The method of enforcing law and maintaining the order of the state. -- W.T.C.

Sibylline Books: These were allegedly ancient, mythical and inspired utterances of prophecy consulted in times of calamity. Their destruction led to composite and forged versions. The so-called Sibylline Oracles were a group of Jewish and Christian writings dating from the 2nd century B.C. to the 3rd century A.D , written in Homeric style, and in imitation of the lost Sibylline Books. They included prophecies of future events, of the fate of eminent persons, of cities and kingdoms. -- V.F.
Siddhi: (Skr.) Reaching of the aim, success, particularly the attainment of supernatural powers, such as clairvoyance, clairaudience, levitation, the penetration of matter, etc, claimed for the Yogin (q.v.) in the highest stage of the practice of Yoga (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Sidgwick, Henry: (1838-1900) Last of the leading utilitarians, remembered principally for his work in ethics. He was an advocate of college education for women and one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research. See Utilitarianism. -- L.E.D.

Main works:

Method of Ethics 1875;
Outlines of the History of Ethics (5th ed. 1902);
Scope and Method of Economic Science, 1885;
Lect. on Philosophy of Kant, 1905.

Sign: (Lat. signum, sign) Logic has been called the science of signs. In psychology that which represents anything to the cognitive faculty. That which signifies or has significance, a symbol. Semasiology or sematology is the science of signs. See Logic, symbolic; Symbolism.

For Theory of Signs, see Semiotic. -- J.K.F.

Any event of character A whose occurrence is invariably accompanied by another event of character B may be said to be an index of that event. Any index which is recognized as being such may be said to function as a sign. Thus as contrasted with 'index', the use of 'sign' presupposes a triadic relations. -- M.B.

Sign-Language: A system of signs established either traditionally (primitive tribes) or technically (deaf-mutes) for the purpose of communicating concepts or sentences, rather than letters or sounds or words as in signalling The question of the priority of vocal and gesture speech is much debated, but there is no doubt that primitive peoples used signs for communicating intentions and expressing their needs, especially when dealing with tribes with a different tongue. This is almost a psychological reflex, as it may be noted in the elementary improvised mimic of travellers among people they do not understand, and also in the vivid gestures accompanying the utterances of even civilized people like those of the Mediternnean shores. Sign-languages have a psychological, sociological and ethnological importance, as they may reveal the fundamental trains of thought, the sociological status, the race peculiarities, the geographical segregation, and even the beliefs and rituals of those who use them. Their study would also give material for various syntactical, semantical and logical problems.

Note on the Indian Sign-Language. Certain general principles concerning gesture speech may be established, by considering the sign-language of the North American Indian which seems to be the most developed.

  1. A sign-language is established when equally powerful tribes of different tongues come into contact.
  2. Better gestures are composed and undesirable ones are weeded out, partly as a result of tribal federations and partly through the development of technical skills and crafts.
  3. Signs come into being, grow and die, according to the needs of the time and to the changes in practical processes.
  4. Stimulus of outside intercourse is necessary to keep alive the interest required for the maintenance and growth of a gesture speech; without it, the weaker tribe is absorbed in the stronger, and the vocal language most easily acquired prevails.
  5. Sign-languages involve a basic syntax destined to convey the fundamental meanings without refinement and in abbreviated form. Articles, prepositions and conjunctions are omitted; adjectives follow nouns; verbs are used in the present tense; nouns and verbs are used in the singular, while the idea of plurality is expressed in some other way.

The use of signals with the smoke, the pony, the mirror, the blanket and the drum (as is also the case with the African tam-tams) may be considered as an extension of the sign-language, though they are related more directly to the general art of signalling. -- T.G.

Signate: (In Schol.) Refers to the intention or direction of the agent; as distinguished from exercite, which refers to the effects of the work or the exercise. E.g., one who studies mathematics, signate intends to acquire the knowledge of truths concerning quantity, -- but exercite, or in the exercise itself of studying, renders the mind more able and apt for reasoning rightly. -- H.G.
Signifies: Theory of Meaning (q.v.). See Peirce, Semiotic.
Signification: Signify may be synonymous with designate (q.v.), or it may be used rather for the meaning of words which are not or are not thought of as proper names, or it may be used to indicate the intensional rather than the extensional meaning of a word. -- A.C.
Similarity, Law of: (Lat similis, like) Association depending upon resemblance between the associated ideas. See Association, Laws of. -- L.W.
Similia similibus percipiuntur: (Lat. like things are apprehended through like things) Like knows like, the basic principle of nearly all epistemologies, viz., that knowledge involves an assimilation of subject to object, or vice versa. -- V.J.B.
Similitude) (Scholastic): Similitudo may be called anything which stands for another so that the second may be known by the first. Aquinas uses the term as a translation of symbol in Aristotle. It does not necessarily imply any resemblance. -- R.A.
Simmel, Georg: (1858-1918) Occupying himself mostly with the reciprocal effects between individuals, he practically ignored the pioblem of the individual to the group. Calling attention to the psychical interactions as constituting the real foundation of community life, he stressed the reciprocity of relations. As alleged founder of the "formalistic" sociology, he regards the forms of socialization, the kinds of interactions of individuals upon each other as the distinctive subject of sociology. He defended in his earlier years a descriptive and relative, as opposed to a normative, absolutistic ethics. Subscribing to a metaphysics of life, he characterizes life as ceaseless self-transcendence. -- H.H.

Main works:

Problem d. Geschichtsphilosophie, 1892;
Philosophie des Geldes, 1900;
Soziologie, 1908;
Goethe, 1913;
Lebensanschauung, 1918.

Simple Enumeration: (Bacon) The name given by F. Bacon to the Aristotelian and the Scholastic process of induction which advances to the knowledge of laws from the knowledge of facts established by observation and experiment and clearly arranged. This type of induction treats instances by noting the number of observed coincident happenings of the antecedent and the consequent under investigation, and then formulating a causal connection between them. Bacon considers that Simple Enumeration lacks the methodological characteristics which he conceived (rather than determined and applied) for the process of induction. It may be added that the ancient and medieval logicians were fully aware of this type of induction. -- T.G.
Simplicius: (6th cent.) A prominent commentator on Aristotelian works in the closing years of the New Academy of Plato. -- M.F.

Main works: Commentaries on Aristotle's De Caelo, Physica, De Anima, and Categoriae.

Simulacrum: (pl. simulacra) (Lat. likeness, image) A likeness or copy of an original, applied especially to a perceptual image which copies its object. See Effluxes, Theory of. -- L.W.
Simultaneity: The condition of belonging to the same time. As two or more events observed as simultaneous may actually take place at different moments, it is useful to distinguish between subjective and objective simultaneity. See Relativity, theory of. -- R.B.W.
Singular proposition: See logic, formal, §§4, 5.
Skepticism: Sec Scepticism.
Skolem paradox: See Löwenheim's theorem.
Smith, Adam: (1723-1790) Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Glasgow. He is best known for his The Wealth of Nations, but he is not to be forgotten for his contributions to the study of ethics, expressed principally in his "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." He finds sympathy as the fundamental fact of the moral consciousness and he makes of sympathy the test of morality, the sympathy of the impartial and well informed spectator. -- L.E.D.
Social Contract: The original covenant by which, according to certain philosophers of modern times -- Hooker, Hohbes, Althusius, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, etc. -- individuals have united and formed the state. This theory was combined with the older idea of the governmental contract by which the people conferred the power of government upon a single person or a group of persons. This theory goes back to ancient philosophy and was upheld by medieval thinkers, suth as Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padova. Though most of the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century realized that no such original compact as the idea of the Social Contract called for, had actually occurred, the idea, nevertheless, served as a criterion to determine whether any act of the government was just or not, i.e., whether the consent of the governed might be assumed (especially Rousseau, Kant). The theory of the Social Contract had a remarkable influence upon the political philosophy of the American colonies. See Political Philosophy. -- W.E.
Socialism, Marxian: Early in their work, Marx and Engels called themselves communists (e.g., the "Communist Manifesto"). Later they found it more accurate, in view of the terminology of the day, to refer to themselves as socialists. During the war of 1914- '18, when socialists split into two camps, one supporting and the other opposing participation in the war, Lenin proposed for the latter group, which became the Third International, a return to the name communist, so far as a party designation was concerned, which proposal was adopted. Those who remained connected with the Second International retained the name socialist as a party designation. This split not only involved the problem of the war, but crystallized other fundamental divergences. For example, among "socialists", there was a widespread belief in gradualism -- the doctrine that the socialist society could be attained by piecemeal reform within the capitalist svstem and that no sudden change or contest of force need be anticipated. These beliefs were rejected by the "communists".

By way of connoting different types of society, many contemporary Marxists, especially in the U.S.S.R., building upon Marx's analysis of the two phases of "communist society" ("Gotha Program") designate the first or lower phase by the term socialism, the second or higher by the term communism (q.v.). The general features of socialist society (identified by Soviet thinkers with the present phase of development of the U.S.S.R.) are conceived as follows:

  1. Economic collective ownership of the means of production, such as factories, industrial equipment, the land, and of the basic apparatus of distribution and exchange, including the banking system; the consequent abolition of classes, private profit, exploitation, surplus value, (q.v.) private hiring and firing and involuntary unemployment; an integrated economy based on long time planning in terms of needs and use. It is held that only under these economic conditions is it possible to apply the formula, "from each according to ability, to each according to work performed", the first part of which implies continuous employment, and the second part, the absence of private profit.
  2. Political: a state based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat (q.v.)
  3. Cultural the extension of all educational and cultural facilities through state planning; the emancipation of women through unrestricted economic opportunities, the abolition of race discrimination through state enforcement, a struggle against all cultural and social institutions which oppose the socialist society and attempt to obstruct its realization.

Marx and Engels held that socialism becomes the inevitable outgrowth of capitalism because the evolution of the latter type of society generates problems which can only be solved by a transition to socialism. These problems are traced primarily to the fact that the economic relations under capitalism, such as individual ownership of productive technics, private hiring and firing in the light of profits and production for a money market, all of which originally released powerful new productive potentialities, come to operate, in the course of time, to prevent full utilization of productive technics, and to cause periodic crises, unemployment, economic insecurity and consequent suffering for masses of people. Marx and Engels regarded their doctrine of the transformation of capitalist into socialist society as based upon a scientific examination of the laws of development of capitalism and a realistic appreciation of the role of the proletariat. (q.v.) Unlike the Utopian socialism (q.v.) of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen (q.v.) and others, their socialism asserted the necessity of mass political organization of the working classes for the purpose of gaining political power in order to effect the transition from capitalism, and also foresaw the probability of a contest of force in which, they held, the working class majority would ultimately be victorious. The view taken is that Marx was the first to explain scientifically the nature of capitalist exploitation as based upon surplus value and to predict its necessary consequences. "These two great discoveries, the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production by means of surplus value we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science . . ." (Engels: Anti-Dühring, pp. 33-34.) See Historical materialism. -- J.M.S.

Socinians: Followers of the 16th century Italian, humanistic Christians, Socinus (Sotzzini), Laelius and Faustus. They advocated freedom of thought over against the orthodox expressions of Christianity. The Racovian Catechism (1605) states their method and doctrines. In general, they were anti-Trinitarians (see Trinitarianism), anti-Augustinian (opposing the doctrines or original sin, depravity, predestination), anti-Catholic institutionalism; their interpretation of Christianity was that it is a religion of the attainment of eternal life, Jesus being the revealer of God, and the Scriptures giving a supernatural revelation which is necessary and rationally defensible. A strong ethical note pervaded their theology. They opposed the view of sacramental mysteries. Although condemned by the Protestant churches, the Socinians exerted a tremendous influence even after their formal dissolution as a party. -- V.F.
Sociology: The woid "sociologie" was coined by the French philosopher, Auguste Comte, (1798-1857).

The study of society, societal relations. Originally called Social Physics, meaning that the methods of the natural sciences were to be applied to the study of society. Whereas the pattern originally was physics and the first sociologists thought that it was possible to find laws of nature in the social realm (Quetelet, Comte, Buckle), others turned to biological considerations. The "organic" conception of society (Lilienfeld, Schaeffle) treated society as a complex organism, the evolutionists, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, considered the struggle between different ethnic groups the basic factor in the evolution of social structures and institutions. Other sociologists accepted a psychological conception of society; to them psychological phenomena (imitation, according to Gabriel Tarde, consciousness of kind, according to F. H. Giddings) were the basic elements in social interrelations (see also W. McDougall, Alsworth Ross, etc.). These relations themselves were made the main object of sociological studies by G. Simmel, L. Wiese, Howard Becker. A kind of sociological realism was fostered by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, and his school. They considered society a reality, the group-mind an actual fact, the social phenomena "choses sociales". The new "sociology of knowledge", inaugurated by these French sociologists, has been further developed by M. Scheler, K. Mannheim and W. Jerusalem. Recently other branches of social research have separated somewhat from sociology proper: Anthropogeography, dealing with the influences of the physical environment upon society, demography, social psychology, etc. Problems of the methodology of the social sciences have also become an important topic of recent studies. -- W.E.

Sociology of Law: The sociology of law is a comparatively infant type of investigation and consequently exhibits, to an even greater degree than most fields of sociology (q.v.), confusion and variety in methods and results. It can be defined, then, only in terms of its subject matter, which is neither the metaphysical and ethical bases of the law nor law as a separate field of social fact. It is, rather, all aspects of the law considered in their relation to all other social institutions and processes. -- M.B.M.
Socrates: (c. 470-399 B.C.) Was one of the most influential teachers of philosophy. The son of an Athenian stone cutter, named Sophroniscus, and of a mid-wife, Socrates learned his father's trade, but, in a sense, practised his mother's. Plato makes him describe himself as one who assists at the birth of ideas. With the exception of two periods of military service, he remained in Athens all his life. He claimed to be guided by a daimon which warned him against what was wrong, and Plato suggests that Socrates enjoyed mystic experiences. Much of his tirne was spent in high-minded philosophic discussion with those he chanced to meet in the public places of Athens. The young men enjoyed his easy methods of discussion and delighted in his frequent quizzing of the Sophists. He was eventually charged in the Athenian citizen court with being irreligious and corrupting the young. Found guilty, he submitted to the court and drank the poison which ended the life of one of the greatest of Athenians. He wrote nothing and is known through three widely divergent contemporary accounts. Aristophanes has caricatured him in the Clouds, Xenophon has described him, with personal respect but little understanding of his philosophical profundity; Plato's dialogues idealize him and probably develop the Socratic philosophy far beyond the original thought of his master. Socrates personifies the Athenian love of reason and of moderation; he probably taught that virtue is knowledge and that knowledge is only true when it reaches the stage of definition. See Socratic method. -- V.J.B.
Socratic method: (from Socrates, who is said by Plato and Xenophon to have used this method) is a way of teaching in which the master professes to impart no information, (for, in the case of Socrates, he claimed to have none), but draws forth more and more definite answers by means of pointed questions. The method is best illustrated in Socrates' questioning of an unlearned slave boy in the Meno of Plato. The slave is led, step by step, to a demonstration of a special case of the Pythagorean theoiem. Socrates' original use of the method is predicated on the belief that children are born with knowledge already in their souls but that they cannot recall this knowledge without some help, (theory of anamnesis). It is also associated with Socratic Irony, i.e., the profession of ignorance on the part of a questioner, who may be in fact quite wise. -- V.J.B.
Solipsism: (Lat solus, alone + ipse, self)

(a) Methodological: The epistemological doctrine which considers the individual self and it states the only possible or legitimate starting point for philosophical construction. See Cogito, ergo sum; Ego-centric predicament, Subjectivism.

(b) Metaphysical: Subvariety of idealism which maintains that the individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality and that the external world and other persons are representations of that self having no independent existence. -- L.W.

Soma: One of the three important gods of the Vedic religion, about whom the ninth book of the Rig-Veda centers. This god is associated with the plant growing in northern India which was made into an intoxicating liquor. The effects of this drink became associated with supernatural powers. -- V.F.
Somatic: (Gr. somatikos, from soma, body) Pertaining to the bodily organism. -- L.W.
Somatic Datum: Somatic data are those originating within the bodily organism (e.g., feelings of muscular tension, fatigue, organic and circulatory sensations, etc.) in contrast to sense data, which are conditioned by the organs of outer senses. See Datum, Sense Datum. -- L.W.
Some: It is now recognized that to construe such a phrase as, e.g., "some men" as a name of an undetermined [non-empty] part of the class of men (thus as a sort of variable) constitutes an inadequate analysis. In translation into an exact logical notation the word "some" is usually to be represented by an existential quantifier (q.v.). -- A.C.
Sophia: (Gr. sophia) Theoretical as distinguished from practical wisdom, specifically, in Aristotle, knowledge of first principles, or first philosophy. -- G.R.M.
Sophism: An eristic or contentious syllogism, distinguished from paralogism by the intent to deceive (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.
Sophistic: (Gr. sophistike) The art of specious reasoning pursued for pay, according to Aristotle, thus distinguished from eristic, whose end is simply victory in disputation. -- G.R.M.
Sophistici Elenchi: (Gr sophistikoi elenchoi) The last of the logical treatises of Aristotle, dealing with fallacies in argumentation. -- G.R.M.
Sophists: (5th Cent B.C.) Wandering teachers who came to Athens from foreign cities, and sought to popularize knowledge. They filled a need felt in Greece at this time for a general dissemination of that scientific knowledge which had previously been more or less privately cultivated in learned societies. Nowhere was this need more widespread than in Athens where a political career necessitated an acquaintance with the intellectual attainments of the race. The Sophists came to Athens to assist young men in achieving political success. Before long, this brought with it the subordination of purely theoretical learning to its practical usefulness, and the Sophists, far from teaching what is most likely to be true, instructed the youth in what is most likely to bear political fruit. Thus eloquent public appeal and the art of rhetoric soon took the place of pure science and philosophy. In this very desire, however, to persuade and refute, the problem presented itself as to whether among the various conflicting opinions which the Sophists had taught their pupils to defend and to oppose, there was anything of permanent value which could claim the assent of all men everywhere. This quest of the universal in knowledge and in conduct forms the basis of the Socratic Quest. -- M.F.
Sophocracy: (Gr. sophos, wise) Government by the wisest. (Montague) -- H.H.
Sorge: (Ger. concern) The most essential structure of human consciousness and of the world; the basis of all 'being'. (Heidegger) -- H.H.
Sorites: A chain of (categorical) svllogisms, the conclusion of each forming a premiss of the next -- traditionally restricted to a chain of syllogisms in the first figure (all of which, with the possible exception of the first and last, must then be syllogisms in Barbara).

In the statement of a sorites all conclusions except the last are suppressed, and in fact the sorites may be thought of as a single valid inference independently of analysis into constituent syllogisms. According to the order in which the premisses are arranged, the sorites is called progressive (if in the analsis into syllogisms each new premiss after the first is a major premiss, and each intermediate conclusion serves as a minor premiss for the next syllogism) or regressive or Goclenian (if each new premiss after "the first is a "minor premiss, and each intermediate conclusion a major premiss). -- A.C.

Soul: (Gr. psyche) In Aristotle the vital principle; the formal cause, essence, or entelechy of a natural organic body. -- G.R.M.
Soul (Scholastic): With few exceptions (e.g., Tertullian) already the Fathers were agreed that the soul is a simple spiritual substance. Some held that it derived from the souls of the parents (Traducianism), others that it is created individually by God (Creationism), the latter view being generally accepted and made an article of faith. Regarding the union with the body, the early Middle-Ages, following St. Augustine, professed a modified Platonic Dualism: the body is a substance in itself to which the soul is added and with which it enters a more or less accidental union. With the revival of Aristoteleanism, the hylemorphic theory became general: the soul is the substantial form of the body, the only origin of all vital and mental performances, there is no other form besides. This strictly Aristotelian-Thomistic view has been modified by later Scholastics who assume the existence of a forma corporeitatis distinct from the soul. (See Form) -- The soul is simple but not devoid of accidents; the "faculties" (q.v.) are its proper accidents; every experience adds an accidental form to the soul. Though a substance in itself, the soul is naturally ordained towards a body; separated, it is an "incomplete" substance. It is created in respect to the body it will inform, so that the inheritance of bodily features and of mental characteristics insofar as they depend on organic functions is safeguarded. -- As a simple and spiritual substance, the soul is immortal. It is not the total human nature, since person is the composite of niatter informed by the soul. -- Animals and plants too have souls, the former a sensitive, the latter a vegetative soul, which function as the principles of life. These souls are perishable, they too are substantial forms. The human soul contains all the powers of the two other souls and is the origin of the vegetative and sensitive performances in man. -- R.A.
Soul-Substance Theory: Theory that the unity of the individual mind is constituted by a single, permanent, and indivisible spiritual substance. (See Ego, Pure) The theory is usually combined with a faculty psychology. See Faculty Psychology. -- L.W.
Soviet philosophy: The contemponiy development of the philosophy of dialecticil materialism in the U. S. S. R.

There are two major points of reference for tracing1 the path that Soviet philosophy has taken -- the successive controversies around the issues of mechanism and of idealism. The first began in the early twenties as a discussion centering on the philosophy of science, and eventually spread to all phases of philosophy. The central issue was whether materialism could be identified with mechanism. Those who answered in the affirmative, among them Timiriazev, Timinski, Axelrod and Stepanov, were called mechanistic materialists. Their position tended to an extreme empiricism which was suspicious of generalization and theory, saw little if any value in Hegel's philosophy, or in dialectical as distinguished from formal logic, and even went so far, in some cases, as to deny the necessity of philosophy in general, resting content with the findings of the specific sciences. It was considered that they tended to deny the reality of quality, attempting to reduce it mechanically to quantity, and to interpret evolution as a mere quantitative increase or decrease of limited factors, neglecting the significance of leaps, breaks and the precipitation of new qualities. In opposition to their views, a group of thinkers, led by Deborin, asserted the necessity of philosophic generalizition and the value of the dialectical method in Hegel as a necessary element in Marxian materialism. In 1929, at a conference of scientific institutions attended by 229 delegates from all parts of the country, the issues were discussed by both sides. A general lack of satisfaction with the mechanist position was expressed in the form of a resolution at the close of the conference. However, the Deborin group was also criticized, not only by the mechanists, but by many who were opposed to the mechanists as well. It was felt by Mitin, Yudin and a group of predominantly younger thinkers that neither camp was really meeting the obligations of philosophy. While they felt there was much that was valuable in Deborin's criticism of mechanism, it seemed to them that he had carried it too far and had fallen over backward into the camp of the idealists. They called his group menshevizing idealists, that is to say, people who talked like the Mensheviks, a pre-revolutionary faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party. By this was meant that they were unduly abstract, vague and tended to divorce theory from practice. In particular, they seemed to accept Hegelian dialectics as such, overlooking the deeper implications of the materialist reconstruction of it which Marx insisted upon. Moreover, they had neglected the field of social problems, and consequently made no significant philosophic contribution to momentous social issues of the times such as collectivization of the land, abandonment of NEP, the possibility of a Five Year Plan. At a three day conference in 1930, the situation was discussed at length by all interested parties. Deborin, Karev and Sten leading the discussion on one side, Mitin and Yudin on the other. The sense of the meetings was that the criticisms made of the Deborin group were valid.

In respect to the field of ethics in general, Soviet philosophers have lately been developing the doctrine known as socialist or proletarian humanism. As distinguished from "bourgeois humanism", this term signifies that system of social institutions and personal values designed to insure that there be no underprivileged gioup or class de facto excluded from full participation in the good life conceived in terms of the educational and cultural development of the individual and the full enjoyment of the things of this world. Such objectives, it is held, are only possible of attainment in a classless society where there is economic security for all. The view taken is that the freedoms and liberties proclaimed by "bourgeois humanism" represented a great historical advance, but one that was, in general, limited in application to the emancipation of the bourgeoisie (q.v.) from the restrictions of feudalism while retaining and making use, to greater or lesser extent, of slavery, serfdom and a system of private capitalism invoking the precarious economic existence and cultural darkness of large proletarian masses. While it is held that there is an absolute light binding upon all, vaguely expressed in such formulations as, each for all and all for each, it is asserted that in class society, the position and class interest of one class may motivate it to oppose a genuine application of this right, whereas the class interest of another class may coincide with such an application. It is held that the proletariat is in this latter position, for its class interest as well as its moral obligation is considered to be in abolishing itself as a proletariat, which is taken to mean, abolishing classes generally.

Lenin, V. I.: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism; State and Revolution; Karl Marx; Leo Tolstoy as Mirror of the Russian Revolution. (These works, with the exception of State and Revolution appear in Lenin: Selected Works, vol. XI. -- J.M.S.

Space: In Aristotle, the container of all objects. In the Cambridge Platonists, the sensorium of God. In Kant: the a priori form of intuition of external phenomena. In modern math., name for certain abstract invariant gioups or set's. See Space-Time. -- P.P.W.
Space, homogeneous: A form of sensibility, an intuition peculiar to man which enables him to externalize his concepts in relation to one another, reveals the objectivity of things; foreshadows and prepares the way for social life. (Bergson). -- H.H.
Space-perception: (Lat. spatium) The apprehension of the spatial properties and relations of the concrete objects of ordinary sense perception in contrast to the conceptual knowledge of the abstract spaces of physics and mathematics. Theories of space-perception are: a) nativistic, when they endow the mind with a primitive intuition of space which becomes qualitatively differentiated through sense experience; b) empirical, when they assume that perceptual space emerges fiom the correlation of the spatial features of the different senses. -- L.W.
Space-Time: The four-dimensional continuum including the three dimensions of space (length, width and height) and one of time; the unity of space and time. The concept was first suggested by H. Minkowski and immediately afterward incorporated by A. Einstein into his (special) theory of relativity. The former contended that nothing can exist or be conceived of as physical apart from space-time; for every object must have not only length, width and height, but also duration in time. As a result, a complete description and location of an object must be given in terms of four coordinates. Space-Time is mathematically grounded in world-points, or durationless geometrical points, as the foundation of all four-dimensional measurement; and in world-lines, or geometrical lines cutting across the four dimensions. An enduring geometrical point thus beconus a geometrical line (or possibly a curve) in space-time. Space-Time is physically conceived of as a general structure determined by the relationship among world-events, or four-dimensional events. The universe of four dimensions (the omniverse, as it may be called) includes space with all of its events and objects as well as time with its changes and motions. As such this four-dimensional universe must be changeless and motionless, insofar as things move and change only when taken in abstraction from time, or rather when space and time are regarded as separate.

According to the classical or Newtonian theory, space-time is separable in an absolute way into the two elements, space and time; on the other hand, according to either the special or the general theory of relativity, this separation is not possible in an absolute sense but is relative to a choice of a coordinate system.

A somewhat different, metaphysical interpretation of Space-Time was formed by S. Alexander and C. L. Morgan. According to their doctrine of Emergent Evolution, space-time is the matrix of the world, out of which have emerged matter, life, mind, and Deity. The world as we know it has evolved out of the original space-time. -- R.B.W.

Species: A relatively narrow class -- or better class concept -- thought of as included (in the sense of class inclusion, ⊂) within a wider class -- or class concept -- the genus. -- A.C.

In Scholasticism:

  1. In logic: the subdivision of genus, comprising several individuals, constituted by the differentia specifica.
  2. In ontology: the common nature or essence, individualized by some agent. This agent is in Thomism conceived as matter, in Scotism as a form of "thisness" (haecceitas). No agreement has been reached on the number of ontological species; some hold that there is an indefinite number, others that the number is limited.
  3. In psychology of cognition:
    1. regarding sensory cognition: The senses are affected by the object through the medium; this affection results in the species impressa which, however, is not merely the immutation of the sense otgan or the nervous apparatus belonging thereto, but implies a "psychic immutation". As conscious percept the ultimate effect of sense affection in the mind becomes the species expressa.
    2. regarding intellectual cognition: the active intellect, by "illuminating" the phantasm disengages therefrom the species intellegibilis impressa which in turn actuates, through informing it, the passive intellect and becomes theory, as the known concept, the species intelligibilis expressa, also called verbum mentis. This "word" is not of the "inner language", but belongs to preverbal thought and becomes, when given verbal form, the "meaning" of the spoken word, which refers primarily to the mental concept and, by this, secondarily to the object.
-- R.A.
Specificative: (in Schol.) Any concrete thing is taken specificatively or denominatively when the predicate which is attributed to it belongs to it by reason of the concrete subject itself: if we say: the philosopher sleeps, philosopher is taken specificatively, for he sleeps as man. -- H.G.
Specious Present: (Lat speciosus, from species, look or apprehend) The psychological or felt present is a spread of duration embraced within the mind's momentary experience. Contrasts with the physical present which is an ideal limit or boundary between the past and the future. -- L.W.
Speculative Idealism: Doctrine, founded on the coherence theory of truth, that Reality comprises one Self, Mind, or spiritual pnnciple. See Coherence, Internal theory of Relations, Pantheism, Organicism, Dialectic, W. T. Harris. -- W.L.
Speculum: (Lat. mirror) In ordinary language a mirror. Special meanings in optics, astronomy, surgery, and in ornithology. In medieval philosophy, mind is the speculum of nature and God. -- V F.
Speech Situation: (1) A situation in which a complete utterance is made by a speaker and correctly interpreted, by a hearer to whom it is addressed, as referring to some feature of the immediate environment.

(2) More generally: the circumstances attending any use of speech from which some of the defining characteristics of a primary speech situation are absent. See Language. -- M.B.

Spencer, Herbert: (1820-1903) was the great English philosopher who devoted a life time to the formulation and execution of a plan to follow the idea of development as a first principle through all the avenues of human thought. A precursor of Darwin with his famous notion of all organic evolution as a change "from homogeneity to heterogenity," from the simple to the complex, he nevertheless was greatly influenced by the Darwinian hypothesis and employed its arguments in his monumental works in biology, psychology, sociology and ethics. He aimed to interpret life, mind and society in terms of matter, motion and force. In politics, he evidenced from his earliest writings a strong bias for individualism. See Evolutionism, Charles Darwin. -- L.E.D.

Main works: System of Synthttic Philosophy (First Principles of Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Ethics), 1862-92; On Moral and Physical Education, 1861.

Spens, Will: An English educator (born 1882), who as Master of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, has written widely on educational theory. In philosophy and theology, he has developed a theory of Christian doctrine as based on religious experience, which it generalizes and states in terms whose adequacy is determined by their capacity to nourish and develop that experience (Belief and Practice); he has also written on sacramental theology, including several essays (chiefly in the symposium Essays, Catholic and Critical) on the Eucharist; here his view is that by the "real presence" is meant the congeries of opportunities of experiencing through material means the spiritual reality of Christ. -- W.N.P.
Sphaeriker: (German) A term used by Fredrich Froebel to designate those, including himself and Pestalozzi, who believe in or realize in practice the totality or wholeness of man in whom all polarities, such as mind and emotion, spirit and soul, are unified, the sphere with centre being the symbol of this attitude. -- K.F.L.
Spinozism: The philosophic doctrine of Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677). Described by Hegel as the philosophy of Substance. Spinoza denies the possibility of a plurality of substances, and reserves the term for absolute reality. Hence Spinozism is sometimes used as equivalent to Monism. It is also identified with Pantheism, although this is a highly misleading characterization.

In his chief work, the Ethica, Spinoza's teaching is expressed in a manner for which geometry supplies the model. This expository device served various purposes. It may be interpreted as a clue to Spinoza's ideal of knowledge. So understood, it represents the condensed and ordered expression, not of 'philosophy' alone, but rather of all knowledge, 'philosophy' and 'science', as an integrated system. In such an ideal ordering of ideas, (rational) theology and metaphysics provide the anchorage for the system. On the one hand, the theology-metaphysics displays the fundamental principles (definitions, postulates, axioms) upon which the anchorage depends, and further displays in deductive fashion the primary fund of ideas upon which the inquiries of science, both 'descriptive' and 'normative' must proceed. On the other hand, the results of scientific inquiry are anchored at the other end, by a complementary metaphysico-theological development of their significance. Ideally, there obtains, for Spinoza, both an initial theology and metaphysics -- a necessary preparation for science -- and a culminating theology and metaphysics, an interpretative absorption of the conclusions of science.

The fixity of this theoretical structure is not to be interpreted as incompatible with the continuous movement of discovery. The function of philosophy as such, in any age, is that of attempting to effect the theoretical ordering of the available fund of knowledge. There is implicit in Spinoza's conception of this function the recognition of the two-fold character of the task of philosophy. The task, on the one hand is reflection upon the available fund of insight and ideas, upon all the fruits of reflection and inquiry, with the purpose of coherent ordering and expression of the fund. In this sense, 'philosophy' is that which can be displayed in the geometrical fashion. It is equally the task of philosophy, however, to prepare for this display and ordering. Paradoxically, philosophy must prepare for itself. Philosophy, in this function, is reflection upon the conditions of all inquiry, the discovery of the grounds of method, of the proper and indispensable assumptions of inquiry as such, and of the basic ideas within whose domain inquiry will move. If inquiry is to be undertaken at all, then mind must discover within itself, and disclose to itself, whatever authoritative guidance can be assured for the enterprise. The competence of the mind to know, the determination of the range of that competence, the rational criteria of truth, the necessities levelled to mind by the very reflections of mind -- these and related questions define the task of philosophy as propaedeutic both to philosophy itself and to science. In this recognition of the two-fold character of philosophy, and of its relation to science, Spinoza is re-stating the spirit of Descartes.

The precipitates of the propaedeutical effort are to be found, for Spinoza, in the definitions, axioms, postulates, and within the structural plan expressed in the geometrical ordering. It is highly probable that Spinoza would have admitted the tentative character of at least some of the definitions, axioms, and postulates formulated by him. He doubtless saw the possibility that the process of inquiry, revising, augmenting, and re-coordinating the fund of knowledge, might demand alteration in the structural bases of systematic expression as well as in the knowledge to be ordered. Such changes, however, would occur within limits set by the propaedeutical disclosures and the general framework. Advance might require the abandonment of an older metaphysical element, and the substitution of a new one. But with equal likelihood, the advance of knowledge would make possible a richer and deeper apprehension of the content of fixed principles. To illustrate: The first definition of the Ethica, that of Causa sui, might well be for Spinoza a principle that awakened reason must accept, a truth whose priority and validity could not be undermined. He might regard it as a minimal definition of reality, of the nature of the ultimate object of inquiry. On the other hand, Spinoza, it may be conjectured, would not claim for every element of his system a similar finality. Just as he recognizes the role of hypothesis in science, in a similar way, he would recognize the tentative character of some metaphysical and theological elements.

The structural mture of this ideal ordering reflects, of course, the Spinozistic view of the real. Ultimate reality, as Causa sui and as substance, is all-inclusive. Causality is immanent causality, and every determinative being lies within the one substantial being. Spinoza's doctiine of attributes, infinite and finite modes, serve to express both the all encompassing and systematic nature of the one ultimate reality and to distinguish and to determine the status of finite beings within this reality. In its immanentism as well as in its rational mysticism, the doctrine of Spinoza is not improperly regarded as a Plotinism re-directed by the influence of Descartes and invigorated by the enterprise of modern science. -- A.G.A.B.

Main works:

Exposition more geometrico of Descartes' Principles, 1663;
Tract. Theol.-Politicus, 1670 (only two books published during Spinoza's lifetime);
Ethics, demonstrated in geometrical order, 1677;
Political Treatise, 1677;
De intellectus. emendatione, 1677 (On the Improvement of the Human Mind).
Cf. Vloten and Land, 2 vol. edition of Spinoza's works.
Spir, African: (1837-1890) A native of Russia, whose philosophy was influenced by Spinoristic and Kantian traditions. The main thesis of his philosophy is that sensory experience and reasoning are basically contradictory, insofar as the former informs us of constant change, whereas the latter is characterized by the a priori principle of identity. -- R.B.W.

Main works: Denken u. Wirklichkeit, 1873; Moralität u. Religion, 1874; Empiric u. Philosophie, 1876.

Spirit: (L. Spiritus: breath, life, soul, mind, spirit)
  1. Originally, the Stoic fire-like, animating and energizing principle (pneuma) of the Cosmos.
  2. A being capable of consciousness and commonly considered as possessing will and intelligence.
  3. Immaterial being.
  4. A disembodied or incorporeal conscious being.
  5. The supersensuous, ideal order of being or realm of mind: the intellectual, rational, noetic, aesthetic, moral, holy, divine.
  6. Medieval and alchemic: A subtle stuff; an element.
-- W.L.
Spiritism: 1. Doctrine that ancestral or other spirits can communicate with man; also the practice of contacting them.

2. Belief in the existence of conscious, voluntary beings other than of the organic, corporeal type represented by animals and man, such as souls connected with inorganic Nature, disembodied nature spirits, manes or ancestral spirits, demons, celestial beings, angelic beings, deities. See Animism, Demonism, Spiritualism (4). -- W.L.

Spiritual Realism: The theory that only the truly good will is free. Causality based on spiritual activity. Self-forgetfulness as the way to a supreme realization of personality. Ravaisson expressed it in the phrase "To simplify one's self." -- R.T.F.

Spiritualism (1) is the doctrine that the ultimate reality in the universe is Spirit, (Pneuma, Nous, Reason, Logos) an Over-Mind akm to human spirit, but pervading the entire universe as its ground and rational explanation. It is opposed to materialism.

Spiritualism (2) is sometimes used to denote the Idealistic view that nothing but an absolute Spirit and finite spirits exist. The world of sense in this view is a realm of ideas.

Spiritualism (3) is used in religious terminology to emphasize the direct influence of the Holy Spirit in the sphere of religion and especially to indicate the teaching of St. John's Gospel that God is Spirit and that worship is direct correspondence of Spirit with spirit.

Spiritualism (4) means the faith that spirits of the dead communicate with the living through persons who are "mediums" and through other forms of manifestation. The word Spiritism is more properly used for this faith. -- R.M.J.

Spiritus rector: Literally in Latin, the ruling or master spirit, some sort of subtle natural force in corporeal beings. The alchemists applied the expression to some substance, or distilled product, said to be capable of transmuting metals into gold, and also to an elixir which was supposed to prolong life indefinitely. -- J.J.R.
Spontaneity: (Lat. sponte, of free will) The supposed ability of the will to act on its own initiative (sua sponte) and in independence of antecedent conditions. See Free-Will. -- L.W.
Spranger, Eduard: (1882) Developed Dilthey's thought, favoring like him, descriptive instead explanatory psychology. As leading exponent of the Verstehungspsychologie, he postulates ideal types representing ultimate categories of value. These types of personality represent merely "schemata of comprehensibility," theoretical guides or aids in understanding people. -- H.H.

Main works:

Grundl. d. Geschichtswiss., 1905;
Lebensformen, 1914;
Die Geisteswiss. u. d. Schule, 1920;
Die wissensch. Grundl. d. Schulverfassungslehre u. d. Schulpolitik, 1925;
Das deutsche Bildungsideal, 1928;
Volk, Staat, Erziehung, 1930.

  1. Partiality, selfishness.
  2. A private name. "Only a particular substance bears the name." (Neo-Mohism).
-- W.T.C.
  1. Deliberation, thinking.
  2. Wish.
  3. Idea.
-- W.T.C.
Ssu chiao: The four things which Confucius taught his pupils, namely, letters, personal conduct, being one's true self (chung), and good faith in social relationship (hsin). -- W.T.C.
Ssu te: The Four Virtues
  1. Being attentive to the fundamentals, penetrative, beneficial, and unflinching -- the virtues of the trigram ch'ien (Heaven, male, yang) and therefore ethical ideals of the superior man.
  2. Filial piety, respect for elders, loyalty to superiors (chung), and good faith in social relationship (hsin).
  3. Lady-like conduct, speech, skill, and appearance. Also called ssu hsing.
-- W.T.C.
Ssu tuan: All men possess the 'four beginnings' of benevolence (jen), righteousness (i), propriety (li), and wisdom (chih). (Mencius). -- H.H.
St. Louis School of Philosophy: Started with the first meeting between Henry Brokmeyer and Wm. Torrey Harris (q.v.) in 1858, it became one of the most important and influential movements in America to die in the early 1880's with the dispersion of the members who included among others Denton J. Snider, Adolph E. Kroeger, George H. Howison, and Thomas Davidson. It engendered the St. Louis Philosophical Society (founded in Feb., 1866) and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Cf. D. S. Snider, St. Louis Movement, and Charles M. Perry, St. Louts Movement in Philosophy. -- K.F.L.
State: (Lat. status, Ital. stato; the term introduced by Machiavelli) A political organization based upon a common territory and exercising control over the inhabitants of that territory. Essential for a state is the existence of a government, and in the "legal state", a written or unwritten constitution. By the pure theory of law (Kelsen), the state is identified with law. By others (Duguit) considered a mere fiction, devised to conceal the matter of fact preponderance of particular persons or groups. The state is sometimes explained as the positive or actual organization of the legislative or judicial powers. (In America also: one of the commonwealths which form the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico). -- W.E.
State of Nature: The state of man as it would he if there were no political organization or government. The concept was used by many philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a criterion of what man's naturnl condition might be and as to what extent that condition has been spoiled or corrupted by civilization. It was used as an argument for man's original rights to liberty and equality (Hooker, Locke, Rousseau), but occasionally also as an argument for the necessity of the state and its right to control all social relations (Hobbes). -- W.E.
Statement: See Meaning, Kinds of, 1.
  1. The systematic study of quantitative facts, numerical data, comparative materials, obtained through description and interpretation of group phenomena.
  2. The method of using and interpreting processes of classification, enumeration, measurement and evaluation of group phenomena.
  3. In a restricted sense, the materials, facts or data referring to group phenomena and forming the subject of systematic computation and interpretation.

The Ground of Statistics. Statistics have developed from a specialized application of the inductive principle which concludes from the characteristics of a large number of parts to those of the whole. When we make generalizations from empirical data, we are never certain of having expressed adequately the laws connecting all the relevant and efficient factors in the case under investigation. Not only have we to take into account the personal equation involved and the imperfection of our instru ments of observation and measurement, but also the complex character of physical, biological, psychological and social phenomena which cannot be subjected to an exhaustive analysis. Statistics reveals precisely definite trends and frequencies subject to approximate laws, in these various fields in which phenomena result from many independently varying factors and involve a multitude of numerical units of variable character. Statistics differs fiom probability insofar as it makes a more consistent use of empirical data objectively considered, and of methods directly inspired by the treatment of these data.

The Method of Statistics. The basic principle of statistical method is that of simplification, which makes possible a concise and comprehensive knowledge of a mass of isolated facts by correlating them along definite lines.

  1. The various stages of this method are:
    1. precise definition of the problem or field of inquiry;
    2. collection of material required by the problem;
    3. tabulation and measurement of material in a manner satisfying the purpose of the problem;
    4. clear presentation of the significant features of tabulated material (by means of charts, diagrams, symbols, graphs, equations and the like),
    5. selection of mathematical methods for application to the material obtained;
    6. necessary conclusion from the facts and figures obtained;
    7. general interpretation within the limits of the problem and the procedure used.
  2. The special methods of treating statistical data are: collecting, sampling, selecting, tabulating, classifying, totaling or aggregating, measuring, averaging, relating and correlating, presenting symbolically. Each one of these methods uses specialized experimental or mathematical means in its actual application.
  3. The special methods of interpreting statistical data already treated are: analyzing, estimiting, describing, comparing, explaining, applying and predicting.
  4. In order to be conclusive, the various stages and types of the statistical method must avoid
    1. loose definitions,
    2. cross divisions resulting ftom conflicting interpretations of the problem,
    3. data which are not simultaneous or subject to similar conditions,
    4. conclusions from poor oi incomplete data,
    5. prejudices in judging, even when there is no conuption of evidence.
  5. The philosophy of statistics is concerned in general with the discussion and evaluation of the mathematical principles, methods and results of this science; and in particular with a critical analysis of the fitness of biological, psychological, educational, economic and sociological materials, for various types of statistical treatment. The purpose of such an inquiry is to integrate its results into the general problems and schemes of philosophy proper. Cf.. Richard von Mises, Statistics, Probability, and Truth.
-- T.G.
Stern, William: (1871-1938) Psychologist and philosopher who has contributed extensively to individual psychology (see Individual Psychology), child psychology and applied psychology. He was an innovator in the field of intelligence testing, having suggested the use of intelligence quotient (I.Q.) obtained by dividing in individual's mental age by his chronological age and recognized that this quotient is relatively constant for a given individual. The Psychological Methods of Testing Intelligence. Stern's psychology with its emphasis on individual differences affords the foundation for his personalistic philosophy, the main contention of which is that the person is a psychophysical unity, characterized by purposiveness and individuality. See Die Psychologie und der Personalismus (1917); Person und Sache, 3 Vols. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung, Vol. 6. -- L.W.
Stheme: An adjective derived from the Greek, Sthenos, strength. It was applied by Dr. John Brown (1735-1788), a Bntish physician, to diseases distinguished by a usual or excessive accumulation of vital power, or nervous energy. Kant applied it to vigorous or exciting emotions. -- J.J.R.
Stirner, Max: Pen name of Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856) Most extreme and thoroughgoing individualist in the history of philosophy. In his classic, The Ego and his Own, he regards everything except the individual as minor; family, state and society all disappear before the individual, the ego, as the primary power for life and living. -- L.E.D.
Stoic School: Founded by Zeno (of Citium, in Cyprus) in the year 308 B.C. in Athens. For Stoicism virtue alone is the only good and the virtuous man is the one who has attained happiness through knowledge, as Socrites had taught. The virtuous man thus finds happiness in himself and is independent of the external world which he has succeeded in overcoming by mastering himself, his passions and emotions. As for the Stoic conception of the universe as a whole, their doctrine is pantheistic. All things and all natural laws follow by a conscious determination from the basic World Reason, and it is this rational order by which, according to Stoicism, the wise man seeks to regulate his life as his highest duty. -- M.F.
Strato: of Lampsacus, head of the Peripatetic School of Greek philosophy from 287-269 B.C. -- M.F.
Strauss, David Friedrich: (1808-1874) German philosopher who received wide popularity and condemnation for his Life of Jesus. He held that the unity of God and man is not realized in Christ but in mankind itself and in its history. This relation, he believed, was immanent and not transcendent. His numerous writings displayed many currents from Hegelianism and Darwinism to a pantheism that approaches atheism and then back to a naturalism that clings devoutly to an inward religious experience. Main works: Das Leben Jesu, 1835; Die Christliche Dogmatik, 1840; Der alte u. d. neue Glaube, 1872. -- L.E.D.
Stream of Consciousness or Thought: Thought considered as a process of continuous change. The metaphor of the stream was suggested by W. James. See The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, ch. IX, entitled "The Stream of Thought" especially p. 239. -- L.W.
Strict implication: As early as 1912, C. I. Lewis projected a kind of implication between propositions, to be called strict implication, which should more nearly accord with the usual meaning of "implies" than does material implication (see logic, formal, § 1). should make "p implies q" synonymous with "q is deducible from p," and should avoid such so-called paradoxes of material implication as the theorem [p ⊃ q] ∨ [q ⊃ p]. The first satisfactory formulition of a calculus of propositions with strict implication appeared in 1920, and this system, and later modified forms of it. have since been extensively investigated. An essential feature is the introduction of modalities through the notation (say) M[p], to mean "p is possible" (Lewis uses a diamond instead of M). The strict implication of q by p is then identified with ∼M[p ∼q], whereas the material implication p ⊃ q is given by ∼[p ∼q]. In 1932 Lewis, along with other modifications, added a primitive formula (involving the binding of propositional variables by existential quantifiers) which renders definitively impossible an interpretation of the system which would make Mp the same as p and strict implication the same as material implication. Consistency of the system, including this additional primitive formula, may be established by means of an appropriate four-valued propositional calculus, the theorems of the system being some among the tautologies of the four-valued propositional calculus. -- A.C.

Lewis and Langford,
Symbolic Logic, New York and London, 1932.
F. V. Huntington,
Postulates for assertive conjunction, negation, and equality, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. 72, no. 1, 1937.
W. T. Parry,
Modalities in the Survey system of strict implication, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4 (1939). pp 137-154.

Structuralism: (Lat. structura, a building) The conception of mind in terms of its structure whether this structure be interpreted (a) atomistically. See Psychological Atomism, Structural Psychology); or (b) configurationally. (Gestalt Psychology). -- L.W.
Structural Psychology: A tendency in American psychology, represented by E. B. Titchener. (A Textbook of Psychology, (1909-10) which in opposition to Functional Psychology (see Functional Psychology, Functionalism) adopted as the method of psychology the analysis of mental states into component sensations, images and feelings; the structure of consciousness is for structural psychology atomistic. -- L.W.
Structural Theories of Mind: See Structuralism.
Struggle For Existence: This is given by Charles Darwin as a premise for his evolutionary hypothesis of natural selection. There is constant struggle in a species resultant from the over production of offspring. This notion is an outgrowth of the influence of Malthus on Darwin. Darwin does not mean actual or necessary combat at all stages, but requisite dependence of one upon another and of each upon all factors in the environment leading to the natural selection of the fittest. See Evolutionism, Natural Selection, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Henry Huxley. -- L.E.D.
Stuff, Neutral: A reality posited by certain philosophers which is neither mental nor physical, but which underlies both. See Neutral Monism. -- L W.
Stumpf, Carl: (184-8-1936) A life long Platonic realist, he was philosophically awakened and influenced by Brentano. His most notable contributions were in the psychology of tone and music, and in musicology. Metaphysics is, in his opinion, best constructed inductively as a continuation of the sciences. -- H.H.

Main works:

Tonpsychologie, 2 vols., 1883-90;
Die Anfange der Musik, 1911;
Empfindung u. Vorstellung, 1918;
Gefühl u. Gefühlsempfindung, 1928;
Erkenntnislehre, I, 1939.

Sturm und Drang: (German, "Storm and Stress"), a period sweeping the German countries about 1770-1785, in which men like Hamann, Herder, the young Goethe, Schiller, Wagner, Christian Schubart, and Friedrich Maximilian Klinger (from whose play the movement got its name) advocated, in a flush of creative enthusiasm, the forces of native talent, the value of emotion, and the power of genius as a conscious reaction against the enlightenment which had spread from France. -- K.F.L.
Su: 'Unadornment', (p'u) 'unadorned simplicity'; (ching) 'quiescence' bespeaking all the complete absence of desires, but really meaning that the desires should be made fewer. (Lao Tzu) Seeking for the tao, emptiness, singleness, concentrated attention (tu), quiescence are all rules for man's conduct. (Hsun Tzu C355-C288 B.C.) -- H.H.
Suarezianism: A school of philosophy and theology founded by Francisco Suarez, of the Society of Jesus, Spain, 1548-1617. His philosophic position is, in general, that of Christian Aristotelianism. The immediate background of his thought is to be found in Albertinism, Thomism, Scotism and Nominalism.

The Disputationes Metaphysicae (no Eng. translation) forms a complete exposition of Suarez general metaphysics, psychology, theory of knowledge, cosmology and natural theology. Basic is the rejection of the thomistic real distinction between essence and existence in finite things. Physical substances are individuated, neither by their matter nor their form, but by their total entities. Their components, matter and form, are individual entities united in the composite of physical substance by a "mode" (unio) which has itself no reality apart from the composite. Except in the case of the human form which is the soul, matter and form in the natural order cannot exist in isolation. Accidental "modes" are used to explain the association of accidents with their subjects. Spiritual creatures (angels and human souls) are not specific natures as in Thomism, but are individuals, constituted such by their own entities.

The soul is the principle of all vital actions and, though these vital operations on the biological, sensory and intellectual levels are attributed to various "faculties", these faculties are not really distinct from the essence of the soul. In this life the human intellect cannot operate without the aid of images supplied by sense perception. An intellectual concept of a single individual thing may be formed directly and then a universal concept of the common nature of many sensible things within a class may be developed by the intellect through the process of abstraction. The will is the faculty of rational appetite, it is free in the ultimate choice of its object, which is called a "good." Suarez emphasizes the psychological and moral supremacy of the will. The Suarezian theory of knowledge is what would be called naive realism today.

As a free creature, man is responsible for his freely performed actions. Man knows the basic principles of the Divine Law through the natural use of his intellect. Thus known, the Divine Law is called the natural moral law. It is immutable. Suarez' ethics provides a rational justification for most of the accepted moral standards of Christianity. The individual has rights and duties in regard to other creatures and himself; he has duties toward his Creator. The political theory of Suarez is most noted for its opposition to the divine right of kings. He held that a ruler derives his authority immediately from the consent of the people, ultimately from God. Suarez maintained that there are several forms of political organizations in which social justice may be secured.

According to Suarez, theology is not a part of philosophy, but a supreme science having a supernatural justification and deriving its principles from Divine revelation. However, in his natural theology, Suarez examined the arguments for the existence of God. The attributes of God can be but dimly known by the unaided reason of man.

Suarezianism is systematic, orderly, easy to teach, it has become the framework of many Catholic text-books in philosophy, particularly of those by Jesuit authors. Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes mention their reading of the Disputations. See: Grab-mann, M., "Die Disp. Metaph. F. Suarez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortwirkung," in Franz Suarez, S.J., (Innsbruck, 1917). (Pedro Descoqs, S. J., is an outstanding contemporary Suarezian).

Opera Omnia, ed. C. Berton, (Paris, 1856-1878), 30 vols. (not quite complete).

De Scorraille, R., F. Suarez, de la Compagnie de Jesus, 2 vols. (Paris, 1912).

A Symposium on Suarez (Five papers and a good bibliography by American Jesuit scholars), Proc. Jesuit Educat. Assoc., (Chicago, 1931) pp. 153-214.

Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance, ed. G. Smith, S.J., (Milwaukee, 1939). -- V.J.B.

Subalternation: See Logic, formal, § 4.
Subclass: A class a is a subclass of a class b if a ⊂ b. See Logic, formal, § 7.

A class a is a proper subclass of a class b if a ⊂ b and a ≠ b. -- A.C.

Subconscious Mind: (Lat. sub, under -- cum together + scire to know) A compartment of the mind alleged by certain psychologists and philosophers (see Psycho-analysis) to exist below the threshold of consciousness. The subconscious, though not directly accessible to introspection (see Introspection), is capable of being tapped by special techniques such as random association, dream-analysis, automatic writing, etc. The doctrine of the subconscious was foreshadowed in Leibniz's doctrine of petites perceptions (Monadology, Sections 21, 23) and received philosophical expression by A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, and E. von Hartman, Philosophy of the Unconscious and has become an integral part of Freudian psychology. See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, esp. pp. 425-35, 483-93. -- L.W.
Subcontrary: See Logic, formal, § 4.
Subject: (Lat. subjicere to place under)

a) In Epistemology: The subject of knowledge is the individual knower considered either as a pure ego (see Ego, Pure), a transcendental ego (see Ego, Transcendental) or an act of awareness. (See Awareness).

b) In Psychology: The psychological subject is the individual subjected to observation. Thus the introspective psychologist may either rely on the report of another subject or he may self-introspect, i.e., serve as his own subject. (See Introspection). -- L.W.

For the use of this word in traditional logic, see Predicate.

Subjective Idealism: Sometimes referred to as psychological idealism or subjectivism. The doctrine of knowledge that the world exists only for the mind. The only world we know is the-world-we-know shut up in the realm of ideas. To be is to be perceived: esse est percipi. This famous doctrine (classically expressed by Bishop Berkeley, 1685-1753) became the cornerstone of modern metaphysical idealism. Recent idealists tend to minimize its significance for metaphysics. -- V.F.
Subjective rightness: An action is subjectively right if it is done in the belief that it is objectively right. See Objective rightness. -- W.F.K.
Subjectivism: a) In Epistemology: The restriction of knowledge to the knowing subject and its sensory, affective ind volitional states and to such external realities as may be inferred from the mind's subjective states. See Solipsism, Ego-centric Predicament.

b) In Axiology: The doctrine that moral and aesthetic values represent the subjective feelings and reactions of individual minds and have no status independent of such reactions. Ethical subjectivism finds typical expression in Westermarck's doctrine that moral judgments have reference to our emotions of approval and disapproval. See The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. Vol. 1, Ch. l. -- L.W.

Subjectivism, epistemological: Doctrine contending that every object apprehended is created, constructed by the apprehender. (Montague). -- H.H.
Sublimation: (Lat. sublimatio, from sublimare, to elevete, lift up) The psychological mechanism, described by Freudians, which consists in the discovery of a substitute object for the expression of a basic instinct or feeling, e.g., the sublimation of the sex impulses in aesthetic creation -- L.W.
Subliminal: (Lat. sub. under + limen, the threshold) Term popularized by F. Myers to describe allegedly unconscious mental processes especially sensations which lie below the threshold of consciousness. See Unconscious Mind. -- L.W.
Subsistents: Abstract and eternal entities, values, universals in a non-mental and non-physical world. -- H.H.
Substance: (Lat. sub + stare = Gr. hypo + stasis, to stand under. Also from Lat. quod quid est, or quod quid erat esse = Gr. to ti en einai, i.e., that by virtue of which a thing has its determinate nature, which makes it what it is, as distinguished from something else. See ousia, natura, subsistentia, essentia. Thus Augustine writes (De Trin. VII, ch. 4, #7) "essence (ousia) usually means nothing else than substance in our language, i.e., in Latin").

Substance is the term used to signify thit which is sought when philosophers investigate the primary being of things. Thus Plato was primarily concerned with investigating the being of things from the standpoint of their intelligibility. Hence the Platonic dialectic was aimed at a knowledge of the essential nature (ousia) of things. But science is knowledge of universals. so the essence of things considered as intelligible is the universal common to many; i.e., the universal Form or Idea, and this was for Plato the substance of things, or what they are primarily.

Besides the universal intelligible being of things, Aristotle was also primarily concerned with an investigation of the being of things from the standpoint of their generation and existence. But only individual things are generated and exist. Hence, for him, substance was primarily the individual: a "this" which, in contrast with the universal or secondary substance, is not communicable to many. The Aristotelian meaning of substance may be developed from four points of view:

  1. Grammar: The nature of substance as the ultimate subject of predication is expressed by common usage in its employment of the noun (or substantive) as the subject of a sentence to signify an individual thing which "is neither present in nor predicable of a subject." Thus substance is grammatically distinguished from its (adjectival) properties and modifications which "are present in and predicable of a subject."

    Secondary substance is expressed by the universal term, and by its definition which are "not present in a subject but predicable of it." See Categoriae,) ch. 5.

  2. Physics: Independence of being emerges as a fundamental characteristic of substance in the analysis of change. Thus we have:
    1. Substantial change: Socrates comes to be. (Change simply).
    2. Accidental change; in a certain respect only: Socrates comes to be 6 feet tall. (Quantitative). Socrates comes to be musical (Qualitative). Socrates comes to be in Corinth (Local).

    As substantial change is prior to the others and may occur independently of them, so the individual substance is prior in being to the accidents; i.e., the accidents cannot exist independently of their subject (Socrates), but can be only in him or in another primary substance, while the reverse is not necessarily the case.

  3. Logic: Out of this analysis of change there also emerges a division of being into the schema of categories, with the distinction between the category of substance and the several accidental categories, such as quantity, quality, place, relation, etc. In a corresponding manner, the category of substance is first; i.e., prior to the others in being, and independent of them.
  4. Metaphysics: The character of substance as that which is present in an individual as the cause of its being and unity is developed in Aristotle's metaphysical writings, see especiallv Bk. Z, ch. 17, 1041b. Primary substnnce is not the matter alone, nor the universal form common to many, but the individual unity of matter and form. For example, each thing is composed of parts or elements, as an organism is composed of cells, yet it is not merely its elements, but has a being and unity over and above the sum of its parts. This something more which causes the cells to be this organism rather than a malignant growth, is an example of what is meant by substance in its proper sense of first substance (substantia prima).

Substance in its secondary sense (substantia secunda) is the universal form (idea or species) which is individuated in each thing.

For the later development of the conception of substance, see Thomas Aquinas, especially De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2.

Note that according to Aristotle, the substance of a thing is always intelligible. Thus there are sensible substances, but the substance of these things is itself neither sensible nor capable of being apprehended by the senses alone, but only when the activity of the intellect is added. In later scholastic philosophy this point was missed, so the Aristotelian doctrine of substance quite naturally ceased to be any longer intelligible.

In modern thought, two general types of usage are discernible. In the empirical tradition. the notion of thing and properties continues the meaning of independence as expressed in first substance. Under the impact of physical science, the notion of thing and its properties tends to dissolve. Substance becomes substratum as that in which properties and qualities inhere. The critique of Berkeley expressed the resultant dilemma: either sub-stratum is property-less and quality-less, and so is nothing at all, or else it signifies the systematic and specific coherence of properties and qualities, and so substance or sub-stratum is merely the thing of common sense. Within science 'first substance' persists as the ultimate discrete particle with respect to which spatial and temporal coordinates are assigned. Within empirical philosophical thought the element of meaning described as 'independence' tends to be resolved into the order and coherence of experience.

In the rationalistic tradition, Descartes introduces a distinction between finite and infinite substance. To conceive of substance is to conceive an existing thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. Strictly speaking, God alone is substance. Created or finite substances are independent in the sense that they need only the concurrence of God in order to exist. 'Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property, quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a Substance." (Reply to Obj. II, Phil. Works, trans, by Haldane and Ross, vol. II, p. 53, see Prin. of Phil. Pt. I, 51, 52). Substance is that which can exist by itself without the aid of any other substance. Reciprocal exclusion of one another belongs to the nature of substance. (Reply to Obj. IV). Spinoza brings together medieval Aristotelian meanings and the Cartesian usage, but rejects utterly the notion of finite substance, leaving only the infinite. The former is, in effect, a contradiction in terms, according to him. Spinoza further replaces the Aristotelian distinction between substance and accident with that between substance and mode. (See Wolfson, The Phil. of Spinoza, vol. I, ch. 3). "By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words that, the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed." (Ethics, I, Def. III). Substance is thus ultimate being, self-caused or from itself (a se), and so absolutely independent being, owing its being to itself, and eternally self-sustaining. It is in itself (in se), and all things are within it. Substance is one and there can be but one substance; God is this substance. For Descartes, every substance has a principal attribute, an unchangeable essential nature, without which it can neither be nor be understood. The attribute is thus constitutive of substance, and the latter is accessible to mind only through the former. By virtue of having different constitutive essences or attributes, substances are opposed to one another. Spinoza, rejecting the idea of finite substance, necessarily rejects the possibility of a plurality of substances. The attributes of the one substance are plural and are constitutive. But the plurality of attributes implies that substance as such cannot be understood by way of any one attribute or by way of several. Accordingly, Spinoza declares that substance is also per se, i.e., conceived through itself. The infinite mode of an attribute, the all pervasive inner character which defines an attribute in distinction from another, is Spinoza's adaptation of the Cartesian constitutive essence.

The critique of Kant resolves substance into the a priori category of Inherence-and-subsistence, and so to a necessary synthetic activity of mind upon the data of experience. In the dialectic of Hegel, the effort is made to unify the logical meanings of substance as subject and the meaning of absolute independent being as defined in Spinoza. -- L.M.H. & A.G.A.B.

In Scholasticism: The nature of substance is that it exists in itself, independently from another being. While accidents are in another, substance is in itself. It is what underlies the accidents, persists even if these are changing, insofar as its being in itself is considered, it is spoken of as subsistence (subststentia). Substances are either material, and as such dependent on matter informed by a substantial form, or spiritual, free of any kind of matter (even a spiritual one, as Aquinas points out in i against Avencebron, i.e., Ibn Gebirol), and as such is called forma subsistens. Substantial forms are not substances, with the one exception of the human soul (q.v.) which, however, is when separated from the body only an incomplete substance. See Form, Matter. -- R.A.

Substance Theory of Mind: The conception of the individual mind as a permanent, self-identical substance. (See Soul-Substance Theory). The Substance Theory is distinguished from the substantive theory by C. W. Morris, (Six Theories of Mind, Chs. I and V) but the distinction is difficult to maintain. -- L.W.
Substantive States: (Lat. substantivus, self-existent) Substantive states of mind in contrast to transitive or relational states are the temporary resting places in the flow of the stream of thought. The term was introduced by W. James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 243-8). -- L.W.
Substantive Theory of Mind: A diluted form of the Substance Theory of mind which asserts that the mind, while not strictly a substance, possesses a substantial character. See Substance Theory of Mind. -- L.W.
Substitution, rule of: See logic, formal, § 1.
Substratum: (Gr. hypokeimenon) That in which an attribute inheres, or of which it is predicated; substance; subject. In Aristotle's philosophy hypokeimenon sometimes means matter as underlying form, sometimes the concrete thing as possessing attributes, sometimes the logicnl subject of predication. -- G.R.M.
Subsumption: Noun signifying that the subject of a proposition is taken under the predicate. Also the inclusion of the species under the genus, and the individual under the species. The minor premiss which applies a general law stated by the major premiss of a syllogism is called a subsumption. -- J.J.R.
Succession and Duration: These concepts are inseparable from the idea of 'flowing' time in which every event endures relatively to a succession of other events. In Leibniz's view, succession was the most important characteristic of time defined by him as "the order of succession." Some thinkers, notably H. Bergson, regard duration (duree) as the very essence of time, "time perceived as indivisible," in which the vital impulse (elan vital) becomes the creative source of all change comparable to a snow-ball rolling down a hill and swelling on its way. According to A. N. Whitehead, duration is 'a slab of nature' possessing temporal thickness, it is a cross-section of the world in its process, or "the immediate present condition of the world at some epoch." -- R.B.W.
Sufficient condition: F is a sufficient condition of G if F(x) ⊃x C(x). See Necessary condition. -- A.C.
Sufficient Reason, Principle of: Consists in the necessary relation of every object or event to every other. Time, space, causality, ground of knowledge and motivation are so many forms of this most basic principle of the relatedness of phenomena. (Schopenhauer). In Leibniz, see Principle of Sufficient Reason. -- H.H.
Sufism: A classical development of mysticism and a reaction from the legalism and rigidity of orthodox Islam. Being a sect seeking to attain a nearer fellowship with God by scrupulous observation of the religious law, it represents an infiltration into Islam of the Christian-gnostic type of piety with its charismatic and ascetic features. Gained many of its converts from the heterodox Moslems in Persia. -- H.H.
Sui generis: (Lat ) Alone of its kind, the condition of a subject which is unique, applied puticularly to God. -- V.J.B.
Sukha-duhkha: (Skr.) Pleasure and pain, to which is often added moha (q.v.), a stereotyped expression for the involvement in activity and thought preventing moksa (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Summa (Scholastic): Name of comprehensive treitises, subdivided in tractatus or quaestiones, which in their turn may contain several articles or membra. The classical procedure is that of the quaestio disputata (see quaestio) which developed from the method adopted first by the students of Canon Law (Yves of Chartres, a.o.) and applied to philosophical and theological discussion by Abelard (Sic et Non). The 12th century produced some works entitled Summa but not yet showing the strictly logical and systematical structure of the later works (e.g. Summa sacramentorum, attributed (?) to Hugh of St. Victor). The 13th century gave birth to the classical form. -- R.A.
Summation, Psychic: (Lat. summa, sum) Fusion or combination of separate states of mind to form a new whole. See Fusion, Psychic. -- L.W.
Summists: (Lat. Summa, a compendium) A group of writers in the 12th to 14th centuries who produced compendious, encyclopedic works known as Summae. Beginnings of the summa-form are to be found in Peter Abaelard's Sic et Non (early 12th C.) and Peter Lombard's Libri IV Sententiarum (mid 12th C.). Theological Summae consisted of collections of opinions (sententiae) from earlier authorities, particularly Patristic, with some attempt at a resolution of the conflicts in such opinions. Hugh of St. Victor may have been the first to use the name, Summa. Wm. of Auxerre (Summa Aurea), Alexander of Hales and his fellow Franciscans (Summa universae theologiae), John of La Rochelle (S. de anima), St. Albert (S. de Creaturis, and an incomplete S. Theologiae), and St. Thomas Aquinas (S. contra Gentiles, and S. Theologiae), are important 13th C. Summists. There were philosophical Summae, also, such as the S. Logicae of Lambert of Auxerre, the S. modorum stgnificandi of Siger of Courtrai (14th C.), and the Summa philosophiae of the Pseudo-Grosseteste (late 13th C.). -- V.J.B.
Summum Bonum: (Lat. the supreme good) A term applied to an ultimate end of human conduct the worth of which is intrinsically and substantively good. It is some end that is not subordinate to anything else. Happiness, pleasure, virtue, self-realization, power, obedience to the voice of duty, to conscience, to the will of God, good will, perfection have been claimed as ultimate aims of human conduct in the history of ethical theory. Those who interpret all ethical problems in terms of a conception of good they hold to be the highest ignore all complexities of conduct, focus attention wholly upon goals towards which deeds are directed, restrict their study by constructing every good in one single pattern, center all goodness in one model and thus reduce all other types of good to their model. -- H.H.
Summum Genus: The highest genus in a division, a genus which is not a species of a higher genus. -- G.R.M.
Sunnites: Denotes the orthodox, traditionalist, by far the larger numbered Islamic sect which denies the Shiite claim that Ali and his descendants are alone entitled to the caliphate. -- H.H.
Sunya-vada: A Buddhist theory (vada) holding the world to be void (sunya) or unreal. Otherwise known as Madhyamaka (q.v.), this Mahayana (q.v.) school as founded by Nagarjuna and elaborated in the Madhyama-kasastra, is hardly correctly translated by nihilism. To be sure, the phenomenal world is said to have no reality, yet the world underlying it defies description, also because of our inability to grasp the thing-in-itself (svabhava). All we know is its dependence on some other condition, its co-called "dependent origination". Thus, nothing definite being able to be said about the real, it is, like the apparent, as nothing, in other words, sunya, void. -- K.F.L.
Supererogation: (Lat. super, above; and erogare, to spend public funds) The act or condition of doing more than is strictly required by law; in Catholic moral terminology, an act of supererorogation consists in doing more than one's duty, a practice of special virtue. -- V.J.B.
Superman: The nnme given by Nietzsche to what he deems a higher type of humanity, viewed as the goal of evolution. -- H.H.
Supernatural: That which surpasses the active and exactive powers of nature -- or that which natural causes can neither avail to produce nor require from God as the compliment of their kind. -- H.G.
Suppositio: In medieval logic, the kind of meaning in use which belongs to nouns or substantives; opposed to copulatio, belonging to adjectives and verbs A given noun having a fixed signification might nevertheless have different suppositiones (stand for different things). Various kinds of suppositio, i.e., various ways in which a noun may stand for something, were distinguished. -- A.C.

Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione, editions e.g. Venice 1597, 1622). J. Maritain, Petite Logique, Paris, 1933.

Suppositio discreta: The kind of suppositio belonging to a proper name; opposed to suppositio communis. -- A.C.
Suppositio materialis: The use of a word autonymously, or as a name for itself (see autonymy) -- "Homo est disyllabum"; opposed to suppositio formalis, the use of a noun in its proper or ordinary signification. -- A.C.
Suppositio naturalis: The use of a common noun to stand collectively for everything to which the name applies -- "Homo est mortalis." It would now usually be held that this involves an inadequate or misleading analysis -- see copula. -- A.C.
Suppositio personalis: The use of a common noun, or class name, to stand for a particular member of the class -- "Homo currit." Contemporary logical usage would supply, in such a case, either a description (corresponding in English to the definite article the) or an existential quantifier (corresponding to the indefinite article a).

Suppositio personalis confusa (opposed to the preceding as suppositio personalis determinata) was further ascribed to a common noun used for the subject or predicate of a universal affirmative proposition. The relation of this to suppositio naturalis and suppositio simplex is not clear, and not uniform among different writers. -- A.C.

Suppositio simplex: The use of a common noun to stand for the class concept to which it refers -- "Homo est species." Suppositio simplex was also ascribed to a common noun used for the predicate of an affirmative proposition. -- A.C.
Supposititious: (Lat suppositions, put in the place of, substituted) Epistemological expression applying to any object which is assumed or posited by the mind without being actually given by experience. -- L.W.
Supralapsarianism: (Lat. supra, before; and lapsus, the Fall of man) The theological view that God positively decreed the Fall of man as a means to the manifestation of His Power of salvation, attributed to Calvinism but opposed by some "Infralapsarian" Calvinists. See Predestination. -- V.J.B.
Su p'u: "Unadorned simplicity", being the state of original nature, is a state of desirelessness, of total absence of knowledge distinctions, of pure instinctivity. (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- H.H.
  1. Spiritualistic trend of art.
  2. A recent artistic school representing dreams interpreted according to Freud's theories.
-- L.V.

Artistic movement which maintains that there exists, and seeks access to, a "real" world that lies behind the artificial world of ordinary objects given in normal awareness. Argues that what is found on the conscious level is an arbitrary construct of mind, determined by habit and custom, and that the function of art is to recover and report the world as originally experienced and felt. Seeks to disintegrate the clear logical life of intellect, so as to search for its materials on the subconscious level, and discover there the true and primitive meanings that things have for us prior to the forms that we impose on them. -- I.J.

Sutra: (Skr. string) An aphorism, the earliest form chosen for mnemonic reasons, in which philosophic thought was couched in India, necessitating often elaborate commentaries (bhasya) which frequently differ widely in their interpretation of the original and have occasioned vanous schools. -- K.F.L.
Svabhava: (Skr.) being-in-itself, essence, natural state, inherent or innate nature; the thing-in-itself aspect of anything, independent being; in the view of some Indian philosophers, the principle governing the universe through the spontaneity and individual character of the various substances. -- K.F.L.
Svaraj: (Skr.) self-rule, self-determination, currently a designation of the home rule movement in India. -- K.F.L.
Svatantra: (Skr. "what has itself as basis") Presuppositionless, absolute, free, said of the ultimate in its in-it-self aspect. -- K.F.L.
Svetambara: (Skr. "white robed") A branch of the Jainas (q.v.) differing with the Digambaras (q.v.) in doctrine and habits. -- K.F.L.
Swedenborgianism: A highly developed religious philosophy arising from Emanuel Swedenborg (Jan. 29, 1688-March 29, 1772). Swedenborg claimed direct spiritual knowledge. He recognized three descending levels or "degress of being in God"; Love the Celestial, Spirit or the End; then Wisdom, the Spiritual or Soul, Cause; and finally the degree of Use, the Natural and Personal, the realm of Effects. Swedenborgism was formally launched in London in 1783 and is often called the New (or New Jerusalem) Church. -- F.K.
Syadvada: (Skr.) The theory of "somehow" (syat), a theory of judgment of the Jainas (q.v.) which takes full account of the partiality of the judged reality and the idiosyncracy of the one who is judging in the world of discourse. -- K.F.L.
Syllogism: See Antilogism; Figure (syllogistic); and Logic, formal, §§ 2, 5.
  1. Used by some writers as synonymous with sign (q.v.).
  2. A conventional sign, i.e., a sign which functions as such in virtue of a convention, explicit or implicit, between its users. In this sense 'symbol' is sometirnes opposed to 'natural sign'.
-- M B.
Symbolism: An artistic trend flourishing at the end of the XIXth century in reaction to faith in the beauty of nature, and endeavoring to represent spiritual values by means of abstract signs. -- L.V.
Symmetry: A dyadic relation R is symmetric if, for all x and y in the field of R, xRy ⊃ yRx; it is asymmetric if, for all x and y in the field of R, xRy ⊃ ∼ yRx; non-symmetric if there are x and y in the field of R such that [xRy] [∼ yRx]. An n-adic propositional function F is symmetric if F(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is materially equivalent to the proposition obtained from it by permuting x1, x2, . . . , xn among themselves in any fashion -- for all sets of n arguments x1, x2, . . . , xn belonging; to the range of F.

A dyadic function f, other than a propositional function, is symmetric if, for all pairs of arguments, x, y, belonging to the range of f, f(x, y) = f(y, x). An n-adic function f is symmetric if, for any set of n arguments belonging to the range of f, the same value of the function is obtained no rmtter how the arguments are permuted among themselves (i.e., if the value of the function is independent of the order of the arguments).

In geometry, a figure is said to be symmetric with respect to a point P if the points of the figure can be grouped in pairs in such a way that the straight-line segment joining any pair has P as its midpoint. A figure is symmetric with respect to a straight line l if the points can be grouped in pairs in such way that the straight-line segment joining any pair has l as a perpendicular bisector. These definitions apply in geometry of any number of dimensions. Similar definitions may be given of symmetry with respect to a plane, etc. -- A.C.

Sympathy: On psychological levels, a participation in and feeling for other living beings in adversity or other emotional phases, not always painful, which may or may not lead to participating or alleviating action, explained naturalistically as a general instinct inherent in all creatures, ethically sometimes as an original altruism, sociologically as acquired in the civilisatory process through needs of co-operation, mutual aid, and fellow-feeling in family and group action. Stressed particularly in Hinduism, fostered along with pity (q.v.) in Christianity, discussed and recommended as a shrewd social expedient by such men as Hobbes, Bentham, and Adam Smith, Schopenhauer raised sympathy Mitleid), as an equivalent to love, into an ethical principle which Nietzsche repudiated because to him it increases suffering and through weakness hinders development. Sympathy, as a cultural force, becomes progressively more evident in the increasing establishment of benevolent institutions, such as hospitals, asylums, etc., a more general altruism and ejection (Clifford), an extension of kindness even to animals (first taught by Buddhism, see Ahimsa), reform and relief movements of all kinds, etc. Still regarded highly as a praiseworthy virtue, it has been gradually rid of its dependence on individual ethical culture by scientific conditioning in social planning on a huge scale. See v. Orelli, Die philosophischen Auffassungen des Mttleids (1912); Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1926). -- K.F.L.
Synaesthesia: (Gr. syn. with + aesthesis, sensation) A connection between sensation of different senses which is indepedent of association established by experience. For example, the capacity of certain musical notes to induce color-images. -- L.W.
Syncategorematic (word): Approximately a synonym of incomplete symbol (q.v.), but usually applied to words of such a language as English rather than to symbols or expressions in a fully formalized logistic system. -- A.C.
Syncretism: (Gr. syn., with; and either kretidzein, or kerannynai, to mix incompatible elements) A movement to bring about a harmony of positions in philosophy or theology which are somewhat opposed or different. Earliest usage (Plutarch) in connection with the Neo-Platonic effort to unify various pagan religions in the 2nd and 4th centuries A.D. Next used in Renaissance (Bessarion) in reference to the proposed union of the Eastern and Western Citholic Churches, also denoted the contemporary movement to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle; again in 17th century used by Georg Calixt in regard to proposed union of the Lutheran with other Protestant bodies and also with Catholicism. -- V.J.B.
Synderesis: (Late Gr. synteresis, spark of conscience, may be connected with syneidesis, conscience) In Scholastic philosophy: the habitus, or permanent, inborn disposition of the mind to think of general and broad rules of moral conduct which become the principles from which a man may reason in directing his own moral activities. First used, apparently, by St. Jerome (In Ezekiel., I, 4-15) as equivalent to the scintilla conscientiae (spark of conscience), the term became very common and received various interpretations in the 13th century. Franciscan thinkers (St. Bonaventure) tended to regard synderesis as a quality of the human will, inclining it to embrace the good-in-general. St. Thomas thought synderesis a habitus of the intellect, enabling it to know first principles of practical reasoning; he distinguished clearly between synderesis and conscience, the latter being the action of the practical intellect deciding whether a particular, proposed operation is good or bad, here and now. Duns Scotus also considered synderesis a quality belonging to intellect rather than will. -- V.J.B.
Syndicalism: This social and political theory, usually considered as the creation of Georges Sorel, is philosophically rooted in a radical anti-intellectualism. Will, faith and action are the basic and creative realities of human nature, whereas all ideological factors are but creatures of these realities -- they are 'myths.' Working upon this metaphysical assumption and upon the Marxist concept of the class struggle, Syndicalsm argues that the ills and vices of bourgeois society can be eliminated only if that class which possesses the most creative power (such a class is known as the 'elite') destroys the present form of society by direct action and violence guided by the 'myth of the general strike.' The working class is, of course, taken to be this elite, and hence the trade unions, or 'syndicates', become the center of the revolution. The economic aim of the revolution is to substitute collectivism for capitalism, its political aim, to substitute 'proletarian management' through the instrumentality of the various syndicates (which represent functional interests) for political control through the instrumentality of the State. Some features of Syndicalism have been consciously incorporated into the ideology of Italian Fascism. -- M.B.M.
Synechism: (Gr. syn, with; and echein, to hold) A theory of philosophical explanation developed, and first named by C. S. Peirce (Monist, II, 534). He defined the theory as: "That tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy, and in particular, upon the necessity of hypothesis involving true continuity." (Baldwin, Dict. of Philos. and Psych., N. Y. 1902, II, 657). Continuity seems to have been the name chosen by Peirce for the complete interdependence and inter-relationship of all things. An explanation is not good which relies upon an inexplicable ultimate. In this he was reacting, possibly, to such contemporary principles of explanation as Spencer's Unknown, and the Absolute of German and English Hegelianism. Synechism was no doubt an important forerunner of the Pragmatic theory of explanation, but Peirce, in describing synechism, stressed the value of generalization, ("the form under which alone anything can be understood is the form of generality, which is the same thing as continuity"), much more than modern pragmatism does. -- V.J.B.
Synechology: The doctrine that simple conscious functions correspond to composite physical events, the psycho-physical view of Fechner (q.v.). -- K.F.L.
Synergisrn: (Gr. syn., with, and ergein, to work) The theological position that there is more than one principle actively working in the salvation of man; the term became common in the 16th century disputes of Melancthon against the "Monergism" of Luther; Melancthon held that the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the human will are three co-operating principles in conversion. -- V.J.B.
Synkatathesis: Greek noun derived from syn, together, and katathesis, to put down; hence Synkatathesis, to deposit together. In the passive voice the verb means, to assent to, to agree with. Used by the Stoics in the sense of agreement, or conviction. In general it signifies, the acknowledgment of the truth of a proposition, or consent given to it with someone else. -- J.J.R.
Syntactics: See Syntax, logical, and Semiotic 3.
Syntagma: The systematized wholes of life views, of life tendencies such as aestheticism, naturalism and intellectualism. (Eucken). -- H.H.
Syntax language: See Object language.
Syntax, logical: "By the logical syntax of a language," according to Carnap, "we mean the formal theory of the linguistic forms of that language -- the systematic statement of the formal rules which govern it together with the development of the consequences which follow from these rules. A theory, a rule, a definition, or the like is to be called formal when no reference is made in it either to the meaning of the symbols or to the sense of the expressions, but simply and solely to the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed."

This definition would make logical syntax coincide with Hilbertian proof theory (q.v.), and in fact the adjectives syntactical, metalogical, metamathematical are used nearly interchangeably. Carnap, however, introduces many topics not considered by Hilbert, and further treats not only the syntax of particular languages but also general syntax, i.e., syntax relating to all languages in general or to all languages of a given kind.

Concerning Carnap's contention that philosophical questions should be replaced by, or reformulated as, syntactical questions, see scientific empiricism I C, and Carnap's book cited below. -- A.C.

R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, New York and London, 1937. Review by S. MacLane, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 44 (1938), pp. 171-176. Review by S. C. Kleene, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4 (1939), pp. 82-87.

  1. In logic, the general method of deduction or deductive reasoning, which proceeds from the simple to the complex, from the general to the particular, from the necessary to the contingent, from a principle to its application, from a general law to individual cases from cause to effect, from an antecedent to its consequent, from a condition to the conditioned, from the logical whole to the logical part.
  2. The logical composition or combination of separate elements of thought, and also the result of this process. A judgment is considered as a synthesis when its predicate is accidental or contingent with respect to the subject: as the ground of such a synthesis is experience, synthetic judgments are a posteriori. The Kantian doctrine of synthetic judgments a priori involves a synthesis between two terms, prior to experience and through the agency of the forms of our intuition or of our understanding.
  3. The logical process of adding some elements to the comprehension of a concept in oider to obtain its 'logical division' in contradistinction to the 'real division' which breaks up a composition by analysis.
  4. The third phase in the dialectical process, combining the thesis and the antithesis for the emergence of a new level of being.
  5. In natural philosophy, the process of combining various material elements into a new substance. The ait of making or building up a compound by simpler compounds or by its elements. Also, the complex substance so formed.
-- T.G.
Synthetic Judgment: (Kant. Ger. synthetische Urteil) A judgment relating a subject concept with a predicate concept not included within the subject proper. The validity of such a judgment depends on its 'ground'. Kant's central question was: "Are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" See Kantianism, Scientific Empiricism. See also Meaning, kinds of, 2. -- O.F.K.