Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1942.
Caitanya: (Skr.) Consciousness, "superconsciousness", a quality near the in-it-self aspect of the Absolute Spirit, and hence sometimes a synonym for it. -- K.F.L.
Calculus: The name calculus may be applied to any organized method of solving problems or drawing inferences by manipulation of symbols according to formal rules. Or an exact definition of a calculus may be provided by identifying it with a logistic system, (q.v.) satisfying the requirement of effectiveness.
In mathematics, the word calculus has many specific applications, all conforming more or less closely to the above statement. Sometimes, however, the simple phrase "the calculus" is used in referring to those branches of mathematical analysis (q.v.) which are known more explicitly as the differential calculus and the integral calculus. -- A.C.
Calkins, Mary Whiton: (1863-1930) Professor of Philosophy at Wellesley College with which institution she was associated from 1891. She advanced an objective idealism of the Roycean character, styling her views as absolutistic personalism. She endeavored to find psychological justification for her views in the gestalt theory. Her works were in both fields of her interest: An Introduction to Psychology, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, The Good Man and the Good, among others. -- L.E.D.
Calvinism: A term covering the current of theological thought dating back to John Calvin (1509-1564) whose famous Institutes embodies its historic principles. Generally speaking, Calvinistic thought is a system in which God is made the center of all that is and happens, God's will pervading human and cosmic events, and upon whom man is utterly and cheerfully dependent. -- V.F.
Cambridge Platonists: A small group of 17th century Cambridge thinkers whose views represented a kind of revival of Platonism. Esp. Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. Remembered chiefly, perhaps, for holding that ethics rests on certain absolute and self-evident truths. -- W.K.F.
Newton was influenced by Henry More, e.g. in viewing space as the sensorium of God. See Cudworth, Deism. Cf. M.H. Nicolson, Conway Papers.
Cambridge School: A term loosely applied to English philosophers who have been influenced by the teachings of Professor G. E. Moore (mainly in unpublished lectures delivered at the Cambridge University, 1911-1939). In earlier years Moore stressed the need to accept the judgments of "common sense" on such matters as the existence of other persons, of an "external world", etc. The business of the analytical philosopher was not to criticise such judgments but to display the structure of the facts to which they referred. (Cf. "A defense of common-sense in philosophy," Contemporary British Philosophy, 2 (1925) -- Moore's only discussion of the method.) Such analysis would be directional, terminating in basic or atomic facts, all of whose constituents might be known by acquaintance. The examples discussed were taken largely from the field of epistemology, turning often about the problem of the relation of material objects to sense-data, and of indirect to direct knowledge. In this earlier period problems were often suggested by Russell's discussion of descriptions and logical constructions. The inconclusiveness of such specific discussions and an increasingly critical awareness of the functions of language in philosophical analysis has in later years tended to favor more flexible interpretations of the nature of analysis. (Cf. M. Black, "Relations Between Logical Positivism and the Cambridge School of Analysis", Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis), 8, 24-35 for a bibliography and list of philosophers who have been most influenced by emphasis on directional analysis.) -- M.B.
Campanella, Tommaso: (1568-1639) A Dominican monk in revolt against Aristotelianism, and influenced by the naturalism of Telesio, he arrived at philosophic conclusions in some ways prophetic of Descartes. Distrusting both the reports of the senses and the results of reasoning as indications of the nature of Reality, he found nothing trustworthy except the fact of his own existence, and the inferences drawn from that fact. As certain as his awareness of his own existence was the awareness of an external world to which experience referred and by which it was caused. Again, since the nature of the part is representative of the nature of the whole to which it belongs, the Universe of which the self is part must, like the part, be possessed of knowledge, will, and power. Hence I may infer from my own existence the existence of a God. Again, I must infer other of the divine nature more or less perfect manifestations than myself descending from the hierarchy of angels above man to the form or structure of the world, the ultimate corporeal elements, and the sensible phenomena produced by these elements of the physical universe, below him in the scale of perfection.
All nature is suffused with a love of God and a desire to return to him, witnessed by the laws of motion governing inanimate bodies, the law of self-preservation in organic life, and by man's conscious search for the divine.
Campanella was a political philosopher. In his City of the Sun he conceived a Utopia built on Platonic lines. He was also an ardent champion of the temporal power of the Papacy and of its political as well as its religious sovereignty through the world. -- B.A.G.F.
Canon: (Gr. kanon, rule) A term reminiscent of the arts and crafts, sometimes applied, since Epicurus who replaced the ancient dialectics by a canonics (kanonike), to any norm or rule which the logical process obeys. Thus John Stuart Mill speaks of five experimental methods as being regulated by certain canons. Kant defined canon as the sum total of all principles a priori of the correct use of our powers of knowledge. See Baconian method, Mill's methods. -- K.F.L.
Cantor, Georg (Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp), 1845-1918, (Russian born) German mathematician. Professor of mathematics at Halle, 1872-1913. He is known for contributions to the foundations of (mathematical) analysis, and as the founder of the theory of transfinite cardinal numbers (q.v.) and ordinal numbers (q.v.). See Infinite. -- A.C.
Gesammelte Abhandlungen Mathematischen und Philosophischen Inhalts, edited by E. Zermelo, and with a life by A. Fraenkel, Berlin, 1932.
Capacity:Any ability, potentiality, power or talent possessed by anything, either to act or to suffer. It may be innate or acquired, dormant or active. The topic of capacity figures, in the main, in two branches of philosophy: (a) in metaphysics, as in Aristotle's discussion of potentiality and actuality, (b) in ethics, where an agent's capacities are usually regarded as having some bearing on the question as to what his duties are. -- W.K.F.
Capitalism: A mode of economic production which is characterized by the fact that the instruments of production (land, factories, raw materials, etc.) are controlled to a greater or lesser extent by private individuals or groups. Since the control an individual can exercise over means of production is never absolute and as a matter of fact fluctuates widely with the ever-changing natural and social environment, "capitalism" is a very loose term which covers a host of actually different economic systems. An implication of this basic notion of individual control is that the individual will control production in his own interests. The ideological counterpart to this fact is the concept of "profit," just as the ideological counterpart to the control itself is the myth of "private property" and "free enterprise." -- M.B.M.
Capitalists: The economic class (q.v.) which owns means of production and hires people at wages to work them, thereby realizing profits. -- J.M.S.
Cardinal number: Two classes are equivalent if there exists a one-to-one correspondence between them (see One-one). Cardinal numbers are obtained by abstraction (q. v.) with respect to equivalence, so that two classes have the same cardinal number if and only if they are equivalent. This may be formulated more exactly, following Frege, by defining the cardinal number of a class to be the class of classes equivalent to it.
If two classes a and b have no members in common, the cardinal number of the logical sum of a and b is uniquely determined by the cardinal numbers of a and b, and is called the sum of the cardinal number of a and the cardinal number of b.
0 is the cardinal number of the null class. 1 is the cardinal number of a unit class (all unit classes have the same cardinal number).
A cardinal number is inductive if it is a member of every class t of cardinal numbers which has the two properties, (1) 0∈ t, and (2) for all x, if x∈ t and y is the sum of x and 1, then y∈ t. In other (less exact) words, the inductive cardinal numbers are those which can be reached from 0 by successive additions of 1. A class b is infinite if there is a class a, different from b, such that a ⊂ b and a is equivalent to b. In the contrary case b is finite. The cardinal number of an infinite class is said to be infinite, and of a finite class, finite. It can be proved that every inductive cardinal number is finite, and, with the aid of the axiom of choice, that every finite cardinal number is inductive.
The most important infinite cardinal number is the cardinal number of the class of inductive cardinal numbers (0, 1, 2, . . .); it is called aleph-zero and symbolized by a Hebrew letter aleph followed by an inferior 0.
For brevity and simplicity in the preceding account we have ignored complications introduced by the theory of types, which are considerable and troublesome. Modifications are also required if the account is to be incorporated into the Zermelo set theory. --A.C. G. Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Trasfinite Numbers, translated and with an introduction bv P.E.B. Jourdain, Chicago and London, 1915. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, vol. 2.
Cardinal Point and Value: Psychological terms having to do with relationship of stimulus to the intensity of sensation. The point at which the proportionate increase of both is in a direct relation. -- C.K.D.
Cardinal virtues: The cardinal virtues for a given culture are those which it regards as primary, the others being regarded either as derived from them or as relatively unimportant. Thus the Greeks had four, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, to which the Christians added three, faith, hope, and love or charity. -- W.K.S.
Carlyle, Thomas: (1795-1881) Vigorous Scotch historian and essayist, apostle of work. He was a deep student of the German idealists and did much to bring them before English readers. His forceful style showed marked German characteristics. He was not in any sense a systematic philosopher but his keen mind gave wide influence to the ideas he advanced in ethics, politics and economics. His whimsical Sartor Resartus or philosophy of clothes and his searching Heroes and Hero-worship, remain his most popular works along with his French Revolution and Past and Present. He was among the Victorians who displayed some measure of distrust for democracy. -- L.E.D.
Carnap, Rudolf: (1891-) successively Privatdozent at the University of Vienna, Professor of Philosophy at the German University of Prague, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago (since 1936); one of the leading representatives of the positivism of the Vienna Circle and subsequently of Scientific Empiricism (q.v.); co-editor of The Journal of Unified Science (previously: Erkenntnis).
Carnap's work has been devoted especially to formal logic and its applications to problems of epistemology and the philosophy of science. His writings in formal logic include a textbook of mathematical logic and a comprehensive monograph devoted to logical syntax, a new branch of logical research to whose development Carnap has greatly contributed.
In his logical work, he has been specially interested in the nature of mathematics and its relation to logic. He has treated these topics in a number of special articles and in a monograph. The latter also includes an introduction to the youngest field of modern logic, semantics.
Carnap's contributions to the study of epistemological and philosophical problems may be characterized as applications of the methods of logical analysis to the languages of everyday life and of science. His books contain applications to the fundamental problems of epistemology, expound the principles of physicalism (q.v.) which was developed by Carnap and Neurath and which offers, amongst others, a basis for a more cautious version of the ideas of older behaviorism and for the construction of one common unified language for all branches of empirical science (see Unity of Science). Main works: Logische Aufblou der Welt; Abriss der Logistik; Logische Syntax der Sprache "Testability and Meaning," Phil. of Sci. (1916). -- C.G.H.
Carneades: (c. 215-125 B.C.) The most prominent head of the Middle Academy and opponent of the Stoics. His most noteworthy contribution to philosophy consisted in the doctrine of logical probabilism as a basis of scepticism. -- R.B.W.
Cartesianism: The philosophy of the French thinker, Rene Descartes (Cartesius) 1596-1650. After completing his formal education at the Jesuit College at La Fleche, he spent the years 1612-1621 in travel and military service. The reminder of his life was devoted to study and writing. He died in Sweden, where he had gone in 1649 to tutor Queen Christina. His principal works are:
Descartes is justly regarded as one of the founders of modern epistemology. Dissatisfied with the lack of agreement among philosophers, he decided that philosophy needed a new method, that of mathematics. He began by resolving to doubt everything which could not pass the test of his criterion of truth, viz. the clearness and distinctness of ideas. Anything which could pass this test was to be readmitted as self-evident. From self-evident truths, he deduced other truths which logically follow from them. Three kinds of ideas were distinguished:
- Discours de la methode, (preface to his Geometric, Meteores, Dieptrique) Meditationes de prima philosophia,
- Principia philosophiae,
- Passions de l'ame,
- Regulae ad directionem ingenii,
- Le monde.
He found most difficulty with the second type of ideas. The first reality discovered through his method is the thinking self. Though he might doubt nearly all else, Descartes could not reasonably doubt that he, who was thinking, existed as a res cogitans. This is the intuition enunciated in the famous aphorism: I think, therefore I am, Cogito ergo sum. This is not offered by Descartes as a compressed syllogism, but as an immediate intuition of his own thinking mind. Another reality, whose existence was obvious to Descartes, was God, the Supreme Being. Though he offered several proofs of the Divine Existence, he was convinced that he knew this also by an innate idea, and so, clearly and distinctly. But he did not find any clear ideas of an extra-mental, bodily world. He suspected its existence, but logical demonstration was needed to establish this truth. His adventitious ideas carry the vague suggestion that they are caused by bodies in an external world. By arguing that God would be a deceiver, in allowing him to think that bodies exist if they do not, he eventually convinced himself of the reality of bodies, his own and others. There are, then, three kinds of substance according to Descartes:
- innate, by which he seems to mean little more than the mental power to think things or thoughts;
- adventitious, which come to him from without;
- factitious, produced within his own mind.
God is the First Cause of all motion in the physical universe, which is conceived as a mechanical system operated by its Maker. Even the bodies of animals are automata. Sensation is the critical problem in Cartesian psychology; it is viewed by Descartes as a function of the soul, but he was never able to find a satisfactory explanation of the apparent fact that the soul is moved by the body when sensation occurs. The theory of animal spirits provided Descartes with a sort of bridge between mind and matter, since these spirits are supposed to be very subtle matter, halfway, as it were, between thought and extension in their nature. However, this theory of sensation is the weakest link in the Cartesian explanation of cognition. Intellectual error is accounted for by Descartes in his theory of assent, which makes judgment an act of free will. Where the will over-reaches the intellect, judgment may be false. That the will is absolutely free in man, capable even of choosing what is presented by the intellect as the less desirable of two alternatives, is probably a vestige of Scotism retained from his college course in Scholasticism. Common-sense and moderation are the keynotes of Descartes' famous rules for the regulation of his own conduct during his nine years of methodic doubt, and this ethical attitude continued throughout his life. He believed that man is responsible ultimately to God for the courses of action that he may choose. He admitted that conflicts may occur between human passions and human reason. A virtuous life is made possible by the knowledge of what is right and the consequent control of the lower tendencies of human nature. Six primary passions are described by Descartes wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sorrow. These are passive states of consciousness, partly caused by the body, acting through the animal spirits, and partly caused by the soul. Under rational control, they enable the soul to will what is good for the body. Descartes' terminology suggests that there are psychological faculties, but he insists that these powers are not really distinct from the soul itself, which is man's sole psychic agency. Descartes was a practical Catholic all his life and he tried to develop proofs of the existence of God, an explanation of the Eucharist, of the nature of religious faith, and of the operation of Divine Providence, using his philosophy as the basis for a new theology. This attempted theology has not found favor with Catholic theologians in general.
Created spirits, i.e. the finite soul-substance of each man: these are immaterial agencies capable of performing spiritual operations, loosely united with bodies, but not extended since thought is their very essence.
Uncreated Spirit, i.e. God, confined neither to space nor time, All-Good and All-Powerful, though his Existence can be known clearly, his Nature cannot be known adequately by men on earth, He is the God of Christianity, Creator, Providence and Final Cause of the universe.
Bodies, i.e. created, physical substances existing independently of human thought and having as their chief attribute, extension. Cartesian physics regards bodies as the result of the introduction of "vortices", i.e. whorls of motion, into extension. Divisibility, figurability and mobility, are the notes of extension, which appears to be little more thin what Descartes' Scholastic teachers called geometrical space.
Apart from philosophy, Descartes' contribution to the development of analytical geometry, the theory of music and the science of optics, are noteworthy achievements.
Descartes is one of the fathers of modern philosophy; his general influence is too extensive to be detailed. Leibniz, Spinoza, Malebranche, Clauberg, De La Forge, Geulincx, Placentius, Chouet, Legrand, Corneio -- these and many others spread Cartesianism throughout Europe. (See Boutroux, "Descartes and Cartesianism," Camb. Mod. Hist., IV, ch. 27.) At present, German Phenomenology, French Spiritualism and Positivism, Bergsonism, and certain forms of Catholic thought represented by J. Geyser in Germany and M. Blondel in France, are offshoots of Cartesianism.
Oeuvres completes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 13 vols. (Paris, 1896-1911). The Philos. Works of Descartes, transl. by Haldane and Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1911-12). Fischer, K., Descartes and his School (London, 1887). Gilson, E., Le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien (Paris, 1930). Maritain, J., Le songe de Descartes (Paris, 1932). Gemelli, A. (ed.), Cartesio (symposium) (Milan, 1937). -- V.J.B.
Cassirer, Ernst: (1874-) Has been chiefly interested in developing the position of the neo-Kantian Philosophy of the Marburg School as it relates to scientific knowledge. Looking at the history of modern philosophy as a progressive formulation of this position, he has sought to extend it by detailed analyses of contemporary scientific developments. Of note are Cassirer's investigations in mathematics, his early consideration of chemical knowledge, and his treatment of Einstein's relativity theory. Main works: Das Erkenntntsprobleme, 3 vols. (1906); Substanz-u-Funktionsbegriff, 1910 (tr. Substance and Function); Philosophie der Symbolischen Forme (1923); Phanom. der Erkenntnis, 1929; Descartes; Leibniz. --C.K.D.
Casualism: The doctrine that all things and events come to be by chance. E.g., the view of the Epicureans.
Casuistic: Adjective; pertaining to casuistry and casuists, or relating to case histories, especially cases of conduct. In a depreciative sense, sophistical and misleading. -- J.J.R.
Casuistry: Study of cases of conscience and a method of solving conflicts of obligations by applying general principles of ethics, religion, and moral theology to particular and concrete cases of human conduct. This frequently demands an extensive knowledge of natural law and equity, civil law, ecclesiastical precepts, and an exceptional skill in interpreting these various norms of conduct. It becomes necessary to determine the degree of guilt and responsibility and weigh all the circumstances of the case, especially by taking into account all the conditions affecting motive and consent. -- J.J.R.
Catechetic: Noun ordinarily employed in the plural, denoting the method and practice of imparting religious instruction orally by means of questions and answers, especially to children. -- J.J.R.
Categorematic: In traditional 1ogic, denoting or capable of denoting a term, or of standing for a subject or predicate- -- said of words. Opposite of syncategorematic (q.v.). --A.C.
Categorial: A priori or non-empirical elements. (Alexander). -- H.H.
(Ger. kategorial) In Husserl: Of or pertaining to the function or the result of ego-spontaneity as conffering logical form on substrates and producing syntactical objects. -- D.C.
Categorical Imperative: (Kant. Ger. kategorischer Imperativ) The supreme, absolute moral law of rational, self-determining beings. Distinguished from hypothetical or conditional imperatives which admit of exceptions. Kant formulated the categorical imperative as follows "Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature." See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Categorical (Judgment): (Gr. kategorikos, affirmative, predicative) Aristotle: Affirmative explicit; direct. Commentators on Aristotle emphasized the opposition between categorical and conditional propositions, although Aristotle did not stress this connotation of the term. -- G.R.M.
(In Kant) A judgment comprising two concepts related by a copula, typically an attribute (predicate) asserted of a substance or thing (subject). Kant denied that hypothetical and disjunctive propositions can be reduced to categorical ones and insisted that each of the forms of judgment denotes a distinct function of the understanding. See Logik, § 24. -- O.F.K.
Category: (Gr. kategoria) In Aristotle's logic (1) the predicate of a proposition; (2) one of the ultimate modes of being that may be asserted in predication, viz.: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, passion. -- G.R.M.
(in Kant) Any of twelve forms or relating principles of the understanding, constituting necessary conditions of experience. Kant sought to deriv e an exhaustive list of pure forms of the understanding from the forms of judgment in the traditional logic. His list of categories comprises three each of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Category of Unity: Kant: The first of three a priori, quantitative (so-called "mathematical") categories (the others being "plurality" and "totality") from which is derived the synthetic principle, "All intuitions (appearances) are extensive magnitudes." By means of this principle Kant seeks to define the object of experience a priori with reference to its spatial features. See Crit. of pure Reason, B106, B202ff. -- O.F.K
Catharsis: (Gr. katharsis) Purification; purgation; specifically the purging of the emotions of pity and fear effected by tragedy (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.
In aesthetics: Purification of and liberation from passions in art (Aristotle). First idea of the distinction between form and sentiment. -- L.V.
Catvari arya-satyani: (Skr.) "The four noble truths" of Gautama Buddha's (q.v.) teaching: Suffering exists; it has a cause; it may cease; there is a path leading to its cessation. -- K.F.L.
Causa sui: Cause of itself; necessary existence. Causa sui conveys both a negative and a positive meaning. Negatively, it signifies that which is from itself (a se), that which does not owe its being to something else; i.e., absolute independence of being, causelessness (God as uncaused). Positively, causa sui means that whose very nature or essence involves existence; i.e., God is the ground of his own being, and regarded as "cause" of his own being, he is, as it were, efficient cause of his own existence (Descartes). Since existence necessarily follows from the very essence of that which is cause of itself, causa sui is defined as that whose nature cannot be conceived as not existing (Spinoza). -- A.G.A.B.
Causality: (Lat. causa) The relationship between a cause and its effect. This relationship has been defined as
a relation between events, processes, or entities in the same time series, such that
when one occurs, the other necessarily follows (sufficient condition),
when the latter occurs, the former must have preceded (necessary condition),
both conditions a and b prevail (necessary and sufficient condition),
when one occurs under certain conditions, the other necessarily follows (contributory, but not sufficient, condition) ("multiple causality" would be a case involving several causes which are severally contributory and jointly sufficient); the necessity in these cases is neither that of logical implication nor that of coercion;
a relation between events, processes, or entities in the same time series such that when one occurs the other invariably follows (invariable antecedence),
a relation between events, processes, or entities such that one has the efficacy to produce or alter the other;
a relation between events, processes, or entities such that without one the other could not occur, as in the relation between
the material out of which a product is made and the finished product (material cause),
structure or form and the individual embodying it (formal cause),
a goal or purpose (whether supposed to exist in the future as a special kind of entity, outside a time series, or merely as an idea of the pur-poser) and the work fulfilling it (final cause),
a moving force and the process or result of its action (efficient cause);
a relation between experienced events, processes, or entities and extra-experiential but either temporal or non-temporal events, processes, or entities upon whose existence the former depend;
a relation between a thing and itself when it is dependent upon nothing else for its existence (self-causality);
a relation between an event, process, or entity and the reason or explanation for its being;
a relation between an idea and an experience whose expectation the idea arouses because of customary association of the two in this sequence;
a principle or category introducing into experience one of the aforesaid types of order; this principle may be inherent in the mind, invented by the mind, or derived from experience; it may be an explanatory hypothesis, a postulate, a convenient fiction, or a necessary form of thought. Causality has been conceived to prevail between processes, parts of a continuous process, changing parts of an unchanging whole, objects, events, ideas, or something of one of these types and something of another. When an entity, event, or process is said to follow from another, it may be meant that it must succeed but can be neither contemporaneous with nor prior to the other, that it must either succeed or be contemporaneous with and dependent upon but cannot precede the other, or that one is dependent upon the other but they either are not in the same time series or one is in no time series at all.
Cause: (Lat. causa) Anything responsible for change, motion or action. In the history of philosophy numerous interpretations were given to the term. Aristotle distinguished among
During the Renaissance, with the development of scientific interest in nature, cause was usually conceived as an object. Today, it is generally interpteted as energy or action, whether or not connected with matter. According to Newton, "to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes." But J. S. Mill contended, in his doctrine of the plurality of causes, that an effect, or a kind of effect (e.g. heat or death) may be produced by various causes. The first clear formulation of the principle was given by Leukippus "Nothing happens without a ground but everything through a cause and of necessity." -- R.B.W.
the material cause, or that out of which something arises,
the formal cause, that is, the pattern or essence determining the creation of a thing,
the efficient cause, or the force or agent producing an effect; and
the final cause, or purpose. Many thinkers spoke also of
the first cause, usually conceived as God.
In scholasticism: Four causes are distinguished, in accordance with Aristotle. Efficient cause, by which any change is brought about in the order new being arises -- prime matter in regard to substantial second matter in regard to accidental forms (Cf. Form, Matter) -- formal cause, the act by which a material substratum is determined towards a new being -- substantial or accidental -- final cause, that because of which something is or becomes. All things tend towards an end by a "natural appetite". -- R.A.
Cause-theory (of mind, body): The influence of mind upon body or body upon mind or both upon each other. This influence may be of any type, e.g., productive, directive, or a stimulus to activity. -- V.F.
Centre-theory: Ascribes the unity of the mind to a certain particular existent centre, "which stands in a common asymmetrical relation to all the mental events" of a certain mind. (Broad). --H.H.
Certainty: (Lat. Certus, sure) The alleged indubitability of certain truths, especially of logic and mathematics. -- L.W.
Certitude: Consists in the firmness, by which the mind adheres to any proposition, whereas evidence, besides the firmness of adhesion, implies also the quietude (or satisfaction) of the intellect in the thing known either because from a comparison. If the terms we immediately know the relation between a subject and predicate, or because, immediately, with the help of deduction we perceive an adequate reason for a thing. Hence for certitude to exist in the mind, it is sufficient that the cause from which it arises be of such a nature as to exclude all fear of the opposite, whereas for evidence, it is required that the intellect fully grasp that which it knows. -- H.G.
Chance: (Lat. cadere, to fall) 1. Property or being undetermined. 2. Property of being predictable according to the laws of probability (q.v.). -- A.C.B.
Chance events, according to Aristotle, are occurrences purposive in appearance but not actually the result of either conscious or unconscious teleology. -- G.R.M.
In Cournot, following Aristotle, the co-incidence of two causally determined series of events. In Peirce (q.v.), a vera causa and metaphysically grounded category. See Tychism.
Chang Heng-ch'u: (Chang Tsai, Chang Tzu-hou, 1021-1077) Was a typical Confucian government official and teacher. When young, he was interested in military strategy. He studied the Chung Yung (Golden Mean) at the advice of a prominent scholar, and went on to Taoist and Buddhist works. But he finally returned to the Confucian classics, explored their meanings and discussed them with the Ch'eng brothers. His works called Chang Heng-ch'u Hsien-sheng Ch'uan-chi (complete works of Master Chang Heng-ch'u) are indispensable to the study of the Neo-Confucian (li hsueh) movement. -- W.T.C.
Ch'ang: (a) "Invariables" or universal and eternal laws or principles running through the phenomenal change of the universe. (Lao Tzu). (b) Constant virtues. See wu ch'ang. -- H.H.
Ch'ang sheng: (a) Everlasting existence, such as that of Heaven and Earth, because of their "not existing for themselves." (Lao Tzu). (b) Long life, as a result of the nourishment of the soul and rich accumulation of virtue. (Taoist philosophy), (c) Immortality, to be achieved through internal alchemy and external alchemy (lien tan). (Taoist religion). -- W.T.C.
Change, Philosophy of: (a) Any philosophical doctrine dealing with the subject of change, e.g., Aristotle's philosophy of change, (b) any philosophy which makes change an essential or pervasive character of reality, e.g., the philosophies of Heraclitus and Bergson. -- W.K.F.
Ch'an wei: Prognostics in 300 B.C.-400 A.D., a system represented by a group of prophetic writings called ch'an and a group of apocryphal "complements" or "woofs" to the Confucian classics, called wei, in an attempt to interpret the classics in terms of medieval Chinese theology, the theory of correspondence between man and the universe, and the Yin Yang philosophy. (Tung Chung-shu, 177-104 B.C., etc.). -- W.T.C.
Chaos: (Gr. chaos) The formless, confused, completely disorderly, absolutely lawless. -- H.H.
Character: (Gr. character from charassein to engrave) A name for the collective traits, emotional, intellectual and volitional, which constitute an individual mind. -- L.W.
Characteristic: Pertaining to the starting point of the artist in his quest for beauty. (Goethe). -- L.V.
Characteristica Universalis: The name given by Leibniz to his projected (but only partially realized) "universal language" for the formulation of knowledge. This language was to be ideographic, with simple characters standing for simple concepts, and combinations of them for compound ideas, so that all knowledge could be expressed in terms which all could easily learn to use and understand. It represents an adumbration of the more recent and more successful logistic treatment of mathematics and science. It is to be distinguished, however, from the "universal calculus," also projected by Leibniz, which was to be the instrument for the development and manipulation of systems in the universal language. -- W.K.F.
L. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (1901).
Characterology: This name originally was used for types; thus in Aristotle and Theophrastus, and even much later, e.g. in La Bruyere. Gradually it came to signify something individual; a development paralleled by the replacement of "typical" figures on the stage by individualities. There is no agreement, even today, on the definition; confusion reigns especially because of an insufficient distinction between character, personality, and person. But all agree that character manifests itself in the behavior of a person. One can distinguish a merely descriptive approach, one of classification, and one of interpretation. The general viewpoints of interpretation influence also description and classification, since they determine what is considered "important" and lay down the rules by which to distinguish and to classify. One narrow interpretation looks at character mainly as the result of inborn properties, rooted in organic constitution; character is considered, therefore, as essentially unchangeable and predetermined. The attempts at establishing correlations between character and body-build (Kretschmer a.o.) are a special form of such narrow interpretation. It makes but little difference if, besides inborn properties, the influence of environmental factors is acknowledged. The rationalistic interpretation looks at character mainly as the result of convictions. These convictions are seen as purely intellectual in extreme rationalism (virtue is knowledge, Socrates), or as referring to the value-aspect of reality which is conceived as apprehended by other than merely intellectual operations. Thus, Spranger gives a classification according to the "central values" dominating a man's behavior. (Allport has devised practical methods of character study on this basis.) Since the idea a person has of values and their order may change, character is conceived as essentially mutable, even if far going changes may be unfrequent. Character-education is the practical application of the principles of characterology and thus depends on the general idea an author holds in regard to human nature. Character is probably best defined as the individual's way of preferring or rejecting values. It depends on the innate capacities of value-apprehension and on the way these values are presented to the individual. Therefore the enormous influence of social factors. -- R.A.
Characters: Statements or E-values like pleasant, true, known; all possible ego attitudes and feelings are so termed. (See Avenarius). --H.H.
- Honesty; sincerity; absence of fault; actuality.
- Reverence; seriousness.
- Being one's true self; absolute true self; truth, in the sense of "fulfillment of the self," which "is the beginning and end of material existence," and "without which there is no material existence." "Being true to oneself (or sincerity) is the law of Heaven. To try to be true to oneself is the law of man." "Only those who are their absolute true selves in the world can fulfill their own nature," "the nature of others," "the nature of things," "help Nature in growing and sustaining," and "become equals of Heaven and Earth." (Early Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism.)
Being true to the nature of being (of man and things), which is "the character of the sage," "the basis of the five cardinal moral principles and the source of the moral life." It is "the state of tranquillity without movement." (Chou Lien-hsi, 1017-1073.) "Sincerity (ch'eng) is the way of Heaven, whereas seriousness (ching) is the essence of human affairs. When there is seriousness, there is sincerity." "Sincerity means 'to have no depraved thought'." (Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107 and Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1086.) "It may also be expressed as the principle of reality." (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200.) -- W.T.C.
Cheng hsin: Setting one's own heart right or rectifying one's own heart. When one is upset by anger, disturbed by fear, blinded by love, or involved in worries and anxieties, one's mind has lost its balance. It must be rectified before personal cultivation is possible. (Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Ch'eng I-ch'uan: (Ch'eng-I, Ch'eng-cheng-shu, 1033-1107) Was younger brother of Ch'eng Ming-tao. He led an active life as a high government official and a prominent teacher. "There was no book which he did not read and he studied with absolute sincerity. With the Great Learning, the Analects, Works of Mencius and the Chung Yung (Golden Mean) as basis, he penetrated all the six (Confucian) classics." He ranks with his brother as great Neo-Confucians. -- W.T.C.
Cheng ming: The doctrine of the "rectification of names" which holds that names should correspond to realities, and serve as standards for social organization and personal conduct. The actual must in each case be made to correspond to the name. (Confucius; Hsun Tzu, c. 335-c. 288 B.C.) -- H.H.
Ch'eng ming: (a) To arrive at understanding from being one's true self. This is due to one's nature, whereas to arrive at being one's true self from understanding is a matter of culture. (Confucianism).
(b) The knowledge that rises above distinctions, attainable only when the human mind, completely comprehends Heaven, nature and the moral law. (Chang Heng-Ch'u, 1020-1077). -- W.T.C.
Ch'eng Ming-tao: (Ch'eng Hou, Ch'eng Po-tun, 1032-1086) Served as government official both in the capital and in various counties with excellent records in social and educational achievements. For decades he studied Taoism and Buddhism but finally repudiated them. Together with his brother, he developed new aspects of Confucianism and became the greatest Confucian since Mencius and a leader of Neo-Confucianism (li hsueh). His works and those of his brother, called Erh Ch'eng Ch'uan-shu (complete works of the Ch'eng brothers), number 107 chuans, in 14 Chinese volumes. -- W.T.C.
Chen jen: "The true man", the supreme man, the pure man, the man of supreme inward power, not in the moral sense but in the sense of "pure gold", has limitless inward resources. One who has transcended the self and the non-self, and life and death, and has reached a state of mystical union with the universe. (Chuang Tzu between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- H.H.
Chen ts'a: The true Lord who directs the operation of the universe, to whose existence there is no clue. (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Chen yun: The True Prime Unit, by which the vital force (ch'i) is constituted. It is not mixed with, but nourished and cultivated by, the external force. (Neo-Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Chi: The moving power; the subtle beginning of motion; the great Scheme (or germs ?) from which all things came and to which all things return (Chuang Tzu, d. c 295 B.C.); a mechanical arrangement according to which heavenly and earthly bodies revolve (Taoist mechanism, especially Lieh Tzu, third century A.D.); man's pure nature (as in Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.). -- W.T.C.
Breath; the vital fluid.
The vital force, as expressed in the operation and succession of the active principle (yang) and the passive principle (yin) and the Five Agents or Elements (wu hsing).
To Chou Lien-hsi (1017-1073), this material principle is identical with yin yang and the Five Elements. To Chang Heng-ch'u (1020-1077) it is the reality of the Ultimate Vacuity, having the two aspects of yin and yang. It is to the Ultimate Vacuity (Tai Hsu) as ice is to water. Ch'eng I-ch'uan (1033-1107) and Ch'eng Ming-tao (1032-1086) considered all that has physical form to be identical with the vital force. It is the principle of differentiation and individuation. When a thing disintegrates, the vital force is at an end, not to appear again in the creative process. A new entity is constituted of new vital force. Thus it is also the principle of novelty in creation. It is produced by Reason (li). But to the Neo-Confucians, especially Chi Hsi (1130-1200), Reason has no control over it. The two can never be separated; without it, Reason would having nothing to be embodied in.
In aesthetics: Rhythmic vitality; vitalizing spirit; strength of expression or brush stioke.
Ch'i: A material thing, whatever is within the realm of matter; corporeality; whatever has form. (Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism.) -- W.T.C.
Chia: Specification, a method of appellation or designation. "To say 'a puppy' or 'a dog' is specification." See chu and i. (Neo-Mohism.) -- W.T.C.
Chia: The method of hypothesis in argumentation. See pien. -- W.T.C.
Chiao: (a) Teaching; a body of doctrines; a system of morality.
(b) Religion, especially used in tsung chiao. K'ung Chiao (Confucianism) and Tao Chiao (Taoism) may either mean
(a) the ethical, political, and philosophical teachings of Confucius and Lao Tzu respectively and their followers, or
(b) the state cult of the worship of Heaven and ancestors and the folk religion of nature and spirit worship, respectively. -- W.T.C.
Ch'i chia: Ordering one's home life by the practice of such virtues as filial piety, respect for one's elder brothers, and parental kindness or love, as a necessary condition for the ordering of national life. (Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Chieh hsuan: Emancipation. See Hsuan chieh. -- W.T.C.
Ch'ien: Heaven, symbolized by ≡ in the Eight Trigrams (pa kua); the trigram of the male cosmic principle, yang, opposite of k'un. --W.T.C.
Chien ai: The doctrine of "universal love" interpreted wholly in terms of utilitarian standards. (Mo Tzu, between 500 and 396 B.C.) -- H.H.
Chien pai: Solidity (of stone) and whiteness (of a horse), central problems in the dispute over the relationship of substance and quality between the Sophists (pien che) and the Neo-Mohists (Mo che) in the third and fourth centuries B.C. -- W.T.C.
Chih: (a) Memory, (b) Purpose, will. -- W.T.C.
Chih: Uprightness; straightness; honesty; justice, "exhausting one's sincere heart without any artificiality." -- W.T.C.
- Wisdom, one of the three Universally Recognized Moral qualities of man (ta te), the Three Moral Qualities of the superior man (san te), the Four Fundamentals of the moral life (ssu tuan), and the Five Constant Virtues (wu ch'ang). (Confucianism.)
- Knowledge; intelligence.
- Discriminate knowledge; small knowledge, which is incapable of understanding Tao.
- Intuitive knowledge (liang chih). (Wang Yang-ming, 1473-1529.) -- W.T.C
Chih: Marks, designation, pointing at (with a finger, chih), an obscure term in the logic of Kung-sun Lung (c. 400 - c. 300 B.C.) which can be interpreted as:
(a) Marks or qualities of a thing. All things are marks or predicates.
(b) That which is designated by a name.
(c) An idea or concept which Kung-sun Lung used to designate the universal. -- W.T.C.
Chih: Basic stuff; essence; solid quality; solid worth. (Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Chih chih: Extension of knowledge or achieving true knowledge through the investigation of things (ko wu) and understanding their Reason (li) to the utmost, not necessarily by investigating all things in the world, but by thoroughly investigating one thing and then more if necessary, so that the Reason in that thing, and thereby Reason in general, is understood. In Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529), it means "extension to the utmost of the mind's intuitive knowledge of good -- the knowledge of good which Mencius calls the good-evil mind and which all people have." (Neo-Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Chih jen: "The perfect man", one who has reached a state of mystical union with the universe, or "one who has not separated from the true." (Chuang Tzu between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- H.H.
Chih kuo: The ordering of the national life, which is the intermediate step between the ordering of one's family life (ch'i chia) and the peace of the world. (Confucianism). -- W.T.C.
Chih shan: Highest excellence; perfection; the ultimate good, the goal of Confucian ethics and education. -- W.T.C
Ch'i hsueh: The intellectual movement in the state of Ch'i. See Chi Hsia.
Chiliasm: Teaching and belief of some Jews and Christians that the Messiah will appear at the end of time to found a glorious kingdom on earth which is to last one thousand years; also called Millenarianism. -- J.J.R.
Chin: Metal, one of the Five Agents or Elements. And fourth centuries B.C. where scholars (including Shen Tao, Tsou Yen) gathered under official patronage to write on and to freely discuss philosophy and politics. Seat of learning and freedom of thought at the time, which was called Ch'i Hsueh. -- W.T.C
Chin: Metal, one of the Five Agents or Elements. See wu hsing. -- W.T.C.
- Personal experience, or knowledge obtained through the contact of one's knowing faculty and the object to be known. (Neo-Mohists.)
- Kinship, as distinguished from the more remote relatives and strangers, such distinction being upheld by Confucians as essential to the social structure but severely attacked by the Mohists and Legalists as untenable in the face of the equality of men.
- Affection, love, which it is important for a ruler to have toward his people and for children toward parents. (Confucianism.)
Chinese Philosophy: Confucianism and Taoism have been the dual basis of Chinese thought, with Buddhism presenting a strong challenge in medieval times. The former two, the priority of either of which is still controversial, rivaled each other from the very beginning to the present day. Taoism (tao chia) opposed nature to man, glorifying Tao or the Way, spontaneity (tzu jan), "inaction" (wu wei) in the sense of non-artificiality or following nature, simplicity (p'u), "emptiness," tranquillity and enlightenment, all dedicated to the search for "long life and lasting vision" (in the case of Lao Tzu, 570 B.C.?), for "preserving life and keeping the essence of our being intact" (in the case of Yang Chu, c. 440-360 B.C.), and for "companionship with nature" (in the case of Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.). The notes of the "equality of things and opinions" (ch'i wu) and the "spontaneous and unceasing transformation of things" (tzu hua) were particularly stressed in Chuang Tzu.
Confucianism (ju chia), on the other hand, advocated true manhood (jen) as the highest good, the superior man (chun tzu) as the ideal being, and cultivation of life (hsiu shen) as the supreme duty of man. It was toward this moralism and humanism that Confucius (551-479 B.C.) taught the doctrines of "chung," or being true to the principles of one's nature, and "shu," or the application of those principles in relation to others, as well as the doctrine of the Golden Mean (chung yung), i.e., "to find the central clue of our moral being and to be harmonious with the universe." Humanism was further strengthened by Mencius (371-289 B.C.) who insisted that man must develop his nature fully because benevolence (jen) and righteousness (i) are natural to his nature which is originally good, and again reinforced by Hsun Tzu (c. 335-286 BC) who, contending that human nature is evil, advocated the control of nature. Amid this antagonism between naturalism and humanism, however, both schools conceived reality as unceasing change (i) and incessant transformation, perpetually in progress due to the interaction of the active (yang) and passive (yin) cosmic principles.
Taoism, however, became too mystical, and Confucianism too formalistic. "Hundred schools" grew and flourished, many in direct opposition to Taoism and Confucianism. There was Mohism (Mo, founded by Mo Tzu, between 500 and 396 B.C.) which rejected formalism in favor of "benefit" and "utility" which are to be promoted through universal love (chien ai), practical observation and application, and obedience to the will of Heaven. There was Neo-Mohism (Mo che, 300 B.C.) which, in trying to prove the thesis of Mohism, developed an intricate system of logic. There was Sophism (ming chia, 400 B.C.) which displayed much sophistry about terms and concepts, particularly about the relationship between substance and quality (chien pai). There was Legalism (fa chia, 500-200 B.C.) which advocated law, statecraft, and authority as effective instruments of government. finally, there was the Yin Yang school (400-200 B.C.) which emphasized yin and yang as the two fundamental principles, always contrasting but complementary, and underlying all conceivable objects, qualities, situations, and relationships. It was this school that provided a common ground for the fusion of ancient divergent philosophical tendencies in medieval China.
Medieval Chinese philosophy was essentially a story of the synthesis of indigenous philosophies and the development of Buddhism. In the second century B.C., the Yin Yang movement identified itself with the common and powerful movement under the names of the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu (Huang Lao). This, in turn, became interfused with Confucianism and produced the mixture which was the Eclectic Sinisticism lasting till the tenth century A.D. In both Huai-nan Tzu (d. 122 B.C.), the semi-Taoist, and Tung Chung-shu (177-104- B.C.), the Confucian, Taoist metaphysics and Confucian ethics mingled with each other, with yin and yang as the connecting links. As the cosmic order results from the harmony of yin and yang in nature, namely, Heaven and Earth, so the moral order results from the harmony of yang and yin in man, such as husband and wife, human nature and passions, and love and hate. The Five Agents (wu hsing), through which the yin yang principles operate, have direct correspondence not only with the five directions, the five metals, etc., in nature, but also with the five Constant Virtues, the five senses, etc., in man, thus binding nature and man in a neat macrocosm-microcosm relationship. Ultimately this led to superstition, which Wang Ch'ung (27-c. 100 A.D.) vigorously attacked. He reinstated naturalism on a rational ground by accepting only reason and experience, and thus promoted the critical spirit to such an extent that it gave rise to a strong movement of textual criticism and an equally strong movement of free political thought in the few centuries after him.
In the meantime, Taoism degenerated and identified itself with the lowest forms of religious worship. Its naturalistic philosophy was carried to the point of fatalistic mechanism in Lieh Tzu (c. 300 A.D.) and was made the theoretical basis for alchemy and the search for longevity in Ko Hung (c. 268-c. 334 A.D.). In Kuo Hsiang (c. 312 A.D.), however, the true spirit of Taoism revived. He restored and developed the Taoist doctrines of naturalism and spontaneous transformation to a position of dignity.
Parallel with these developments was the growth of Buddhism in China, a story too long to relate here. Many Buddhist doctrines, latent in India, were developed in China. The nihilism of Madhyamika (Sun-lan, c. 450-c. 1000) to the effect that reality is Void in the sense of being "devoid" of any specific character, was brought to fullness, while the idealism of Vijnaptimatravada (Yogacara, Fahsiang, 563-c. 1000), which claimed that reality in its imaginary, dependent and absolute aspects is "representation-only," was pushed to the extreme. But these philosophies failed because their extreme positions were not consonant with the Chinese Ideal of the golden mean. In the meantime, China developed her own Buddhist philosophy consistent with her general philosophical outlook. We need only mention the Hua-yen school (Avatamisaka, 508) which offered a totalistic philosophy of "all in one" and "one in all," the T'ien-t'ai school (c. 550) which believes in the identity of the Void, Transitoriness, and the Mean, and in the "immanence of 3,000 worlds in one moment of thought," and the Chin-t'u school (Pure Land, c. 500) which bases its doctrine of salvation by faith and salvation for all on the philosophy of the universality of Buddha-nature. These schools have persisted because they accepted both noumenon and phenomenon, both ens and non-ens, and this "both-and" spirit is predominantly characteristic of Chinese philosophy.
The most strange development was Ch'an (Meditation, Zen, c. 500). It is basically a method of "direct intuition into the heart to find Buddha-nature," a method based, on the one hand, on the eightfold negation of production and extinction, annihilation and permanence, unity and diversity, and coming and departing, and, on the other hand, on the affirmation of the reality of the Buddha-nature in all things. Its sole reliance on meditation was most un-Chinese, but it imposed on the Chinese mind a severe mental and spiritual discipline which was invigorating as well as fascinating. For this reason, it exerted tremendous influence not only on Taoism which had much in common with it and imitated it in every way, but also on Neo-Confucianism, which stood in diametrical opposition to it.
Neo-Confucianism developed in three phases, namely the Reason school in the Sung period (960-1279), the Mind school in the Ming period (1388-1644) and the Moral-Law school in the Ch-ing period (1644-1911). The central idea of the movement is focused on the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi) and Reason (li). The Great Ultimate moves and generates the active principle, yang, when its activity reaches its limit, and engenders the passive principle, yin, when it becomes tranquil. The eternal oscillation of yin and yang gives rise to the material universe through their Five Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal and Earth. Thus, reality is a progressively evolved and a well-coordinated system.
This dynamic and orderly character of the universe is due to Reason and the vital force. As the Ch'eng brothers (I-ch'uan, 1033-1077, and Min-tao, 1032-1086) said, "All things have the same Reason in them." Thus, Reason combines the Many into One, while the vital force differentiates the One into the Many, each with its own "determinate nature." The two principles, however, are not to be sharply contrasted, for neither is independent of the other. Reason operates through, and is embodied in, the vital force. It is this cooperative functioning of theirs that makes the universe a cosmos, a harmonious system of order and sequence. "Centrality is the order of the universe and harmony is its unalterable law." As such the cosmos is a moral order. This is the main reason why the greatest of the Neo-Confucians, Chu Hsi (1130-1200) said that "the Great Ultimate is nothing but the Reason of ultimate goodness."
Furthermore, the universe is a social order, and nothing can stand by itself. At the same time, everything has its opposite. "No two of the productions of creation are alike," and the Taoist doctrine of the equality of things must be rejected. In the eternal sequence of appearance and disappearance every creation is new, and the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration must be rejected.
In order to appreciate fully the meaning of the universe, man must comprehend Reason. This can be done by "investigating things to the utmost" (ko wu), that is, by "investigating the Reason of things to the utmost (ch'iung li)." When sufficient effort is made, and understanding naturally comes, one's nature will be realized and his destiny will be fulfilled, since "the exhaustive investigation of Reason, the full realization of one's nature, and the fulfillment of destiny are simultaneous." When one understands Reason, he will find that "All people are brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions," because all men have the same Reason in them. Consequently one should not entertain any distinction between things and the ego. This is the foundation of the Neo-Confucian ethics of jen, true manhood, benevolence or love. Both the understanding of Reason and the practice of jen require sincerity (ch'eng) and seriousness (ching) which to the Neo-Confucians almost assumed religious significance. As a matter of fact these have a certain correspondence with the Buddhist dhyana and prajna or meditation and insight. Gradually the Neo-Confucian movement became an inward movement, the mind assuming more and more importance.
When it came to the Ming period especially in Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529), Reason became identified with Mind. Mencius' doctrine of intuitive knowledge (liang chih) was revived and made the basis of his theory of the identity of knowledge and conduct and the sacred duty of man to "fully exercise his mind" and to "manifest his illustrious virtues."
Wang Yang-ming considered desire as an obstacle to the mind. The Neo-Confucians of the Ch'ing period, especially Tai Tung-yuan (1723-1777), however, argued that since desire is part of our nature, it has its rightful place, just as the vital force has its rightful place beside Reason. The main problem then would be to attain the harmony of human passion (ch'ing) and the originally good human nature (hsing). Thus Neo-Confucianism reasserted the principle of central harmony (chung yung), and central harmony is the Moral Law (tao). This Law finds expression in constant and orderly transformation, the realization of which is Reason. It will be seen that Neo-Confucianism is essentially compatible with western philosophy and science. It is to be expected, therefore, that both Neo-Confucianism and western thought will play a great role in any future philosophy in China. -- W.T.C
- Alfred Forke,
- Geschichte der neueren chinesischen Philosophie, De Gruyter & Co., Hamburg, 1938;
- Fung Yu-lan,
- A History of Chinese Philosophy (ancient period), tr. by D. Bodde, Henri Vetch, Peiping, 1937;
- Hu Shih,
- The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, The Oriental Book Co., Shanghai, 1922.
Ching: (a) The classics, whether Confucian or Taoist. Formerly spelled king.
(b) Cardinal standards or directions in Confucian ethics and government. -- W.T.C.
Ching: (a) Reverence. (Ancient Confucianism.)
(b) Seriousness, the inner state of respect or politeness (kung). With respect to daily affairs, it is expressed in care, vigilance, attention, etc., and with respect to the laws of the universe, it is expressed in sincerity (ch'eng), especially toward the Reason (li) of things. "Seriousness is the basis of moral cultivation, the essence of human affairs, just as sincerity is the way of Heaven." It is "to straighten one's internal life and righteousness (i) is to square one's external life." It means "unity of mind and absolute equanimity and absolute steadfastness." (Neo-Confucianism.) -- W.T.C.
Essence. "Essence and vital force (ch'i) constitute things."
Purity; the pure nature.
Concentration; unity of thought.
Ching: (a) Tranquillity: rest; passivity: inactivity; "the constant feature of the passive principle." See tung. (Confucianism.)
(b) Quietude; quiescence; interpreted by the Taoist as absence of desire and unity of thought, by Confucians in general as the original state of human nature, and by Hsun Tzu (c. 335-c. 288 B.C.) as the mind not being disturbed by such things as dreams. -- W.T.C.
Ch'ing: Passions; feelings; emotions; interpreted as
(a) Human nature (which is originally tranquil) when moved and awakened and expressed in the seven feelings (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire), like and dislike, and the sense of advantage and disadvantage.
(b) The impure side of man, born of the passive (yin) vital force (ch'i) as contrasted with the pure, the nature (hsing) born of the active (yang) vital force and expressed in the Five Constant Virtues (wu ch'ang).
(c) Human nature, or feelings original in or proper to man. -- W.T.C.
Ch'ing (dynasty) philosophy: See li hsueh and Chinese philosophy. -- W.T.C
Ching shen: The spirit and soul of man, or "the vital force (ch'i) and the keeper of life of man," which is endowed by Heaven as against the physical form which is endowed by Earth. (Huai-nan Tzu, d. 122 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Chin hsin: Exerting one's mind to the utmost; complete development of one's mental constitution, by which one knows his nature and thereby Heaven. (Mencius, Wang Yang-ming, 1473-1529, and Tai Tung-yuan, 1723-1777.) -- W.T.C
Chin tan: Medicine of immortality. (Taoist alchemy, especially Pao-p'o Tzu, c 268-c 334.) See Wai tan. -- W.T.C.
Chiu: Duration, or "what reaches to different times," or "what unites past and present, morning and evening." (Neo-Mohism.) -- W.T.C
Chiu ch'ou: The Nine Categories of the Grand Norm (hung fan) of ancient Confucian philosophy, consisting of the Five Elements (wu hsing), the reverent practice of the five functions (of personal appearance, speech, vision, hearing, and thought), the intensive application of the eight governmental measures, the harmonious use of the five regulations of time, the establishment of the royal standard, the orderly practice of the three virtues, the intelligent practice of divination, the thoughtful following of various indications, and the rewarding with five kinds of good and punishment with six forms of evil. -- W.T.C.
Ch'iung li: Investigation of Reason of things to the utmost. A thing is considered by the Neo-Confucianists to be an event. A perfect understanding of an event can be obtained by investigating to the utmost the Reason underlying it. This does not require the investigation of the Reason of all things. When the Reason in one thing is extensively investigated, the Reason in other things can be understood. (Neo-Confucianism.) -- W.T.C.
Ch'i wu: The equality of things and opinions, the identity of contraries. "Viewed from the standpoint of Tao, a beam and a pillar are identical. So are ugliness and beauty, greatness, wickedness, perverseness, and strangeness. Separation is the same as construction; construction is the same as destruction." Therefore the sages harmonize the systems of right and wrong, and rest in the equilibrium of nature (t'ien chun). "This is called following two courses at the same time." (Chuang Tzu, between 399 and 295 B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Choice: (a) In ethics the term choice refers to an agent's act of volition in deciding between two or more alternatives. Sometimes it is said that we may choose only between alternative courses of action, sometimes that we may also choose between alternative ends of action. In either case it is said that choice is deliberate and knowing, as compared with preference, which may be spontaneous; and that it is one's choices which both determine and express one's moral character. Two further questions arise (a) Are our choices free in the sense of not being determined by previous events' and (b) Are our choices simply the determinations of our strongest desires? -- W.K.F.
See Cause, Determinism, Will.
Choice, axiom of, or Zermelo's axiom, is the name given to an assumption of logical or logico-mathematical character which may be stated as follows: Given a class K whose members are non-empty classes, there exists a (one-valued) monadic function f whose range is K, such that f(x) &isin: x for all members x of K. This had often been employed unconsciously or tacitly by mathematicians -- and is apparently necessary for the proofs of certain important mathematical theorems -- but was first made explicit by Zermelo in 1904, who used it in a proof that every class can be well-ordered. Once explicitly stated the assumption was attacked by many mathematicians as lacking in validity or as not of legitimately mathematical character, but was defended by others, including Zermelo.
An equivalent assumption, called by Russell the multiplicative axiom and afterwards adopted by Zermelo as a statement of his Auswahl-prinzip, is as follows: Given a class K whose members are non-empty classes no two of which have a member in common, there exists a class A (the Auswahlmenge) all of whose members are members of members of K and which has one and only one member in common with each member of K. Proof of equivalence of the multiplicative axiom to the axiom of choice is due to Zermelo. -- A.C.
- E. Zermelo,
- Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeord net werden kann, Mathematische Annalen, vol. 59 (1904), pp. 514-516.
- B. Russell,
- On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, ser 2. vol. 4 (1906), pp 29-53.
- E. Zermelo,
- Neuer Beweis fur die Moglichkeit einer Wohlordnung, Mathematische Annalen, vol. 65 (1908), pp. 107-128.
- K. Gödel,
- The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory. Princeton, N.J., 1940.
Chou Tun-i: (Chou Lien-hsi, Chou Mao-shu, 1017-1073) Was active in government and was a renowned judge. He was the pioneer of Neo-Confucianism (li hsueh), anticipating the Ch'eng brothers. He wrote the T'ung-shu (explanation of the Book of Changes) and the T'aichi T'u-shu (explanation of the diagram of the Great Ultimate), fundamental texts of Neo-Confucian philosophy. -- W.T.C.
Chrematistiscs: (Gr. chrematistike, the art of the use of money) A term insisted upon by Ingram (1823-1900) and others in a restricted sense to that portion of the science of political economy which relates to the management and regulation of wealth and property, one of the efforts to indicate more clearly the content of classical economics. -- H.H.
Christology: The totality of doctrines constituting that part of theology which treats of the nature and personality of Christ. First of all Christology must concern itself with the promise of a Saviour and Redeemer of the human race. It includes the study of the prophecies foretelling the Messiah, as well as their fulfillment. Further it must inquire into the mystery of the Incarnation, of the Word made flesh, and examine all the circumstances of the birth, passion, and resurrection of Christ. Since He acknowledged that He was God, the Son of God, one with the Father, it becomes necessary to examine His credentials, His own prophecies, miracles, and saintly life, which were to serve as evidence that He was sent by God and really possessed all power in heaven and on earth. Christology must deal with the human and Divine nature, their relation to each other, and the hypostatic union of both in one Divine Person, as well as the relation of that Person to the Father and the Holy Ghost. Moreover, the authentic decisions of the Councils of the Church form an exceedingly important portion of all christological theories and doctrines, and also the interpretations of those decisions by theologians. -- J.J.R.
Chrysippus: (280-209 B.C.) One of the leaders of the Stoic School, whose voluminous writings have been completely lost. In many respects he deviated from the Stoic speculative course; for instance, he combined the principle of natural necessity, or determinism, with the doctrine of Providence. -- R.B.W.
Chu: Direct appellation, a method of designation. "To call out 'Puppy!' is direct appellation." See chia and i (Neo-Mohism.) -- W.T.C.
Ch'uan: (a) A weight; a standard; a balance.
(b) Power; authority; force.
(c) Expediency, a Confucian ethical concept which justifies deviation from cardinal standards or directions (ching) in ethics and government under certain abnormal circumstances. -- W.T.C.
Chuang Tzu: (Chuang Chou, Chuing Chi-yuan, between 399 and 295 B.C.) The second greatest Taoist, was once a petty officer in his native state, Meng (in present Honan), in the revolutionary and romantic south. A little-travelled scholar, he declined a premiership in favor of freedom and peace. His love of nature, his vivid imagination and subtle logic make his works masterpieces of an exquisite style. Only the first seven and a few other chapters of Chuang Tzu (English transl. by H. (Giles and by Feng Yu-lan) are authentic. -- W.T.C.
Ch'uan hsing: Preservation of one's original nature. (Taoism.) -- W.T.C.
Ch'uan sheng: (a) Preservation of life, by the suppression of desires. (Taoism.)
(b) Completeness of life, that is, "all desires reach a proper harmony." (Taoism.) -- W.T.C.
Chu Hsi: (Chu Hui-an, Chu Yiian-hui, Chu Chung-hui, 1130-1200) Early distinguished himself as a patriot-scholar, having repeatedly petitioned the emperor to practice the principles of "investigation of things" and "extension of knowledge" and not to make peace with the invading enemy. But he preferred a life of peace and poverty, accepted a number of government appointments with a great deal of reluctance. His lectures at the White Deer Grotto attracted all prominent scholars of the time. The works of this leader of Neo-Confucianism (li hsueh) include the Chu Tzu Ch'uan-shu ("Complete Works," really Selected Works, partial English transl. by J. P. Bruce: The Philosophy of Human Nature by Chu Hsi) of 66 Chinese chuans in 25 volumes and the Yu Lei (Sayings Arranged by Topics) of 140 chuans in 40 volumes. -- W.T.C.
Chu i wu shih: Unity of mind, with absolute steadfastness or impartiality, a state of reverential seriousness (ching). (Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107, and Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1086.) -- W.T.C.
- The Mean. See Chung yung. (Confucius.)
- The central self or moral being, in which "the passions such as joy, anger, grief, and pleasure have not awakened," and which exists "in a state of absolute tranquillity without being moved." See ho. (Early Confucianism; Neo-Confucianism.)
- The central or the proper principle; the Moral Law (tao); the "ultimate principle" of the universe; "the great basis of existence"; "the beginning and the end of the universe."
- The principle of centrality, which is observable in everything, that everything should have the proper balance of activity and tranquillity. (Tung Chung-shu, 177-104 B.C., Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1086.)
- Impartiality; the principle of neutrality which is present in every human heart.
- The inner life; the inner principle. (Lao Tzu.)
- Being true to the principle of the self; being true to the originally good nature of the self; being one's true self; the Confucian "central thread or principle" (i kuan) with respect to the self, as reciprocity (shu) is that principle with respect to others. See i kuan.
- Exerting one's pure heart to the utmost, to the extent of "not a single thought not having been exhausted", honesty, sincerity; devotion of soul, conscientiousness. (Confucianism.) "Honesty (chung) is complete realization of one's nature" whereas truthfulness (hsin) is "complete realization of the nature of things." "Honesty (chung) is the subjective side of truthfulness (hsin) whereas truthfulness is the objective side of honesty." (Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1086.)
"Honesty is exerting one's heart to the utmost whereas truthfulness is the observance of the Reason of things." (Chu Hsi, 1230-1300.)
- Impartiality, especially in love and profit,
- Loyalty, especially to one's superiors, faithfulness.
Chung: Identity, one of the proofs of agreement. See Mo che. -- W.T.C.
- The Golden Mean. See Chung and i kuan.
- Centrality and harmony, a law "from whose operation we cannot for one instant in our existence escape", the central clue to man's moral being which unites him to the universal order (or to attain central harmony). (Early Confucianism.)
- The Universal and the Changeless which is the true principle of things and the eternal law of the universe. (Neo-Confucianism.)
- The superior man, the perfect man, the moral man, the noble man. "There may have been a superior man who is not a true man (jen), but there has never been an inferior man (hsiao jen) who is a true man." The superior man "makes upward progress," "understands profit," and "despises the ordinances of Heaven, great men, and the words of the sages." (Confucius.)
"The superior man's moral order is on the increase, while the inferior man's moral order is on the decrease." "The superior man abides by what is internal, whereas the inferior man abides by what is external." (Ancient Confucianism )
"The superior man makes advance in the moral law, whereas the inferior man makes advance in profit." "The superior man enjoys in the fulfillment of the moral law, whereas
the inferior man enjoys in the fulfillment of his desires." (Medieval Confucianism.) The superior man "sees what is great and far" and is interested in "helping things to perfection," whereas the inferior man "sees what is small and near" and is interested in destroying things." (Neo-Confucianism.)
- A ruler.
- Husband (as in the Odes).
Cicero: (Marcus Tullius, 106-43 B.C.) Famous for his eclectic exposition of general scientific knowledge and philosophy, by which he aimed to arouse an appreciation of Greek culture in the minds of his countrymen, the Romans. -- M.F.
Cicero: De Natura deorum; De officiis; Disputationes: Tuscalanae; De finibus bonorum et malorum.
Circular evidence: (Lat, circulus in probando) Proof or evidence involving premisses which assume the conclusion which is to be established. -- O.F.K.
Cit: (Skr.) Awareness. Cf. sat-cit-ananda. -- K.F.L.
Citi: (Skr.) Spirit, highest intelligence. -- K.F.L.
Citta: (Skr.) In the philosophy of the Yogasutras (q.v.) the phenomenal form of mind as the first creation of prakrti (q.v.) which is differentiated into mental states (vrttis), such as true and false knowledge, imagination, memory, sleep. These states being of the active, need restraining (citta-vrtti nirodha; cf. Yoga) in order to have the true and abiding nature of self (purusa) come into its own. -- K.F.L.
Claims: See prima facie duties.
Clarification: (Ger. Klärung, Aufklärung) In Husserl: Synthesis of identification, in which the noematic sense is given less clearly in an earlier than in a later intending. The course of potential clarification is predelineated horizonally for every element of sense that is either intended emptily or experienced with less than optimal clarity. The horizonal experiencings in which "the same" would be given more clearly are explicable in phantasy. Thus, the essential dimensions and the range of indeterminacy of the object (and its essential possibility or impossibility) as intended can be grasped in evidence. This is clarification in the usual sense. On the other hand, potential experiencings of "the same" may be made actual rather than fictively actual (phantasied) -- in which case, the synthesis of clarification is a synthesis of fulfilment. See Fulfilment. -- D.C.
Class: or set, or aggregate (in most connections the words are used synonymously) can best be described by saying that classes are associated with monadic propositional functions (in intension -- i.e., properties) in such a way that two propositional functions determine the same class if and only if they are formally equivalent. A class thus differs from a propositional function in extension only in that it is not usual to employ the notation of application of function to argument in the case of classes (see the article Propositional function). Instead, if a class a is determined by a propositional function A, we say that x is a member of a (in symbols x∈a) if and only if A(x).
Whitehead and Russell, by introducing classes into their system only as incomplete symbols, "avoid the assumption that there are such things as classes." Their method (roughly) is to reinterpret a proposition about a class determined by a propositional function A as being instead an existential proposition, about some propositional function formally equivalent to A.
See also Logic, formal, §§ 7, 9. -- A.C.
Class: (Socio-economic) Central in Marxian social theory (see Historical materialism) the term class signifies a group of persons having, in respect to the means of production, such a common economic relationship as brings them into conflict with other groups having a different economic relationship to these means. For example, slaves and masters, serfs and lords, proletariat and capitalists are considered pairs of classes basic respectively to ancient, medieval and modern economies. At the same time many subordinate classes or sub-classes are distinguished besides or within such primary ones. In "'Revolution and Counter-Revolution" for instance, Marx applies the term class to the following groups, feudal nobility, wealthy bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, small farmers, proletariat, agricultural laborers, subdividing the class of small farmers into two further "classes", peasant free-holders and feudal tenants. The conflict of interests involved has many manifestations, both economic and non-economic, all of which are considered part of the class struggle (q.v.) -- J.M.S.
Class concept: A monadic propositional function, thought of as determining a class (q.v.). -- A.C.
Class consciousness: The consciousness on the part of an individual of his membership in a given economic class (q.v.). -- J.M.S.
Class struggle: Fundamental in Marxian social thought, this term signifies the conflict between classes (q.v.) which, according to the theory of historical materialism (see the entry, Dialectical materialism) may and usually does take place in all aspects of social life, and which has existed ever since the passing of primitive communism (q.v.). The class struggle is considered basic to the dynamics of history in the sense that a widespread change in technics, or a fuller utilization of them, which necessitates changes in economic relations and, in turn, in the social superstructure, is championed and carried through by classes which stand to gain from the change. The economic aspects of the class struggle under capitalism manifest themselves most directly, Marx held, in disputes over amount of wages, rate of profits, rate of interest, amount of rent, length of working day, conditions of work and like matters. The Marxist position is that the class struggle enters into philosophy, politics, law, morals, art, religion and other cultural institutions and fields in various ways, either directly or indirectly, and, in respect to the people involved, consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly. In any case the specific content of any such field or institution at a given time it held to have a certain effect upon a given class in its conflicts with other classes, weakening or aiding it. Marxists believe that certain kinds of literature or art may inspire people with a lively sense of the need and possibility of a radical change in social relations, or, on the contrary, with a sense of lethargy or complacency, and that various moral, religious or philosophical doctrines may operate to persuade a given class that it should accept its lot without complaint or its privileges without qualms, or may operate to persuade it of the contrary. The Marxist view is that every field or institution has a history, an evolution, and that this evolution is the result of the play of conflicting forces entering into the field, which forces are connected, in one way or another, with class conflicts. While it is thus held that the class struggle involves all cultural fields, it is not held that any cultural production or phenomenon, selected or delimited at random, can be correlated in a one-to-one fashion with an equally delimited class interest. -- J.M.S.
Classic: A. Art of the first class (Aulus Gellius).
B. Greek and Roman art in which perfect balance between body and spirit is achieved (Hegel). Contrasted with Modern and Romantic. -- L.V.
Classicism: Taste based on the imitation of classic art. -- L.V.
1. Process of grouping objects into classes on the basis of the discovery of common properties; or the results of such grouping.
2. Process of grouping species into genera, genera into still larger genera, and so on to the summum genus (q.v.). -- A.C.B.
Cleanthes: (c. 310-230 B.C.) Zeno's disciple and one of the most prominent thinkers of the Stoic School. Of his writings only a hymn to Zeus is extant. -- R.B.W.
Clearness: (Ger. Klarheit) In Husserl: Intuitional fullness, whether perceptual, fictively perceptual, memorial, or anticipational. See Clarification, Distinctness, and Intuition. -- D.C.
Clement of Alexandria: (150-217) An early Christian thinker and theologian who attempted to raise the attitude of faith to the level of knowledge; he was influenced by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Philo Judaeus. -- R.B.W.
Co-conscious, The: (Lat. co- + conscire, to know) Consciousness which is dissociated from the central core of a personality and of which that personality is unaware. The co-conscious and the unconscious consisting of neural structures and processes are, in the terminology of Morton Prince, the two species of the subconscious. (The Unconscious, pp. 247 ff.) -- L.W.
Coenaesthesis: (Gr. Koinos, common + aisthesis, feeling) Organic sensation (circulatory, digestive etc.) as distinguished from external sensation (visual, auditory, tactual etc.). See Somatic Datum. -- L.W.
Cogitatio: One of the two attributes (q.v.) of God which, according to Spinoza, are accessible to the human intellect (Ethica, II, passim) Though God is an infinite thinking thing, it is not possible so to define him; God is "substance consisting of infinite attributes, etc." (Ibid, I, Def. 6), and is thus beyond the grasp of the human mind which can know only thought and extension (extensio, q.v.). -- W.S.W.
Cogito: In Husserl: A collective name for spontaneous acts, acts in which the ego lives. -- D.C.
Cogito Argument, The: (Lat. cogito, I think) An argument of the type employed by Descartes (Meditation II) to establish the existence of the self. Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum ("I think, therefore I exist") is an attempt to establish the existence of the self in any act of thinking, including even the act of doubting. The cogito ergo sum is, as Descartes himself insisted, not so much inference as a direct appeal to intuition, but it has commonly been construed as an argument because of Descartes' formulation. -- L.W.
Cognition: (Lat. cognoscere, to know) Knowledge in its widest sense including:
Cognition, along with conation and affection, are the three basic aspects or functions of consciousness. See Consiousness, Epistemology. -- L.W.
- non-propositional apprehension (perception, memory, introspection, etc.) as well as
- propositions or judgments expressive of such apprehension.
In Scholasticism: Whatever is known is, as known, an accident of the knowing soul and therefore caused by an informing agent. All knowledge ultimately is due to an affection of the senses which are informed by the agency of the objects through a medium. The immutation of the sense organ and the corresponding accidental change of the soul are called species sensibilis impressa. The conscious percept is the species expressa. Intellectual knowledge stems from the phantasm out of which the active intellect disengages the universal nature which as species intelligibilis impressa informs the passive intellect and there becomes, as conscious concept. the species expressa or verbum mentis. Sensory cognition is a material process, but it is not the matter of the particular thing which enters into the sensory faculties; rather they supply the material foundation for the sensible form to become existent within the mind. Cognition is, therefore, "assimilation" of the mind to its object. The cognitive mental state as well as the species by which it originates are "images" of the object, in a metaphorical or analogical sense, not to be taken as anything like a copy or a reduplication of the thing. The senses, depending directly on the physical influence exercised by the object, cannot err; error is of the judging reason which may be misled by imagination and neglects to use the necessary critique. -- R.A.
Abstractive: That meaning of cognition which lacks one of the two requisites for intuitive knowledge: for in abstrictive cogniti n either we know things through other things, and not through their proper images -- or we know th'ngs that are not present: e.g., the knowledge we now have of God, through creatures -- or the knowledge we have of Adam, a being not present to us.
Comprehensive: Strictly speaking, that which is adequate to or fully commensurate with the object, -- a knowledge in which the whole object is known completely and in every way in which it can be known -- even to all the effects and consequences with which it has an intrinsic connection. This knowledge must be clear, certain, evident, and quidditative, because it is the most perfect type of knowledge corresponding to the object. E.g., God's complete knowledge of Himself.
Intuitive: Requires two things: (1) that it result from the proper species, or the proper image of the object itself, impressed upon the mind by the object or by God, and (2) that it bear upon an object that is really present with the greatest clearness and certitude. Our knowledge of the sun is intuitive while we are looking at the sun, and that knowledge which the blessed have of God is intuitive.
Quidditative: In the strict sense, is that which arises from the proper image of an object, like intuitive knowledge, and besides, penetrates distinctly, with a clear, proper, and positive concept, the essential predicates of a thing even to the last difference. The knowledge which God has of Himself is of this kind. But quidditative knowledge in the wide sense is any knowledge of the quiddity or essence of an object, or any definition explaining what a thing is. -- H.G.
Cognitive Meaning, Cognitive Sentence: See Meaning, Kinds of, 1.
Cognoscendum: (pl. cognoscenda) (Lat. cognoscere, to know) The object of a cognition. Cognoscenda may be
See Object, Objective. -- L.W.
- real and existent e.g. in veridical perception and memory;
- abstract and ideal e.g. in conception and valuation;
- fictitious, e.g. in imagination and hallucination.
Cohen, Hermann: (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924) were the chief leaders of the "Marburg School" which formed a definite branch of the Neo-Kantian movement. Whereas the original founders of this movement, O. Liebmann and Fr. A. Lange, had reacted to scientific empiricism by again calling attention to the a priori elements of cognition, the Marburg school contended that all cognition was exclusively a priori. They definitely rejected not only the notion of "things-in-themselves" but even that of anything immediately "given" in experience. There is no other reality than one posited by thought and this holds good equally for the object, the subject and God. Nor is thought in its effort to "determine the object = x" limited by any empirical data but solely by the laws of thought. Since in Ethics Kant himself had already endeavored to eliminate all empirical elements, the Marburg school was perhaps closer to him in this field than in epistemology. The sole goal of conduct is fulfillment of duty, i.e., the achievement of a society organized according to moral principles and satisfying the postulates of personal dignity. The Marburg school was probably the most influential philosophic trend in Germany in the last 25 years before the First World War. The most outstanding present-day champion of their tradition is Ernst Cassirer (born 1874). Cohen and Natorp tried to re-interpret Plato as well as Kant. Following up a suggestion first made by Lotze they contended that the Ideas ought to be understood as laws or methods of thought and that the current view ascribing any kind of existence to them was based on a misunderstanding of Aristotle's. -- H.G.
Cohen, Morris Raphael: (1880-) Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of the College of the City of New York. His contributions have been many in the fields of social, political and legal philosophy. He describes his view in general as realistic rationalism, a view that emphasizes the importance of intellect or reason as applied to what is, rather than in vacuo. He has found the principle of polarity a fruitful means of resolving antinomies. His best known works are Reason and Nature and Law and the Social Order. -- L.E.D.
Coherence Theory of Truth: Theory of knowledge which maintains that truth is a property primarily applicable to any extensive body of consistent propositions, and derivatively applicable to any one proposition in such a system by virtue of its part in the system. -- A.C.B.
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor: (1772-1834) Leading English poet of his generation along with his friend and associate, William Wordsworth. He was for a time a Unitarian preacher and his writings throughout display a keen interest in spiritual affairs. He was among the first to bring the German idealists to the attention of the English reading public. Of greatest philosophic interest among his prose works are Biographia Literaria, Aids to Reflection and Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. His influence was greit upon his contemporaries and also upon the American transcendentalists. -- L.E.D.
Collective and Distributive Properties: A general term is taken in its collective sense when what is predicated of its applies to its designation as a whole, rather than to each of the individual members belonging to it; the distributive properties are those that apply only in the latter way.
Colligation: (Lat. con + ligare, to bind) The assimilation of a number of separately observed facts to a unified conception or formula. The term was introduced by Whewcll who gives the eximple of the idea of an eliptical orbit which "unifies all observations made on the positions of a planet" (see Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, I Aphorism 1). J. S. Mill appropriates the term and carefully differentiates it from induction: whereas colligation is a simple "description" of observed facts, induction is an extension to the unknown and to the future. See Logic, III, ii, § 4. -- L.W.
Combination: (Lat. combinare, to join) The process of forming a new whole by the union of parts; also the product of such union. Two types of combination are distinguishable:
See Psychic Fusion. -- L.W.
- Composition is a union of parts such that the component parts are discernible in the compound. Thus the visual and factual data which combine to form a total percept are recognizable in the resultant percept.
- Fusion is a union of parts into a whole in which the identity of the parts is obliterated. Thus the amalgamation of two sense images to form a new quality would, if this phenomenon were psychologically possible, be an instance of psychic fusion.
Combination of Ideas: According to Locke and his followers, the process by which the mind forms complex ideas out of the simple ideas furnished to it by experience, and one of the three ways in which the mind by its own activity can get new ideas not furnished to it from without (Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. 12, 22). Conceived sometimes as a mechanical, sometimes as a quasi-chemical process. -- W.K.F.
Combinatory Logic: A branch of mathematical logic, which has been extensively investigated by Curry, and which is concerned with analysis of processes of substitution, of the use of variables generally, and of the notion of a function. The program calls, in particular, for a system of logic in which variables are altogether eliminated, their place being taken by the presence in the system of certain kinds of function symbols. For a more detailed and exact account, reference must be made to the papers cited below. -- A.C.
- M. Schönfinkel,
- Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik, Mathematische Annalen, vol. 92 (1924), pp. 305-316.
- H. B. Curry,
- Grundlagen der kombmatorischen Logik, American Journal of Mathematics, vol. 52 (1930), pp. 509-536, 789-834.
- H. B. Curry,
- The universal quantifier in combinatory logic, Annals of Mathematics, ser. 2, vol. 32 (1931), pp. 154-180.
- H. B. Curry,
- Apparent variables from the standpoint of combinatory logic, Annals of Mathematics, ser. 2, vol 34 (1933), pp. 381-404.
- H. B. Curry,
- Functionality in combinatory logic, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 20 (1934), pp. 584-590.
- J. B. Rosser,
- A mathematical logic without variables, Annals of Mathematics, ser. 2, vol. 36 (1935), pp 127-150, and Duke Mathematical Journal, vol. 1 (1935), pp. 328-355.
- H. B. Curry,
- A revision of the fundamental rules of combinatory logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 6 (1941), pp. 41-53.
- H. B. Curry,
- Consistency and completeness of the theory of combinators, ibid , pp. 54-61.
Comedy: In Aristotle (Poetics), a play in which chief characters behave worse than men do in daily life, as contrasted with tragedy, where the main characters act more nobly. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates argues at the end that a writer of good comedies is able to write good tragedies. See Comic. Metaphysically, comedy in Hegel consists of regarding reality as exhausted in a single category. Cf. Bergson, Le rire (Laughter).
Commentator, The: Name usually used for Averroes by the medieval authors of the 13th century and later. In the writings of the grammarians (modistae, dealing with modis significandi) often used for Petrus Heliae. -- R.A.
Common Sense: In Aristotle's psychology the faculty by which the common sensibles are perceived. It is probable also that Aristotle attributes to this faculty the functions of perceiving what we perceive and of uniting the data of different senses into a single object. -- G.R.M.
Common Sense Realism: A school of Scottish thinkers founded by Thomas Reid (1710-96) which attempted to set up a theory of knowledge which would support the realistic belief of the man on the street. (See Naive Realism.) The school began a movement of protest against Locke's theory which led to an eventual subjective idealism and skepticism. -- V.F.
Common Sensibles: (Lat. sensibilia communia) In the psychology of Aristotle the qualities of a sense object that may be apprehended by several senses; e.g. motion (or rest), number, shape, size; in distinction from the proper sensibles, or qualities that can be apprehended by only one sense, such as color, taste, smell. -- G.R.M.
Communication: A term used to refer to a certain feature of sign-situations, viz. the identity, similarity or correspondence of what is understood by the interpreter with what is, or is intended to be, expressed by the speaker.
By a familiar ambiguity the term is used indiscriminately to refer either to the process by which such accordance is brought about, or that with regard to which accord between the speaker and interpreter is achieved.
The definition is intended to cover the communication of attitudes, evaluations, desires, etc., as well as of judgments or assertions. See Functions of Language, Speech Situation. -- M.B.
Communication: (Lat. communicare, to share) Intercourse between minds or selves whereby sensations, imagery or conceptional meanings are transferred from one to another. Communication includes:
See Telegnosts; Telepathy. -- L.W.
- ordinary sense-mediated communication by means of speech, writing, gesture, facial expression and bodily attitude and
- allegedly direct contact between minds by mental telepathy and other occult means.
Communism: (Marxian) In its fullest sense, that stage of social development, which, following socialism (q.v.) is conceived to be characterized by an economy of abundance on a world wide scale in which the state as a repressive force (army, jails, police and the like) is considered unnecessary because irreconcilable class antagonisms will have disappeared, and it will be possible to apply the principle, "from each according to ability, to each according to need" (Marx "Gotha Program"). It is held that the release of productive potentialities resulting from socialized ownership of the means of production will create a general sufficiency of economic goods which in turn will afford the possibility of educational and cultural development for all, and that under such conditions people will learn to live in accordance with valued standards without the compulsion of physical force represented by a special apparatus of state power. It is considered that by intelligent planning, both economic and cultural, it will then be possible to eradicate the antagonism between town and country and the opposition between physical and mental labor. It is now considered in the U.S.S.R. that the principal features of communist society, with the exception of the "withering away" of the state, may be attained in one country of an otherwise capitalist world. Trotsky considered this a false version of Marxism. -- J.M.S.
Commutative law is any law of the form x o y = y o x, or with the biconditional, etc., replacing equality -- compare Associative law. Commutative laws of addition and multiplication hold in arithmetic, also in the theory of real numbers, etc. In the propositional calculus there are commutative laws of conjunction, both kinds of disjunction, the biconditional, alternative denial and its dual; also corresponding laws in the algebra of classes. -- A.C.
Comparison: (Lat. com- + par, equal) The act of discerning or describing the common properties possessed by two or more objects; or the result of such discernment or description. -- A.C.B.
Compathy: (Ger. Miteinanderfühlen) Men feel with each other the same sorrow, the same pain. It is a with-each-other feeling. Only psychical suffering can thus be felt, not physical pain. There is no symagony. See Sympathy. -- H.H.
Completeness: A logistic system (q.v.) may be called complete if there is no formula of the system which is not a theorem and which can be added to the list of primitive formulas (no other change being made) without rendering the system inconsistent, in one of the senses of consistency (q.v.). The pure propositional calculus -- as explained under logic, formal, § 1 -- is complete in this sense.
Given the concept of semantical truth (q.v.), we may also define a logistic system as complete if every true formula of the system is a theorem. This sense of completeness is not, in general, equivalent to the other; and may be the weaker one if formulas containing free variables occur. See Logic, formal, §§ 3, 6. -- A.C.
Complex: (Lat. complecti, to entwine around, comprise) 1. Anything that possesses distinguishable parts, or the property of possessing distinguishable parts. 2. Anything that possesses distinguishable parts which are related in such a way as to give unity to the whole; or the property of having parts so related. -- A.C.B.
Complication: (Lat. com + plicatio, folded together) The union or act of combining more or less disparate elements into a single whole impression or idea. The term usually has reference to the synthesis of sense data in perceptions, or of perceptions in a unifying idea. -- O.F.K.
Composite: (Scholastic) The existing being as composed of prime matter (q.v.) and form (q.v.). The human composite: matter informed by the spiritual and rational soul. -- R.A.
Composite idea: Any idea that consists of a fusion of sentient elements, which together are presumed to pass the threshold of consciousness. In logic, a compound of undefined ideas by way of definition. -- C.K.D.
Composition is the form of valid inference of the propositional calculus from A ⊃ B and A ⊃ C to A ⊃ BC. The law of composition is the theorem of the propositional calculus:
[p ⊃ q][p ⊃ r] ⊃ [p ⊃ qr].
Composition and Division, fallacies of: Semi-formal logical fallacies. In the fallacy of composition it is assumed that what characterizes individuals qua individuals will likewise characterize groups of these same individuals qua groups. In that of division what is taken as validly applying to the group as a whole is then assumed to apply with equal validity to the individuals constituting said group. Called semi-formal because they involve passing from the distributive to the collective use of terms and vice versa. -- C.K.D.
Compossibility: Those things are compossible in Leibniz's philosophy which are literally "co-possible," i.e., which may exist together, which belong to the same possible world. Since metaphysical possibility means for Leibniz simply the absence of contradiction, two or more things are compossible if, and only if, their joint ascription to a single world involves no contradiction. All possible worlds are held by Leibniz to have general laws analogous to those of our own actual world. Compossibility for any set of things, consequently, involves their capacity to be brought under one and the same general system of laws. That this last provision is important follows from the fact that Leibniz affirmed all simple predicates to be compatible. -- F.L.W.
Compound: (Lat. con + ponere, to place) A complex whole formed by the union of a number of parts in contrast to an element which is a simple unanalyzable part. A mental compound is a state of mind formed by the combination (see Combination) of simple mental elements, either conscious or unconscious. -- L.W.
Compound Theory of Mind: The conception of mind as a compound of psychological elements analogous to a chemical compound. See Psychological Atomism. -- L.W.
Comprehension: (Lat. com + prehendere, to grasp) The act or faculty of understanding, intellectual grasp, or insight. Comprehension may be achieved variously by:
Comprehension carries sometimes the special connotation of thorough understanding.
- unifying and relating manifold facts or ideas;
- deducing something from premises;
- accommodating new facts or ideas to established knowledge;
- seeing a thing or idea in its proper or significant context;
- relating a fact or idea to something known, universal and subject to law.
Logic: The sum of characteristics which connote a class notion symbolized by a general term. Also, the features common to a number of in stances or objects. Thus, the connotation (q.v.) or intension (q.v.) of a concept. See Intension. -- O.F.K.
Compresence: (Lat. compraesentia from praesse, to be present) The togetherness of two or more items, for example, the coexistence of several elements in the unity of consciousness. In the terminology of S. Alexander (Space, Time and Deity), an unique kind of togetherness which underlies cognition. -- F.W.
Comte, Auguste: (1798-1857) Was born and lived during a period when political and social conditions in France were highly unstable. In reflecting the spirit of his age, he rose against the tendency prevalent among his predecessors to propound philosophic doctrines in disregard of the facts of nature and society. His revolt was directed particularly against traditional metaphysics with its endless speculations, countless assumptions, and futile controversies. To his views he gave the name of positivism. According to him, the history of humanity should be described in terms of three stages. The first of these was the theological stage when people's interpretation of reality was dominated by superstitions and prejudicesj the second stage was metaphysical when people attempted to comprehend, and reason about, reality, but were unable to support their contentions by facts; and the third and final stage was positive, when dogmatic assumptions began to be replaced by factual knowledge. Accordingly, the history of thought was characterized by a certain succession of sciences, expressing the turning of scholarly interest toward the earthly and human affairs, namely; mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. These doctrines were discussed in Comte's main work, Cours de philosophic positive. -- R.B.W.
Conation: (Lat. conatio, attempt) Referring to voluntary activity. -- V.F.
Conatus: The drive, force, or urge possessed by a thing which is directed towards the preservation of its own being. Since, for Spinoza, all things are animated, the term is used by him in a broader meaning than that accorded it, for example, in the Stoic philosophy. Spinoza maintains that there is no conatus for self-destruction (Ethica, III, 4; see also IV, 20 Schol., etc.); rather, the conatus relates to a thing's "power of existence", and he thus speaks of it as a kind of amour propre (natuurlyke Liefde) which characterizes a specific thing. See Short Tr., App. H. -- W.S.W.
Conceivability: The quality or condition of taking into and holding an idea in mind. It has come to mean any affection of the mind or any apprehension, imagining or opinion of the mind. It is a necessary though not sufficient criterion for the truth of said idea or affection, etc. -- C.K.D
Concept: In logic syn. either with propositioned function (q.v.) generally or with monadic propositional function. The terminology associated with the word function is not, however, usually employed in connection with the word concept; and the latter word may serve to avoid ambiguities which have arisen from loose or variant usages of the word function (q.v.); or it may reflect a difference in point of view. -- A.C.
In scholasticism: the "word of the mind" (verbum mentis) by which the possible intellect expresses (therefore also in later writers species expressa) the universal nature disengaged by the active intellect from the phantasm and transmitted as species intelligibilis to the possible intellect. -- R.A.
In Kant: In the strict sense, any generic or class term, exclusive or relational terms or categories. Sometimes, loosely, any general or abstract representation. -- O.F.K.
In Husserl: 1. An expressible sense. 2. An eidos as intended. -- D.C.
Conception: (Lat. concipere, to take together) Cognition of abstracta or universals as distinguished from cognition of concreta or particulars. (See Abstractum.) Conception, as a mode of cognition, may or may not posit real or subsistent universals corresponding to the concepts of the mind. See Conceptualism; Conceptual Realism. -- L.W.
Conceptualism: A solution of the problem of universals which seeks a compromise between extreme nominalism (generic concepts are signs which apply indifferently to a number of particulars) and extreme realism (generic concepts refer to subsistent universals). Conceptualism offers various interpretations of conceptual objectivity:
- the generic concept refers to a class of resembling particulars,
- the object of a concept is a universal essence pervading the particulars, but having; no reality apart from them,
- concepts refer to abstracta, that is to say, to ideal objects envisaged by the mind but having no metaphysical status.
Conceptual Realism: Theory which ascribes objectivity of some sort to conceptual cognition, includes extreme or Platonic realism and conceptualism but excludes nominalism. See Conceptualism. -- L.W.
Concomitance: (Latin concomitantia, accompaniment), literally the act or state of being associated, the term has received wide currency in logic, particularly since John Stuart Mill clearly formulated the method of concomitant variations, as the concurrent existence, appearance or disappearance of certain characters which, under circumstances, admit but do not necessarily postulate causal interrelatedness. -- K.F.L.
Precise conjunction or accompaniment, spatial or temporal. -- C.A.B.
Concrete: Anything that is specific or individual. The term is opposed to "general" or to "abstract", terms which stress common characteristics or qualities considered apart from their specific setting. -- V.F.
Concrete Universal: In Hegel's system a category is concrete when it possesses the basic character of the real, i.e. tension, change dialectical opposition. Such a universal comprises a synthesis of two opposite abstractions; and with one exception, it in turn becomes an abstract member of a piir of logical opposites united or "sublated" in a higher category. The lowest of such dynamic or concrete universals is Becoming, which is a dialectical synthesis of Being and Not-Being. The only absolutely concrete universal, however, is Reality itself, the World Whole, conceived as an all-inclusive, organic svstem of self-thinking Thought.
2. Neo-idealism (q.v.) in Italy introduce a second type of concrete universal whose element^ lack the character of dialectical opposition and logical abstractness. -- W.L.
Concretion: (Lat. concresco, to grow together) A uniting or growing together. -- V.F.
Santayana calls universals "concretions of discourse." (Life of Reason, vol. I (Reason in Common Sense)).
Concupiscence: (Lat. con + cupere, to desire wholly or altogether) Desire for pleasure or delight of the senses; as such it is a desire which is natural, necessary and proper to man. But when this desire operates independently of, or contrary to the right rule of reason, then concupiscence is a bad habit or vice, contrary to nature, and thus opposed to the virtue of temperance or "nothing in excess." In an extended sense, concupiscence may apply to desire for objects arousing appetites other than those of the senses. -- L.M.H.
Concurrence: The doctrine of Augustine that before the Fall it was possible for man not to sin, but he needed God's help, adjutorium sine quo non. After the Fall man needs God's grace or concurrence which acts with him, adjutotium quo, with which he must co-operate. The term also signifies, concursus, or the general cooperation of God, the primary cause, with the activity of all creatures, as secondary causes. -- J.J.R.
Concursus dei (or divinus): (Lat. Divine concurrent activity) The divine activity in its relation to the finite causes in the development of the world and the free will of man. The term suggests that divine activity runs parallel with the activity of things and creatures. The concursus dei is differently conceived depending on whether the stress is laid on the divine action or on the action of secondary causes. -- H.H.
Condignity: A characteristic of merit which implies equality and proportionality between service rendered and its recompense, to which there is a claim on the ground of justice. Merit of this description is called condign merit, or meritum de condigno. -- J.J.R.
Condillac, Etienne: (l715-1780) French sensationalist. Successor of Locke. In his Traite des sensations, he works out the details of a system based on Lockean foundations in which all the human faculties are reduced in essence to a sensory basis. Understanding in all its phases, is deemed nothing more than the comparison or multiplication of sensations. He is important today for his having followed the lead of Locke in pointing the way to psychology to profit by observation and experience. -- L.E.D.
E. Condillac, Traite des systemes, 1846;
Traite des sensations, 1854;
Langue des calculs, 1858.
Condition: (Lat. conditio, agreement, condition) 1. The if-clause in an implicative proposition. 2. Cause (q.v.). 3. Necessary cause (q.v.) as opposed to sufficient cause. -- A.C.B.
Conditional: The sentential connective ⊃. See Logic, formal, § 1.
A sentence of the form A ⊃ B (or a proposition expressed by such a sentence) -- verbally, "if A then B" -- may be called a conditional sentence (or proposition). -- A. C.
Conditional Immortality: A teaching affirming that immortality is a gift of God conferred on believers in Christ, who become the children of God, and denying that the human soul is immortal by nature. -- J.J.R.
Conditional Morality: Any system of morals which has for its basic principle what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative, e.g., a system of morals which reasons that we should act in certain ways because such actions will bring us happiness, assuming that we want happiness. See Hypothetical imperatives. -- W.K.F.
Conditioned Reflex: See Conditioned Response.
Conditioned Response: Response of an organism which, originally produced by its "natural" stimulus, is subsequently produced in the absence of the original stimulus by a substitute or "conditioning" stimulus. Thus if S represents an original stimulus (in Pavlov's experiment, the presentation of food to a dog) and R is the natural response (the salivary flow of the dog) and if S' is a conditioning stimulus associated with S (the ringing of a bell at the time of presenting food to the dog) then R, produced by S' in the absence of S is said to be a conditioned or conditional response. See Behaviorism. -- L.W.
Conditiones sine quibus non: A phrase descriptive of such accompanying conditions without the presence of which it is impossible for a cause to produce an effect, conditions for which there are no substitutes. -- J.J.R.
Conduct: (Lat. conducere, to bring together) (a) Voluntary behavior of any sort, actual or intended. Action for which a person may he held responsible. Subject-matter of ethics which seeks to determine right and wrong action or proper and improper conduct. Deportment.
(b) In psychology. Behavior of a living organism reacting to environmental stimuli. See Behaviorism. -- A.J.B.
Configuration: (Lat. configurare from con, together and figurare, to form) A structural pattern at the physical, physiological or psychological level. The term has been suggested to translate the German Gestalt. See Gestalt Psychology. -- L.W.
Configurationism: A suggested English equivalent for Gestalt Psychology. See Gestalt Psychology.
Confirmation, Confirmable: See Verification 3, 4.
Conflict: The psychological phenomenon of struggle between competing ideas, emotions or tendencies to action. J. F. Herbart (Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 1816) enunciated a doctrine of conflict of ideas in accordance with which ideas opposed to the mind's dominant ideas are submerged below the threshold of consciousness. The doctrine of conflict has been revived by recent psychoanalytic psychology (see Psychoanalysis) to account for the relegation to the subconscious of ideas and tendencies intolerable to the conscious mind. -- L.W.
Confucius: (K'ung Ch'iu, K'ung Chung-ni, K'ung Fu-tzu or Grand Master K'ung, 557-479 B.C.) Was born of a poor and common family in the state of Lu (in present Shangtung), a descendant of the people of Sung. His father died soon after his birth. When he grew up, he was put in charge of a granary, then cattle and sheep, and then public works in his native state. Later he became Grand Secretary of Justice and then Chief Minister. He regained some territory lost to a neighboring state purely by his moral force, executed a minister who created disorder, and brought peace to the land to the extent that things lost on the highways were not stolen.
In 496 B.C., he began 14 years of travelling from state to state, offering his service. He was politely consulted by princes and dukes, but no one would put his moral doctrines into practice. He was even sent away from Ch'i, threatened in Sung, driven out of Sung and Wei, and surrounded between Ch'en and Ts'ai. When in difficulty, he exclaimed, "Heaven has endowed me with a moral destiny. What can Huan Tuei (who threatened him) do to me?" Eventually he retired to Lu to study, teach and write.
He lived in the time when the moral and cultural traditions of Chou were in rapid decline. Attempting to uphold the Chou culture, he taught poetry, history, ceremonies and music to 3,000 pupils, becoming the first Chinese educator to offer education to any who cared to come with or without tuition. He taught literature, human conduct, being one's true self and honesty in social relationships. He wrote the chronicles called Spring and Autumn. His tacit judgments on social and political events were such that "unruly ministers and villainous sons were afraid" to repeat their evil deeds.
He severely disciplined himself and practiced what he taught. He loved poetry, ceremonies and music. He was serious, honest, polite, filially pious towards his mother, stern toward his son, and friendly to his pupils. His most reliable teachings are found in the Lun Yu (Analects), aphorisms recorded by his followers. -- W.T.C.
Confused: (Ger. verworren) In Husserl: Not given distinctly, articulatedly, with respect to implicit components. In Descartes, sensations are confused ideas. -- D.C.
Confusion: (logical) May be due to the ambiguity which is always a possible accompaniment of the use of words or terms with respect to their several meanings. It may also refer to any logical misapprehension which results in a semi-formal or material fallacy. -- C.K.D.
Congruity: A characteristic of merit which implies an intrinsic disproportionality between service rendered and its recompense, to which there is no claim on the ground of justice, but on that of equity alone. Merit of this description is called congruous merit, or meritum de congruo. -- J.J.R.
Conjugation: (Lat. con + jungere, yoke together)
- Grammar: The inflections of a verb.
- Biology: The union of male and female plant or animal.
- Logic: Joining the extreme terms of a syllogism by the middle term; joining dissimilar things by their common characteristics or by analogy.
- Ethics: Conjugations or pairings of the passions: love and hate, desire and avoidance, pleasure and sadness, etc. Synonymous with connexio.
- Metaphysics: In Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., the pairings of opposites in the simple bodies: dry and hot (fire), hot and moist (air), moist and cold (water), cold and dry (earth).
Conjunction: See Logic, formal, § 1.
Connexity: A dyadic relation R is cilled connected if, for every two different members x, y of its field, at least one of xRy, yRx holds.
See Intension. -- T.G.
- The sum of the constitutive notes of the essence of a concept as it is in itself and not as it is for us. This logical property is thus measured by the sum of the notes of the concept, of the higher genera it implies, of the various essential attributes of its nature as such. This term is synonymous with intension and comprehension; yet, the distinctions between them have been the object of controversies.
- J. S. Mill identifies connotation with signification and meaning, and includes in it much less than under comprehension or intension. The connotation of a general term (singular terms except descriptions are non-connotative) is the aggregate of all the other general terms necessarily implied by it is an abstract possibility and apart from exemplification in the actual world. It cannot be determined by denotation because necessity does not always refer to singular facts. Logicians who adopt this view distinguish connotation from comprehension by including in the latter contingent characters which do not enter in the former. Comprehension is thus the intensional reference of the concept, or the reference to universals of both general and singular terms. The determination of the comprehension of a concept is helped by its denotation, considering that reference is made also to singular, contingent, or particular objects exhibiting certain characteristics. In short, the connotation of a concept is its intensional reference determined intensionally; while its comprehension is its intensional reference extensionally determined.
- It may be observed that such a distinction and the view that the connotation of a concept contains only the notes which serve to define it, involves the nominalist principle that a concept may be reduced to what we are actually and explicitely thinking about the several notes we use to define it. Thus the connotation of a concept is much poorer than its actual content. Though the value of the concept seems to be saved by the recognition of its comprehension, it may be argued that the artificial introduction into the comprehension of both necessary and contingent notes, that is of actual and potential characteristics, confuses and perverts the notion of connotation as a logical property of our ideas.
Conscience: (Lat. conscientia, knowledge) Any emotionally-toned experience in which a tendency to act is inhibited by a recognition, socially conditioned, that suffering evil consequences is likely to result from acting on the impulse to act. -- A.J.B.
Conscientalism: The doctrine that contends that the entities we apprehend must be necessarily mental, idealistic; that the real objects are realities of consciousness. -- H.H.
Conscientialism: (Lat. conscientia + al, pertaining to conscience) Originally denoting simple consciousness without ethical bearing, the term conscience came in modern times to mean in contrast to consciousness, viewed either as a purely intellectual function or as a generic term for mind, a function of distinguishing between right and wrong. With the rise of Christianity the term came to be described as an independent source of moral insight, and with the rise of modern philosophy it became an inner faculty, an innate, primeval thing. -- H.H.
Conscious: (Ger. bewusst) In Husserl:
1. Broadest sense: noematically intentional, conscious of something. A process may be "conscious" in this sense even if it is not "conscious"' in the following sense.
2. Narrower sense: "Actual", belonging to the cogito. As living in a process that is "conscious" in this second sense, the ego is also said to be "conscious", "awake", and "conscious of" (awake to) the intentional object of the process. As objects of processes that are conscious (in either of the first two senses), objects are occasionally referred to as "conscious". -- D.C.
Conscious Illusion Theory: The theory that conscious self-illusion, semblance and deliberate make-believe are constant factors in art and art appreciation which free the individual momentarily from the practical and hum-drum and thus enhance and refresh his life. See Konrad Lange, Die bewusste Selbsttäuschung als Kern des aesthetischen Genusses, 1895. -- O.F.K.
Consciousness: (Lat. conscire, to know, to be cognizant of) A designation applied to conscious mind as opposed to a supposedly unconscious or subconscious mind (See Subconscious Mind; Unconscious Mind), and to the whole domain of the physical and non-mental. Consciousness is generally considered an indefinable term or rather a term definable only by direct introspective appeal to conscious experiences. The indefinability of consciousness is expressed by Sir William Hamilton: "Consciousness cannot be defined: we may be ourselves fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot without confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain: consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge." (Lectures on Metaphysics, I, 191.) Ladd's frequently quoted definition of consciousness succeeds only in indicating the circumstances under which it is directly observable: "Whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that is to be conscious."
The analysis of conscioisness proceeds in two principal directions:
- a distinction may be drawn between the act of consciousness and the content of consciousness and the two may even be considered as separable ingredients of consciousness, and
- consciousness is analyzed into its three principal functions: cognition, affection and conation.
Locke, Reid and others restricted consciousness to the reflective apprehension of the mind of its own processes but this usage has been abandoned in favor of the wider definition indicated above and the term introspection is used to designate this special kind of consciousness. See Behaviorism. -- L.W.
(Ger. Bewusstsein) In Husserl:
- Noematic intentionality in general. The intentional constituting of the temporal stream-of-consciousness itself is an instance of "consciousness" in this broad sense, though it is intrinsically prior to the constituted stream.
- The stream of subjective process, or any part of it, as having the characteristic of noematic intentionality.
- The stream of "actual" subjective process, or any part of it; the "ego cogito".
Consciousness, Field of: The sum-total of items embraced within an individual's consciousness at any given moment. The total field consists of (a) the focus, where the concentration of attention is maximal and (b) a margin, periphery or fringe of a diminishing degree of attention which gradually fades to zero.
Consciousness-in-general: (Kant's Bewusstsein Ueberhaupt) Consciousness conceived as purely logical, objective, universal, necessarily valid, in contrast to the eccentricity, particularity, subjectivity, irrationality, and privacy of the psychological consciousness. See Kant. -- W.L.
Consectarium: (Lat. consectarius) Peculiar to the philosophical vocabulary of Cicero, it means an inference, a conclusion. It is the substantive for the phrase "that follows logically". -- H.H.
Consensus gentium: (Lat. agreement of people) A criterion of truth: that which is universal among men carries the weight of truth. -- V.F.
Consent: Agreement or sympathy in feeling or thought. -- V.F.
Consentience: (Lat. con + sentire, to feel) Conscious unity existing at the level of sensation after the subtraction of all conceptual and interpretative unity. Consentience includes both: (a) the intra-sensory unity of a single sensory continuum (e.g. the visual, tactual or auditory) and (b) the inter-sensory unit embracing the diverse sensory continua. Consentience plays an important role in the psychological doctrine of the presentation-continuum of J. Ward and G. F. Stout. An allied concept is the sensory organization of Gestalt Psychology. See Gestalt Psychology. -- L.W.
Consequence: (Ger. Konsequenz) In Husserl: The relation of formal-analytic inclusion which obtains between certain noematic senses.
Consequence: See Valid.
Consequence-logic: (Ger. Konsequenzlogik) Consistency-logic (Logik der Widerspruchslosigkeit); pure apophantic analytics (in a strict sense); a level of pure formal logic in which the only thematic concepts of validity are consequence, inconsequence, and compatibility. Consequence-logic includes the essential content of traditional syllogistics and the disciplines making up formal-mathematical analysis. -- D.C.
Consequent: See Antecedent.
Consilience: Whewell calls "consilience of inductions" what occurs when a hypothesis gives us the "rule and reason" not only of the class of facts contemplated in its construction, but also, unexpectedly, of some class of facts altogether different. -- C.J.D.
(1) A logistic system (q.v.) is consistent if there is no theorem whose negation is a theorem. See Logic, formal, §§ 1, 3, 6; also Proof theory.
Since this definition of consistency is relative to the choice if a particular notation as representing negation, the following definition is sometimes used instead:
(2) A logistic system is consistent if not every formula (not every sentence) is a theorem. In the case of many familiar systems, under the usual choice as to which notation represents negation, the equivalence of this sense of consistency to the previous one is immediate.
Closely related to (2), and applicable to logistic systems containing the pure propositional calculus (see Logic, formal, § 1) or an appropriate part of it, is the notion of consistency in the sense of E. L. Post, according to which a system is consistent if a formula composed of a single propositional variable (say the formula p) is not a theorem. -- A.C.
Consistency proofs: See Proof theory, and Logic formal, §§ 1, 3, 6.
Constant: A constant is a symbol employed as an unambiguous name -- distinguished from a variable (q.v.).
Thus in ordinary numerical algebra and in real number theory, the symbols x, y, z are variables, while 0, 1, 3, -- 1/2, π, e are constants. In such mathematical contexts the term constant is often restricted to unambiguous (non-variable) names of numbeis. But such symbols as +, =, < may also be called constants, as denoting particular functions and relations.
In various mathematical contexts, the term constant will be found applied to letters which should properly be called variables (according to our account here), but which are thought of as constant relatively to other variables appearing. The actual distinction in such cases, as revealed by logistic formalization, either is between free and bound variables, or concerns the order and manner in which the variables are bound by quantifiers, abstraction operators, etc.
In mathematics, the word constant may also be employed to mean simply a number ("Eulers constant"), or, in the physical sciences, to mean a physical quantity ("the gravitational constant," "Planck's constant"). -- A.C.
Constituted: (Ger. konstituiert) In Husserl: Resultant from constitutive synthesis, intentionally synthetized. See Constitution. -- D.C.
Constitution: (Ger. Konstitution) In Husserl: 1. Broader sense: Intentionality in its character as producing, on the one hand, intentionally identical and different objects of consciousness with more or less determinate objective senses and, on the other hand, more or less abiding ego-habitudes (see Habit) is said to be "constitutive"; its products, "constituted" (q.v.). The synthetic structure of the constitutive process, regarded either as a static or as a temporally genetic affair, is called the constitution of the intentional object. 2. Narrower sense: The structure of intentionality in its character as rational, i.e., as productive of valid objects and correct, justified, habits (convictions, etc). See Evidence and Reason. -- D.C.
Constitutive: Of the essential nature; internal; component; inherent. Internal relations are constitutive because they are integral parts or elements of the natures which they relate, whereas external, non-constitutive relations may be altered without change in the essential natures of the related entities.
In Kant: Whatever enters into the structure of actual experience. Thus, the categories are constitutive of knowledge of nature because they are necessary conditions of any experience or knowledge whatever. In contrast, the transcendent Ideas (God, the total Cosmos, and the immortal Soul) are not constitutive of anything, since they do not serve to define or compose real objects, and must be restricted to a regulative and speculative use. See Crit. of Pure Reason, Transc. Dialectic, Bk. II, ch. II, Sec. 8. -- O.F.K.
Construct, Imaginative: (Lat. construere, to build) See Construction, Psychological.
Construction: (Lat. constructio, from construere, to build) The mental process of devising imaginative constructs or the products of such constructional activities. A construction, in contrast to an ordinary hypothesis which professes to represent an actual state of affairs, is largely arbitrary and fictional. -- L.W.
Construction, Psychological: (In contrast to Logical) A framework devised by the common-sense, scientific or philosophical imagination for the integration of diverse empirical data. In contrast to an hypothesis, a construction is not an inference from experience but is an arbitrary scheme which, though presumably not a true picture of the actual state of affairs, satisfies the human imagination and promotes further investigation. Perceptual objects, space and time, physical atoms, electrons, etc. as well as philosophical world-views, have by certain philosophers been called logical constructs. (Cf. B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, Ch. IV.) -- L.W.
Contemplation: (Lat. contemplare, to gaze at tentively) (a) In the mystical sense: Knowledge consisting in the partial or complete identification of the knower with the object of knowledge with the consequent loss of his own individuality. In Hugo of St. Victor (1096-1141), Contemplatio is the third and highest stage of knowledge of which cogitatio and meditatio are the two earlier levels.
(b) In recent epistemology: Contemplation is knowledge of an object in contrast to enjoyment which is the minds' direct self-awareness. (Cf. S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol I, p. 12.) -- L.W.
Content of Consciousness: (Lat. contentus from continere, to contain) The totality of qualitative data present to consciousness in contrast to the act of apprehending such data. See Act Psychology; Datum. -- L.W.
Contextual definition: See incomplete symbol.
Contiguity, Association by: A type of association, recognized by Aristotle, whereby one of two states of mind, which have been coexistent or successive, tends to recall the other. This type of association has sometimes been considered the basic type to which all others are reducible. See Association, laws of. -- L.W.
Continence: In Aristotle's ethics the moral condition of a person able to control his bodily desires by reason. Aristotle distinguishes continence from temperance in that the former implies a conflict between bodily desires and rational choice, whereas in the temperate man there is no such conflict. -- G.R.M.
Contingency: (Lat. contingere, to touch on all sides) In its broadest philosophical usage a state of affairs is said to be contingent if it may and also may not be. A certain event, for example, is contingent if, and only if, it may come to pass and also may not come to pass. For this reason contingency is not quite equivalent in meaning to possibility (q.v.); for while a possible state of affairs is one which may be, it may at the same time be necessary, and hence it would be false to say that it may not be.
In this broad sense contingency appears always to imply a reference to some basis in relation to which a given thing may be said to be contingent, and in view of the two referents most commonly employed it is possible to distinguish two chief types: (1) logical contingency, and (2) physical contingency. The first is contingency with respect to the laws of logic, the second contingency with respect to the laws of nature. A given state of affairs, e.g., the existence of a snowflake with a given shape, is logically contingent in that the laws of logic do not suffice to establish that such a thing does or does not exist. This same state of affairs would not ordinarily be held to be physically contingent, however, for, although the laws of nature alone do not suffice to determine that there is such a snowflake, still it would be held on the general hypothesis of determinism that, given the specific conditions under which the water was frozen, it was determined by physical laws that a snowflake would exist and that it would have this shape and no other.
A narrower, less philosophical employment of "contingent" emphasizes the aspect of dependence of one state of affairs upon another state of affairs in accordance with the laws of nature. In this usage an event A is said to be contingent upon B when the occurrence of A depends upon the occurrence of B, and it is usually implied that the occurrence of B is itself uncertain. -- F.L.W.
In metaphysics: The opposite of determinism, which holds that free activity may enter causally into natural processes. See Boutroux. -- R.T.F.
Leibniz distinguished contingent truths (verites de fait) from necessarv truths of reason (verites de raison), Hume (q.v.) regarded all causal assertions as contingent upon certain habits of the mind. See Cause, Probability.
Continuant: ''That which continues to exist while its states or relations may be changing" (Johnson, Logic I, p. 199). The continuant is in Johnson's metaphysics a revised and somewhat more precise form of the traditional conception of substance; it includes, according to him, that residuum from the traditional conception of substance which is both philosophically justifiable and indispensable.
A "substantive", or "existent" is defined by Johnson as anything manifested in space or time. The substantives divide into two subclasses, continuants and occurrents: those which continue to exist, and those which cease to exist. Every occurrent is referable to one or more continuant.
While continuants are collections or sets of occurrents, every collection of occurrents does not constitute a continuant, but only those possessing a certain type of unity. This unity is not an "unknown somewhat" supporting the observable properties; nor does it imply the permanence of any given property. Rather it is a "causal unity of connection between its temporarally or spatially separated manifestations" (Ibid., III, p. 99).
Johnson recognizes two fundamentally distinct types of continuant: physical and psychical, -- the "occupant" (of space), and the "experient". -- F.L.W.
Continuity: A class is said to be compactly (or densely) ordered by a relation R if it is ordered by R (see Order) and, whenever xRz and x≠z, there is a y, not the same as either x or z, such that xRy and yRz. (Compact order may thus be described by saying that between any two distinct members of the class there is always a third, or by saying that no member has a next following member in the order.)
If a class b ii ordered by a relation R, and a ⊂ b, we say that z is an upper bound of a if, for all x, x∈a implies xRz; and that z is a least upper bound of a if z is an upper bound of a and there is no upper bound y of a, different from z, such that yRz.
A class b ordered by a relation R is said to have continuous order (Dedekindian continuity) if it is compactly ordered by R and every non-empty class a, for which a ⊂ b, and which has an upper bound, has a least upper bound.
An important mathematical example of continuous order is afforded by the real numbers, ordered by the relation not greater than. According to usual geometric postulates, the points on a straight line also have continuous order, and, indeed, have the same order type as the real numbers.
The term continuity is also employed in mathematics in connection with functions of various kinds. We shall state the definition for the case of a monadic function f for which the range of the independent variable and the range of the dependent variable both consist of real numbers (see the article Function).
Let us use R for the relation not greater than among real numbers. A neighborhood of a real number c is determined by two real numbers m and n -- both different from c and such that mRc and cRn -- and is the class of real numbers x, other than m and n, such that mRx and xRn. The function f is said to be continuous at the real number c if the three following conditions are satisfied:
A function may be called continuous if it is continuous at every real number, or at every real number in a certain set determined by the context. -- A.C.
- c belongs to the range of the independent variable;
- in every neighborhood of c there are numbers other than c belonging to the range of the independent variable;
- corresponding to every neighborhood b of f(c) there is a neighborhood a of c such that, for every real number x belonging to the range of the independent variable, x∈a implies f(x) ∈ b.
E. V. Huntington, The Continuum, Cambridge, Mass., 1917.
Continuum, Sensory: (Lat. continuere, to hold together) The unity of a single sensory field, (visual, tactual, auditory, etc.) or of the total sensory experience of an individual. (Cf. G. F. Stout, Mind and Matter, Bk. IV, Ch. III.) See Consentience. -- L.W.
Contraction of a genus or species: (in Scholasticism) Is the determination or application of a genus to some species, or of a species to some individual. -- H.G.
Contradictio in adjecto: A logical inconsistency between a noun and its modifying adjective. A favorite example is the phrase "round square." -- A.C.
Contradiction, law of, is given by traditional logicians as "A is B and A is not B cannot both be true." It is usually taken to be the theorem of the propositional calculus, ∼[p∼p]. In use, however, the name often seems to refer to the syntactical principle or precept which may be formulated as follows: A logical discipline containing (an applied) propositional calculus, or a set of hypotheses or postulates to be added to such a discipline, shall not lead to two theorems or consequences of the forms A and ∼A. The law is explicitly stated in a syntactical form, e.g. by Ledger Wood in his The Analysis of Knowledge (1940). -- A.C.
Contrapletes: The two opposites or poles of a relationship which while they stand over against each other at the same time fulfil one another. Polarity, Dyadism, Harmony of opposites. -- R.T.F.
Contraposition: The recommended use of this word is that according to which the contrapositive of
S(s) ⊃x P(x) is ∼P(x) ⊃x ∼S(x).
This is, however, not quite strictly in accordance with traditional terminology; see Logic, formal, § 4. -- A.C.
Contraries: (a) Logic: (i) Terms: According to Aristotle, Categ. 1lb-18, contrariety is one of the four kinds of opposition between concepts: contradictory, privative, contrary, relative. Those terms are contrary "which, in the same genus, are separated by the greatest possible difference" ib. 6a-17. Thus pairs of contraries belong to the same genus, or contrary sub-genera, or are themselves sub-genera, ib. 14a-18.
Strictly speaking, there are no contraries in the category of substance, since substances are the subject of contraries, nor in the category of quantity, since these are relative. Two contrary states cannot obtain in one and the same individual at the same time and in the same respect; cf. contradiction. Some contraries, e.g. good-bad, black-white, have intermediaries; while others do not, e.g. odd-even. (ii) Propositions: Two universal propositions, having opposite quality (i.e. one affirmative and one negative) are contrary; De Interpretattone, 17b-4, See Logic, formal § 4, 8.
(b) Physics: In Greek philosophy, the ultimate principles of nature and change were contraries: e.g. love-strife; motion-rest; potentiality-actuality. All motion is between contraries. See Heraclitus, Empedodes, Aristotle. -- L.M.H.
Contrast: In aesthetics: the term may refer either to the presence in the object contemplated of contrasting elements (colors, sounds, characters, etc.), or to the principle that the presence of such contrasting elements is a common feature of beautiful objects which, within limits, enhances their beauty. -- W.K.F.
Contrast: (contrastare, to stand opposed to) Relation, complementary to resemblance, obtaining between qualities. In a continuous qualitative series, the contrast increases as the resemblance diminishes. -- L.W.
Contrast, Association by: (Lat. contrastare, to stand opposed to) Association in accordance with the principle proposed by Aristotle but rejected by Hartley, J. S. Mill and other associationists that contrasting qualities tend to reinstate one another in consciousness. See Association, Laws of. -- L.W.
Convention: (Lat. conveniens, suitable) Any proposition whose truth is determined not by fact but by social agreement or usage. In Democritus, "Sweet is sweet, bitter is bitter, color is color by convention (nomoi)." (Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker B. 125) The Sophists (q.v.) regarded all laws and ethical principles as conventions. -- A.C.B.
Conventionalism: Any doctrine according to which a priori truth, or the truth of propositions of logic, or the truth of propositions (or of sentences) demonstrable by purely logical means, is a matter of linguistic or postulational convention (and thus not absolute in character). H. Poincare (q.v.) regarded the choice of axioms as conventional (cf. Science et hypothese, p. 67). -- A.C.
Converse: See logic, formal, §§ 4, 8.
Coordinates: (from Lat. co + ordinare, to regulate) Logical: Items of the same order and rank in a scheme of classification. Also, class characteristics serving as indices of order or distinction among the elements of a series or assemblage. -- O.F.W.
In mathematics, any system of designating points by means of ordered sets of n numbers may be called an n-dimensional coordinate system, and the n numbers so associated with any point are then called its coordinates. Coordinates may also be used in like fashion for various other things besides points. -- A.C.
Copula: The traditional analysis of a proposition into subject and predicate involves a third part, the copula (is, are, is not, are not), binding the subject and predicate together into an assertion either of affirmation or of denial. It is now, however, commonly held that several wholly different meanings of the verb to be should be distinguished in this connection, including at least the following: predication of a monadic propositional function of its argument (the sun is hot, 7 is a prime number, mankind is numerous); formal implication (gold is heavy, a horse is a quadruped, mankind is sinful); identity (China is Cathay, that is the sun, I am the State); formal equivalence (lightning is an electric discharge between parts of a cloud and the earth). -- A.C.
Corollary: (Lat. corollarium, corollary) An immediate consequence of a theorem (q.v.). -- A.C.B.
Corporative State: A type of state in which political and economic life is regulated through the medium of occupational associations. "Corporations" in Italy are the central liaison organs through which the employers and the workers organizations are brought together. -- W.E.
Corrective Justice: Justice as exhibited in the rectification of wrongs committed by membeis of a community in their transactions with each other; distinguished from distributive justice (q.v.) (Aristotle's Ethics). -- G.R.M.
Correlation, Sensory: (Lat. co + relatus, related) Correspondences between data of different senses, especially visual and tactual, by which the apprehension of perceptual objects is effected. Intersensory correlations depend upon the co-appearance rather than the comparison of data of different senses. -- L.W.
Correspondence: Suppose there is some determinate relation R between members a of a class A and members b of a class B. Consider a subclass B' of B, consisting of all the b's (in B) which are related by R to each member of some one sub-class A' of A. Then the members of B' may be said to correspond to the members of A'. If a class D corresponds to C as so defined (by means of the relation R and the chss C also corresponds to D (by means of the common relation R), the two classes may be said to correspond to each other.
If the relation R is such that when C and D so correspond, C must always have exactly k members and D exactly 1 member, the correspondence is termed a k-1 correspondence. By an obvious extension it is customary to speak also of many-one, one-many, and many-many correspondences.
Thus the heads and tails of coins are said to be in one-one correspondence; the square roots of positive integers in two-one correspondence with the positive integers. See One-one. -- M.B.
Correspondence Theory of Truth: The theory that the truth of propositions is determined by the existence of some one-one correspondence between the terms of the propsition and the elements of some fact. Supporters of this view differ as to the nature of the determinate relation by which the alleged correspondence is constituted.
Contrasted with the Coherence Theory of Truth. Cf. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 1941, for defence, and F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, for criticisms of the theory. -- M.B.
In more general epistemology: Theory of knowledge which maintains that truth attaches to a proposition by virtue of its capacity to represent or portray fact. -- A.C.B.
Cosmogony: (Gr. cosmos a. gonia, producing or creating the world) Is a pictorial treatment of the way in which the world or the universe came into being. In contrast to the most primitive civilizations, the great ethnic stocks of mankind have originated cosmogonies. The basal principles common to all mythological cosmogonies are: They deduce the creation of the world either from the fewest possible elements or from a single material principle such as water, ocean, earth, air, mud of river, slime, two halves of an egg, body of a giant, or from a spiritual or abstract principle such as an anthropomorphic god, deities, chaos, time, night, That. The genesis being a slow development characterized by an orderly sequence of periods, the creation process is variously divided into definite periods of specified units of years. The process of creation being self-originating, in its final stages the genealogy and origin of deities is a large admixture. There is no apparent ethical import attached to the cosmogonies. Few of them assume the idea of design as underlying the creation. They hold that the world had a beginning in time. The process of creation from less perfect to more perfect, from an original chaos to the final creation of man, the predominance of water in the original condition of the earth, the evolution of a spiritual or luminous principle reacting on the primeval water and the emphasis upon the godlike origin of man or his immediate relation to the deity, are all permeating threads of cosmogonic myths. In dualistic religions the world originates as a result of a hostile conflict of two opposing principles, or as a result of the parallel development of two opposing forces. The conception of creation ex nihilo was almost universally unknown in antiquity. -- H.H.
Cosmological argument: Attempted to prove that God's existence follows from the fact that things exist. It aims to prove that there is a God by showing that causes presuppose causes, no matter how far back we go. The series of causes of causes can only come to an end in a cause which does not depend upon something else for its existence. Being the most basic proof of God's existence as it starts with the existence of anything, it is the favorite of most philosophers and theologians. -- H.H.
Cosmology: A branch of philosophy which treats of the origin and structure of the universe. It is to be contrasted with ontology or metaphysics, the study of the most general features of reality, natural and supernatural, and with the philosophy of nature, which investigates the basic laws, processes and divisions of the objects in nature. It is perhaps impossible to draw or maintain a sharp distinction between these different subjects, and treatises which profess to deal with one of them usually contain considerable material on the others.
Encyclopedia, section 35), are the contingency, necessity, eternity, limitations and formal laws of the world, the freedom of man and the origin of evil. Most philosophers would add to the foregoing the question of the nature and interrelationship of space and time, and would perhaps exclude the question of the nature of freedom and the origin of evil as outside the province of cosmology. The method of investigation has usually been to accept the principles of science or the results of metaphysics and develop the consequences. The test of a cosmology most often used is perhaps that of exhibiting the degree of accordance it has with respect to both empirical fact and metaphysical truth. The value of a cosmology seems to consist primarily in its capacity to provide an ultimate frame for occurrences in nature, and to offer a demonstration of where the limits of the spatio-temporal world are, and how they might be transcended.
Most of the basic problems and theories of cosmology seem to have been discussed by the pre-Socratic philosophers. Their views are modified and expanded in the Timaeus of Plato, and rehearsed and systematized in Aristotle's Physics. Despite multiple divergencies, all these Greek philosophers seem to be largely agreed that the universe is limited in space, has neither a beginning nor end in time, is dominated by a set of unalterable laws, and has a definite and recurring rhythm. The cosmology of the Middle Ages diverges from the Greek primarily through the introduction of the concepts of divine creation and annihilation, miracle and providence. In consonance with the tendencies of the new science, the cosmologies of Descartes, Leibniz and Newton bring the medieval views into closer harmony with those of the Greeks. The problems of cosmology were held to be intrinsically insoluble by Kant. After Kant there was a tendency to merge the issues of cosmology with those of metaphysics. The post-Kantians attempted to deal with both in terms of more basic principles and a more flexible dialectic, their opponents rejected both as without significance or value. The most radical modern cosmology is that of Peirce with its three cosmic principles of chance, law and continuity; the most recent is that of Whitehead, which finds its main inspiration in Plato's Timaeus.
- Hermann Diels,
- Doxographi Graeci;
- Le Systeme du Monde;
- Aristotle's Criticisms of His Predecessors;
- Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.
Cosmopolis: (Cosmopolitan) A type of universalism, derived first from the Cynic doctrine of the cosmopolis which proclaimed that the family and the city were artificial and that the wise man was the cosmopolitan. Taught also by the Cyrenaics. Later with the Stoics it came to mean a franchise of world citizenship with no differences as to class and race, a doctrine not always followed by the Roman Stoics. See Cynics, Cyrenaics, Stoicism. -- E.H.
Cosmos: (Gr. kosmos -- in order, duly; hence, good behavior, government, mode or fashion, ornament, dress (cf. cosmetic); a ruler; the world or universe as perfectly arranged and ordered; cf. providence.)
The early Greek notion of the universe as ordered by destiny or fate was gradually refined until the time of Plato and Aristotle who conceived the world as ordered by an intelligent principle (nous) of divine justice or harmony; Plato, Philebus, 30: ". . . there is in the universe a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges . . ."; and Aristotle, Physics, 252a-12: "nature is everywhere the cause of order". This cosmic view was an essential element of the Stoic metaphysics, and was later incorporated into medieval philosophy and theology as the divine governance or ordering of creation, i.e. providence.
This "widespread instinctive conviction" in the order of nature, without its theological implications, became the basis and primary article of faith of modern natural science, whose aim is to express this rationality of nature as far as possible by the laws of natural science. Cf. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 5ff). Opposed to chaos, disorder, absence of law, irrationality. -- L-M.H.
Cosmothetic Idealism: A name given by Hamilton to that form of dualism (held e.g. by Descartes and Locke) which affirms (a) that there are both minds and material objects, and (b) that a mind can have only a mediate or representative perception of material objects. -- W.K.F.
Counterpoint: Art of combining with a given melody, one or more simultaneous and independent melodies. -- L.V.
Counting: (Lat. computare, to reckon, compute) The process of determining the number of a class of objects by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the class in question and a portion of the class of natural numbers beginning with 1 and ordered in the usual way. -- A.C.B.
Courage: In ethical discussions courage is usually regarded as a virtue (it is one of the traditional cardinal virtues), and either enjoined as a duty or praised as an excellence. When thus regarded as a virtue, courage is generally said to be a disposition, not merely instinctive, to exhibit a certain firmness, stopping short of rashness, in the face of danger, threat, temptation, pain, public opinion, etc. (thus including "moral" as well as physical courage, and passive courage or "fortitude" as well as active courage); which disposition, if it is to be a virtue, must, it is thought, be exhibited in the course of what the bearer knows or believes to be his duty, or at least in the support of some cause to which one is seriously committed or which is generally regarded as worthwhile. -- W.K.F.
Cournot, Antoine Augustin: (1801-1877) French mathematician, economist, and philosopher, is best known for his interest in probability. His philosophical writings, long neglected, reflect disagreement both with the positivism of his own day and with the earlier French rationalism. His place between the two is manifest in his doctrine that order and contingency, continuity and discontinuity, are equally real. This metaphysical position led him to conclude that man, though he cannot attain certain truth of nature, can by increasing the probable truth of his statements approach this truth. Cournot's mathematical investigations into probability and his mathematical treatment of economics thus harmonize with his metaphysics and epistemology. Main works:
- Exposition de la theorie des chances et des probabdites, 1843;
- Essai sur les fondements de la connaissance, 2 vols. 1851;
- Consid. sur les marches des idees, 1872;
- Materialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalism, 1875;
- Traite de l'Enchainement des idees fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire, 1881.
Cousin, Victor: (1792-1867) Was among those principally responsible for producing the shift in French philosophy away from sensationalism in the direction of "spiritualism"; in his own thinking, Cousin was first influenced by Locke and Condillac, and later turned to idealism under the influence of Maine de Biran and Schelling. His most characteristic philosophical insights are contained in Fragments Philosophiques (1826), in which he advocated as the basis of metaphysics a careful observation and analysis of the facts of the conscious life. He lectured at the Sorbonne from 1815 until 1820 when he was suspended for political reasons, but he was reinstated in 1827 and continued to lecture there until 1832. He exercised a great influence on his philosophical contemporaries and founded the spiritualistic or eclectic school in French Philosophy. The members of his school devoted themselves largely to historical studies for which Cousin had provided the example in his Introduction a l'Histoire General de la Philosophie, 7th ed. 1872. -- L.W.
CratyIus of Athens: A Heraclitean and first teacher of Plato. Carried the doctrine of irreconcilability of opposites so far that he renounced the use of spoken language. Plato's dialogue of same name criticized the Heraclitean theory of language. -- E.H.
Creation: (in Scholasticism) Is the production of a thing from nothing either of itself or of a subject which could sustain the finished product. In other words, both the material as well as formal causes are produced ex nihilo, or, as in the case of certain doctrines on the soul, the formal cause is produced ex nihilo without any intrinsic dependence on the material cause of the total entity, man; which material cause in this case would be the body. -- H.G.
Creative Theory of Perception: The creative theory, in opposition to the selective theory, asserts that the data of sense are created or constituted by the act of perception and do not exist except at the time and under the conditions of actual perception, (cf. C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature, pp. 200 ff.) See Selective Theory of Perception. The theories of perception of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Berkeley are historical examples of creative theories, Russell (Problems of Philosophy, Ch. II and III) and the majority of the American critical realists defend creative theories. -- L.W.
Credo quia absurdum est: Literally, I believe because it is absurd. Although these particular words are often wrongly attributed to Tertullian (born middle of the 2nd century) they nevertheless convey the thought of this Latin church father who maintained the rule of faith on the basis of one's trust in the commands and authority of Christ rather than upon the compulsion of reason or truth. To believe in the absurd, in other words, is to reveal a greater faith than to believe in the reasonable. -- V.F.
Credo ut intelligam: Literally, I believe in order that I may understand. A principle which affirms that after an act of faith a philosophy begins, held by such thinkers as Augustine, Anselm, Duns Scotus and many others. -- V.F.
Creighton, James Edwin: (1861-1924) Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Cornell University. He was one of the founders and a president of the American Philosophical Association, American editor of Kant-Studien and editor of The Philosophical Review. He was greatly influenced by Bosanquet. His Introductory Logic had long been a standard text. His basic ideas as expressed in articles published at various times were posthumously published in a volume entitled Studies in Speculative Philosophy, a term expressive of his intellectualistic form of objective idealism. -- L.E.D.
Crescas, Don Hasdai: (1340-1410) Jewish philosopher and theologian. He was the first European thinker to criticize Aristotelian cosmology and establish the probability of the existence of an infinite magnitude and of infinite space, thus paving the way for the modern conception of the universe. He also took exception to the entire trend of the philosophy of Maimonides, namely its extreme rationalism, and endeavored to inject the emotional element into religious contemplation, and make love an attribute of God and the source of His creative activity. He also expressed original views on the problems of freedom and creation. He undoubtedly exerted influence on Spinoza who quotes him by name in the formulation of some of his theories. See Jewish Philosophy. Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, 1929. -- M.W.
Criterion: Broadly speaking, any ground, basis, or means of judging anything as to its quality. Since validity, truth, goodness, justice, virtue, and beauty are some of the most fundamental qualities for philosophic enquiry, criteria for these are embodied in almost all philosophies and are either assumed or derived. In logic, consistency is a generally recognized criterion; in epistemology, evidence of the senses, comparison, or reason may be regarded as criteria; in metaphysical speculation have been suggested. as criteria for truth, among others, correspondence, representation, practicability, and coherence; in religion, evidences of faith, revelation or miracle; in ethics, pleasure, desirability, utility, self-determination of the will, duty, conscience, happiness, are among common criteria, while in aesthetics there have been cited interest, satisfaction, enjoyment, utility, harmony.
Criterion ethical: In ethics the main problem is often said to be the finding of a criterion of virtue, or of rightness, or of goodness, depending on which of these concepts is taken as basic; and the quest for a moral standard, or for an ethical first principle, or for a summum bonum may generally be construed as a quest for such a criterion (e.g., Kant's first form of the categorical imperative may be interpreted as a criterion of rightness). Hence to find a criterion of, say, goodness is to find a characteristic whose presence, absence, or degree may be taken as a mark of the presence, absence, or degree of goodness. Thus hedonists hold pleasantness to be such a characteristic. Often, finding a criterion of a characteristic is taken as equivalent to finding a definition of that characteristic. Strictly, this is not the case, for a characteristic may serve as a criterion of another with which it is not identical. Pleasantness might be a criterion of goodness without being identical with it, if only the above relation held between pleasantness and goodness. However, the discovery of a definition of a characteristic does normally furnish a criterion of that characteristic. Vide the definition of a right act as an act conducive to the greatest happiness.
To some minds the ethical quest results in a failure to find and in a denial of the existence of any single moral criterion -- this is the position of such intuitionists as G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross and of some relativists. -- W.K.F.
Critical Idealism: Kant's designation for his theory of knowledge. See Idealism, Kant. -- W.L.
Critical Monism: (a) In ontology: The view of reality which holds that it is one in number but that the unity embraces real multiplicity. Harald Höffding (1843-1931) gave the title of critical monism to the theory that reality, like conscious experience, is one although there are many items within that experience. Another example: both the One and the Many exist and in the closest relation without either merging or cancelling the other. The One is immanent in the Many although transcendent; the Many are immanent in the One although in a sense beyond it.
(b) In epistemology: A variety of ''critical realism." The view which holds that in the knowledge-relation the subject or percipient is at one (monism) with the object or the thing objectively existent and perceived, and that the subject contributes qualities not inherent in the object (hence, critical) and the object contains qualities not perceived. -- V.F.
Critical Realism: A theory of knowledge which affirms an objective world independent of one's perception or conception of it (hence realistic) but critical in the sense of acknowledging the difficulties in affirming that all in the knowing relation is objective. The theory must be distinguished further as follows:
(a) In general, critical realism is distinguished from naive or uncritical realism.
(b) It may refer to any number of realists, such as those of the Scottish School, critical monism, etc. (See under proper headings.)
(c) A special school called "Critical Realists" arose as a reactionary movement against the alleged extravagant views of another school of realists called the "New Realists" (q.v.). According to the "Critical Realists" the objective world, existing independently of the subject, is separated in the knowledge-relation by media or vehicles or essences. These intermediaries are not objects but conveyances of knowledge. The mind knows the objective world not directly (epistemological monism) but by means of a vehicle through which we perceive and think (epistemological dualism). For some, this vehicle is an immediate mental essence referring to existences, for some a datum, for some a subsistent realm mediating knowledge, and for one there is not so much a vehicle as there is a peculiar transcendental giasping of objects in cognition. In 1920 Essays in Critical Realism was published as the manifesto, the platform of this school. Its collaborators were D. Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K. Rogers, G. Santayana, R. W. Sellars, and C A. Strong. -- V.F.
Criticism: (Kant.) An investigation of the nature and limits of reason and knowledge, conducted in a manner to avoid both dogmatism and skepticism. The term is generally used to designate Kant's thought after 1770. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Critique of Pure Reason: (Ger. Kritik der reinen Vernunft) The first of three Critiques written by Immanuel Kant (1781) in which he undertook a critical examination of pure reason, its nature and limits, with a view to exhibiting a criterion for judging the validity of propositions of metaphysics. The first Critique was followed by the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of Judgment (1790). See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Croce, Benedetto: Born it Percasseroli (Abruzzi) Italy, February 25, 1866. Senator, Minister of Public Education. Lives in Naples. Has influenced every branch of Italian culture.
Considers all human experience an historical experience, philosophy being the methodology of history.
His aesthetics defines art as an expression of sentiment, as a language. His logic emphasizes the distinction of categories, reducing opposition to a derivative of distinction. According to his ethics, economics is an autonomous and absolute moment of spirit. His theory of history regards all history as contemporaneous. His philosophy is one of the greatest attempts at elaboration of pure concepts entirely appropriate to historical experience.
- B. Croce,
- Estetica, 1902;
- Logica, 1905-1909;
- Filosofia della prattica (1909) ;
- Teoria e storia della storiografia, 1917;
- What is Living and What is Dead of Hegel (tr. 1915);
- Historical Materialism and Econ. of K. Marx (tr. 1922);
- History as the Story of Liberty (tr. 1941).
Cross-Roads Hypothesis: Theory of the relation between the mental and the physical which holds that an identical item (e.g. a red color patch) may in one relational context be considered physical and in another context be mental. The neutral entity may accordingly be represented as the point of intersection of the physical and mental cross-roads. Cf. W. James, Essays m Radical Empiricism, Chaps. I, II and VIII and The Meaning of Truth, pp. 46-50. See Neutral Monism. -- L.W.
Cudworth, Ralph: (1617-1688) Was the leading Cambridge Platonist (q.v.). His writings were devoted to a refutation of Hobbesean materialism which he characterized as atheistic. He accepted a rationalism of the kind advanced by Descartes. He found clear and distinct fundamental notions or categories reflecting universal reason, God's mind, the nature and essence of things and the moral laws, which he held to be as binding on God as the axioms of mathematics. His two most important works are The True Intellectual System of the Universe, and A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. -- L.E.D.
Culture: (Lat. cultura, from colo, cultivate) The intrinsic value of society. Syn. with civilization. Employed by Spengler to define a civilization in its creative growth-period. The means, i.e. the tools, customs and institutions, of social groups; or the employment of such means. In psychology, the enlightenment or education of the individual. Some distinguish culture from civilization (q.v.) the former being the effect on personal development and expression (art, science, religion) of the institutions, materials and social organization identified with the latter. -- J.K.F.
Cusa. Nicholas of: (1401-1464) Born in Cusa (family name: Krebs), educated in the mystical school of Deventer, and at the Universities of Heidelberg, Padua and Cologne. He became a Cardinal in 1448, Bishop of Brixen in 1450, and died at Todi. He was interested in mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and ecclesiastical policy. His thought is Neo-Platonic and mystical, he is critical of Aristotelian Scholasticism. His theories of "learned ignorance" and the "concordance of contraries" have been historically influential. Chief works: De concordantia Catholica, De docta ignorantia, De conjecturis (Opera, Paris, 1514). E. Van Steenberghe, Le Card. N. de Cuse,l'action, la pensee (Paris, 1920). -- V.J.B.
- Behavior patterns participated in by persons as members of a group, contrasted with personal or random group behavior patterns, including folkways, conventions, mores, institutions.
Behavior patterns long established in a group as contrasted with newly enacted laws or newly acquired conduct practices.
Group behavior patterns which are un-enforced (folkways) or moderately enforced (conventions) or morally enforced (mores) as contrasted with institutions which are legally enforced.
Cynics: A school of Greek Philosophy, named after the gymnasium Cynosarges, founded by Antisthenes of Athens, friend of Socrates. Man's true happiness, the Cynics taught, lies in right and intelligent living, and this constitutes for them also the concept of the virtuous life. For the Cynics, this right and virtuous life consists in a course of conduct which is as much as possible independent of all events and factors external to man. This independence can be achieved through mastery over one's desires and wants. The Cynics attempted to free man from bondage to human custom, convention and institution by reducing man's desires and appetites to such only as are indispensable to life and by renouncing those whicn are imposed by civilization. In extreme cases, such as that of Diogenes, this philosophy expressed itself in a desire to live the natural life in the midst of the civilized Greek community. -- M.F.
Cyrenaics: A school of Greek Philosophy founded by Aristippus of Cyrene. The teachings of this school are known as the philosophy of Hedonism, or the doctrine of enjoyment for its own sake. For the Cyrenaics the virtuous or the good life is that which yields the greatest amount of contentment or pleasure derived from the satisfaction of desire. Education and intelligence are necessary so as to guide one to proper enjoyment, that is to such satisfaction of desire as yields most pleasure and is least likely to cause one pain. It also aids one in being master of pleasure and not its slave. -- M.F.