Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1942.
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E: (C.) Evil, interpreted by the Confucians as "too much or too little," that is, deviation from the Mean (chung yung). -- W.T.C.
Eckhart, Meister: (1260-1327) Was born in Hochheim (Gotha), may have studied with St. Albert in Cologne, received his doctorate at Paris in 1302. He taught theology at various times, devoted much time to preaching in the vernacular, and filled various administrative posts in the Dominican Order. Mystical, difficult in terminology, his thought appears to contain elements of Aristotelianism, Augustinism, Neoplatonism and Avicennism. Accused of Pantheism and other theological errors, he was the subject of a famous trial in 1326; he abjured publicly any possible religious errors which he may have made. Chief works Opus Tripartitum, Quaestiones Parisienses, Deutsche Predigten. (Pfeiffer, F., Deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrh., Bd. II, Leipzig, 1857; tr. Evans, London, 1924.) B. J. Muller-Thym, University of Being in M. Eckhart (N. Y., 1939). -- V.J.B.
Eclecticism: The principle, tendency, or practice of combining, or drawing upon, various philosophical or theological doctrines. In its passive form, it is found in many thinkers of no great originality. In its more active form, as a deliberate attempt to create unity among discordant schools of philosophy, eclecticism was practised by the Alexandrien School (q.v.), where the Oriental and Occidental thought mingled, and, more recently, by V. Cousin (q.V.). -- R.B.W.
Economic determinism: The theory that the economic base of society determines other social doctrines often designated as economic determinism on the ground that they are too narrow and assert only a one-way causal influence (from economic base to other institutions), whereas causal influence, they hold, proceeds both ways. They refer to their own theory as historical materialism or the materialist conception of history. See Marxism. -- J.M.S.
Economics: (Lat. aeconomicus, domestic economy, from oikos, house, + nomos, law) That branch of social science which is concerned with the exchange of goods. Employed by Xenophon, Aristotle and Cicero to describe treatises on the proper conduct of the household. In more recent times, combined with politics as political economy, the study of the laws and system of society. Now, more specially, the study of the production, distribution and consumption of material wealth and skills. -- J.K.F.
Economy: An aspect of the scientific methodology of Ernst Mach (Die Analyse der Empfindungen, 5th ed., Jena, 1906); science and philosophy utilize ideas and laws which are not reproductive of sense data as such, but are simplified expressions of the functional relations discovered in the manifold of sense perceptions. -- V.J.B.
Economy, principle of: Is the modern name for the logical rule known also as Occam's Razor. Its original formula was: Entia non sunt multilicanda praeter necessitatem, i.e. of two or more explanations, which are of equal value otherwise, the one which uses the fewest principles, or suppositions, is true, or at least scientifically preferable. -- V.J.B.
Ecpyrosis: (Gr. ekpyrosia) Conflagration; in Stoic doctrine the periodic resolution of all things into fire. -- G.R.M.
Ecstasy: (Gr. ekstasis, displacement, a trance) The enraptured condition of the mystical spirit which has reached the climax of its intuitive and affective experience. Of brief duration, it is physiologically negative (resembling trance) but, according to some mystics, psychologically very rich. Usually said to be concomitant with a spiritual union of the soul with higher reality. See Mysticism, Ptotinism. -- V.J.B.
Ecstasy: (aesthetics) The contemplation of absolute beauty purified of any sensory experience. (Plotinus.) -- L.V.

1. In logic, a term proposed by E. E. Constance Jones as a synonym or substitute for the more usual immediate inference (see Logic, formal, § 4). -- A.C.

2. In cosmology, the production of the substantial form out of the potentiality of matter, according to the hylomorphic system. -- T.G.

Edwards, Jonathan: (1703-1758) American theologian. He is looked upon by many as one of the first theologians that the New World has produced. Despite the formalistic nature of his system, there is a noteworthy aesthetic foundation in his emphasis on "divine and supernatural light" as the basis for illumination and the searchlight to an exposition of such topics as freedom and original sin. Despite the aura of tradition about his pastorates at Northampton and Stockbridge, his missionary services among the Indians and his short lived presidency of Princeton University, then the College of New Jersey, he remains significant in the fields of theology, metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics. See Life and Works of Jonathan Edwards, 10 vol. (1830) ed. S. E. Dvsight. -- L.E.D.
Effect: (in Scholasticism) Formal: is the effect of a formal cause a primary and intrinsic formal effect is a concrete composite, or a designation resulting from form united to an apt subject. (i.e. to a subject capable of receiving that form) e.g. the formal primary and intrinsic effect of heat by which water is made warm is the warm water itself, so also a holy man is the formal effect of grace united to man. But that which is called secondary and extrinsic is any effect whether positive or negative, which so results, from the union of form with its subject that it may be adequately distinguished from or remain extrinsic to the form, e.g. the driving out of cold from the water. -- H.G.
Effectiveness: See Logistic system, and Logic, formal, § 1.
Effluvium: See Effluxes, Theory of.
Effluxes, Theory of: (Lat. efflux, from effluere, to flow out) Theory of early Greek thinkers that perception is mediated by effluvia or simulacra projected by physical objects and impinging upon the organs of sense. Thus Empedocles developed the theory of effluxes in conjunction with the principle that "like perceives only like" (similia similibus percipiuntur); an element in the external world can only be perceived by the same element in the body. (See Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr. I, 8, 324b26; Theophrastus, De Sens. 7.) Democritus' theory of images is a form of the theory of effluxes. -- L.W.
Ego-centric Predicament: (Lat. ego, self, Gr. kentrikon, center) The epistemological predicament of a knowing mind which, confined to the circle of its own ideas, finds it difficult, if not impossible, to escape to a knowledge of an external world (cf. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 129-30). Descartes is largely responsible for having confronted modern philosophy with the ego-centric predicament. See Cogito Argument, The. -- L.W.
Ego, Empirical: (Lat. ego, self) The individual self, conceived as a series of conscious acts and contents which the mind is capable of cognizing by direct introspection. See Bundle Theory of Self. -- L.W.
Ego, Pure: The self conceived as a non-empirical principle, ordinarily inaccessible to direct introspection, but inferred from introspective evidence. See Ego, empirical. The principal theories of the pure ego are: (a) the soul theory which regards the pure ego as a permanent, spiritual substance underlying the fleeting succession of conscious experience, and (b) the transcendental theory of Kant which considers the self an inscrutable subject presupposed by the unity of empirical self-consciousness. -- L.W.
Ego, Transcendental: See Ego, Pure. -- L.W.
Egoism, Ethical: The view that each individual should seek as an end only his own welfare. This principle is sometimes advanced as a separate intuition, sometimes on the ground that an individual's own welfare is the only thing that is ultimately valuable (for him). -- C.A.B
Egoism, Psychological: The doctrine that the determining, though perhaps concealed, motive of every voluntary action is a desire for one's own welfare. Often combined with Psychological Hedonism. -- C.A.B.
Egological: (Ger. egologisch) In Husserl; Of or pertaining to the ego or to egology. Egological reduction phenomenological reduction as involving epoche with respect to one's own explicit and implicit positing of concrete egos other than one's own and therefore with respect to one's positing of one's own ego as one among others. See Phenomenology. -- B.C.
Ehrenfels, Maria Christian Julius Leopold Karl, Freiherr von: (1859-1932) As one of the leaders of the "Brentano School", he affirmed that the fundamental factor in valuation was desire. His principal interest was to trace the way in which desires and motives generate values. He described for the most part the development, the conflict, the hierarchy, and the obsolescence of values. Having a major influence upon the analytic approach to value theory, his outlook was relativistic and evolutionary. Main works: Uber Gestaltqualitäten (1890), System der Werttheorie (1897); Sexualethik (1907). -- H.H.
Eidetic: (Ger. eidetisch) In Husserl: Of or pertaining to an eidos or to eide. Eidetic existent: anything falling as an example within the ideal extension of a valid eidos; e.g., an ideally or purely possible individual. (Purely) eidetic judgments: judgments that do not posit individual existence, even though they are about something individual. Eidetic necessity an actual state of affairs, so far as it is a singularization of an eidetic universality. E.g., This color has (this) brightness, so far as that is a singularization of All eidetically possible examples of color have brightness. Eidetic possibility see eidos. Eidetic reduction: see Phenomenology. -- D.C.
Eidetic Imagery: Expression used by the German psychologist E. R. Jaensch, (Ueber den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter, 1923) to designate images usually visual which are almost photographic in their fidelity. Eidetic imagery differs from hallucination in that the former are usually recognized by the subject to be "subjective." -- L.W.
Eidola: (Gr. eidola) Images; insubstantial forms, phantoms. Democritus and Epicurus use the term to denote the films, or groups of very fine particles, believed to be thrown off by bodies and to convey impressions to the eye. -- G.R.M.
Einfühlung: (and Einsfühlung, in Max Scheler) The emotional and dynamic understanding of nature as the operational field of living forces. See Empathy. -- P.A.S.
Eirenicon, epistemological: (Gr. eirenikos, peaceful) The purging of the negative claims and the synthesis of subjectivism, objectivism, dualism and relativism in epistemology. (Montague.) -- H.H.
Eject: (Lat. pp. of ejicere, to throw out) Term intioduced by W. K. Clifford to designate another conscious subject conceived as an outward projection of the knowing subject. -- L.W.
Elan vital: Term used by Bergson to denote the source of efficient causation and evolution in nature. See Bergson. -- R.T.F.
Election: (Lat. eligo, to choose) A choice between alternatives. In psychology: free choice by the will between means proposed by the understanding. An act of volition. -- J.K.F.
Elements: Are simple constituents, in psychology, of sense perceptions such as sweet and green. Elementary complexes are things of experience. (Avenarius.) In logic: individual members of a class. Also refers to Euclid's 13 books. -- H.H.
Elenchus: (Gr. elenchos) A syllogism establishing the contradictory of a proposition attacked; a refutation. (Aristotle.) -- G.R.M.
Elijah, Aaron ben: Karaite exegete and philosopher (1300-1369). The Ez Hayyim, i.e. Tree of Size, his philosophical work, deals with all problems of philosophy and displays the influence of both Maimonides and of the teachings of the Mutazilites. -- M.W.
Emanation: Literally, an outpouring or flowing forth, specifically, applied to the process of derivation or mode of origination, immediate or mediate, of the multiplicity of beings whether spiritual or material from the eternal source of all being, God, of Whose being consequently they are a part and in Whose nature they somehow share. It is opposed to creation from nothing. Some writers have not adequately distinguished one from the other. -- J.J.R.
Emergent Evolution: Generalization of emergent mentalism (q.v.) due to S. Alexander (q.v.), Space, Time and Deity. See Bergson's variation in L'evolution creatrice. See Holism.
Emergent Mentalism: (Lat. emergere, to rise out) The theory of emergent evolutionism considered as an explanation of the genesis of mind or consciousness in the world. Mind is a novel quality emerging from the non-mental when the latter attains a certain complexity of organization. Cf. C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, Lect. I, II, Life, Mind, Spirit, Ch. V. -- L.W.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo: (1803-1882) American poet and essayist. His spirit of independence early led him to leave the pulpit for the lecture platform where he earned high rank as the leading transcendentalist and the foremost figure in the famous Concord group. His profound vision, his ringing spirit of individualism and his love of democracy place him among the New World's philosophic pantheon. His "The American Scholar," "The Over-Soul," ''Self-Reliance," "Compensation" and the Divinity School Address are perhaps the most famous of his lectures and essays. He edited The Dial, the official organ of the transcendental movement. His several trips to Europe brought him into contact with Coleridge and Wordsworth, but particularly with Carlyle.

R. W. Emerson: Complete Works, 12 vols. (Boston, 1903-4). -- L.E.D.

Emotion: (Lat. emovere, to stir up, agitate) In the widest sense emotion applies to all affective phenomena including the familiar '"passions" of love, anger, fear, etc. as well as the feelings of pleasure and pain. See Affect. -- L.W.
Emotive Meaning: Emotive, as distinguished from the cognitive, meaning of a statement is its ability to communicate an attitude or emotion, to inspire an act of will without conveying truth. Exclamations, commands and perhaps ethical and aesthetic judgments are emotive but not cognitive. -- L.W.
Empathic: Adjective of empathy. See Empathy. -- L.W.
Empathy: (Gr. en + pathein, to suffer) The projection by the mind into an object of the subjective feeling of bodily posture and attitude which result from the tendency of the body to conform to the spatial organization of the object (e.g. the tendency to imitate the outstretched hands of a statue). The phenomenon is of particular significance for aesthetics. See H. S. Langfeld, The Aesthetic Attitude. The term was introduced to translate the German Einfühlung. See Lipps, Raumaesthetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen. See Eject. -- L.W.
Empedocles: Of Agrigentum, about 490-430 B.C.; attempted to reconcile the teaching of the permanence of Being of the Eleatics with the experience of change and motion as emphasized by Heraclitus. He taught the doctrine of the four "elements", earth, water, air and fire, out of the mixture of which all individual things came to be; love and hate being the cause of motion and therefore of the mixings of these elements. He was thus led to introduce a theory of value into the explanation of Nature since love and hate accounted also for the good and evil in the world. -- M.F.
Empirical: (Gr. empeirikos, experienced) Relating to experience. Having reference to actual facts. (a) In epistemology: pertaining to knowledge gained a posteriori. (b) In scientific method: that part of the method of science in which the reference to actuality allows an hypothesis to be erected into a law or general principle. Opposite of normative. -- J.K.F.
Empiricism: (1) A proposition about the sources of knowledge: that the sole source of knowledge is experience, or that either no knowledge at all or no knowledge with existential reference is possible independently of experience. Experience (q.v.) may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only, or other designated content. Such empiricism may take the form of denial that any knowledge or at least knowledge about existents can be obtained a priori (q.v.), that is, denial that there are universal and necessary truths, denial that there is knowledge which holds regardless of past, present, or future experience; denial that there is instinctive, innate, or inborn knowledge; denial that the test of truth is clarity to natural reason or self-evidence, denial that one can gain certain knowledge by finding something the opposite of which is inconceivable; denial thit there are any necessary presuppositions of all knowledge or of anything known certainly, denial that any truths can be established by the fact that to deny them implies their reaffirmation; or denial that conventional or aibitrary definitions or assumptions yield knowledge.

(2) A proposition about origins of ideas, concepts, or universals: that they or at least those of them having existential reference are derived solely or primarily from experience or some significant part of experience.

(3) A proposition about the nature of meaning, ideas, concepts, or universals: that they (and thus, some contend, knowledge) "consist of" or "are reducible to" references to directly presented data or content of experience; or that signs standing for meanings, ideas, concepts, or universals refer to experienced content only or primarily; or that the meaning of a term consists simply of the sum of its possible consequences in experience; or that if all possible experiential consequences of two propositions are identical, their meanings are identical.

(4) A proposition about the limitations of knowledge: that every possible referent either is something with which one has "direct acquaintance" or consists exclusively of entities with which he is acquainted, or that one can have knowledge of only immediate content of experience; or that although one can have knowledge of existents outside one's own or everyone's experience, that knowledge must always be uncertain, since it is reached through experience.

(5) A proposition about the nature or tests of truth in which proposition some relation or other between experience and truth is taken to be definitive of either the nature of truth or the means of its identification.

(6) A proposition about the existent or the real or both that experience(s) is (are) the sole existent(s) or reality or both; or the negation of the proposition that nature is a deductive process or is rational through and through; or a proposition that the variable, particular, changing, and contingent are "nearer to the heart of things" than the universal, immutable, and necessary.

(7) A combination of two or more of the above propositions, of approximations to them, of their respective immediate implications, or of their mediate implications when taken together or in conjunction with other premises.

(8) Practice, method, or methodology: relying upon direct observation or immediate experience; or precluding or excluding analysis or reflection, or employing experimentation or systematized induction as opposed to purely discursive, deductive, speculative, transcendental, or dialectical procedures, or relying upon all the ways of mind involved in inquiry.

(9) An assertion, belief, hypothesis, assumption, postulation, or attitude favoring any of the above propositions, practices, methods, or methodologies; or an attitude of dependence upon sense rather than intellect, or an insistence upon fact as against fiction, fancy, or interpretation of fact (supposing fact and interpretation separable); or an attitude favorable to application of scientific attitude or method to inquiry, or a temperament close to common sense and practicality; or a "tough-minded" temperament or attitude involving considerable disillusionment and holding facts (q.v.) worthy of utmost intellectual respect; or a tendency to rely on things' being as they appear.

The term "empiricism" has been used with extreme looseness and confused with numerous related propositions, practices, and attitudes. Many definitions here listed are themselves ambiguous, but to remove their ambiguity would require misrepresentation of usage of the term. See also Scepticism, Sensationalism, Pluralism, Phenomenalism, Pragmatism, Positivism, Intuitionalism, Nativism, Rationalism, A Priorism, Intellectualism, Idealism, Transcendentalism, Scientific Empiricism. -- M.T.K.

Empiricism, Radical: The theory of knowledge which holds that idens are reducible to sensations, as in Hume (1711-1776). The doctrine that experience is the final criterion of reality in knowledge. Syn. with sensationalistic empiricism or sensationalism (q.v.). See Avenarius.

William James, who first adopted this philosophical position, and so named it, described it in The Meaning of Truth (Preface, xii-xiii) as consisting "first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.

1. "The postulate is that the only things which shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. . . .

2. "The statement of fact is that relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are as much matters of direct particular experience . . . [as] . . . the things themselves.

3. "The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure."

James believed that ridical empiricism differed from ordinary or traditional empiricism primarily through the above "statement of fact" (No. 2). By this statement he wished explicitly and thoroughly to reject a common assumption about experience which he found both in the British empiricism and in Kantian and Hegelian idealism, namelv, that experience as given is either a collection of disparate impressions or, as Kant would have preferred to say, a manifold of completely unsynthesized representations, and that hence, in order to constitute a world, the material of experience must first be worked over and connective relations established within it either through the principles of the association of ideas (British empiricism) or through a set of trans-empirical categories imposed by the unity of consciousness (Kantian and Hegelian idealism). -- F.L.W.

Empiricism, Scientific: See Scientific Empiricism. -- R.C.
Empiricists: (Early English) By the beginning of the 17th century, the wave of search for new foundations of knowledge reached England. The country was fast growing in power and territory. Old beliefs seemed inadequate, and vast new information brought from elsewhere by merchants and scholars had to be assimilated. The feeling was in the air that a new, more practicable and more tangible approach to reality was needed. This new approach was attempted by many thinkers, among whom two, Bacon and Hobbes, were the most outstanding. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), despite his busy political career, found enough enthusiasm and time to outline requirements for the study of natural phenomena. Like Descartes, his younger contemporary in France, he felt the importance of making a clean sweep of countless unverified assumptions obstructing then the progress of knowledge. As the first pre-requisite for the investigation of nature, he advocated, therefore, an overthrow of the idols of the mind, that is, of all the preconceptions and prejudices prevalent in theories, ideas and even language. Only when one's mind is thus prepared for the study of phenomena, can one commence gathering and tabulating facts. Bacon's works, particularly Novum Organum, is full of sagacious thoughts and observations, but he seldom goes beyond general advice. As we realize it today, it was a gross exaggeration to call him "the founder of inductive logic". Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an empiricist of an entirely different kind. He did not attempt to work out an inductive method of investigation, but decided to apply deductive logic to new facts. Like Bacon, he keenly understood the inadequacy of medieval doctrines, particularly of those of "form" and "final cause". He felt the need for taking the study of nature anew, particularly of its three most important aspects, Matter, Man and the State. According to Hobbes, all nature is corporeal and all events have but one cause, motion. Man, in his natural state, is dominated by passion which leads him to a "war of all against all". But, contrary to animals, he is capable of using reason which, in the course of time, made him, for self-protection, to choose a social form of existence. The resulting State is, therefore, built on an implicit social contract. -- R.B.W.
Empirio-criticism: Avenarius' system of pure experience in which all metaphysical additions are eliminated. Opposed to every form of apriorism, it admits of no basic difference between the psychical and the physical, subject and object, consciousness and being. Knowledge consists in statements about contents which are dependent upon System C in man in the form of experience. Ideal of knowledge is the winning of a purely empirical world conception, removal of every dualism and metaphysical category. -- H.H.
Empty: (Ger. leer) In Husserl: Without intuitional fullness, materially indeterminate; obscure. Emptiness is compatible with distinctness. In logic: a class that happens to have no members, but is not a null-class. -- D.C.
End, (in Scholasticism): That object for the attainment of which the agent moves and acts. End which (finis qui): That good the agent intends to attain, e.g. health, which a sick man intends. End for whom (finis cui): Refers to the person or subject for whom the end which (finis qui) is procured, e.g. the sick man himself for whom health is procured.

Formal. Or end by which (finis quo) is the actual attainment of the good itself, e.g. beatitude itself in the blessed.

Of the work or of knowledge (finis operis seu scientiae): That to which an act or habit (habitus) is ordered through itself and in its proper nature -- as the end of logic is the correctness of the actions of the mind. The end of the one working or knowing (finis operantis seu scientis) is that which the one acting proposes to his will, in the exercise of the action or in the acquisition of knowledge, e.g. -- one who learns a science on account of its usefulness.

Simply ultimate: That to which all things are actually or virtually referred, -- and which itself is ordered to nothing further, as God. A relatively ultimate end (finis secundum quid ultimus): That which terminates some seiies of acts, in which it is intended ultimately and in itself, but nevertheless can be referrcd to another end, as health is the end of the art of medicine, but nevertheless it can be ordered to another end, e.g. to working. -- H.G.

Ends: (in Kant's ethics) (1) Humanity and every rational creature is an end in itself (never merely a means). (2) "The natural end which all men have is their own happiness." (Kant.)

Kingdom of ends: Kant's notion of the systematic union of different rational beings by common laws. Cf. also the Practical Imperative. -- P.A.S.

Energeia: (Gr. energeia, actuality) In Aristotle's philosophy (1) the mode of existence of that which possesses to the full its specific essence; actuality; entelechy; -- opposed to dynamis, or potentiality; (2) the activity that transforms potentiality into actuality. -- G-R.M.
Energism: (Lat. energia, active) Ethical theory that right action consists in exercising one's normal capacities efficiently. Not happiness or pleasure, but self-realization is the aim of ethical action. -- A.J.B.
Energy: (Gr. energos, at work) The power by which things act to change other things. Potentiality in the physical. Employed by Aristotle as a synonym for actuality or reality. (a) In physics: the capacity for performing work. In modern physics, the equivalent of mass. (b) In i axiology: value at the physical level- -- J.K.F.
Engels, Frederick: Co-founder of the doctrines of Marxism (see Dialectical materialism) Engels was the life-long friend and collaborator of Karl Marx (q.v.). He was born at Barmen, Germanv, in 1820, the son of a manufacturer. Like Marx, he became interested in communism early in life, developing and applying its doctrines until his death, August 5, 1895. Beside his collaboration with Marx on Die Heilige Familie, Die Deutsche Ideologie, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Anti-Dühring and articles for the "New York Tribune" (a selection from which constitutes "Germany: revolution and counter-revolution"), and his editing of Volumes II and III of Capital, published after Marx's death, Engels wrote extensively on various subjects, from "Condition of the Working Class in England (1844)" to military problems, in which field he had received technical training. On the philosophical side of Marxism, Engels speculated on fundamental questions of scientific methodology and dialectical logic in such books as Dialectics of Nature and Anti-Dühring. Works like Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy and Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State are likewise regarded as basic texts. The most extensive collection of Engels' works will be found in Marx-Engels "Gesamtausgabe", to which there is still much unpublished material to be added. -- J.M.S.
Enjoyment: See Contemplation. -- L.W.
Enlightenment: When Kant, carried by the cultural enthusiasm of his time, explained "enlightenment" as man's coming of age from the state of infancy which rendered him incapable of using his reason without the aid of others, he gave only the subjective meaning of the term. Objectively, enlightenment is a cultural period distinguished by the fervent efforts of leading personalities to make reason the absolute ruler of human life, and to shed the light of knowledge upon the mind and conscience of any individual. Such attempts are not confined to a particular time, or nation, as history teaches; but the term is generally applied to the European enlightenment stretching from the early 17th to the beginning of the 19th century, especially fostered by English, Dutch, French, and German philosophers. It took its start in England from the empiricism of F. Bacon, Th. Hobbes, J. Locke, it found a religious version in the naturalism of Edw. H. Cherbury, J. Toland, M. Tindal, H. Bolingbroke, and the host of "freethinkers", while the Earl of Shaftesbury imparted to it a moral on the "light of reason". Not so constructive but radical in their sarcastic criticism of the past were the French enlighteners, showing that their philosophy got its momentum from the moral corruption at the royal court and abuse of kinglv power in France. Descartes' doctrine of the "clear and perspicuous ideas," Spinoza's critical attitude towards religion, and Leibniz-Wolff's "reasonable thinking" prepared the philosophy of P. Bayle, Ch. Montesquieu, F. M. Voltaire, and J. J. Rousseau. The French positive contribution to the subject was the "Encyclopedie ou Dictionaire raisonne des sciences, arts et metiers", 1751-72, in 28 volumes, edited by Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, Holbach, J. L. Lagrane, etc. What, in England and France, remained on the stage of mere ideas and utopic dreams became reality in the new commonwealth of the U.S.A. The "fathers of the constitution" were enlightened, outstanding among them B. Franklin, Th. Jefferson, J. Adams, A. Hamilton, and Th. Paine their foremost literary propagandist.

In Germany, the movement was initiated by G. W. Leibniz whose writings reveal another motive for the cult of pure reason, i.e. the deep disappointment with the Reformation and the bloody religious wars among Christians who were accused of having forfeited the confidence of man in revealed religion. Hence the outstanding part played by the philosophers of ''natural law", Grotius, S. Pufendorf, and Chr. Thomasius, their theme being advanced by the contributions to a "natural religion" and tolerance by Chr. Wolff, G. E. Lessing, G. Herder, and the Prussian king Frederik II. Fr. v. Schiller's lyric and dramas served as a powerful commendation of ideal freedom, liberty, justice, and humanity. A group of educators (philanthropists) designed new methods and curricula for the advancement of public education, many of them, eg. Pestalozzi, Basedow, Cooper, A. H. Francke, and Fr. A. Wolf, the father of classic humanism, having achieved international recognition. Although in general agreement with th philosophical axioms of foreign enlighteners, the German philosophy decidedly opposed the English sensism (Hume) and French scepticism, and reached its height in Kant's Critiques. The radical rationalism, however, combined with its animosity against religion, brought about strong philosophical, theological, and literal opposition (Hamann, Jacobi, Lavater) which eventually led to its defeat. The ideals of the enlightenment period, the impassioned zeal for the materialization of the ideal man in an ideal society show clearly that it was basically related to the Renaissance and its continuation. See Aufklärung. Cf. J. G. Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 1910. -- S.v.F.

Ens: Being in the most general sense of the term, with the least possible determination, without qualifications. -- J.J.R.
Ens Parmenideum: (Lat. ens, being) The changeless being (existence) ascribed by Parmenides to all things and events. Change was regarded by him as an illogical illusion. -- R.B.W.
Ens Rationis: (in Scholasticism) A purelv objective ens rationis is a chimera, or an impossible thing, although in a certain way it is an object of human knowledge, as a triangular circle. A logical ens rationis is that which is fashioned by the intellect with some foundation in realitv, e.g. human nature conceived as one reality because of the likeness of singular natures. -- H.G.
Entelechy: (Gr. entelecheia) In Aristotle's philosophy (1) the mode of being of a thing whose essence is completely realized; actuality; energeia; -- opposed to dynamis, or potentiality; (2) the form or essence. -- G.R.M.
Enthymeme: (Gr. enthymema) In Aristotle's logic a rhetorical syllogism, usually consisting of probable premisses, and used for persuasion as distinct from instruction. In later logic a syllogism of which one premiss or the conclusion is not explicitly stated. -- G.R.M.
Entities, neutral: Qualityless elements, simples that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. -- H.H.
Entity: A real being; also the common element in all individuals belonging to a genus or species, which may be considered apart from the individual characteristics. Sometimes used in the sense of a vague and ill-defined reality. -- J.J.R.
Entropy: Thermodynamic state approaching a maximum level of zero difference of energy potentials.
Enumerable: A class is enumerable if its cardinal number (q.v.) is aleph 0. -- A.C.
Enumerative Induction: A type of inference from a number of given instances, when these are treated by noting the number of observed coincident happenings of their conditions and their effects, and without attempting to analyze their respective contents or to determine a causal connection between them by means of one or more of the methods of research and verification. The generalization "Every A is B" thus obtained, should be understood with the qualification "Every observed A is B". This process is used especially in statistical methods. -- T.G.
Epagoge: (Gr. epagoge) In Aristotle's logic the process of establishing a general proposition by induction (seeing the univers.il in the particular). -- C.R.M.
Epicheirema: (Gr. epicheirema) In Aristotle's logic a dialectical as distinct from an apodictic or an eristic syllogism.

In later logic an argument one of whose premisses is established by a prosyllogism expressed in the form of an enthymeme. -- G.R.M.

Epictetus: (c. 60-110 A.D.) A Stoic philosopher and freed slave, who established his School in Nicopolis, Epirus; his Discourses were published by Arrian, his learned disciple, they contain sharp observations of human behavior and pithy sayings on ethical matters. -- R.B.W.
Epicurean School: Founded by Epicurus in Athens in the year 306 B.C. Epicureanism gave expression to the desire for a refined type of happiness which is the reward of the cultured man who can take pleasure in the joys of the mind over which he can have greater control than over those of a material or sensuous nature. The friendship of gifted and noble men, the peace and contentment that comes from fair conduct, good morals and aesthetic enjoyments are the ideals of the Epicurean who refuses to be perturbed by any metaphysical or religious doctrines which impose duties and thus hinder the freedom of pure enjoyment. Epicurus adopted the atomism of Democritus (q.v.) but modified its determinism by permitting chance to cause a swerve (clinamen) in the fall of the atoms. See C. W. Bailey, Epicurus. However, physics was not to be the main concern of the philosopher. See Apathia, Ataraxia, Hedonism. -- M.F.
Epicurus: (341-270 B.C.) A native of Samos, founded his School in Athens about 306 B.C., where he instructed his disciples and admirers in the art of rational living. He taught that pleasure and happiness are the natural end of life. But, contrary to later misconceptions, he did not advocate the pursuit of all or any pleasures, but only of those which are consistent with intelligence and moderation. Joys of the mind are superior to pleasures of the body. In his interpretation of nature, he accepted Democritus' atomism, but contended that the element of chance enters into atoms' motions and makes them deviate from their course. -- R.B.W.
Epiphenomenalism: Theory of the body-mind relation advanced by Clifford, Huxley, Hodgson, etc. which holds that consciousness is, in relation to the neural processes which underlie it, a mere epiphenomenon. See W. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, ch. V. See Epiphenomenon. -- L.W.
Epiphenomenon: (Gr. epi + phenomenon, from phainein, to appear) A by-product of a basic process which exerts no appreciable influence on the subsequent development of the process. -- L.W.
Epistemic: (Gr. episteme, knowledge) Relating to knowledge. See Epistemological object. -- L.W.
Epistemological Dualism: See Dualism, Epistemological.
Epistemological Idealism: The form of epistemological monism which identifies the content and the object of knowledge by assimilating the object to the content. Berkeleyeyan idealism by its rejection of a physical object independent of ideas directly present to the mind is an example of epistemological monism. See Epistemological Monism. -- L.W.
Epistemological Monism: Theory that non-inferential knowledge, (perception, memory, etc.) the object of knowledge, (the thing perceived or remembered) is numerically identical with the data of knowledge (sense data, memory images, etc.). Epistemological monism may be either (a) epistemologically realistic, when it asserts that the data exist independently of the knowing mind, or (b) epistemologically idealistic when it asserts the data to be mind constituted and to exist only when apprehended by the mind. See Epistemological Dualism, Epistemological Idealism and Epistemological Realism. -- L.W.
Epistemological Object: The object envisaged by an act of knowledge whether the knowledge be veridical, illusory or even hallucinatory in contrast to ontological object, which is a real thing corresponding to the epistemological object when knowledge is veridical. See C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature, pp. 141 ff. -- L.W.
Epistemological Realism: Theory that the object of knowledge enjoys an existence independent of and external to the knowing mind. The theory, though applied most commonlv to perception where it is designated perceptual realism, may be extended to other types of knowledge (for example memory and knowledge of other minds). Epistemological realism may be combined either with Epistemological Monism or Epistemological Dualism. See Epistemological Monism, Epistemological Dualism. -- L.W.
Epistemology: (Gr. episteme, knowledge + logos, theory) The branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure, methods and validity of knowledge. The term "epistemology" appears to have been used for the first time by J. F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics (1854) who distinguished two branches of philosophy -- epistemology and ontology. The German equivalent of epistemology, Erkenntnistheorie, was used by the Kantian, K. L. Reinhold, Versuch einer Neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (1789); Das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791), but the term did not gain currency until after its adoption by E. Zeller, Ueber Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Erkenntnisstheorie (1862). The term theory of knowledge is a common English equivalent of epistemology and translation of Erkenntnistheorie; the term Gnosiology has also been suggested but has gained few adherents.

The scope of epistemology may be indicated by considering its relations to the allied disciplines: (a) metaphysics, (b) logic, and (c) psychology.

(a) Speculative philosophy is commonly considered to embrace metaphysics (see Metaphysics) and epistemology as its two coordinate branches or if the term metaphysics be extended to embrace the whole of speculative philosophy, then epistemology and ontology become the two main subdivisions of metaphysics in the wide sense. Whichever usage is adopted, epistemology as the philosophical theory of knowledge is one of the two main branches of philosophy. The question of the relative priority of epistemology and metaphysics (or ontology) has occasioned considerable controversy: the dominant view fostered by Descartes, Locke and Kant is that epistemology is the prior philosophical science, the investigation of the possibility and limits of knowledge being a necessary and indispensible preliminary to any metaphysical speculations regarding the nature of ultimate reality. On the other hand, strongly metaphysical thinkers like Spinoza and Hegel, and more recently S. Alexander and A. N. Whitehead, have first attacked the metaphvsical problems and adopted the view of knowledge consonant with their metaphysics. Between these two extremes is the view that epistemology and metaphysics are logically interdependent and that a metaphysically presuppositionless epistemology is as unattainable as an epistemologically presuppositionless metaphysics.

(b) Despite the fact that traditional logic embraced many topics which would now be considered epistemological, the demarcation between logic and epistemology is now fairly clear-cut: logic is the formal science of the principles governing valid reasoning; epistemology is the philosophical science of the nature of knowledge and truth. For example, though the decision as to whether a given process of reasoning is valid or not is a logical question, the inquiry into the nature of validity is epistemological.

(c) The relation between psychology and epistemology is particularly intimate since the cognitive processes of perception, memory, imagination, conception and reasoning, investigated by empirical psychology are the very processes which, in quite a different context, are the special subject matter of epistemology. Nevertheless the psychological and epistemological treatments of the cognitive processes of mind are radically different: scientific psychology is concerned solely with the description and explanation of conscious processes, e.g. particular acts of perception, in the context of other conscious events; epistemology is interested in the cognitive pretentions of the perceptions, i.e. their apparent reference to external objects. In short, whereas psychology is the investigation of all states of mind including the cognitive in the context of the mental life, epistemology investigates only cognitive states and these solely with respect to their cognitive import. Psychology and epistemology are by virtue of the partial identity of their subject matter interdependent sciences. The psychology of perception, memory, imagination, conception, etc. affords indispensable data for epistemological interpretation and on the other hand epistemological analysis of the cognitive processes may sometimea prove psychologically suggestive. The epistemologist must, however, guard against a particularly insidious form of the genetic fallacy: viz. the supposition that the psychological origin of an item of knowledge prejudices either favorably or unfavorably its cognitive validity -- a fallacy which is psychologism at its worst.

An examination of the generally recognized problems of epistemology and of the representative solutions of these problems will serve to further clarify the nature and scope of epistemological inquiry. The emphasis in epistemology has varied from one historical era to another and yet there is a residium of epistemological problems which has persisted to the present.

(a) The initial and inescapable problem with which the epistemologist is confronted is that of the very possibility of knowledge: Is genuine knowledge at all attainable? The natural dogmatism of the human mind is confronted with the sceptic's challenge: a challenge grounded on the relativity of the senses (sensory scepticism) and the contradictions into which the reason is often betrayed (rational scepticism). An alternative to both dogmatism and extreme scepticism is a tentative or methodological scepticism of which Descartes' systematic doubt, Locke's cautious empiricism and Kant's critical epistemology are instances. See Dogmatism; Scepticism; Criticism. Scepticism in modern epistemology is commonly associated with solipsism, since a scepticism regarding knowledge of the external world leads to solipsism and the ego-centric predicament. See Solipsism; Ego-centric predicament.

(b) An epistemologist who rejects an extreme or agnostic scepticism, may very properly seek to determine the limits of knowledge and to assert that genuine knowledge is, within certain prescribed limits, possible yet beyond those limits impossible. There are, of course, innumerable ways of delimiting the knowable from the unknowable -- a typical instance of the sceptical delimitation of knowledge is the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world. See Phenomenon; Noumenon. A similar epistemological position is involved in the doctrine of certain recent positivists and radical empiricists that the knowable coincides with the meaningful and the verifiable, the unknowable with trie meaningless and unverifiable. See Positivism, Logical; Empiricism, Radical.

(c) The traditional problem of the origin of knowledge, viz. By what faculty or faculties of mind is knowledge attainable? It gave rise to the principal cleavage in modern epistemology between rationalism and empiricism (q.v.) though both occur in any thinker. The rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) rely primarily -- though not exclusively -- on reason as the source of genuine knowledge, and the empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) rely mainly on experience. A broadly conceived empiricism such as Locke's which acknowledges the authenticity of knowledge derived both from the inner sense (see Reflection; Introspection), and the outer senses, contrasts with that type of sensationalism (q.v.) which is empiricism restricted to the outer senses. Various attempts, the most notable of which is the critical philosophy of Kant, have been made to reconcile rationalism and empiricism by assigning to reason and experience their respective roles in the constitution of knowledge. Few historical or contemporary epistemologists would subscribe either to a rationalism or an empiricism of an exclusive and extreme sort.

(d) The methodological problem bulks large in epistemology and the solutions of it follow in general the lines of cleavage determined by the previous problem. Rationalists of necessity have emphasized deductive and demonstrative procedures in the acquisition and elaboration of knowledge while empiricists have relied largely on induction and hypothesis but few philosophers have espoused the one method to the complete exclusion of the other. A few attempts have been made to elaborate distinctively philosophical methods reducible neither to the inductive procedure of the natural sciences nor the demonstrative method of mathematics -- such are the Transcendental Method of Kant and the Dialectical Method of Hegel though the validity and irreducibility of both of these methods are highly questionable. Pragmatism, operationalism, and phenomenology may perhaps in certain of their aspects be construed is recent attempts to evaluate new epistemological methods.

(e) The problem of the A PRIORI, though the especial concern of the rationalist, confronts the empiricist also since few epistemologists are prepared to exclude the a priori entirely from their accounts of knowledge. The problem is that of isolating the a priori or non-empirical elements in knowledge and accounting for them in terms of the human reason. Three principal theories of the a priori have been advanced:

  1. the theory of the intrinsic A PRIORI which asserts that the basic principles of logic, mathematics, natural sciences and philosophy are self-evident truths recognizable by such intrinsic traits as clarity and distinctness of ideas. The intrinsic theory received its definitive modern expression in the theory of "innate ideas" (q.v.) of Herbert of Cherbury, Descartes, and 17th century rationalism.
  2. The presuppositional theory of the a priori which validates a priori truths by demonstrating that they are presupposed either by their attempted denial (Leibniz) or by the very possibility of experience (Kant).
  3. The postulational theory of the A PRIORI elaborated under the influence of recent postulational techniques in mathematics, interprets a priori principles as rules or postulates arbitrarily posited in the construction of formal deductive systems. See Postulate; Posit.

(f) The problem of differentiating the principal kinds of knowledge is an essential task especially for an empirical epistemology. Perhaps the most elementary epistemological distinction is between

  1. non-inferential apprehension of objects by perception, memory, etc. (see Knowledge by Acquaintance), and
  2. inferential knowledge of things with which the knowing subject has no direct apprehension. See Knowledge by Description.
Acquaintance in turn assumes two principal forms: perception or acquaintance with external objects (see Perception), and introspection or the subject's acquaintance with the "self" and its cognitive, volitional and affective states. See Introspection; Reflection. Inferential knowledge includes knowledge of other selves (this is not to deny that knowledge of other minds may at times be immediate and non-inferential), historical knowledge, including not only history in the narrower sense but also astronomical, biological, anthropological and archaeological and even cosmological reconstructions of the past and finally scientific knowledge in so far as it involves inference and construction from observational data.

(g) The problem of the structure of the knowledge-situation is to determine with respect to each of the major kinds of knowledge just enumerated -- but particularly with respect to perception -- the constituents of the knowledge-situation in their relation to one another. The structural problem stated in general but rather vague terms is: What is the relation between the subjective and objective components of the knowledge-situation? In contemporary epistemology, the structural problem has assumed a position of such preeminence as frequently to eclipse other issues of epistemology. The problem has even been incorporated by some into the definition of philosophy. (See A. Lalande, Vocabulaire de la Philosophie, art. Theorie de la Connaissance. I. and G.D. Hicks, Encycl. Brit. 5th ed. art. Theory of Knowledge.) The principal cleavage in epistemology, according to this formulation of its problem, is between a subjectivism which telescopes the object of knowledge into the knowing subject (see Subjectivism; Idealism, Epistemological) and pan-objectivism which ascribes to the object all qualities perceived or otherwise cognized. See Pan-obiectivism. A compromise between the extrernes of subjectivism and objectivism is achieved by the theory of representative perception, which, distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities, considers the former objective, the latter subjective. See Representative Perception, Theory of; Primary Qualities; Secondary Qualities.

The structural problem stated in terms of the antithesis between subjective and objective is rather too vague for the purposes of epistemology and a more precise analysis of the knowledge-situation and statement of the issues involved is required. The perceptual situation -- and this analysis may presumably be extended with appropriate modifications to memory, imagination and other modes of cognition -- consists of a subject (the self, or pure act of perceiving), the content (sense data) and the object (the physical thing perceived). In terms of this analysis, two issues may be formulated

  1. Are content and object identical (epistemological monism), or are they numerically distinct (epistemological dualism)? and
  2. Does the object exist independently of the knowing subject (epistemological idealism) or is it dependent upon the subject (epistemological realism)?

(h) The problem of truth is perhaps the culmination of epistemological enquiry -- in any case it is the problem which brings the enquiry to the threshold of metaphysics. The traditional theories of the nature of truth are:

  1. the correspondence theory which conceives truth as a relation between an "idea" or a proposition and its object -- the relation has commonly been regarded as one of resemblance but it need not be so considered (see Correspondence theory of truth);
  2. the Coherence theory which adopts as the criterion of truth, the logical consistency of a proposition with a wider system of propositions (see Coherence theory of truth), and
  3. the intrinsic theory which views truth as an intrinsic property of the true proposition. See Intrinsic theory of truth. -- L-W.


L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge, 1896.
H. Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, Eng. trans., 1912.
W. P. Montague, Ways of Knowing, 1925.
J. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 1929.
W. James, The Meaning of Truth, 1909.
C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, 1929.
D. Drake and others, Essays in Critical Realism, 1920.
E. B. Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, 1914
W. James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 1912.
J. Laird, A Study in Realism, 1920.
A. O. Lovejoy, The Revolt against Dualism, 1930.
G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, 1922.
B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 1912.
B. Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, 1914.
E. G. Spaulding, The New Rationalism, 1918.
S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, 2nd ed., 1928.
C. D. Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, 1914.
C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, 1923.
C. D. Broad, Mind and its Place in Nature, 1925.
B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 1921.
N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, 1924.
H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of "As If", Eng. trans., 1924.
A. N. Whitehead, Principles of Natural Knowledge.
A. N. Whitehead, Concept of Nature.
H. H. Price, Perception, 1933.
W. T. Stace, The Theory of Knowledge and Existence, 1932.
L. Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge.
Episyllogism: Where the conclusion of one (categorical) syllogism is used as one of the premisses of another, the first syllogism is called a prosyllogism and the second one an episyllogism. -- A.C.
Equality: See Logic, formal, §§ 3, 6, 9.
Equipollence: A relation of equivalence between two propositions or propositional forms or symbols for these.

(a) Some writers, following the example of Galen, use it in the sense of material equivalence, i.e., having the same truth value.

(b) Others, following Apuleius, use it in a much more restricted sense such as that of strict equivalence or even reciprocal entailment. In the latter sense the relation holds when and only when the two sentences express the same fact. -- C.A.B.

Carnap proposes a purely syntactical definition of equipollence by defining two sentences (or two classes of sentences) to be equipollent if they have the same class of non-valid consequences. See the article Valid. -- A.C.

Equivalence: (Lat. aequivaleo, have equal power) Identical value. Having the same relation or force. In logic, syn. of equipollence (q.v.) -- J.K.F.

Equivocation is any fallacy arising from ambiguity of a word, or of a phrase playing the role of a single word in the reasoning in question, the word or phrase being used at different places with different meanings and an inference drawn which is formally correct if the word or phrase is treated as being the same word or phrase throughout. -- A. C.

(a) The active or male principle (yang) and the passive or female principle (yin), which are the products of Tao and which produce the myriad of things. (Taoism.)

(b) The active or male principle (yang or ch'ien) and the passive or female principle. -- W.T.C.

Eristic: (Gr. eristike) In Aristotle's logic the art of specious reasoning, or of reasoning from specious premises, for the purpose of victory in argument; -- opposed to apodictic and to dialectical reasoning. See Apodiclic; Dialectic.

A kind of polemic, characterized by the use of logical subtleties and oratorical casuistry, for which the Megarian School was particularly famous. See Megarians. -- R.B.W.

Eriugena, Joannes Scottus: (800/815 - c. 800) Was of Irish birth and early education. He came to the Court of Charles the Bald, son of Charlemagne, as a teacher c. 845. A good linguist, he translated works of Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa and the Pseudo-Dionysius from Greek to Latin. His thought is partly Augustinian, partly a personal development inspired by the Greek Fathers. He has been accused of Pantheism. Chief works: De Praedestinatione, De divisione Naturae (PL 122). M. Cippuyns, Jean S.. Erigene, sa vie, son oevre, sa pensee (Louvain-Paris, 1933). -- V.J.B.
Erlebnis: (Ger. erleben, to experience or live through) The mind's identification with its own emotions and feelings when it consciously "lives through"; contrasts with cognition, with its characteristic duality between subject and object. See Enjoyment and Contemplation. -- L.W.
Eros: (Gr.) 1. Possessive desire or love, commonly erotic. 2. In Platonic thought, the driving force of life aspiring to the absolute Good; hence the motive underlying education, fine art, and philosophy. The connotation of aesthetic fascination, impersonality, and intense desire is retained in Plato's use of the term. Hence Eros is to be distinguished from the Indian Bhakti (selfless devotion), the Buddhist Metta (disinterested benevolence), the Confucian Jen (humanity, charity), and Ai (personal love), and the Christian Agapao (sacrificial, protective brotherly love), and Phileo (personal affection or fondness). -- W.L.
Erotema: (Gr. erotema) A question in Aristotle's logic a premise stated in interrogative form for acceptance or rejection by the respondent; hence, any premise used in dialectical reasoning. -- G.R.M.
Error: (Lat. error, from errare, to wander) Distorted or non-veridical apprehension, for example illusory perception and memory. See Veridical. The term, although sometimes used as a synonym of falsity, is properly applied to acts of apprehension like perception and memory and not to propositions and judgments. -- L.W.
Eschatology: (Gr. ta eschata, death) That part of systematic or dogmatic theology dealing with the last things, namely, death, judgment, heaven and hell, and also with the end of the world. Also applied by philosophers to the complexus of theories relating to the ultimate end of mankind and the final stages of the physical cosmos. -- J.J.R.
Esoteric: Belonging to the inner circle of initiates, or experts; e.g. the esoteric doctrines attributed to the Stoics, or the esoteric members of the Pythagorean brotherhoods;contrasted with exoteric (q.v.). -- G.R.M.
Essence: (Lat. essentia, fr. essens, participle of esse, to be) The being or power of a thing; necessary internal relation or function. The Greek philosophers identified essence and substance in the term, ousia. In classic Latin essence was the idea or law of a thing. But in scholastic philosophy the distinction between essence and substance became important. Essence began to be identified, as in its root meaning, with being, or power. For Locke, the being whereby a thing is what it is. For Kant, the primary internal principle of all that belongs to the being of a thing. For Peirce, the intelligible element of the possibility of being. (a) In logic: definition or the elements of a thing; the genus and differentia. See Definition. (b) In epistemology: that intelligible character which defines what an indefinite predicate asserts. The universal possibility of a thing. Opposite of existence. Syn. with being, possibility. See Santayana's use of the term in Realm of Essence, as a hybrid of intuited datum and scholastic essence (q.v.). See Eternal object. -- J.K.F.
Essence, (Scholastic): The essence of a thing is its nature considered independently of its existence. Also non-existent things and those which cannot exist at all have a proper essence. The definition details all properties making up the essence. It is doubtful whether we can give of a ny thing a truly essential definition with the one exception of man: man is a rational animal. Most of the definitions have to be content with naming accidental features, because we do not attain a direct knowledge of substances. Synonymously the term "quiddity" is used. The essence implies, in the case of corporeal beings, matter, but not as actually contained, since the essence is individualized by prime matter. But it is of the essence of material things to be material. Thus, Essence is not "form" properly speaking. See Distinction, Form, Individuation, Matter. -- R.A.
Essential Coordination: Term employed bv R. Avenarius (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888) to designate the essential solidarity existing between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. The theory of "essential coordination" is contrasted by Avenarius with the allegedly false theory of introjection (q.v.). -- L.W.
Esthesis: (Gr. aisthesis, sensation or feeling, from aisthanesthai, to perceive) A state of pure feeling -- sensuous, hedonic or affective -- characterized by the absence of conceptual and interpretational elements. Aesthesis at the sensory level consists of pure sense data. See Sense datum. Though the existence of pure esthesis is challenged by most psychologists and epistemologists (see C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, pp. 54-5); a state of mind approximates pure esthesis when the conceptual, interpretative and constructional elements are reduced to a minimum. -- L.W.
Esthetic: See Aesthetic.
Eternal object: A. N. Whitehead's term essentially synonymous with Plato's "Idea" or Aristotle's "form"; a potential form determining and limiting the qualitative characteristics of actuality, a universal attributed to reality -- R.B.W.
Eternal recurrence: The view that as the dynamic energies of nature are finite, whereas time is infinite, only a limited number of combinations is possible, which results in the cyclical recurrence of every situation in infinitely numerous times. The view which assumes that the initial combination of the forces of existence will recur again and again. (Nietzsche.) -- H.H.
Eternity: An infinite extent of time, in which every event is future at one time, present at another, past at another. As everlastingness, it was formerly divided into two eternities, eternitv a parte ante, an infinite extent of time before the present, and eternity a parte post, an infinite extent of time after the present. Anything can be called "eternal" which is not subject to change, f.i. laws of nature, or which transcends all time. See Timeless. -- R.B.W.
Ethical formalism: (Kantian) Despite the historical over-shadowing of Kant's ethical position by the influence of The Critique of Pure Reason upon the philosophy of the past century and a half, Kant's own (declared) major interest, almost from the very beginning, was in moral philosophy. Even the Critique of Pure Reason itself was written only in order to clear the ground for dealing adequately with the field of ethics in the Grundlegung zur Metapkysik der Sttten (1785), in the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (1788), and in the Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). By the end of the seventeen-sixties Kant was ready to discard every prior ethical theory, from the earlv Greeks to Baumgarten, Rousseau, and the British moralists, finding, all of them, despite the wide divergencies among them, equally dogmatic and unacceptable. Each of the older theories he found covertly to rely upon some dogmatic criterion or other, be it a substantive "principle," an intuition, or an equally substantive "sense." Every such ethical theory fails to deal with ethical issues as genuinely problematic, since it is amenable to some "demonstrative" preconceived criterion.

In harmony with Kant's major concern in his other Critiques, -- namely the establishment of lawfulness in each respective sphere (of scientific knowledge, of moral action, and of artistic and religious hopefulness) -- Kant's primary aim in ethics is the unification or synthesis of the field of action. Since, however, action is ever changing and since eternally new and creative possibilities of action are constantly coming into view, Kant saw that lawfulness in the ethical sphere could not be of either a static or predetermined nature.

As against the faulty ethical procedures of the past and of his own day, therefore, Kant very early conceived and developed the more critical concept of "form," -- not in the sense of a "mould" into which content is to be poured (a notion which has falselv been taken over by Kant-students from his theoretical philosophy into his ethics), but -- as a method of rational (not ratiocinative, but inductive) reflection; a method undetermined by, although not irrespective of, empirical data or considerations. This methodologically formal conception constitutes Kant's major distinctive contribution to ethical theory. It is a process of rational reflection, creative construction, and transition, and as such is held by him to be the only method capable if coping with the exigencies of the facts of hunnn experience and with the needs of moral obligation. By this method of creative construction the reflective (inductive) reason is able to create, as each new need for a next reflectively chosen step arises, a new object of "pure" -- that is to say, empirically undetermined -- "practical reason." This makes possible the transition from a present no longer adequate ethical conception or attitude to an untried and as yet "indemonstrable" object. No other method can guarantee the individual and social conditions of progress without which the notion of morality loses all assignable meaning. The newly constructed object of "pure practical reason" is assumed, in the event, to provide a type of life and conduct which, just because it is of my own construction, will be likely to be accompanied by the feeling of self-sufficiency which is the basic pre-requisite of any worthy human happiness. It is this theory which constitutes Kant's ethical formalism. See also Autonomy, Categorical Imperative, Duty, End(s), Freedom, Happiness, Law, Moral, Practical Imperative, Will. -- P. A.S.

Ethical Hedonism: See Hedonism, ethical.
Ethical relativism: The view that ethical truths are relative -- that the rightness of an action and the goodness of an object depend on or consist in the attitude taken towards it by some individual or group, and hence may vary from individual to individual or from group to group. See Absolutism. -- W.K.F.
Ethical rule: See Rule.
Ethics: (Gr. ta ethika, from ethos) Ethics (also referred to as moral philosophy) is that study or discipline which concerns itself with judgments of approval and disapproval, judgments as to the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, virtue or vice, desirability or wisdom of actions, dispositions, ends, objects, or states of affairs. There are two main directions which this study may take. It may concern itself with a psychological or sociological analysis and explanation of our ethical judgments, showing what our approvals and disapprovals consist in and why we approve or disapprove what we do. Or it may concern itself with establishing or recommending certain courses of action, ends, or ways of life as to be taken or pursued, either as right or as good or as virtuous or as wise, as over against others which are wrong, bad, vicious, or foolish. Here the interest is more in action than in approval, and more in the guidance of action than in its explanation, the purpose being to find or set up some ideal or standard of conduct or character, some good or end or summum bonum, some ethical criterion or first principle. In many philosophers these two approaches are combined. The first is dominant or nearly so in the ethics of Hume, Schopenhauer, the evolutionists, Westermarck, and of M. Schlick and other recent positivists, while the latter is dominant in the ethics of most other moralists.

Either sort of enquiry involves an investigation into the meaning of ethical statements, their truth and falsity, their objectivity and subjectivity, and the possibility of systematizing them under one or more first principles. In neither case is ethics concerned with our conduct or our ethical judgments simply as a matter of historical or anthropological record. It is, however, often said that the first kind of enquiry is not ethics but psychology. In both cases it may be said that the aim of ethics, as a part of philosophy, is theory not practice, cognition not action, even though it be added at once that its theory is for the sake of practice and its cognition a cognition of how to live. But some mornlists who take the second approach do deny that ethics is a cognitive discipline or science, namely those who hold that ethical first principles are resolutions or preferences, not propositions which may be true or false, e.g., Nietzsche, Santayana, Russell.

Ethical judgments fall, roughly, into tw o classes, (a) judgments of value, i.e. judgments as to the goodness or badness, desirability or undesirability of certain objects, ends, experiences, dispositions, or states of affairs, e.g. "Knowledge is good," (b) judgments of obligation, i.e. judgments as to the obligatoriness, rightness or wrongness, wisdom or foolishness of various courses of action and kinds of conduct, judgments enjoining, recommending or condemning certain lines of conduct. Thus there are two pnrts of ethics,

  1. the theory of value or axiology. which is concerned with judgments of value, extrinsic or intrinsic, moral or non-moral,
  2. the theory of obligation or deontology, which is concerned with judgments of obligation.
In either of these parts of ethics one mav take either of the above approaches -- in the theory of value one may be interested either in anilvzing and explaining (psychologically or sociologically) our various judgments of value or in establishing or recommending certain things as good or as ends, and in the theory of obligation one may be interested either in analyzing and explaining our various judgments of obligation or in setting forth certain courses of action as right, wise, etc.

Historically, philosophers have, in the main, taken the latter approach in both parts of ethics, and we may confine our remaining space to it. On this approach a theory of value is a theorv as to what is to be pursued or sought, and a theory of obligation, a theory as to what is to be done. Now, of these two parts of ethic, philosophers have generally been concerned primarily with the latter, busying themselves with the former only secondarily, usually because it seemed to them that one must know what ends are good before one can know what acts are tn be performed. They all offer both a theory of value and a theory of obligition, but it was not until the 19th and 20th centuries that value-theory became a separate discipline studied for its own sake -- a development in which important roles were played by Kant, Lotze, Ritschl, certain European economists, Brentano, Meinong, von Ehrenfels, W. M. Urban, R. B. Perry, and others.

In the theory of value the first question concerns the meaning of value-terms and the status of goodness. As to meaning the main point is whether goodness is definable or not, and if so, how. As to status the main point is whether goodness is subjective or objective, relative or absolute. Various positions are possible.

  1. Recent emotive meaning theories e.g. that of A. J. Ayer, hold that "good" and other value-terms have only an emotive meaning,
  2. Intuitionists and non-naturalists often hold that goodness is an indefinable intrinsic (and therefore objective or absolute) property, e.g., Plato, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, J. Laird, Meinong, N. Hartman.
  3. Metaphysical and naturalistic moralists usually hold that goodness can be defined in metaphysical or in psychological terms, generally interpreting "x is good" to mean that a certain attitude is taken toward x by some mind or group of minds.
For some of them value is objective or absolute in the sense of having the same locus for everyone, e.g., Aristotle in his definition of the good as that at which all things aim, (Ethics, bk. I). For others the locus of value varies from individual to individual or from group to group, i.e. different things will be good for different individuals or groups, e.g., Hobbes, Westermarck, William James, R. B. Perry.

The second question in value-theory is the question "What things are good? What is good, what is the highest good, etc.;" On this question perhaps the main issue historically is between those who say that the good is pleasure, satisfaction, or some state of feeling, and those who say that the good is virtue, a state of will, or knowledge, a state of the intellect. Holding the good to be pleasure or satisfaction are some of the Sophists, the hedonists (the Cyrenaic, the Epicureans, Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, Spencer, Schlick). Holding virtue or knowledge or both to be good or supremely good are Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Neo-Platonists, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, G. E. Moore, H. Rashdall, J. Laird, W. D. Ross, N. Hartmann.

In the theory of obligation we find on the question of the meaning and status of right and wrong the same variety of views as obtain in the theory of value: "right," e.g., has only an emotive meaning (Ayer); or it denotes an intuited indefinable objective quality or relation of an act (Price, Reid, Clarke, Sidgwick, Ross, possibly Kant); or it stands for the attitude of some mind or group of minds towards an act (the Sophists, Hume, Westermarck). But it is also often defined as meaning that the act is conducive to the welfare of some individual or group -- the agent himself, or his group, or society as a whole. Many of the teleological and utilitarian views mentioned below include such a definition.

On the question as to what acts are right or to be done ethical theories fall into two groups (1) Axiological theories seek to determine what is right entirely by reference to the goodness or value of something, thus miking the theory of obligation dependent on the theorv of value. For a philosopher like Martineau it is the comparative goodness of its motive that determines which act is right. For a teleologist it is the comparative amount of good which it brings or probably will bring into being that determines which act is right -- the egoistic teleologist holding that the right act is the act which is most conducive to the good of the agent (some Sophists, Epicurus, Hobbes), and the universalistic teleologist holding that the right act is the act which is most conducive to the good of the world as a whole (see Utilitarianism). (2) On deontological theories see Deontological ethics and Intuitionism.

Historically, one may say that, in general, Greek ethics was teleological, though there are deontological strains in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Christian moralists one finds both kinds of ethics, according as the emphasis is on the will of God as the source of duties (the ordinary view) or on the goodness of God as somehow the end of human life (Augustine and Aquinas), theology and revelation taking a central role in either case. In modern philosophical ethics, again, both kinds of ethics are present, with the opposition between them coming out into the open. Starting in the 17th and 18th centuries in Britain are both "intuitionism" (Cambridge Platonists, Clarke, Butler, Price, Reid, Whewell, McCosh, etc.) and utilitarianism (q.v.), with British ethics largely a matter of controversy between the two, a controversy in which the teleological side has lately been taken by Cambridge and the deontological side by Oxford. Again, in Germany, England, and elsewhere there have been, on the one hand, the formalistic deontologism of Kant and his followers, and, on the other, the axiological or teleological ethics of the Hegelian self-realizationists and the Wertethik of Scheler and N. Hartmann.

Ethical theories are also described as metaphysical, naturalistic, and non-naturalistic or intuitionistic. See Intuitionism., Non-naturalistic ethics, Metaphysical ethics, Naturalistic ethics, Autonomy of ethics.

Histories of Ethics: H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, Rev. Ed. 1931. Gives titles of the classical works in ethics in passing. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 1930.

Elementary Texts: T. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, Rev. Ed. 1932. W. M. Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics, 1930.

Treatises: H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed. 1907. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 19^9 N. Hartmann, Ethics, 3 vol., trans. 1932. M. Schlick, Problems of Ethics, trans. 1939. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, 1926. -- W.K.F.

Ethics, Absolute: A phrase which is sometimes used to designate an ethics which is put forth as absolute, see Absolutism, and sometimes, as by H. Spencer, to designate the formulation of the ideal code of conduct of an ideal man in the ideal society. See Relative Ethics. -- W.K.F.
Ethics, Relative: A term due to H. Spencer and used to designate any attempt to apply the ideal code of conduct formulated by Absolute Ethics to actual men in actual societies. See Absolute Ethics. -- W.K.F.
Ethos: (Gr. ethos) Character; moral purpose; distinguished by Aristotle from thought or intelligence as a source of dramatic action; hence that element in a dramatic composition which portrays character as distinct from the portrayal of thought or suffering. -- G.R.M.
Etiology: (1) The science or philosophical discipline which studies causality; (2) The science of the causes of some particular phenomenon, e.g. in medicine the science of the causes of disease. -- A.C.B.
Eucken, Rudolf: (1846-1926) Being a writer of wide popularity, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1908, Eucken defends a spiritualistic-idealistic metaphysics against materialistic naturalism, positivism and mechanism. Spiritual life, not being an oppositionless experience, is a struggle, a self-asserting action by resistance, a matter of great alternatives, either-ors between the natural and the spiritual, a matter of vital choice. Thus all significant oppositions are, within spiritual life itself, at once created and overcome. Immanence and transcendence, personalism and absolutism are the two native spiritual oppositions that agitate Eucken's system. Reconciliation between the vital dualities therefore depends not on mere intellectual insight, but on personal effort, courageous, heroic, militant and devoted action. He handles the basic oppositions of experience in harmony with the activist tenor of liberal Protestantism. Eucken sought to replace the prevailing intellectualistic idealism by an activistic idealism, founded on a comprehensive and historical consideration of culture at large. He sought to interpret the spiritual content of historical movements. He conceived of historical facts as being so many systematized wholes of life, for which he coined the term syntagma. His distinctive historical method consists of the reductive and the noological aspects. The former considers the parts directly in relation to an inward whole. The latter is an inner dialectic and immanent criticism of the inward principles of great minds, embracing the cosmologicnl and psychological ways of philosophical construction and transcending by the concept of spiritual life the opposition of the world and the individual soul. Preaching the need of a cultural renewal, not a few of his popularized ideas found their more articulated form in the philosophical sociology of his most eminent pupil, Max Scheler, in the cultural psychology of both Spranger and Spengler. His philosophy is essentially a call to arms against the deadening influences of modern life. -- H.H.
Euclid: (c. 400 B.C.) Of Megara, founder of the Megarian School. He was chiefly interested in the theory of refutation. See Megarians.

Euclid of Megara identified the good and the One. The many are unreal. Not to be confused with the great geometer who lived at Alexandria (c. 300 B.C.), author of the Elements in 13 books. -- M.F.

Eudaemonia: (Gr. eudaimonia) Happiness, or well-being, acclaimed by Aristotle as the universally recognized chief good, and described by him as consisting in the activ exrcise (energeia) of the soul's powers in accordance with reason. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Eudaemonism: (Gr. eu, well + daimon, spirit) Theory that the aim of right action is personal well-being or happiness, often contrasted with hedonism's aim at pleasure. -- A.J.B.
Euhemerism: The view that explains religious myths as traditional and partially distorted accounts of historical events and personages; from Euhemerus, Cyrenaic philosopher (c. 300 B.C.), who advanced the theory that the gods of mythology were deified heroes. -- G.R.M.
Euler diagram: The elementary operations upon and relations between classes -- complementation, logical sum, logical product, class equality, class inclusion -- may sometimes advantageously be represented by means of the corresponding operations upon and relations between regions in a plane. (Indeed, if regions are considered as classes of points, the operations and relations for regions become particular cases of those for classes.) By using regions of simple character, such as interiors of circles or ellipses, to stand for given classes, convenient diagrammatic representations are obtained of the possible logical relationships between two or more classes. These are known as Euler diagrams, although their employment by Euler in his Letters to a German Princess (vol. 2, 1772) was not their first appearance. Or the diagram may be so drawn as to show all possible intersections (2n intersections in the case of classes), and then intersections known to be empty may be crossed out, and intersections known not to be empty marked with an asterisk or otherwise (Venn diagram). -- A.C.
Eusebius of Caesarea: (265-340) Is one of the first great historians of the Christian Church. He was born at Caesarea, in Palestine, studied at the school of Pamphilus, became Bishop of Caesarea in 313. His works are in Greek and include a Chronicle, Ecclesiastical History, and a treatise On Theophanies (PG 19-24). His philosophical views are those of a Christian Platonist and he contributed to the development of the allegorical method of Scriptural exegesis. -- V.J. B.
Evaluation: Quantitative comparison of values. The appraisal of value; the estimation of worth. See Value. -- J.K.F.
E-values: Every descriptive value in as far as it is a statement of another individual. E-values divide into elements and characters. They are basic values independent of the System C whose function they are. (Avenarius.) -- H.H.
Event: (Lat. evenire, to happen, come out) Anything which happens, usually something which exhibits change and does not endure over a long time; hence opposed to object (q.v.) or thing. -- A.C.B.
Event-particle: A. N. Whitehead's term meaning a material event with all its dimensions ideally restricted. -- R.B.W.
Evidence: (Lat. e+videre, to see) Any supposed fact which is considered as supporting the truth of a given proposition. -- A.C.B.
Evidence: (Ger. Evidenz) In Husserl:

1. Usual (strict) sense: consciousness of an intended object as itself (more or less fully) given; experience in the broadest sense. Contrasted with empty intending. Perfect evidence is a regulative idea: In any particular evidence the object is also emptily intended as the object of further, confirmative, evidence. Evidence is either original ("perceptual" in the broadest sense) or directly reproductive ("memorial" in the broadest sense); again, it is either impressional or retentional evidence. Empirical evidence, in general, is the category of evidence of real individual objects; within this category, sensuous perceiving is original evidence of sensible real individuals and their sensible real individual determinations. For every other category of objects there is a corresponding category of evidence in general and original evidence in particular.

2. In a broader sense, "evidence" may be either immediate (evidence in the first sense) or mediate. E.g., an intended fact is mediately evident if (and only if) there is immediate evidence of its entailment as the consequence of an immediately evident fact.

3. In a still broader sense, evidence of an intended object may be indirect, i.e., by way of direct evidence (evidence in the first or second sense) of evidence of the intended object in some other consciousness, perhaps the consciousness belonging to another ego.

The concept of original evidence is accordingly relativized and broadened to include all kinds of consciousness in which the intended object is given in the most original manner possible for an object of its kind and status. Thus, e.g., clear direct remembering is original evidence of one's own retained past, qua past, and perceptive empathy is original evidence of another's consciousness. Evidence of every kind (and in each of the above-defined senses) has its parallel in phantasy (fictive consciousness). Fictive empirical evidence involves non-fictive evidence of the essential possibility of an individual having the fictively presented determinations. The evident incompatibility of fictively experienced determinations is evidence of the essential impossibility of any individual having such determinations. Apodictic evidence is evidence together with the further evidence that no conflicting evidence is essentially possible. Essential possibilities, impossibilities, and necessities, admit of apodictic evidence. The only actual individual object that can be an object of apodictic evidence is one's own subjectivity. Evidence is not to be confounded with certainty of positing (see Modality) nor conceived as restricted to apodictic evidence. Furthermore, it is evident that no evidence is a talisman against error. What is evident in one process may evidently conflict with what is evident in another, or, again, the range of evidence may be overestimated. Evidence is exemplified in valuing and willing as well as in believing. It is the source of all objective sense (see Apperception and Genesis) and the basis of all rationality (see Reason). -- D.C.

Evident: (Ger. evident) In Husserl: Both evidence and the object of evidence are called "evident". -- D.C.
Evil: (AS. yfel) Negation of the extrinsic elections of things. In practice, the positive effects of such negation. The morally bad. Hostility to the welfare of anything. Absence of the good. Opposite of goodness. See Ethics. -- J.K.F.
Evolution: The development of organization. The working out of a definite end; action by final causation. For Comte, the successive stages of historical development are necessary. In biology, the series of phylogenetic changes in the structure or behavior of organisms, best exemplified by Charles Darwin's Origin of Species. In cosmology, cosmogony is the theory of the generation of the existing universe in space and time. Opposite of: epigenesis. See Emergent evolution, Evolutionism. Cf. T. Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin. -- J.K.F.
Evolution, creative: The conserved pluri-dimensional life force causing all the numerous varieties of living forms, dividing itself more and more as it advances. (Bergson.) -- H.H.
Evolutionary ethics: Any ethical theory in which the doctrine of evolution plays a leading role, as explaining the origin of the moral sense, and, more especially, as contributing importantly to the determination of the moral standard, e.g. the ethics of Charles Darwin, H. Spencer, L. Stephen. Typical moral standards set up by evolutionists are adaptation, conduciveness to life, social health. Cf. H. Spencer, The Data of Ethics. -- W.K.F.
Evolutionism: This is the view that the universe and life in all of its manifestations and nature in all of their aspects are the product of development. Apart from the religious ideas of initial creation by fiat, this doctrine finds variety of species to be the result of change and modification and growth and adaptation rather than from some form of special creation of each of the myriads of organic types and even of much in the inorganic realm. Contrary to the popular notion, evolution is not a product of modern thought. There has been an evolution of evolutionary hypotheses from earliest Indian and Greek speculation down to the latest pronouncement of scientific theory. Thales believed all life to have had a marine origin and Anaximander, Anaximenes, Empedocles, the Atomists and Aristotle all spoke in terms of development and served to lay a foundation for a true theory of evolution. It is in the work of Charles Darwin, however, that clarity and proof is presented for the explanation of his notion of natural selection and for the crystallization of evolution as a prime factor in man's explanation of all phases of his mundane existence. The chief criticism leveled at the evolutionists, aside from the attacks of the religionists, is based upon their tendency to forget that not all evolution means progress. See Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Hemy Huxley, Natural Selection, Evolutionary Ethics. Cf. A. Lalande, L'Idee de dissolution opposee a celle de l'evolution (1899), revised ed. (1930): Les Illusions evolutionistes. -- L.E.D.
Exact: Opposite of vague (q. v.). -- A.C.
Excluded middle, law of, or tertium non datur, is given by traditional logicians as "A is B or A is not B." This is usually identified with the theorem of the propositional calculus, p ∨ ∼p to which the same name is given. The general validity of the law is denied by the school of mathematical intuitiontsm (q. v.). -- A.C.
Exclusive particularity, fallacy of: The unwarranted belief that a particular term belongs only to one system of terms; that it can function in only one relationship. -- H.H.
Exemplarism: (Lat. exemplum, a pattern or copy) The theological doctrine that finite things are copies of originals existing in the divine mind. -- L.W.
Exemplary cause: (Lat. exemplum, pattern or example) A form of causality resembling that exercised by the Ideas in Platonism, the rationes aeternae in Augustinianism and Thomism. The role of an archetypal, or "pattern" cause is much discussed in Scholastic metaphysics because of the teaching that the universe was created in accord with a Divine Plan consisting of the eternal ideas in the Mind of God. -- V.J.B.
Exemplification: (Ger. Exemphfizierung) In Husserl: The relation of an entity to any eidos or any universal type under which it falls as an instance or as containing a part which is an instance of the eidos or the type. Exemplification is distinguished from (a) the relation of species to genus, (b) the relation of a more detailed syntactical form to a less detailed, and (c) the relation of real embodiment to embodied ideal individual. -- D.C.
Exercite: (in Scholasticism) The exercise (exercitium) of, for example, understanding, walking, or doing something, indicates the act itself of understanding, of walking, or of doing something. Opposed to signate (signately) (q.v.). -- H.G.
Existence: (Lat. existere: to emerge) The mode of being which consists in interaction with other things. For Aristotle, matter clothed with form. Essences subjected to accidentst the state of things beyond their causes. The state of being actual, the condition of objectivity. In epistemology: that which is experienced. In psychology: the presence of a given datum in the physical universe at some date and place. Sometimes identified with truth or reality. Opposite of essence. See Actuality. -- J.K.F.
Existence: (Ger. Dasein, Existenz) In Husserl's writings the terms Dasein and Existenz are not given different senses nor restricted to the sphere of personal being, except with explicit reference to other writers who use them so. In Husserl's usage, "existence" means being (q.v.) of any kind or, more restrictedly, individual being. -- D.C.
Existential import: See Logic, formal, § 4.
Existential Philosophy: Determines the worth of knowledge not in relation to truth but according to its biological value contained in the pure data of consciousness when unaffected by emotions, volitions, and social prejudices. Both the source and the elements of knowledge are sensations as they "exist" in our consciousness. There is no difference between the external and internal world, as there is no natural phenomenon which could not be examined psychologically, it all has its "existence" in states of the mind. See Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers.

Existential Philosophy arose from disappointment with Kant's "thing-in-itself" and Hegel's metaphysicism whose failure was traced back to a fundamental misrepresentation in psychology. It is strictly non-metaphysical, anti-hypothetical, and contends to give only a simple description of existent psychological realities. "Existence" is therefore not identical with the metaphysical correlative of "essence". Consciousness is influenced by our nerveous system, nutrition, and environment; these account for our experiences. Such terms as being, equal, similar, perceived, represented, have no logical or truth-value; they are merely biological "characters", a distinction between physical and psychological is unwarranted. Here lies the greatest weakness of the Existential Philosophy, which, however, did not hinder its spreading in both continents.

Resuming certain ideas of Locke and Berkeley, it was first propounded by the physicist Kirchhoff, and found its best representation by Richard Avenarius (1843-96) in Menschlicher Welthegriff, and, independently, by Ernst Mach (1838-1916) in Anal, d. Empfindungen. Many psychologists (Wm. Wundt, 0. Kuelpe, Harold Hoeffding, E. B. Titchener) approved of it, while H. Rickert and W. Moog discredited it forcefully. Charles Peirce (Popular Science Monthly, Jan. 1878) and Wm. James (Principles of Psych. 1898) applied Avenarius' ideas, somewhat roughly though, for the foundation of ''Pragmatism". John Dewey (Reconstruction in Philos.) used it in his "Instrumentalism", while F. C. S. Schiller (Humanism) based his ethical theory on it. -- S.v.F.

Existential proposition: Traditionally, a proposition which directly asserts the existence of its subject, as, e.g., Descartes's "ergo sum" or the Christian's "Good exists." Expressed in symbolic notation, such a proposition has a form like (Ex)M.

By an extension of this, a proposition expressible in the functional calculus of first order may be called existential if the prenex normal form has a prefix containing an existential quantifier (see Logic, formal, § 3).

Brentano (Psychologie, 1874) takes an existential proposition (Existentialsatz) to be one that directly affirms or denies existence, and shows that each of the four traditional kinds of categorical propositions is reducible (i.e., equivalent) to an existential proposition in this sense; thus, e.g., "all men are mortal" becomes "immortal men do not exist." This definition of an existential proposition and the reduction of categorical propositions to existential appears also in Keynes's Formal Logic, 4th edn. (1906). -- A.C.

Existential Psychology: A school of introspective psychology represented in America by E. B. Titchener (1867-1927) which conceived the task of psychology to be the description, analysis and classification of the experiences of an individual mind considered as existences. Also called Existentialism. A characteristic doctrine of the school is the denial of imageless thought. -- L.M .
Existential quantifier: See Quantifier.
Exoteric: External; belonging to or suited for those who are not initiates or experts. The exoterikoi logoi referred to in Aristotle are popular arguments or treatises, as contrasted with strictly scientific expositions. -- G.R.M.
Expectation: 1. In general, the act or state of looking forward to an event about to happen. The grounds on which something is believed to happen. A supposition, an anticipation, a reasonable hope, a probable occurrence.

2. A mathematical expectation is the value of any chance which depends upon some contingent event. Thus, if a person is to receive an amount of money upon the occurrence of an event which has an equal chance of happening or failing, the expectation is worth half that amount. The mathematical expectation of life is the average duration of life (of an individual or a group) after a given age, as determined by computation from the mortality tables.

3. The term actuarial expectation is used analogically by Lloyd Morgan to denote the qualitative probability of the emergence of a genuine or primary novelty. -- T.G.

Experience: (Lat. Experientia, from experiri: to test) The condition or state of subjectivity or awareness. (The term differs from Consciousness by emphasizing the temporal or passing character of affective undergoing. Usage, however, is not uniform, since its definition involves a theoretical standpoint. Thus Bradley identified it with Consciousness, while W. James used it to mean neutral phenomenon, a That or Given, without implications of either subjectivity or objectivity.) -- W.L.
Experience, pure: The elimination of all presuppositions of thought. See Avenarius, Experientialism. -- H.H.
Experientialism: The resort to concrete experience, whether perceptual, intuitive, activistic, axiological, or mystical, as the source of truth. The opposite of Intellectualism. Experientialism is a broader term than Empiricism. -- W.L.
Experiment: (Lat. experiri, to try) Any situation which is deliberately set up by an investigator with a view to verifying a theory or hypothesis. -- A.C.B.
Experimental Psychology: (1) Experimental psychology in the widest sense is the application to psychology of the experimental methods evolved by the natural sciences. In this sense virtually the whole of contemporary psychology is experimental. The experimental method consists essentially in the prearrangement and control of conditions in such a way as to isolate specific variables. In psychology, the complexity of subject matter is such that direct isolation of variables is impossible and various indirect methods are resorted to. Thus an experiment will be repeated on the same subjects with all conditions remaining constant except the one variable whose influence is being tested and which is varied systematically by the experimenter. This procedure yields control data within a single group of subjects. If repetition of the experiment with the same group introduces additional uncontrolled variables, an equated control group is employed. Systematic rotation of variables among several groups of subjects may also be resorted to. In general, however, psychologists have designed their experiments in accordance with what has frequently been called the "principle of the one variable."

A distinction is frequently drawn between two observational methods in psychology: (a) introspection which appeals to private data, accessible to a single observer (see Introspection), and (b) objective observation of public data, accessible to a number of observers among whom there is substantial agreement (see Behaviorism). These two methods, though they are often regarded as disparate, may perhaps be more properly regarded as the extremes of a continuum of observational objectivity, many varying degrees of which can be found in psychological experimentation.

(2) The term experimental psychology is also used in a more restricted sense to designate a special branch of psychology consisting of laboratory studies conducted on normal, human adults as distinguished from such branches as child, abnormal, differential, animal or comparative, social, educational and applied psychology. This restricted sense is employed in the titles of text-books and manuals of "experimental psychology." Included in this field are such topics as sensory phenomena, perception, judgment, memory, learning, reaction-time, motor phenomena, emotional responses, motivation, thinking and reasoning. This identification of experimental psychology with a specific type of content is largely a result of historical accident, the first experimental psychologists were preoccupied with these particular topics.

The historical antecedents of experimental psychology are various. From British empiricism and the psychological philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume came associationism (see Associationism), the psychological implications of which were more fully developed by Herbart and Bain. Associationism provided the conceptual framework and largely colored the procedures of early experimental psychology. Physics and physiology gave impetus to experiments on sensory phenomena while physiology and neurology fostered studies of the nervous system and reflex action. The names of Helmholtz, Johannes Müller, E. H. Weber and Fechner are closely linked with this phase of the development of experimental psychology. The English biologist Galton developed the statistical methods of Quetelet for the analysis of data on human variation and opened the way for the mental testing movement; the Russian physiologist Pavlov, with his researches on "conditioned reflexes," contributed an experimental technique which has proved of paramount importance for the psychologist. Even astronomy made its contribution; variations in reaction time of different observers having long been recognized by astronomers as an important source of error in their observations.

The first laboratory of experimental psychology was founded at Leipzig in 1879 by Wundt, who has been called "the first professional psychologist." With such research as that of Stumpf on sound; G. E. Müller on psycho-physics, color and learning; Ebbinghaus on memory; and Kulpe and the Würzburg school on the "higher thought processes," experimental psychology made rapid strides within the next two decades. In America, the chief standard bearer of Wundtian psychology was Titchener. Among the others who were instrumental in the introduction and development of experimental psychology in America, may be mentioned James, Hall, Münsterberg, Cattell, and Watson.

Johannes Müller, Elements of Physiology, 1834-40.
E. H. Weber, De Tractu, 1851.
G. T. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik, 1860.
W. Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, 1873-4.
G. T. Fechner, In Sachen der Psychophysik, 1877.
G. E. Müller, Zur Grun&egung der Psychophystk, 1878.
G. E. Müller, Die Gesichtspunkte und die Tatsachen der Psychophysichen Methodik, 1904.
E. B. Titchener, Experimental Psychology, 1905.
Frobes, Lehrbuch der Experrmentellen Psychologic, 3rd ed., 1923.
E. G. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, 1929.
-- L.W.
Explanation: In general:
  1. the process, art, means or method of making a fact or a statement intelligible;
  2. the result and the expression of what is made intelligible;
  3. the meaning attributed to anything by one who makes it intelligible;
  4. a genetic description, causal development, systematic clarification, rational exposition, scientific interpretation, intelligible connection, ordered manifestation of the elements of a fact or a statement.

A. More technically, the method of showing discursively that a phenomenon or a group of phenomena obeys a law, by means of causal relations or descriptive connections, or briefly, the methodical analysis of a phenomenon for the purpose of stating its cause. The process of explanation suggests the real preformation or potential presence of the consequent in the antecedent, so that the phenomenon considered may be evolved, developed, unrolled out of its conditioning antecedents. The process and the value of a scientific explanation involve the question of the relation between cause and law, as these two terms may be identified (Berkeley) or distinguished (Comte). Hence modern theories range between extreme idealism and logical positivism. Both these extremes seem to be unsatisfactory: the former would include too much into science, while the latter would embrace a part of it only, namely the knowledge of the scientific laws. Taking into account Hume's criticism of causality and Mill's reasons for accepting causality, Russell proposes what seems to be a middle course, namely

  1. that regular sequences suggest causal relations,
  2. that causal relations are one special class of scientific generalization, that is one-way sequences in time, and
  3. that causal relations as such should not be used in the advanced stages of scientific generalization, functional relations being sufficient in all cases. However satisfactory in methodology, this view may not cover all the implications of the problem.

B. There are three specific types of causal explanation, and their results may be combined:

  1. genetic or in terms of the direct and immediate conditions or causes producing a phenomenon (formal and efficient cause);
  2. descriptive, or in terms of the material elements of the phenomenon (material cause);
  3. teleological, or in terms of the ultimate end to be attained (final cause), either in accordance with the nature of the event or with the intention of the agent.
The real causes of a phenomenon cannot be identified always, because the natural process of change or becoming escapes complete rationalization. But the attempt to rationalize the real by causal explanation, need not be abandoned in favor of a limited genetic description (postulational or functional) of the laws which may account for the particular phenomenon.

C. More formally, explanation is a step towards generalization or the establishment of a theory. It is the process of linking a statement of fact to its logical implications and consequences;or the process of fitting a statement of fact into a coherent system of statements extending beyond the given fact, or the construction of a logically related body of statements including the statement of fact to be justified. In the most general terms, explanation is the search for generalizations whose variables are functionally related in such a way that the value of any one variable is calculable from the value of the others, whether or not causal relations are noticeable or ultimately involved in the elements of the generalization. -- T.C.

Explication: (Ger. Auslegung) In Husserl: Synthesis of identification between a confused, non-articulated (internally indistinct, unseparated) sense and a subsequently intended distinct, articulated, sense. The latter is the explicate (Explikat) of the former. See Explanation. -- D.C.
Explicative judgment: (Lat. explicatio, unfolding) A mental action which explains a subject by mentally dissecting it, (Kant) a judgment in which the predicate is obtained by analysis of the subject. See Analytic judgment. -- V.J.B.
Exponible: Employed as a noun and as an adjective, applied to an obscure proposition which needs an exposition or explanation owing to a hidden composition. Kant applied it to propositions including an affirmation and a concealed negation, which an exposition makes apparent. -- J.J.R.
Exportation is the form of valid inference of the propositional calculus from AB ⊃ C to A⊃ [B ⊃ C]. The law of exportation is the theorem of the propositional calculus:
[pq ⊃ r] ⊃ [p ⊃ [q ⊃ r]].
-- A.C.
Expression: (Ger. Ausdruck) In Husserl: A symbol that embodies and signifies the noematic-objective sense of an act of thinking. The sense is expressed; the act, manifested. -- D.C.
Expressionism: In aesthetics, the doctrine that artistic creation is primarily an expressive act, a process of clarifying and manifesting the impressions, emotions, intuitions, and attitudes of the artist. Such theories hold that art has its foundation in the experiences and feelings of its creator; it is a comment on the artist's soul, not on any external object, and its value depends on the freshness and individuality of this creative spirit. The artist is he who feels strongly and clearly; his art is a record of what he has felt. It is maintained that the artist has no responsibility to respect reality nor to please an audience, and the primary synonyms of beauty become sincerity, passion, and originality. -- J.J.
Expressive Meaning: See Meaning, Kinds of, 4.
Extension: (Lat. ex + tendere, to stretch) Physical space, considered as a single concrete, continuum as contrasted with the abstract conceptual space of mathematics. The distinction between extension and "space" in the abstract sense is clearly drawn by Descartes (1596-1650) in The Principles of Philosophy, part II, Princ. IV-XV. -- L.W.

One of the two attributes (q.v.) of God which, according to Spinoza, are accessible to the human intellect (Ethics, II, passim). While the attribution of thought (cogitatio, q.v.) to God was a medieval commonplace, the attribution of extension to God was, in the tradition, highly heretical. Spinoza, however, was at great pains to show (Ibid, I, 14-18) that unless such attribution was made, all theories of God's causality were rendered either nonsensical or explicitly contradictory. -- W.S.W.

Extension: See Intension and Extension.
Extensionality, axiom of: See Logic, formal, § 9.
Extensity: A rudimentary spatiality alleged to characterize all sensation. See J. Ward, article "Psychology" in Encyclopaedia Bntannica, 9th Ed. pp. 46, 53 -- L.W.
Extensive quantity: Any quantity such that there exists some physical process of addition by which a greater quantity of the kind in question may be produced from a lesser one; opposed to intensive quantity (q.v.). -- A.C.B.
Exteriority: (Lit. exterior comp. of exter, without) The character of externality ascribed to physical objects by common sense and by realistic epistemology. -- L.W.
External: (Fr. externe, outer) Outside a thing. Independent of opinion. Capable of pressure or resistance. Used by Peirce (1839-1914) in contradistinction to mental. -- J.K.F.
External Reference: The tendency of the mind to objectify sensory data and construe them as referring to a real external world. See Intentionality. -- L.W.
External relations, Doctrine of: Neo-realistic view that relations are not grounded in the nature of their terms; that relations are independent of the terms; that terms can pass in and out of relations without being modified. -- H.H.
External sense: In Kant, intuition of spatial properties, as contrasted with the internal sense which is that of the a priori form of time.
External World: The ideally envisaged totality of objects of actual or possible perception conceived as constituting a unified system. -- L.W.
Externalization: (Lat. externus, external from exter, without) The mental act by which sensory data originally considered to be internal arc projected into the external world. See Introjection. The problem of externalization was formulated by Condillac in these words: "If one admits that sensations are only modifications of the mind, how does it come about that the mind apprehends them as objects independent of and external to it." Traite de sensations, Part III. -- L.W.
Exteroceptor: See Receptor.
Extramental: (Lat. extra + mens, mind) Possessing a status external to and independent of the knowing mind. Extramental status is attributed to physical objects by physical realists and to universals by Platonic realists. -- I.W.
Extraspective situations: "Situations in which we seem to be in direct cognitive contact with other minds and their states". (Broad.) -- H.H.
Extrinsic: (Lat. exter, out + secus, beside) Having external value. Value in the relation of wholes to other wholes. -- J.K.F.
Extrojection: (Lat. extra + jacere, to throw) The tendency of the mind to externalize sensuous qualities and even affective states. See External Reference. -- L.W.
Ezra, Abraham Ibn: Jewish exegete and philosopher (1093-1167). Born in Spain he wandered in many lands, sojourned for a time in Italy and Provence. His philosophy is expressed largely in his commentaries but also in several short treatises, such as the Yesod Mora, i.e. Foundation of the Knowledge of God, and the Shaar ha-Shamayyim, i.e., The Gate to Heaven. Main problems he deals with are that of the right conception of the universe and its becoming and that of knowledge. He was influenced by teachings of neo-Platonism and Gabirol. -- M.W.