Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1942.
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Fa chia: The Legalists School, the Philosophers of Law, also called hsing ming chia, who "had absolute faithfulness in reward and punishment as support for the system of correct conduct," and made no distinction between kindred and strangers and no discrimination between the honorable and the humble, but treated them as equals before the law. They emphasized the power natural to the position of a ruler (shih, especially Kuan Tzu, sixth century B.C. and Shen Tao, 350-275 B.C.?) statecraft (shu, especially Shen Pu-hai, 400-337 B.C.?), and law (fa, especially Shang Chun, 390-338 B.C.?), with Han Fei Tzu (280-233 B.C.) synthesizing all the three tendencies. -- W.T.C.
Fact: In Husserl: 1. State of affairs (Sachverhalt): an object having categorial-syntactical structure. 2. matter of fact (Tatsache, Faktum)
  1. that which simply is, as contrasted with that which is necessarily;
  2. that which is actual, as contrasted with that which is merely possible;
  3. that which is, regardless of its valuer ;
  4. that which is non-fictive.
-- DC.
Fact: (Lat. factus, pp. of facio, do) Actual individual occurrence. An indubitable truth of actuality. A brute event. Syn. with actual event. -- J.K.F.
Factual: See Meaning, Kinds of, 2.
Faculty: (Scholastic) Medieval psychology distinguishes several faculties of the soul which are said to be really distinct from each other and from the substance of the soul. According to Aquinas the distinction is based on objects and operations. The faculties are conceived as accidents of the soul's substance, but as pertaining essentially to its nature, therefore "proper accidents". The soul operates by means of the faculties. Much misunderstood and deteriorated, this theory remained alive until recent times and is still maintained, in its original and pure form, by Neo-Scholasticism. A certain rapprochement to the older notion may he observed in the modern theory of "general factors". Most of the criticisms directed against the faculty-psychology are based on modern experimental and nominalistic approaches. The faculties listed by Aquinas are:
  1. The sensory faculties, which to operate need a bodily organ;
    1. The external senses,
    2. The internal senses, sensus communis, memory, imagination, vis aestimativa (in animals) or cogitativa (in man),
    3. The sensory appetites, subdivided in the concupiscible appetite aiming at the attainable good or fleeing the avoidable evil, the irascible appetite related to good and evil whose attainment or avoidance encounters obstacles.
  2. The vegetative faculties, comprising the achievements of nutrition, growth and procreation. While the sensory appetites are common sto man and animals, the vegetative are observed also in plants.
  3. The locomotive faculty, characteristic of animals and, therefore, also of man.
  4. The rational faculties, found with man alone;
    1. Intellect, whose proper object is the universal nature of things and whose achievements are abstraction, reasoning, judging, syllogistic thought,
    2. Rational Will, directed towards the good as such and relying in its operation on particulars on the co-operation of the appetites, just as intellect needs for the formation of its abstract notions the phantasm, derived from sense impressions and presented to the intellect by imagination. The vis cogitativa forms a link between rational universal will and particular strivings; it is therefore also called ratio particularis.
Ch. A. Hart, The Thomisttc Theory of Mental Faculties, Washington, D. C, 1930. -- R.A.
Faculty Psychology: (Lat. facultas, faculty or ability) The conception of mind as the unity in a number of special faculties, like sensibility, intelligence, volition, by reference to which individual processes of sensation, thought or will are explained. Faculty psychology, which originated in Plato's division of the soul into the appetitive, the spirited and the rational faculties was the dominant psychology of the Middle Ages and received its most influential modern statement by C. Wolff (1679-1754) in his Rational Psychology, 1734. Faculty psychology is usually associated with the Soul Substance Theory of Mind. See Soul Substance. The common criticism of the theory is its circularity in attempting to explain individual mental processes in terms of a faculty which is merely the hypostatization of those processes. See J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690. Bk. II, Ch. xxi, § 17. -- L.W.
Faith: (Kant. Ger. Glaube) The acceptance of ideals which are theoretically indemonstrable, yet necessarily entailed by the indubitable reality of freedom. For Kant, the Summum Bonum, God, and immortality are the chief articles of faith or "practical" belief. See Kantianism. Cf. G. Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith, where faith is the non-rational belief in objects encountered in action. -- O.F.K.
Fallacy is any unsound step or process of reasoning, especially one which has a deceptive appearance of soundness or is falsely accepted as sound. The unsoundness may consist either in a mistake of formal logic, or in the suppression of a premiss whose unacceptability might have been recognized if it had been stated, or in a lack of genuine adaptation of the reasoning to its purpose. Of the traditional names which purport to describe particular kinds of fallacies, not all have a sufficiently definite or generally accepted meaning to justify notice. See, however, the following:
affirmation of the consequent;
denial of the antecedent;
ignoratio elenchi;
illicit process of the major;
illicit process of the minor;
many questions;
noncausa pro causa;
non sequitur;
petitio prtncipii;
post hoc ergo propter hoc;
quaternio terminorum; secundum quid;
undistributed middle;
vicious circle
. -- A. C.
Fan or fu: The greatest of all the laws underlying phenomenal change, that if any one thing moves to an extreme direction, a change must bring about an opposite result, called "reversion" or "return". Reminds one of Hegel's antithesis. (Lao Tzu.) -- H.H.
Fang hsin: The lost heart, i.e., the originally good mind which has turned away from the principles of benevolence and righteousness. (Mencius.) -- W.T.C.
Fang shih: "Scholars with formulae," or priests and magicians who flourished in the Ch'in and Han dynasties (249 B.C-220 A.D.) and who offered divination, magic, herbs, charms, alchemy, breath technique, and other crafts (fang shu) and superstitions in terms of Yin Yang and Taoist philosophies, as means to immortality, inward power, restored youth, and superhuman ability. -- W.T.C.
Fang shu: Divination and magic. See Fang shih. -- W.T.C.
Fantastic: (Art) Product of an arbitrary imagination without any claim to reality. -- L.V.
Fatalism: (Lat. fatalis, fatal) Determinism, especially in its theological form which asserts that all human activities are predetermined by God. Sec Determinism. -- L.W.
Fechner, Gustav Theodor: (1801-1887) Philosophizing during the ascendency of modern science and the wane of metaphysical speculation, Fechner though as physicist believing in induction, analogy, history and pragmatic procedure, expounded a pure, objective idealism of Berkeley's type. With Oken and Schelling as spiritual guides, he held that everything is in consciousness, there are no substances, no things-in-themselves, everything, including animals, plants, earth, and heavens, shares the life of the soul (alles ist beseelt). In a consequent psycho-physicalism he interpreted soul (which is no substance, but the simplifying power in contrast to the diversifying physical) as appearance to oneself, and matter as appearance to others, both representing the same reality differentiated only in point of view. He applied the law of threshold to consciousness, explaining thus its relative discontinuity on one level while postulating its continuity on another, either higher or lower level. In God, as the highest rung of existence, there is infinite consciousness without an objective world. Evil arises inexplicably from darker levels of consciousness. With poetic imagination Fechner defended the "day-view" of the world in which phenomena are the real content of consciousness, against the "night-view" of science which professes knowledge of the not-sensation-conditioned colorless, soundless world.

Main works:
Nanna o.d. Seelenleben d. Pflanzen, 1848;
Ueber die physikalische u. philos. Atomenlehre, 1855;
Elemente der Psychophysik, 1860;
Drei Motiven des Glaubens, 1863;
Vorschule der Aesihetik, 1876.

See K. Lasswitz, G. Th, Fechner, 1896. -- K.F.L.

Feeling: (Ger. Gefühl) In Husserl: 1. Noetic processes of valuing (e.g., liking, disliking, preferring). 2. Non intentional, "hyletic", processes or states, immanent in the stream of consciousness. See Hyle and Noesis. -- D.C.
Feeling: (Kant. Ger. Gefühl) A conscious, subjective impression which does not involve cognition or representation of an object. Feelings are of two kinds: pleasures and pains. These represent nothing actual in objects, but reveal the state or condition of the subject. Kant saw in pleasure and pain, respectively, life-promoting and life-destroying forces; pleasure results from the harmony of an object with the subjective conditions of life and consciousness, while pain is the awareness of disharmony. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Felicific: Making happy; conducive to happiness or pleasure. -- G.R.M.
Feuerbach. Ludwig Andreas: (1804-1872) Was one of the earliest thinkers manifesting the trend toward the German materialism of the 19th century. Like so many other thinkers of that period, he started with the acceptance of Hegel's objective idealism, but soon he attempted to resolve the opposition of spiritualism and materialism. His main contributions lay in the field of the philosophy of religion interpreted by him as "the dream of the human spirit" essentially an earthly dream. He publicly acknowledged his utter disbelief in immortality, which act did not fail to provoke the ire of the authorities and terminated his academic career.

L. A. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, 1840; Philosophie u. Christentum, 1859. See Engels. -- R.B.W.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: (1762-1814) Skillful in framing the general conception of a few great ideas, Fichte's thought centered in a passionate espousal of Kant's practical reason or of autonomous good will as the creative source of all that is distinctive in personality. He sought to discern the method of the psychogenetic process of the acceptance of the moral law as supreme. He assumed that consciousness, including the representations of physical objects that make up the outer world, is the product of one ultimate cause in the universe. The world in which each individual lives is his own world, brought into being through the creative agency of the ultimate.

Thinking was to Fichte a wholly practical affair, a form of action. Since experience is given in the form of consciousness, the origin and nature of consciousness is the key to all problems. The ego is the point at which the creative activity of the Absolute emerges in the individual consciousness. The world means nothing of itself. It has no independent self-existence. It exists for the sole purpose of affording man the occasion for realizing the ends of his existence. It is merely the material for his duty. Fichte sought to bring out the structural principles of the knowing act.

His popular works, influential in the German uprising against Napoleon, have been interpreted as being a source of Pan-Germanism.

J. G. Fichte,
Versuch einer Kritik alter Offenbarung, l792;
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794;
Grundlage des Naturrechts, 1798;
System der Sittenlehre;
Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1800;
Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1800;
Grundzüge d. Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1804-5;
Die AnWeisung zum seligen Leben, 806.
-- H.H.
Ficino, Marsilio: Of Florence (1433-99). Was the main representative of Platonism in Renaissance Italy. His doctrine combines NeoPlatonic metaphysics and Augustinian theologv with many new, original ideas. His major work, the Theologia Ptatonica (1482) presents a hierarchical system of the universe (God, Angelic Mind, Soul, Quality, Body) and a great number of arguments for the immortality of the soul. Man is considered as the center of the universe, and human life is interpreted as an internal ascent of the soul towards God. Through the Florentine Academy Ficino's Platonism exercised a large influence upon his contemporaries. His theory of "Platonic love" had vast repercussions in Italian, French and English literature throughout the sixteenth century. His excellent Latin translations of Plato (1484), Plotinus (1492), and other Greek philosophers provided the occidental world with new materials of the greatest importance and were widely used up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. -- P.O.K.
Fiction: Whenever a symbol, as part of an utterance, occurs in such a context that the truth of any utterance of the same form would normally guarantee the existence of an individual denoted by that symbol, whereas in the case considered no such implication holds, the symbol may be said to occur fictitiously in that context. Thus in the utterance "The average man is six feet tall" the phrase "the average man" occurs fictitiously. For "X is less thin six feet tall" normally implies that there is an individual denoted by "X". But there is no individual denoted by "the average man".

If "S" occurs fictitiously it is customary to say that S is a fictitious entity or a fiction. (The language is unfortunate as falsely suggesting that in such case there is a special kind of entity denoted by S and having the property of being fictitious.)

It is to be noted that a symbol "S" occurs fictitiously only if the complex token "C(S)", containing "S", does not fully display the logical form of the utterance. In such cases the fictitious character of the occurrence of S is revealed by translation of the utterance (e.g. by translating remarks about the average man in such a way as to remove any apparent reference to a specific person).

The definition is suggested by that of Jeremy Bentham. Reference: C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, 12. See also Incomplete Symbol, Construction. -- M.B.

(Lat. fictio, from fingere, to devise, or form) A logical or imaginative construction framed by the mind to which nothing corresponds in reality. See Construction, Imaginative. -- L.W.

Fictionism: An extreme form of pragmatism or instrumentalism according to which the basic concepts and principles of natural science, mathematics, philosophy, ethics, religion and jurisprudence are pure fictions which, though lacking objective truth, are useful instruments of action. The theory is advanced under the influence of Kant, by the German philosopher H. Vaihinger in his Philosophie des Als Ob, 1911. Philosophv of the "As If." English translation by C. K. Ogden.) See Fiction, Construction. -- L. W.
Fideism: A doctrine of Abbe Bautain which attempted to justify the teachings of Christianity by the theory that all knowledge rested upon premises accepted by faith. The premises of religion are to be found in the tradition of the Synagogue and Church. This tradition needs no rational criticism because it is self-critical. The doctrine was condemned in 1840 by Gregory XVI. -- G.B.
Fides: Faith, according to St. Augustine, means, to believe that which one does not see: Fides ergo est, quod non vides credere. That is the reason why faith is praiseworthy. Haec est enim laus fidei, si quod creditur non videtur. -- J.J.R.
Figure (syllogistic): The moods of the categorical syllogism (see Logic, formal, § 5) are divided into four figures, according as the middle term is subject in the major premiss and predicate in the minor premiss (first figure), or predicate in both premisses (second figure), or subject in both premisses (third figure), or predicate in the major premiss and subject in the minor premiss (fourth figure). Aristotle recognized only three figures, including the moods of the fourth figure among those of the first. The separation of the fourth figure from the first (ascribed to Galen) is accompanied by a redefinition of "major" and "minor" -- so that the major premiss is that involving the predicate of the conclusion, and the minor premiss is that involving the subject of the conclusion. -- A.C.
Filioque: See Trinitarianism.
Final Causes, the doctrine of: The view that things and events in the world can be explained, and ultimately can best be explained, by reference to some end or purpose or good or final cause to which they are conducive. Held, e.g., by Aristotle and Leibniz. -- W.K.F.
Finalism: The theory that purpose is present in all the events of the physical order. Teleology. -- R.T.F.
Fine Arts: Opposite of mechanical arts. Distinction of the arts whose principle is based on beauty (poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music). -- L.V.
Finite: For the notion of finiteness as applied to classes and cardinal numbers, see the article cardinal number. An ordered class (see order) which is finite is called a finite sequence or finite series. In mathematical analysis, any fixed real number (or complex number) is called finite, in distinction from "infinity" (the latter term usually occurs, however, only as an incomplete symbol, in connection with limits, q. v.). Or finite may be used to mean bounded, i.e., having fixed real numbers as lower bound and upper bound. Various physical and geometrical quantities, measured by real numbers, are called finite if their measure is finite in one of these senses. -- A.C.
First Heaven: The outermost sphere in the Aristotelian cosmology, the sphere of the fixed stars. -- G.R.M.
First Mover: See Prime Mover.
First Philosophy: (Gr. prote philosophia) The name given by Aristotle (1) to the study of the principles, first causes and essential attributes of being as such; and (2) more particularly to the study of transcendent immutable i being; theology. -- G.R.M.
Fischer, Kuno: (1824-1907) Is one of the series of eminent German historians of philosophy, inspired by the impetus which Hegel gave to the study of history. He personally joined in the revival of Kantianism in opposition to rationalistic, speculative metaphysics and the progress of materialism.

K. Fischer, Gesch. der neueren Philosophie, 10 vols., 1854-1877. -- H.H.

Fiske, John: (1842-1901) Harvard librarian and philosopher. He is best known as an historian of the colonial period. He was a voluminous writer in many fields. His Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy is his best known work as a pioneer in America of the evolutionary theories. He claimed an original contribution to these speculations in his studies of the period of infancy. His works on God and on immortality were widely read in his day although he later expressed doubts about them. Nevertheless his constant emphasis on the theistic as opposed to the positivistic implications of evolution served to influence the current theories of creative and emergent evolution. See Evolutionism. -- L.E.D.
Florentine Academy: It was a loose and informal circle of scholars and educated persons which gathered in Florence around the Platonic philosopher Marsilio Ficino. Its activities consisted in regular lectures on Platonic philosophy as well as in informal discussions and parties. "Platonic" love or friendship was considered as the spiritual link between the members of the group which was organized and named after the model of Plato's Academy. The main documents describing it are Ficino's correspondence and a number of dialogues like Ficino's commentary on Plato's Symposion, Landino's Disputationes Camaldulenses , and Benedetto Colucci's Declamationes. Outstanding members or associates of the Academy were Cosimo, Piero, and Lorenzo de'Medici, Angelo Poliziano, and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. The Academy which was first founded in 1462, dissolved after the revolution in Florence (1494) and after Ficino's death (1499), but the tradition of Platonic philosophy was continued in other private circles as well as at the universities of Florence and Pisa throughout the sixteenth century. -- P.O.K.
Flux: The characteristic of time, by virtue of which all things change inevitably. In Heracleitus' view, who brought the problem into prominence, "all things flow; nothing abides". -- R.B.W.
Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm: (1869) Is a German ethicist and pedagogical authority. He was born in Berlin and taught at the Universities of Vienna and Munich. In 1927 he went to Paris and has recently been living in Zurich. He is most noted for his forthright criticism of the moral tenets of German National Socialism. His principal work are: Jugendlehre (1904), Schule und Charakter, 14th ed. (1930), Politische Ethik und Padagogik, 4th ed. (1920). -- V.J.B.
Folk-Art: A fragmentary art in which the artistic elements are not bound together by an artistic personality. -- L.V.
Folkways: (AS folc) Customs. Conventions. Mores. Traditional group behavior patterns. Cf. Sumner, Folkways. -- A.J.B.
Foreknowledge: Knowledge of the future of which two types may be distinguished: (a) anticipation or prescience which professes to be immediate and non-inferential and (b) expectation, which is inferential prediction of the future on the basis of the remembered or recorded past. See Anticipation, Prescience, Expectation. -- L.W.
Foreordination: The doctrine that events of one's life, even one's eternal destiny, are determined beforehand by Deity. See Predestination. -- V.F.
Foreshortening: Application of perspective to plastic bodies, occupying space in depth. -- L.V.
Form: (Gr. eidos) The intelligible structure, characters constituting a substance or species of substances, as distinguished from the matter in which these characters are embodied; essence; formal cause. See Aristotelianism. -- G.RM.

In Art: a. Opposite of content. The conclusive aspect of art, the surpassing of emotions, taste, matter, the final imprint of the personality of the artist, b. Opposite of color. The plastic form achieved by drawing and chiaroscuro- -- L.V.

Form: (in Kant) That a priori element in experience in virtue of which the manifold of sense is synthcsized and unified into meaningful perceptions and judgments. Kant attributed the form of experience to mind and reason, the matter to sensuous intuition. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.

In Scholasticism. Accidental; That which comes to a subject already substantially complete, e.g. roundness or whiteness.

Substantial form: Substance distinct from matter ordered in itself in such a way that with prime matter it constitutes a natural body; for -- since matter is indifferent to any composite, it is determined by the form united to itself, so that it may be, e.g., a stone, or a dog. or wood. There are as many substantial forms as there are different bodies.

Metaphysical: Is the substantial essence of the whole thing -- as rational animal is said to bt the metaphysical form of man. -- H.G.

Form, logical: See Logic, formal.
Forma: Latin noun meaning shape, figure, appearance, image; also plan, pattern, stamp, mould. As a philosophic term used by Cicero and Augustine in the sense of species, and similarly by Scotus Eriugena. Boethius and fhe mediaeval writers employed it in the Aristotelian sense of a constituent of being, synonymous with causa formalis. Generally speaking it is an intrinsic, determining, perfective principle of existence of any determinate essence. More strictly it is a forma substantialis, or that constitutive element of a substance which is the principle or source of its activity, and which determines it to a definite species, or class, and differentiates it from any other substance. It is distinguished from a forma accidentalis which confers a sort of secondary being on a substance already constituted in its proper species and determines it to one or other accidental mode, thus a man may become a musician. A forma corporeitatis is one by which a being is a body, on which its corporeal nature and essence depend and which is its principle of life. A forma non-subsistens or materialis is one whose existence depends on matter without which it cannot exist and be active. It is distinguished from a forma subsistens or immaterialis which can exist and act separately from matter. An immaterial form may be an incomplete substance, like the human soul, which is created to be united with a body to complete its own species, or a complete substance, a pure spirit, which is not destined to be united with matter to which it cannot communicate its being, hence it is also called a forma separata. -- J.J.R.
Formal: 1. In the traditional use: valid independently of the specific subject-mattei; having a merely logical meaning (see Meaning. Kinds of, 3). 2. Narrower sense, in modern logic: independent of, without reference to meaning (compare Semiotic, 3). -- R.C.
Formal Cause: See Form; Aristotelianism.
Formalism: (a) In ethics: the term is sometimes used as equivalent to intuitionism in the traditional sense. See Intuitionism. Also used to designate any ethical theory, such as Kant's, in which the basic principles for determining our duties are purely formal. See Ethics, formal. -- W.K.F.

(b) In art A form for form's sake, lacking in content. -- L.V.

Formalism (mathematical) is a name which has been given to any one of various accounts of the foundations of mathematics which emphasize the formal aspects of mathematics as against content or meaning, or which, in whole or in part, deny content to mathematical formulas. The name is often applied, in particular, to the doctrines of Hilbert (see Mathematics), although Hilbert himself calls his method axiomatic, and gives to his syntactical or metamathematical investigations the name Beweistheorie (proof theory, (q. v.). -- A.C.
Formalization: (Ger. Formalisierung) In Husserl: 1. (objective) Ideational "abstraction" from the determination of an object as belonging in some material region. The residuum is a pure eidetic form. 2. (noematic) Substitution, in a noematic-objective sense, e.g., the sense signified by a sentence, of the moment "what you please" for every materially determinate core of sense, while retaining all the moments of categorial form. Noematic formalization reduces a determinate objective sense to a materially indeterminate categorial sense-form. See Algebraization, Generalization, and Ideation. -- DC.
Formally: (in Scholasticism) Is sometimes trtken for mentally, i.e. according to the formalities which we distinguish by the mind alone. When formally is so understood, it has as its correlative really. Thus the omnipotence and the wisdom of God are not really but formally distinct.

It is also said of the thing considered in itself or in its proper entity. It then has various correlatives as the aspects of the thing compared vary:

(1) If compared with an effect, its correlative will be efficiently: e.g. food is the life of man not formally but efficiently.

(2) If compared with an object, its correlative will be objectively: e.g. God is said to be the hope of a just man not formally but objectively i.e. God is not the hope of man, but the object of that hope.

(3) If compared with in exemplar, a likeness in accordance with which a thing is made, the correlative will be exemplarily: e.g. the image of Caesar existing in the painter's imagination concurs with the picture of Caesar's image not formally but exemplarily.

(4) If compaied with an end, the correlative is finally: e.g. eternal happiness is said to move man to act rightly not formally but finally, as in end to be attained.

(5) If compared with another thing connected with it, whose existence is inferred from or simply accompanies it, its correlative will be illatively connectively: e.g. in smoke we recognize fire not formally but illatively.

(6) If compared with a thing whose existence is imputed to it, its correlative will be imputativly.

(7) If compared with a thing of which it is the root, the correlative will be radically, e.g. we say that almost all evils consist in a disordered self-love not formally but radically.

(8) If compared with those qualities which constitute a disposition for having that thing, the correlative will be dispositively. Thus the dryness of wood will result in fire not formally but dispositively.

(9) If compared with a thing from which it receives some denomination (or designation) its correlative will be denominatively e.g. when some part of the body is formally ill, man himself or the whole man is said to be denominatively ill.

Meaning the same as truly and properly -- then it has as correlatives: apparently, metaphorically.

Meaning the same as essentially, so that the predicate which is said to belong the subject formally, enters into the essence and definition of the subject. Thus man is formally animal. Formally, so understood has various correlatives, according to the various aspects under which the essence of a thing can be considered:

(1) An essence can be compared with accidental predicates and then its correlative is accidentally: e.g. a man is said to be not formally, but accidentally white.

(2) An essence can be compared with the attributes or parts of a thing which like the matter of a subject may indifferently constitute that thing or another, and then the correlative is materially: e.g. man is said to be materially flesh.

When said of an effect: An effect is taken formally when it is looked at according to itself, but it is taken radically or fundamentally when it is looked at according to its cause, root, or foundation. Thus visibility taken formally is a property of man, and is distinguished by the mind from rationality; but taken radically, it is the same as rationality, inasmuch as rationality is the root of visibility.

When referring to causes containing the perfection of their effect. Formally, virtually, and eminently are said of causes according as they contain the perfection of their effect. For an effect is said to be contained formally in its cause, when the nature of the effect which is produced, is found in the cause itself, thus heat is contained formally in fire, because fire also contains in itself the heat which it produce. An effect is contained virtually in its cause when the cause can indeed produce such an effect, but the nature of the effect is not found in the cause itself, e.g. the statue is contained virtually in the artist. Lastly, an effect is contained eminently in its cause, when the cause is much more perfect than the effect and is without the imperfections which are found in the effect. E.g. God eminently contains the perfections of creatures. -- H.G.

Founded: (Ger. fundiert) In Husserl: 1. The character of one noetic-noematic stratum as presupposing the presence of another, the founding stratum. 2. The character of an act or an act-correlate as containing founded and founding strata. E.g., intending something as a tool is founded in intending "the same" as a material thing; correlatively, the tool-sense is founded in the mere-thing-sense. -- D.C.
Four Elements: The four primary kinds of body recognized by the Greek philosophers, viz. fire, air, water, and earth. -- G.R.M.
Frank, Philipp: (b. 1884) A member of the "Vienna Circle," who has made his home in the U. S. He has been avowedly influenced by Mach. His major work lies on the borderline between philosophy and physics and he makes an effort "to employ only concepts which will not lose their usefulness outside of physics."

Ph. Frank, Between Physics and Philosophy (Harvard, 1941). -- R.B.W.

Freedom: (Kant. Ger. Freiheit) The autonomy or self-determination of rational beings. Kant considers the reality of freedom an indubitable, albeit an inexplicable, fact, and places it at the fulcrum of his entire system, theoretical as well as practical. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.
Freedom, Sense of: The subjective feeling of an agent either at the moment of decision or in retrospect that his decision is free and that he might, if he had chosen, have decided differently. This feeling is adduced by Free-Willists as empirical evidence for their position but is interpreted by their opponents as a subjective illusion. See Free-Will. -- L.W.
Free-will: The free-will doctrine, opposed to determinism, ascribes to the human will freedom in one or more of the following senses:
  1. The freedom of indeterminacy is the will's alleged independence of antecedent conditions, psychological and physiological. A free-will in this sense is at least partially uncaused or is not related in a uniform way with the agent's character, motives and circumstances.
  2. The freedom of alternative choice which consists in the supposed ability of the agent to choose among alternative possibilities of action and
  3. The freedom of self-determination consisting in decision independent of external constraint but in accordance with the inner motives and ideals of the agent.
See Determinism, Indeterminism. -- L. W.
Frege, (Friedrich Ludwig) Gottlob, 1848-1925, German mathematician and logician. Professor of mathematics at the University of Jena, 1879-1918. Largely unknown to, or misunderstood by, his contemporaries, he is now regarded by many as "beyond question the greatest logician of the Nineteenth Century" (quotation from Tarski). He must be regarded -- after Boole (q. v.) -- as the second founder of symbolic logic, the essential steps in the passage from the algebra of logic to the logistic method (see the article Logistic system) having been taken in his Begriffsschrift of 1879. In this work there appear tor the first time the propositional calculus in substantially its modern form, the notion of propositional function, the use of quantifiers, the explicit statement of primitive rules of inference, the notion of an hereditary property and the logical analysis of proof by mathematical induction or recursion (q. v.). This last is perhaps the most important element in the definition of an inductive cardinal number (q.v.) and provided the basis for Frege's derivation of arithmetic from logic in his Grundlagen der Anthmetik (1884) and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. 1 (1893), and vol. 2 (1903). The first volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is the culmination of Frege's work, and we find here many important further ideas. In particular, there is a careful distinction between using a formula to express something else and naming a formula in order to make a syntactical statement about it, quotation marks being used in order to distinguish the name of a formula from the formula itself. In an appendix to the second volume of Grundgesetze , Frege acknowledges the presence of an inconsistency in his system through what is now known as the Russel paradox (see Paradoxes , logical), as had been called to his attention by Russell when the book was nearly through the press. -- A.C.

P.E.B. Jourdain,
Gottlob Frege, The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 43 (1912), pp. 237-269.
H Scholz,
Was ist ein Kalkul und was hat Frege fur eine punktliche Beantwortung dieser Frage geleistet?, Semester-Berichte (Münster i. W.), summer 1935, pp. 16-47.
Scholz and Bachmann,
Der wissenschaftliche Nachlass von Gottlob Frege, Actes du Congres International de Philosophie Scientifique (Pans, 1936), section VIII, pp. 24-30.

Freud. Sigmund: (1856-1940) Founder of the Psvcho-analytic school (see Psycho-Analysis), studied medicine at the University of Vienna, and becoming interested in the treatment of neuroses, went to Paris in 1885 to study under Charcot and later examined the methods employed by the Nancy school. In his own practice, he employed hypnotic methods of treatment (see Hypnosis, Hypnotism) in combination with his own techniques of free association and dream interpretation. (The Interpretation of Dreams, German ed., 1900.) Psychopathology of Everyday Life, German ed., 1901.) Freud not only developed a therapeutic technique for the treatment of hysteria and neuroses but advanced an elaborate psychological theory of which the main tenets are the predominance of sex and the doctrine of the subconscious.

Freud's writings in addition to those already include: Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious, 1905; General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, Eng. trans., 1920-1 -- L.W.

Fries, Jakob Friedrich: (1773-1843) Eminent German philosopher. The contribution of Fries lies in the continuation of Kant's work as offered in New or Anthropological Criticism of Reason and by his system of philosophy as exact science.

J. F. Fries,
Rechtslehre, 1804;
Wissen, glauben u. Ahnung, 1805;
Neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1807;
System der Logik, 1811;
Psychische Anthropologie, 1821.
-- J.K.
Fringe, Psychical: See Consciousness, Field of.
Frui: St. Augustine distinguished frui, to enjoy, from uti to use. We use the things of this world; we are to enjoy God, of whom St. Augustine writes: Ista temporalia dedit ad utendum, se ad fruendum. -- J.J.R.
Fu: Correspondence, especially that between man and the Universe in the macrocosm-microcosm relationship. Tung Chung-shu, 177-104 (B.C.) -- W.T.C.
Fulfilment: (Ger. Erfüllung) In Husserl: Synthesis of identification, based on conscious processes, in the earlier of which the intended object is intended emptily or is given less evidently than it is in the later. The more evident conscious process is said to fulfil (or to fill) and clarify the noematic-objective sense of the less evident.

Positive fulfilment: Fulfilment in which the objective senses of the fulfilled and fulfilling processes harmonize.

Negative fulfilment: Fulfilment in which the objective senses of the fulfilled and fulfilling processes conflict. Fulfilment cannot be completely negative, since that would preclude synthesis of identification. -- D.C.

Fulguration: Is a lightning flash of the mind. To Leibniz, the monads are God's perpetual fulguration, Monadology, 47. -- J.M.
Function: In mathematics and logic, an n-adic function is a law of correspondence between an ordered set of n things (called arguments of the function, or values of the independent variables) and another thing (the value of the function, or value of the dependent variable), of such a sort that, given any ordered set of n arguments which belongs to a certain domain (the range of the function), the value of the function is uniquely determined. The value ot the function is spoken of as obtained by applying the function to the arguments. The domain of all possible values of the function is called the range of the dependent variable. If F denotes a function and X1, X2, . . . , Xn denote the first argument, second argument, etc., respectively, the notation F(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is used to denote the corresponding value of the function; or the notation may be [F](X1, X2 . . . , Xn), to provide against ambiguities which might otherwisc arise if F were a long expression rather than a single letter.

In particular, a monadic function is a law of correspondence between an argument (or value of the independent variable) and a value of the function (or value of the dependent variable), of such a sort that, given any argument belonging to a certain domain (the range of the function, or range of the independent variable), the value of the function is uniquely determined. If F denotes a monadic function and X denotes an argument, the notation F(X) is used for the corresponding value of the function.

Instead of a monadic function, dyadic function, etc., one may also speak of a function of one variable, a function of two variables, etc. The terms singulary or unary (= monadic), binary (= dyadic), etc., are also in use. The phrase, "function from A to B" is used in the case of a monadic function to indicate that A and B (or some portion of B) are the ranges of the independent and dependent variables respectively -- in the case of a polyadic function to indicate that B (or some portion of B) is the range of the dependent variable while the range of the function consists of ordered sets of n things out of A.

It is sometimes necessary to distinguish between functions in intension and functions in extension, the distinction being that two n-adic functions in extension are considered identical if they have the same range and the same value for every possible ordered set of n arguments, whereas some more severe criterion of identity is imposed in the case of functions in intension. In most mathematical contexts the term function (also the roughly synonymous terms operation, transformation) is used in the sense of function in extension.

(In the case of propositional functions, the distinction between intension and extension is usually made somewhat differently, two propositional functions in extension being identical if they have materially equivalent values for even set of arguments.)

Sometimes it is convenient to drop the condition that the value of a function is unique and to require rather that an ordered set of arguments shall determine a set of values of the function. In this case one speaks of a many-valued function.

Often the word function is found used loosely for what would more correctly be called an ambiguous or undetermined value of a function, an expression containing one or more free variables being said, for example, to denote a function. Sometimes also the word function is used in a syntactical sense -- e.g., to mean an expression containing free variables.

See the article Propositional function. -- Alonzo Church

Functional calculus: See Logic, formal, §§ 3, 6.
Functional Psychology: (Lat. functio from fungor, I execute) A tendency in American psychology represented by W. James, G. T. Ladd, G. S. Hall, J. Dewey and J. R. Angell which considered the mental processes of sense perception, emotion, volition and thought as functions of the biological organism in its adaptation to and control of its environment. Functionalism arose as a protest against structural psychology for which the task of psychology is the analysis and description of consciousness. The functional theory of mind is characteristic of the pragmatism and instrumentalism of C. S. Pierce, W. James, G. H. Mead and J. Dewey. See C. H. Morris, Six Theories of Mind, Ch. VI. -- L.W.
Functional Theory of Mind: See Functional Psychology.
Functionalism: See Functional Psychology.
Functor: In the terminology of Carnap, a functor is a sign for a (non-propositional) function (q. v.). The word is thus synonymous with (non-proposittonal) function symbol. -- A.C.
Fundamentum divisionis: (Lat.) Principle according to which a genus is subdivided into species. -- A.C.B.
Fusion, Psychic: See Psychic Fusion.
Future: That part of time which includes all the events which will happen; these events may be conceived as determined in advance, though unknown, or as an indefinite potentiality, not fixed in advance, but subject to chance, free choice, statistical determination, or Divine interference. In Aristotle, assertions about the future are always contingent or non-apodeictic. -- R.B.W.