S

Main work: L'Industrie on discussions politiques, morales, et philosophiques, dans l'interet de tous les hommes livres a des travaux utiles et independants, 1817. Cf. Oeuvres de Saint-Simon, 46 vols., 1865-77.

1. the natural or physical sanction, i.e., the ordinary course of nature,
2. the virtuous or moral sanction, i.e., the ordinary actions and judgments of one' fellows,
3. the civil or political sanction, i e , the threat of punishment or the promise of reward made by the government,
4. the religious sanction, i.e., the fear of God, etc.

Matter, among other things, is external to and independent of consciousness, spatially extended, unequally distributed (corporeal), subject to locomotion and perhaps to intrinsic alteration in its parts, and capable of becoming conscious. Its selective and progressive enactment of essences is not teleological or intelligent, but is actuated by efficient causation and predetermined by antecedent situations.

In organic bodies matter may become conscious. Mind, being an activity of the body, and unsubstantial, is not causally effective, but simply entertains and contemplates essences both enacted and unenacted. Its registration of the natural functions and drives of the body of which it is the aura, is desire, which gives values like truth, goodness, and beauty to the essences entertained. The desire to know, satisfied by intelligibility, creates science, which is investigation of the world of enacted essences, where alone the explanation of things is to be found.The natural desire to experience social harmony and to contemplate beauty creates morality, art, poetry and religion, which entertain in imagination and seek to make concrete by action, combinations of essences, often unenacted and purely ideal.

These desires and drives, however, tend to stray beyond their proper provinces and to become intermingled and confused in attempts to identify truth, goodness, and beauty, to turn justifications into explanations, to regard subsistent ideals as concretely existent facts, and to distort facts into accordance with desired ideals. It is the business of reason and philosophy to clear up this confusion by distinguishing human drives and interests from one another, indicating to each its proper province and value, and confining each to the field in which it is valid and in which its appropriate satisfaction may be found. By so doing, they dispel the suspicion and antagonism, with which the scientist, the moralist, the artist, and the theologian are wont to view one another, and enable a mind at harmony with itself to contemplate a world in which subsistent and the existent form a harmonious whole. --

Main works:

Sense and Beauty, 1896;

Interpret. of Poetry and Religion, 1900;

Life of Reason, 5 vols , 1905-6 (Reason in Common Sense, Reason in Society, Reason in Religion, Reason in Art, Reason in Science);

Winds of Doctrine, 1913;

Egotism in German Philosophy, 1915;

Character and Opinion in the U. S., 1920;

Skepticism and Animal Faith, 1923;

Realms of Being, 4 vols., 1927-40 (Realm of Essence, Realm of Matter, Realm of Truth, Realm of Spirit).

(2) a proposition about a method of obtaining knowledge: that every hypothesis should be subjected to continual testing; that the only or the best or a reliable method of obtaining knowledge of one or more of the above kinds is to doubt until something indubitable or as nearly indubitable as possible is found; that wherever evidence is indecisive, judgment should be suspended; that knowledge of all or certain kinds at some point rests on unproved postulates or assumptions;

(3) a proposition about values: that morality is entirely a matter of individual preference; or that there are no fixed and eternal values; or that all values are relative to time, place, or other circumstance (these propositions, properly or improperly, have been called scepticism because of their association with certain other propositions here mentioned);

(4) a method of intellectual caution; systematic suspense of judgment on the basis of some criteria of certainty or truth; criticism, particularly in absence of conclusive evidence; questioning or doubting as a means to gaining absolute or relative certainty;

(5) an attitude, belief, postulate, assumption, assertion, or tendency favoring any of the above propositions or methods; an attitude of complete or dogmatic disbelief, an attitude involving greater inclination to disbelief than to belief; an attitude involving no greater inclination to belief than to disbelief nor to disbelief than to belief, but favoring dispassionate consideration. Scepticism may be treated as such attitudes, beliefs, etc., as applied to all or only certain particular propositions;

(6) a proposition negating the sincerity, rectitude, or existence of motives of human conduct other than selfish or at least negating their significance in human affairs, or a proposition expressing lack of confidence in the worth or hope of success of any one or all of man's enterprises (cynicism), or an attitude, belief, postulate, assumption, assertion, or tendency favoring such propositions, or moroseness, surliness, or pessimism growing out of cynicism or any of the aforesaid attitudes, beliefs, etc. Confusion of cynicism with other conceptions of scepticism may result in great misunderstanding and harm. See Pyrrhonism, agnosticism. -- M.T.K.

Michalski, C.,

Les sources du criticisme et du scepticisme dans la philosophie, du XIV e s., (Cracovie, 1924).

Pelster, F.,

Heinrich v. Harclay u. seine Quaestionen, Miscel. Fr. Ehrle, I, 307-355.

Rashdall, H.,

"Nicholas de Ultricuria, a medieval Hume," Proc. Aristotel. Soc. (Lond. 1907) N. S. VIII, 1-27.

Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (1900);

Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1916);

Vom Ewigen in Menschen (1921); Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1923);

Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (3 vols., 1923-1924);

Die Wissensformen und dte Gesellschaft (1926);

Die Stellung des Menschen in Kosmos (1928);

Philosophische Weltanschauung (1929);

Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre (1933).

In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Analytic): The procedure of the imagination by which the categories of the understanding are applied to the manifold of sensuous intuitions. Imagination, working with the pure form of time, connects sense and understanding. This is possible because the imagination contains an element of both sense and understanding, and thus is capable of formulating the rules and procedures by means of which sensuous representations may be subsumed under pure concepts. See Kantianism. -- O.F.K.

Complete works: Werke 32 vols., 1835-64. Cf. W. Dilthey: Das Leben Schleiermachers.

Major publications: Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin 1925; Gesammelte Aufsätze, Wien, l938; Problems of Ethics (Rynin, transl.), New York 1939. -- S.S.S.

Hence in its widest sense Scholasticism embraces all the intellectual activities, artistic, philosophical and theological, carried on in the medieval schools. Any attempt to define its narrower meaning in the field of philosophy raises serious difficulties, for in this case, though the term's comprehension is lessened, it still has to cover many centuries of many-faced thought. However, it is still possible to list several characteristics sufficient to differentiate Scholastic from non-Scholastic philosophy.

1. While ancient philosophy was the philosophy of a people and modern thought that of individuals, Scholasticism was the philosophy of a Christian society which transcended the characteristics of individuals, nations and peoples. It was the corporate product of social thought, and as such its reasoning respected authority in the forms of tradition and revealed religion.
2. Tradition consisted primarily in the systems of Plato and Aristotle as sifted, adapted and absorbed through many centuries.
3. It was natural that religion, which played a paramount role in the culture of the middle ages, should bring influence to bear on the medieval, rational view of life. Revelation was held to be at once a norm and an aid to reason. Since the philosophers of the period were primarily scientific theologians, their rational interests were dominated by religious preoccupations. Hence, while in general they preserved the formal distinctions between reason and faith, and maintained the relatively autonomous character of philosophy, the choice of problems and the resources of science were controlled by theology.
4. The most constant characteristic of Scholasticism was its method. This was formed naturally by a series of historical circumstances,
   1. The need of a medium of communication, of a consistent body of technical language tooled to convey the recently revealed meanings of religion, God, man and the material universe led the early Christian thinkers to adopt the means most viable, most widely extant, and nearest at hand, viz. Greek scientific terminology. This, at first purely utilitarian, employment of Greek thought soon developed under Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origin, and St. Augustine into the "Egyptian-spoils" theory; Greek thought and secular learning were held to be propaedeutic to Christianity on the principle: "Whatever things were rightly said among all men are the property of us Christians." (Justin, Second Apology, ch. XIII). Thus was established the first characteristic of the Scholastic method: philosophy is directly and immediately subordinate to theology.
   2. Because of this subordinate position of philosophy and because of the sacred, exclusive and total nature of revealed wisdom, the interest of early Christian thinkers was focused much more on the form of Greek thought than on its content and, it might be added, much less of this content was absorbed by early Christian thought than is generally supposed. As practical consequences of this specialized interest there followed two important factors in the formation of Scholastic philosophy:
      1. Greek logic en bloc was taken over by Christians;
      2. from the beginning of the Christian era to the end of the XII century, no provision was made in Catholic centers of learning for the formal teaching of philosophy. There was a faculty to teach logic as part of the trivium and a faculty of theology.
      For these two reasons, what philosophy there was during this long period of twelve centuries, was dominated first, as has been seen, by theology and, second, by logic. In this latter point is found rooted the second characteristic of the Scholastic method: its preoccupation with logic, deduction, system, and its literary form of syllogistic argumentation.
   3. The third characteristic of the Scholastic method follows directly from the previous elements already indicated. It adds, however, a property of its own gained from the fact that philosophy during the medieval period became an important instrument of pedogogy. It existed in and for the schools. This new element coupled with the domination of logic, the tradition-mindedness and social-consciousness of the medieval Christians, produced opposition of authorities for or against a given problem and, finally, disputation, where a given doctrine is syllogistically defended against the adversaries' objections. This third element of the Scholastic method is its most original characteristic and accounts more than any other single factor for the forms of the works left us from this period. These are to be found as commentaries on single or collected texts; summae, where the method is dialectical or disputational in character.

Though the roots of Scholasticism are to be found in the preoccupation of the Patristical (vide) period, its proper history does not begin until the Carolingian renaissance in the ninth century. From that date to the present day, its history may be divided into seven divisions.

I. Period of Preparation (9-12 cent.). Though he does not belong in time to this period, the most dominant figure in Christian thought was St. Augustine (+430), who constructed the general framework within which all subsequent Scholastic speculation operated. Another influential figure was Boethius (+525) whose opuscula sacra established the Scholastic method and who furnished many of the classical definitions and axioms. The first great figure of this period was John Scottus Erigena (+c. 877) who introduced to Latin thought the works of Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite, broadened the Scholastic method by his glossary on Boethius' opuscule sacra and made an unfruitful attempt to interest his contemporaries in natural philosophy by his semi-pantheistic De Divisione Naturae. Other figures of note: Gerbert (+1003) important in the realm of mathematics and natural philosophy; Fulbert of Chartres (+1028) influential in the movement to apply dialectics to theology; Berengar of Tours (+1088) Fulbert's disciple, who, together with Anselm the Peripatetic, was a leader in the movement to rationalize theology. Peter Damiani (+1072), preached strongly against this rationalistic spirit. More moderate and more efficacious in his reaction to the dialectical spirit of his age was Lawfranc (+1089), who strove to define the true boundaries of faith and reason.

II. Early Scholastics (12 cent.) St. Anselm of Canterbury (+1109) did more than anyone else in this early period to codify the spirit of Scholasticism. His motto: credo, ut tntelligam taken from St. Augustine, expressed the organic relation that existed between the supernatural and the natural during the Middle Ages and the interpretative and the directive force which faith had upon reason. In this period a new interest was taken in the problem of the universals. For the first time a clear demarcation was noted between the realistic and the nominalistic solutions to this problem. William of Champeaux (+1121) proposed the former and Roscelin (+c. 1124) the latter. A third solution, concepiualistic in character, was proposed by Abelard (+1142) who finally crystalized the Scholastic method. He was the most subtle dialectician of his age. Two schools of great importance of this period were operating at Chartres and the Parisian Abbey of St. Victor. The first, founded by Fulbert of Chartres in the late tenth century, was characterized by its leanings toward Platonism and distinguished by its humanistic tendencies coupled with a love of the natural sciences. Many of its Greek, Arabian and Jewish sources for studies in natural sciences came from the translations of Constantine the African (+c. 1087) and Adelard of Bath. Worthy to be noted as members of or sympathizers with this school are Bernard and Thierry of Chartres (+c. 1127; c. 1150); William of Conches (+1145) and Bernard Silvestris (+1167). The two most important members of the School were Gilbert de la Poiree (+1154) and John of Salisbury (+1180). The latter was a humanistic scholar of great stylistic skill and calm, balanced judgment. It is from his works, particularly the Metalogicus, that most of our knowledge of this period still derives. Juxtaposed to the dialectic, syllogistic and rationalistic tendencies of this age was a mystical movement, headed by St. Bernard of Clairvaux (+1153). This movement did not oppose itself to dialectics in the uncompromising manner of Peter Damiani, but sought rather to experience and interiorize truth through contemplation and practice. Bernard found a close follower and friend in William of St. Thierry (+1148 or 1153). An attempt to synthesize the mystic and dialectical movements is found in two outstanding members of the Victorine School: Hugh of St. Victor (+1141) who founded its spirit in his omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse supervuum and Richard of St. Victor (+1173), his disciple, who introduced the a posteriori proof for God's existence into the Scholastic current of thought. Finally, this century gave Scholasticism its principal form of literature which was to remain dominant for some four centuries. While the method came from Abelard and the formulas and content, in great part, from the Didascalion of Hugh of St. Victor, it was Robert of Melun (+1167) and especially Peter the Lombard (+1164) who fashioned the great Summae sententiarum.

III. Golden Age (13 cent.). The sudden elevation of and interest in philosophy during this period can be attributed to the discovery and translation of Aristotelian literature from Arabian, Jewish and original sources, together with the organization of the University of Paris and the founding of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders. Names important in the introduction and early use of Aristotle are Dominic Gundisalvi, William of Auvergne (+ 1149), Alexander Neckam (+1217), Michael Scot (+c. 1234) and Robert Grosseteste (+ 1253). The last three were instrumental in interesting Scholastic thought in the natural sciences, while the last (Robert), if not the author of, was, at least, responsible for the first Summa philosophiae of Scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy has now reached the systematizing and formularizing stage and so on the introduction of Aristotle's works breaks up into two camps: Augustinianism, comprising those who favor the master theses of Augustine and look upon Aristotle with varying degrees of hostility; Aristotelianism, comprising those who favor Aristotle, without altogether abandoning the Augustinian framework.

Augustinianism. Alexander of Hales (+1245) is the founder of this line and the first great Scholastic to utilize all of Aristotle's works, whose terminology and concepts he adopted rather than the spirit. Others worthy of mention are John de la Rochelle (+1145), Adam of Marsh (+1258) and Thomas of York (+1260). The Metaphysica of this latter constitutes a milestone in philsophy's fight for autonomy. The outstanding representative of this group is Bonaventure (+1274), who combined great constructive ability with profound psychological and mystical insight. Prominent among his pupils were Matthew of Aquasparta (+1302), John Peckham (+1292), William de la Mare (+1298) and Walter of Brügge (+1306). Also prominent in this line are Roger of Marston, Richard of Middleton (+1308), a forerunner of Duns Scotus, William of Ware, Duns Scotus' master, and Peter Johannis Olivi (+1298). Among the Dominicans who belonged to this group should be mentioned Roland of Cremona, Peter of Tarantaise (+1276), Richard Fitzacre (+1248) and Robert Kilwardby (+1279). Among the secular clergy, although more independent in their allegiance, we may place here Gerard of Abbeville and Henri of Ghent (1293).

Aristotelianism. In this group there are two broad currents of thought. The first attempted to harmonize Aristotle with St. Augustine and the Church's dogmas. This line was founded by St. Albert the Great (+1280), who amassed the then known Aristotelian literature but failed to construct any coherent synthesis. His pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas (+1274) succeeded to a remarkable degree. From the standpoint of clarity and formularization, St. Thomas marks the apex of medieval Scholasticism. Pupils and adherents worthy of note among Albert's, Hugo and Ulrich of Strassburg, this latter (+c. 1277), together with Dietrich of Freiberg (+c. 1310) revealing marked Neo-platonic tendencies; among Thomas', Aegidius of Lessines (+1304), Herveus Natalis (Herve Nedelec, +1318), John (de Regina) of Naples (+c. 1336), Aegidius Romanus (+1316), Godfrey of Fontaines ( + 1306 or 1309), quite independent in his allegiance, and the great Dante Alighieri (+1321).

The second broad current of thought is Latin Averroism. This movement, accepting Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle and his doctrine of separated orders of truth, gave birth to the two-truth theory which eventually led to rationalism and which together with nominalism brought about the first decline of Scholasticism. The main proponents of this period were Siger of Brabant (+1282), Boece of Dacie and perhaps Bernier of Nivelles.

Another movement of thought worthy of note was Neoplatonism. Grounded by Ulrich of Srassburg on texts found in Albert the Great, this movement gathered momentum, particularly in Germany under Dietrich of Freiberg until it ended in the mysticism of Meister Eckehart (+1327).

Other figures worthy of mention who fit wholly into none of the above currents of thought are Raymond Lull (+1315), an active opponent of Averroism and the inventor of the famous Ars magna which intrigued young Leibnitz; Roger Bacon (+c. 1293) who under the influence of Platonism, furthered the mathematical and experimental methods; William of Moerbeke (+1286), one of the greatest philologists of the M.A., who greatly improved the translations of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic literature by consulting directly Greek sources; the first proponents of the via moderna doctrine in Logic, William Shyreswood (+1249) and Petrus Hispanus (+1277).

Finally the period ends with the great John Duns Scotus (+1308), whose thought is characterized by great acuteness and a fine critical sense. In opposition to that of St. Thomas, his synthesis lays greater stress on the traditional Augustinian theses.

IV. First Decline. (14-16 cent.) St. Thomas' position in many points had been so radical a departure from the traditional thought of Christendom that many masters in the late XIII and early XIV centuries were led to reexamine philosophy in the light of Aristotle's works. This gave rise to a critical and independent spirit which multiplied systems and prepared for the individualism of the Renaissance. Noteworthy in this movement are James of Metz, Durand de St. Pourcain (+1334), Peter Aureoli (+1322) and Henry of Harclay (+1317). The greatest figure, however, is William of Occam (+1349), founder of modern thought, who renewed the Nominalism of the XI and XII cent., restricted the realm of reason but made it quite independent in its field. In reaction to this critical and independent movement, many thinkers gathered about the two great minds of the past century. Thomas and Duns Scotus, contenting themselves with merely reproducing their masters' positions. Thus Scholasticism broke up into three camps: Thomism, Scotism and Nominalism or Terminism; the first two stagnant, the third free-lance.

Nominalism: critical and skeptical, this is the largest and most influential school of the period. Important members are, first, Occam's pupils Adam Wodham (+1358), Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot (+1349), then come Gregory of Rimini (+1358), John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, a medieval Hume, John Buridan (+c. 1360) and Nicholas of Oresme (+1382), two forerunners of modern physics and astronomy, Albert of Sachsen (+1390), first Rector of University of Vienna, Peter d'Ailly (+1420), John Gerson (+1429), Marsilius of Inghen (+1396), first Rector of Heidelberg, and Gabriel Biel (+1495), who introduced Luther to Occamism.

Scotism: from the standpoints of number and influence, this was the next most important school of this period. Among the pupils of Duns Scotus, may be mentioned Anthony Andreas (+1320), Francis of Meyronnes (de Mayronis) (+1325) and John de Bassolis (+1347). Walter Burleigh (+1343) was a vigorous opponent of Nominalism; Thomas Bradwardine (+1349), a mathematician and philosopher whose determinism influenced John Wiclif (+1384), John Hus and the German reformers. In the XV cent., this school is represented by William of Vaurouillon (+1464), Nicholas of Orbelhs (+1455), John Anglicus, Thomas Bricot and the great Peter Tartaret (+1494).

Thomists: John Capreolus, Thomistarum princeps, (+1444), Denis the Carthusian (+1471) and Peter Nigri (+c. 1484). Two other important schools of this period are the Latin Averroists and the Mystics. In the first group we find Peter d'Abano (+1315) who made Padua the center of this movement, John of Jandun (+1328), John Baconthorp (+1348), Averroistarum princeps, Paul of Perusio, Paul of Venice (+1429), Cajetan of Tiene (+1465).

The mystical school, dominated by Eckehart, and the famous Peter Pomponazzi (+1525), is represented by Tauler (+1361) and Seuse (+1366), who tried to conform the Master's teaching with the Church's dogmas, and Jan van Ruysbroeck (+1381). From this school stemmed the anonymous "Deutsche Theologie" which Luther edited (1516). Gerson belonged to this group and also Nicholas of Cusa (+1464), the first systematic philosopher of modern times.

V. Spanish Renaissance (16-17 cent.). This renaissance took place in the Thomistic school and was remotely prepared for by such figures as Thomas del Vio (Cajetan) (+1534), Peter Crockaert (+1514), Francis de Sylvestris (+1528), Conrad Koellin (1536) and Chrysostom Javellus (+1550). It began as a concerted movement under Francis Victoria (+1566) at Salamanca and Ignatius Loyola (+1556), founder of the Society of Jesus. Dominicans of note were: Dominic Soto (1560), Melchior Cano (+1560), de Medina (+1581), and Banez (+1604). Jesuits: Francis Toledo (+1596), Fonseca (+1599), Molina (+1600), Vasquez (+1604), Lessius (+1623), de Valentia (+1603), B»llarmine (+1625), Francis Suarez (+1617), the greatest philosopher and jurist of this period, whose Disputationes Metaphysicae constitutes perhaps the greatest philosophical work produced by Scholasticism. Others worthy of mention: Cosmas de Lerma (+1642), John a S. Thoma (+1644), Goudin (+1695), Philip a SS. Trinitate (+1671), Ruiz de Montoya (+1632), Cosmas Alamannus (+1634), Hurtado de Mendoza (+1651), De Lugo (+1660), Arriaga (+1667), Sylvester Maurus (+1687).

Among the Scotists active during this period: Maurice a Portu (+1513), Francis Lychetus a Brixia (+1520), John Poncius (+1660), Bellutus (+1671) and Mastrius (+1673).

In the second half of the XVII cent, a group of Scholastics attempted to modify the traditional system by adopting some of the modern theses particularly from Cartesianism. This tendency, together with the conservative reaction which accompanied it, brought about the second decline of Scholasticism. Two leaders in this movement were Emmanuel Maignau (+1676) and Honoratus Fabri (+1688).

VI. Second Decline (18-19 cent.). This group and its tendencies were continued by Du Hamel (+1706), Tolomei (+1726), Fortunatus a Brixia (+1754), Steinmeyer (+1797) and Reuss (+1798). Among the conservatives: Louis de Lossada (+1748). In 1773 the Society of Jesus was suppressed. This disaster completed the downfall of Scholasticism. Not until its restoration in 1814 did the Church's traditional philosophy revive. Prominent in preparing for this second renaissance was the Jesuit-trained Vincent Bruzzetti (+1824). Others: Taparelli (+1862), Liberatore (+1872), Sanseverino (+1865), Kleutgen (+1883), Zigliara (+1893) and Gonzalez (+1895). For the first time in the modern period, history began to play an important part in Scholasticism. Karl Werner (+1888) and Al. Stoeckl (1895) were the first figures in this movement.

VII. Leonine Restoration (1879). The Encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII gave this new movement a conscious direction. Since Leo XIII's time to the present day, Catholic Scholars have been active both in the fields of speculation and history. Numerous reviews have been founded and Scholasticism has raised its voice even in the non-sectarian Universities of America. -- W.G.

Sämmtliche Werke, ed. P. Deussen, 14 vo!s. -- K.F.L.

J. Lüroth. Ernst Schröder, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, vol. 12 (1903). pp. 249-265; reprinted in Schröder's Algebra der Logik, vol. 2, part 2.

No very precise definition of the term is possible since the discipline shades imperceptibly into science, on the one hand, and into philosophy in genetal, on the other. A working division of its subject-matter into three fields is helpful in specifying its problems, though the three fields should not be too sharply differentiated or separated.

1. A critical study of the method or methods of the sciences, of the nature of scientific symbols and of the logical structure of scientific symbolic svstems. Presumably such a study should include both the empirical and the rational sciences. Whether it should also include the methods of the valuational studies (e.g., ethics, esthetics) and of the historical studies, will depend upon the working definition or science accepted by the investigator. Valuational studies are frequently characterized as "normative" or "axiological" sciences. Many of the recognized sciences (e.g., anthropology, geology) contain important historical aspects, hence there is some justification for the inclusion of the historical method in this aspect of the philosophy of science. As a study of method, the philosophy of science includes much of the traditional logic and theory of knowledge. The attempt is made to define and further clarify such terms as induction, deduction, hypothesis, data, discovery and verification. In addition, the more detailed and specialized methods of science (e.g., experimentation, measurement, classification and idealization) (q.v.) are subjected to examination. Since science is a symbolic system, the general theory of signs plays an important role in the philosophy of science.

2. The attempted clarification of the basic concepts, presuppositions and postulates of the sciences, and the revelation of the empirical, rational, or pragmatic grounds upon which they are presumed to rest. This aspect of the philosophy of science is closely related to the foregoing but includes, in addition to the logical and epistemological subject-matter, a large portion of metaphysics. Roughly, the task here is two-fold. On the one hand it involves the critical analysis of certain basic notions, such as quantity, quality, time, space, cause and law, which are used by the scientist but not subjected to examination. On the other hand it includes a similar study of certain presupposed beliefs, such as the belief in an external world, the belief in the uniformity of nature, and the belief in the rationality of natural processes.

3. A highly composite and diverse study which attempts to ascertain the limits of the special sciences, to disclose their interrelations one with another, and to examine their implications so fir as these contribute to a theory either of the universe as a whole or of some pervasive aspect of it. This aspect of the philosophy of science is the least precise and definite of the three, and employs the more speculative methods. One of the most characteristic of its problems is that of the classification of the sciences. This involves the attempt to construct a general table, or diagram, or map of the sciences which will properly integrate the sciences according to method, subject-matter, or some other principle of organization. Another characteristic problem is that of the implications of science for some general theory of the universe, e.g., idealism, materialism, positivism, mechanism, teleology, monism, or pluralism. In recent years a new type of problem has appeared which, if it is properly part of the philosophy of science at all, belongs to this aspect of the subject. This is the problem of the social relations of science. It examines such problems as the place of science in a given cultural scheme, e.g., its relations to government, business, art, religion and morality.

Bibliography:

Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, 1892.

Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, 1905.

W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, 1907.

J. A. Thomson, An Introduction to Science, 1911.

N. Campbell, What is Science?, 1921.

C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, 1923.

A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method, 1923.

E. W. Hobson, Domain of Natural Science, 1923.

A. S. Eddington, Nature of the Physical World, 1929.

M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 1931.

A. C. Benjamin, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 1937.

W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science, 1940.

I. Vienna Circle; Logical Positivsm, Logical Empiricism.

1. The Vienna Circle, founded by M. Schlick (q.v.) in 1924, ending with his death in 1936. Among its members: G. Bergmann, R. Carnap (q.v.), H. Feigl, Ph. Frank (q.v.), K. G&oUML;del (q.v.), H. Hahn (d. 1934), O. Neurath, F Waismann.
2. Seen historically, the movement shows influences from three sides
   1. the older empiricism and positivism, especially Hume, Mill, Mach;
   2. methodology of empirical science, as developed by scientists since about the middle of the 19th century, e.g., Helmholtz, Mach, Poincare. Duhem, Boltzmann, Einstein;
   3. symbolic logic and logical analysis of language as developed especially by Frege, Whitehead and Russell, Wittgenstein.
   Russell (q.v.) was the first to combine these trends and therefore had an especially strong influence.
3. The views developed in the V. C. have been called Logical Positivism (A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, J. Phil. 28, 1931); many members now prefer the term "Logical Empiricism". Among the characteristic features: emphasis on scientific attitude and on co-operation, hence emphasis on intersubjective (q.v.) language and unity of science. Empiricism: every knowledge that is factual (see Meaning, Kinds of, 1), is connected with experiences in such a way that verification or direct or indirect confirmation is possible (see Verification).

   The emphasis on logical analysis of language (see Semiotic) distinguishes this movement from earlier empiricism and positivism. The task of philosophy is amlysis of knowledge, especially of science; chief method: analysis of the language of science (see Semiotic; Meaning, Kinds of).

4. Publications concerning the historical development of this movement and its chief views: Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, Wien 1929 (with bibliography). O. Neurath, Le Developpement du Cercle de Vienne, et l'Avenir de l'Empirisme Logique, 1935. C. W. Morris, Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism, Paris 1937. E. Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe", I, II, tic Empiricism in Germany, and the Present State of its Problems. Ibid. E. Nagel, "The Fight for Clarity: Logical Empiricism", Amer. Scholar, 1938. Many papers by members of the group have been published in "Erkenntnis" since 1930, now continued as "Journal of Unified Science".

   Compare M. Black, "Relations between Logical Positivism and the Cambridge School of Analysis", J. Un. Sc. 8, 1940.

II. Scientific Empiricism. A wider movement, comprising besides Logical Empiricism other groups and individuals with related views in various countries. Also called Unity of Science Movement.

Among its members W. Dubislav (1937), K. Grelling, O. Helmer, C. G. Hempel, A. Herzberg, K.. Korsch, H. Reichenbach (q.v.), M. Strauss.

1. Many members of the following groups may be regarded as adherents of Scientific Empiricism: the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy, the W arsaw School, the Cambridge School for Analytic Philosophy (q.v.), further, in U. S. A., some of the representatives of contemporary Pragmatism (q.v.), especially C. W. Morris, of Neo-Realism (q.v.), and of Operationalism (q.v.).

   Among the individual adherents not belonging to the groups mentioned: E. Kaila (Finland), J. Jörgensen (Denmark), A. Ness (Norway); A. J. Ayer, J. H. Woodger (England); M. Boll (France); K. Popper (now New Zealand); E. Brunswik, H. Gomperz, Felix Kaufmann, R. V. Mises, L. Rougier, E. Zilsel (now in U. S. A.); E. Nagel, W. V. Quine, and many others (in U.S.A.).

2. The general attitude and the views of Scientific Empiricism are in esential agreement with those of Logical Empiricism (see above, 1). Here, the unity of science is especially emphasized, in various respects
   1. There is a logical unity of the language of science; the concepts of different branches of science are not of fundamentally different kinds but belong to one coherent system. The unity of science in this sense is closely connected with the thesis of Physicahsm (q.v.).
   2. There is a practical task in the present stage of development, to come to a better mutual adaptation of terminologies in different branches of science.
   3. There is today no unity of the laws of science. It is an aim of the future development of science to come, if possible, to a simple set of connected, fundamental laws from which the special laws in the different branches of science, including the social sciences, can be deduced.
3. Here also, the analysis of language is regarded as one of the chief methods of the science of science. While logical positivism stressed chiefly the logical side of this analysis, it is here carried out from various directions, including an analysis of the biological and sociological sides of the activities of language and knowledge, as they have been emphasized earlier by Pragmatism (q.v.), especially C. S. Peirce and G. H. Mead. Thus the development leads now to a comprehensive general theory of signs or semiotic (q.v.) as a basis for philosophy
4. The following publications and meetings may be regarded as organs of this movement.
   1. The periodical "Erkenntnis", since 1930, now continued as "Journal of Unified Science"
   2. The "Encyclopedia of Unified Science", its first part ("Foundations of the Unity of Science", 2 vols.) consisting of twenty monographs (eight appeared by 1940). Here, the foundations of various fields of science are discussed, especially from the point of view of the unity of science and scientific procedure, and the relations between the fields. Thus, the work intends to serve as an introduction to the science of science (q.v.).
   3. A series of International Congresses for the Unity of Science was started by a preliminary conference in Prague 1934 (see report, Erkenntnis 5, 1935). The congresses took place at Pans in 1935 ("Actes", Pans 1936; Erkenntnis 5, 1936); at Copenhagen in 1936 (Erkenntnis 6, 1937); at Paris in 1937; at Cambridge, England, in 1938 (Erkenntnis 7, 1938); at Cambridge, Mass., in 1939 (J. Unif. Sc. 9, 1941); at Chicago in 1941.

Concerning the development and the aims of this movement, see O. Neurath and C. W. Morris (for both, see above, I D), further H. Reichenbach, Ziele and Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, 1931; S. S. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of Science", Psych. Bull. 36, 1939 (with bibliography). Bibliographies in "Erkenntnis": 1, 1931, p. 315, p. 335 (Polish authors); 2, 1931, p. 151, p. 189; 5, 1935, p. 185, p. 195 (American authors), p. 199 (Polish authors), p. 409, larger bibliography: in Encycl. Unif. Science, vol. II, No. 10 (to ippetr in 1942). -- R.C.

The general superiority of theology in this system over the admittedly distinct discipline of philosophy, makes it impossible for unaided reason to solve certain problems which Thomism claims are quite within the province of the latter, e.g., the omnipotence of God, the immortality of the soul. Indeed the Scotist position on this latter question has been thought by some critics to come quite close to the double standard of truth of Averroes, (q.v.) namely, that which is true in theology may be false in philosophy. The univocal assertion of being in God and creatures; the doctrine of universal prime matter (q.v.) in all created substances, even angels, though characteristically there are three kinds of prime matter); the plurality of forms in substances (e.g., two in man) giving successive generic and specific determinations of the substance; all indicate the opposition of Scotistic metaphysics to that of Thomism despite the large body of ideas the two systems have in common. The denial of real distinction between the soul and its faculties; the superiority of will over intellect, the attainment of perfect happiness through a will act of love; the denial of the absolute unchangeableness of the natural law in view of its dependence on the will of God, acts being good because God commanded them; indicate the further rejection of St. Thomas who holds the opposite on each of these questions. However the opposition is not merely for itself but that of a voluntarist against an intellectualist. This has caused many students to point out the affinity of Duns Scotus with Immanuel Kant. (q.v.) But unlike the great German philosopher who relies entirely upon the supremacy of moral consciousness, Duns Scotus makes a constant appeal to revelation and its order of truth as above all philosophy. In his own age, which followed immediately upon the great constructive synthesis of Saints Albert, Bonaventure, and Thomas, this lesser light was less a philosopher because he and his School were incapable of powerful synthesis and so gave themselves to analysis and controversy. The principal Scotists were Francis of Mayron (d. 1327) and Antonio Andrea (d. 1320); and later John of Basoles, John Dumbleton, Walter Burleigh, Alexander of Alexandria, Lychetus of Brescia and Nicholas de Orbellis. The complete works with a life of Duns Scotus were published in 1639 by Luke Wadding (Lyons) and reprinted by Vives in 1891. (Paris) -- C.A.H.

Secundum quid, or more fully, a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, is any fallacy arising from the use of a general proposition without attention to tacit qualifications which would invalidate the use made of it. -- A.C.

2. The quality of uniqueness and persistence through changes (Lat. ipse), by virtue of which any person calls himself I and leading to the distinction among selves, as implied in such words as myself, yourself, himself, etc. (By transfer, this applies to the uniqueness of my thing, as in 'itself').

3. The metaphysical principle of unity underlying subjective experience, which may be conceived as dependent upon the given organism or as distinct in nature; sometimes identified with the soul.

Some philosophers doubted or even denied the existence of the self. Thus, Hume pointed out (Treatise of Human Nature, I, pt. 4) that, apart from the bundle of successive perceptions, nothing justifying the concept of self can be discerned by introspection.

The meaning of self, with its metaphysical, linguistic and psychological distinctions has become so ambiguous that it may be useful to distinguish between

(a) the self as applied to the bearer of subjective experience, or the physical or somatic (G. S. Hall, The American Journal of Psychology, 1897-1898) self; and

(b) the self as applied to the contents of that experience, or the psychological self, which is "an organization of experiences in a dynamic whole." (W. Pillsbury, Attention, 217). -- R.B.W.

b) In ethics the notion of self-determination is used by self-determimsts to solve the free-will problem. H. Rashdall, e.g., uses the notion of a "causality of a permanent spiritual self" as mediating between the indeterminists on the one hand and the mechanical determinists on the other, his view being that our actions are indeed determined but determined by "the nature or character of the self" and not just mechanically, and that it is in this determination by the self that our moral freedom consists. -- W.K.F.

(2) The study of signs and symbolism. In this sense equivalent to semiotic (q.v.). -- M.B.

The theory of the relation between the formulas of an interpreted logistic system (semantical system in Carnap's terminology) and their meanings. See Name relation; Semiotic 2; and Truth, semantical. -- A.C.

C. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 1, no 2, Chicago, 1938. R. Carnap. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol 1, no 3, Chicago, 1939.

1. Pragmatics. Theory of the relations between signs and those who produce or receive and understand them. This theory comprehends psychology, sociology, and history of the use of signs, especially of languages.

2. Semantics. Theory of the relations between signs and what they refer to (their "designata" or "denotata"). This theory contains also the theory of truth (q.v., semantical definition) and the theory of logical deduction.

3. Syntactics. Theory of the formal relations (see Formal 2) among signs. Logical Syntax is syntactics applied to theoretical language (language of science); it contains the theory of formal calculi (q.v.), including formalized logic. Compare C. W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory or Signs, 1938; R. Carnap, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, 1939. -- R.C.

Main works: Naturalium quaestionum libri septem; Dialogorum libri duodecim.

There is little agreement as to the correct analytical definition. To define a sentence as a complete utterance (Bloomfield, Language, 27) merely shifts the difficulty to that of deciding when symbols are not incomplete. A similar objection applies to Gardiner's definition (Speech and Language, 182) "those single words or combinations of words which taken as complete in themselves give satisfaction by shadowing forth the intelligible purpose of a speaker."

An exact definition is of some importance in view of the tendency of some contemporary logicians to replace the use of the term proposition by that of sentence.

Like all designations of symbols, the term is subject to Type-Token Ambiguity (q.v.).

References: J. Ries, Was ist ein Satz? 208, ff. (for quoted definitions). R. Carnap, Logical Syntax of language, 26. -- M.B.

In connection with logic, and logical syntax, the word sentence is used for what might be called more explicitly a declarative sentence -- thus for a sequence of words or symbols which (in some language or system of notation, as determined by the context) expresses a proposition (q.v.), or which can be used to convey an assertion. A sequence of words or symbols which contains free variables and which expresses a proposition when values are given to these variables (see the article variable) may also be called a sentence.

In connection with logistic systems, sentence is often used as a technical term in place of formula (see the explanation of the latter term in the article logistic system). This may be done when, under the intended interpretation of the system, sentences in this technical or formal sense become sentences in the sense of the preceding paragraph. -- A.C.

(b) In philosophy: god-like power, spiritual power, or creative power, mystery, the divine man, a spirit man, god-like man, a sage who is beyond our knowledge, vital force, the mind, the animal spirit, energy, the operation of the active cosmic principle yang (as in Neo-Confucianism).

(c) In aesthetics: Rhythmic vitality; expression; wonderful quality; style full of spirit, energy or vivacity. -- W.T.C.

(d) What is given by nature. -- W.T.C.

(b) A sage (Confucianism). A great man who exercises a transforming influence (as in Mencius).

(c) Confucius.

(d) The ideal ruler. (Lao Tzu).

(e) One who "regards nature as the essential, the character of Tao (te) as the basis, Tao as the way, and follows the indications of changes." (Taoism) -- W.T.C.

(b) External force; tending force; circumstances, such as that which completes things after Tao engenders them and the Individual Principle (te) develops them. (Lao Tzu).

(c) Movement, tendency. -- W.T.C.

(b) Magic. See shu and shu shu. -- W.T.C.

(b) The method of enforcing law and maintaining the order of the state. -- W.T.C.

Main works:

Method of Ethics 1875;

Outlines of the History of Ethics (5th ed. 1902);

Scope and Method of Economic Science, 1885;

Lect. on Philosophy of Kant, 1905.

For Theory of Signs, see Semiotic. -- J.K.F.

Any event of character A whose occurrence is invariably accompanied by another event of character B may be said to be an index of that event. Any index which is recognized as being such may be said to function as a sign. Thus as contrasted with 'index', the use of 'sign' presupposes a triadic relations. -- M.B.

Note on the Indian Sign-Language. Certain general principles concerning gesture speech may be established, by considering the sign-language of the North American Indian which seems to be the most developed.

1. A sign-language is established when equally powerful tribes of different tongues come into contact.
2. Better gestures are composed and undesirable ones are weeded out, partly as a result of tribal federations and partly through the development of technical skills and crafts.
3. Signs come into being, grow and die, according to the needs of the time and to the changes in practical processes.
4. Stimulus of outside intercourse is necessary to keep alive the interest required for the maintenance and growth of a gesture speech; without it, the weaker tribe is absorbed in the stronger, and the vocal language most easily acquired prevails.
5. Sign-languages involve a basic syntax destined to convey the fundamental meanings without refinement and in abbreviated form. Articles, prepositions and conjunctions are omitted; adjectives follow nouns; verbs are used in the present tense; nouns and verbs are used in the singular, while the idea of plurality is expressed in some other way.

The use of signals with the smoke, the pony, the mirror, the blanket and the drum (as is also the case with the African tam-tams) may be considered as an extension of the sign-language, though they are related more directly to the general art of signalling. -- T.G.

Main works:

Problem d. Geschichtsphilosophie, 1892;

Philosophie des Geldes, 1900;

Soziologie, 1908;

Goethe, 1913;

Lebensanschauung, 1918.

Main works: Commentaries on Aristotle's De Caelo, Physica, De Anima, and Categoriae.

By way of connoting different types of society, many contemporary Marxists, especially in the U.S.S.R., building upon Marx's analysis of the two phases of "communist society" ("Gotha Program") designate the first or lower phase by the term socialism, the second or higher by the term communism (q.v.). The general features of socialist society (identified by Soviet thinkers with the present phase of development of the U.S.S.R.) are conceived as follows:

1. Economic collective ownership of the means of production, such as factories, industrial equipment, the land, and of the basic apparatus of distribution and exchange, including the banking system; the consequent abolition of classes, private profit, exploitation, surplus value, (q.v.) private hiring and firing and involuntary unemployment; an integrated economy based on long time planning in terms of needs and use. It is held that only under these economic conditions is it possible to apply the formula, "from each according to ability, to each according to work performed", the first part of which implies continuous employment, and the second part, the absence of private profit.
2. Political: a state based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat (q.v.)
3. Cultural the extension of all educational and cultural facilities through state planning; the emancipation of women through unrestricted economic opportunities, the abolition of race discrimination through state enforcement, a struggle against all cultural and social institutions which oppose the socialist society and attempt to obstruct its realization.

Marx and Engels held that socialism becomes the inevitable outgrowth of capitalism because the evolution of the latter type of society generates problems which can only be solved by a transition to socialism. These problems are traced primarily to the fact that the economic relations under capitalism, such as individual ownership of productive technics, private hiring and firing in the light of profits and production for a money market, all of which originally released powerful new productive potentialities, come to operate, in the course of time, to prevent full utilization of productive technics, and to cause periodic crises, unemployment, economic insecurity and consequent suffering for masses of people. Marx and Engels regarded their doctrine of the transformation of capitalist into socialist society as based upon a scientific examination of the laws of development of capitalism and a realistic appreciation of the role of the proletariat. (q.v.) Unlike the Utopian socialism (q.v.) of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen (q.v.) and others, their socialism asserted the necessity of mass political organization of the working classes for the purpose of gaining political power in order to effect the transition from capitalism, and also foresaw the probability of a contest of force in which, they held, the working class majority would ultimately be victorious. The view taken is that Marx was the first to explain scientifically the nature of capitalist exploitation as based upon surplus value and to predict its necessary consequences. "These two great discoveries, the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production by means of surplus value we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science . . ." (Engels: Anti-Dühring, pp. 33-34.) See Historical materialism. -- J.M.S.

The study of society, societal relations. Originally called Social Physics, meaning that the methods of the natural sciences were to be applied to the study of society. Whereas the pattern originally was physics and the first sociologists thought that it was possible to find laws of nature in the social realm (Quetelet, Comte, Buckle), others turned to biological considerations. The "organic" conception of society (Lilienfeld, Schaeffle) treated society as a complex organism, the evolutionists, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, considered the struggle between different ethnic groups the basic factor in the evolution of social structures and institutions. Other sociologists accepted a psychological conception of society; to them psychological phenomena (imitation, according to Gabriel Tarde, consciousness of kind, according to F. H. Giddings) were the basic elements in social interrelations (see also W. McDougall, Alsworth Ross, etc.). These relations themselves were made the main object of sociological studies by G. Simmel, L. Wiese, Howard Becker. A kind of sociological realism was fostered by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, and his school. They considered society a reality, the group-mind an actual fact, the social phenomena "choses sociales". The new "sociology of knowledge", inaugurated by these French sociologists, has been further developed by M. Scheler, K. Mannheim and W. Jerusalem. Recently other branches of social research have separated somewhat from sociology proper: Anthropogeography, dealing with the influences of the physical environment upon society, demography, social psychology, etc. Problems of the methodology of the social sciences have also become an important topic of recent studies. -- W.E.

(a) Methodological: The epistemological doctrine which considers the individual self and it states the only possible or legitimate starting point for philosophical construction. See Cogito, ergo sum; Ego-centric predicament, Subjectivism.

(b) Metaphysical: Subvariety of idealism which maintains that the individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality and that the external world and other persons are representati