I

1. The One, which is engendered by Tao and which in turn engenders the Two (yin and yang). (Lao Tzu.) "The Formless is the One. The One has no compare in the universe . . . It is the Great Infinite and forms the Unity. It is the life of myriad generations, everlasting without beginning, and most mysterious. It enfolds the universe and opens the portal of Tao. . . . When the One is established and the myriad things are engendered, there is Tao." (Huai-nan Tzu, d. 112 B.C.)
2. Unity of mind, "not allowing one impression to harm another." (Hsun Tzu c 335-c 288 B.C.)
3. The number for Heaven, as two is the number for Earth. See Ta i and T'a i.

(b) The will, purpose, motive; idea; which is "operation of" and "emanation from" the mind with an objective in view (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200). It is called will "when the intuitive faculty, with its pure intelligence and clear understanding, is moved and becomes active." (Wang Yang-ming, 1473-1529.) See Ch'eng i. -- W.T.C.

Fichte conceives the ultimate Ich as an absolute, unconditioned, simple ego which "posits" itself and its not-self in a series of intellectual acts. He emphasizes the dynamic, creative powers of the ego, its capacity for self-determination, the act in which the absolute subject creates the I. Self and not-self are products of the original activity of the conscious subject. Schelling conceives the I as a creation of the Absolute Idea. Hegel, however, treats the Ich as thought conceived as subject, as thinking, abstracted from all things perceived, willed or felt -- in short abstracted from all experience. As such it is universal abstract freedom, an ideal unity.

From this point the notion of Ich in the German idealistic tradition passes into

1. voluntaristic channels, with emphasis on the dynamic will, as in Schopenhiuer, Eduard von Hartmann and Nietzsche;
2. the pragmatic-psychologic interpretation, typified by Lotze and other post-idealists; and
3. such reconstructions of the transcendental I as are to be found in the school of Husserl and related groups.

1. In pre-Platonic Greek: form, semblance, nature, fashion or mode, class or species.
2. Plato (and Socrates): The Idea is a timeless essence or universal, a dynamic and creative archetype of existents. The Ideas comprise a hierarchy and an organic unity in the Good, and are ideals as patterns of existence and as objects of human desire.
3. The Stoics: Ideas are class concepts in the human mind.
4. Neo-Platonism: Ideas are archetypes of things considered as in cosmic Mind (Nous or Logos).
5. Early Christianity and Scholasticism: Ideas are archetypes eternally subsistent in the mind of God.
6. 17th Century: Following earlier usage, Descartes generally identified ideas with subjective, logical concepts of the human mind. Ideas were similarly treated as subjective or mental by Locke, who identified them with all objects of consciousness. Simple ideas, from which, by combination, all complex ideas are derived, have their source either in sense perception or "reflection" (intuition of our own being and mental processes).
7. Berkeley: Ideas are sense objects or perceptions, considered either as modes of the human soul or as a type of mind-dependent being. Concepts derived from objects of intuitive introspection, such as activity, passivity, soul, are "notions."
8. Hume: An Idea is a "faint image" or memory copy of sense "impressions."
9. Kant: Ideas are concepts or representations incapable of adequate subsumption under the categories, which escape the limits of cognition. The ideas of theoretical or Pure Reason are ideals, demands of the human intellect for the absolute, i.e., the unconditioned or the totality of conditions of representation. They include the soul, Nature and God. The ideas of moral or Practical Reason include God, Freedom, and Immortality. The ideas of Reason cannot be sensuously represented (possess no "schema"). Aesthetic ideas are representations of the faculty of imagination to which no concept can be adequate.

1. Pertaining to ideas (q.v.)
2. Mental.
3. Possessing the character of completely satisfying a desire or volition. A state of perfection with respect to a standard or goal of will or desire.
4. A norm, perfect type, or goal, an object of desire or will, whether or not conceived as attainable.

The term appeared in the later 17th century to name (a) the theory of archetypal Ideas, whether in the original Platonic teaching or as incorporated into Christian Platonic and Scholastic theism; (b) the epistemological doctrine of Descartes and Locke, according to which "ideas," i.e., direct objects of human apprehension, are subjective and privately possessed. Since this latter view put in doubt the very existence of a material world, the term began to be used in the early 18th century for acosmism (according to which the external world is only the projection of our minds), and immaterialism (doctrine of the non-existence of material being). Its use was popularized by Kant, who named his theory of knowledge Critical or Transcendental Idealism, and by his metaphysical followers, the Post-Kantian Idealists.

Metaphysics. Pure Idealism or Immaterialism identifies ontological reality (substance, substantives, concrete individuality) exclusively with the ideal, ie., Mind, Spirit, Soul, Person, Archetypal Ideas, Thought. See Spiritualism, Mentalism, Monadism, Panpsychtsm, Idealistic Phenomenalism. With respect to the metaphysical status of self-consciousness and purposeful activity, Idealism is either impersonalistic or personalistic. See Personalism.

Impersonalistic Idealism identifies ontological reality essentially with non-conscious spiritual principle, unconscious psychic agency, pure thought, impersonal or "pure" consciousness, pure Ego, subconscious Will, impersonal logical Mind, etc. Personalistic Idealism characterizes concrete reality as personal selfhood, i.e., as possessing self-consciousness. With respect to the relation of the Absolute or World-Ground (s.) to finite selves or centers of consciousness, varying degrees of unity or separateness are posited. The extreme doctrines are radical monism and radical pluralism. Monistic Idealism (pantheistic Idealism) teaches that the finite self is a part, mode, aspect, moment, appearance or projection of the One. Pluralistic Idealism defends both the inner privacy of the finite self and its relative freedom from direct or causal dependence upon the One. With respect to Cosmology, pure idealism is either subjective or objective. Subjective Idealism (acosmism) holds that Nature is merely the projection of the finite mind, and has no external, real existence. (The term "Subjective Idealism" is also used for the view that the ontologically real consists of subjects, i.e., possessors of experience.) Objective Idealism identifies an externally real Nature with the thought or activity of the World Mind, (In Germany the term "Objective Idealism" is commonly identified with the view that finite minds are parts -- modes, moments, projections. appearances, members -- of the Absolute Mind.) Epistemological Idealism derives metaphysical idealism from the identificition of objects with ideas. In its nominalistic form the claim is made that "To be is to be perceived." From the standpoint of rationalism it is argued that there can be no Object without a Subject. Subjects, relations, sensations, and feelings are mental; and since no other type of analogy remains by which to characterize a non-mental thing-in-itself, pure idealism follows as the only possible view of Being.

Realistic Idealism recognizes the reality of non-ideal types of being, but relegates them to a subordinate status with respect either to quantity of being or power. This view is either atheistic or theistic. Realistic theism admits the existence of one or more kinds of non-mental being considered as independently co-eternal with God, eternally dependent upon Deity, or as a divine creation. Platonic Idealism, as traditionally interpreted, identifies absolute being with timeless Ideas or disembodied essences. Thtse, organically united in the Good, are the archetypes and the dynamic causes of existent, material things. The Ideas are also archetypes of rational thought, and the goal of fine art and morality. Axiological Idealism, a modern development of Platonism and Kantianism, maintains that the category of Value is logically and metaphysically prior to that of Being.

The idealistic doctrine known as Conceptual Realism identifies the logical (and at times the perceptual) content of experience with universals (essences, objectives, subsistents, etc.) considered as non-mental, i.e. as essentially independent of cognitive subjects.

Epistemology. Theistic Platonism maintains that the archetypes of existent things are eternal ideas in the mind of God. Epistemological Idealism teaches that all entities other than egos or subjects of experience are exclusively noetic objects, i.e. have no existence or reality apart from the relation of being perceived or thought. Transcendental Idealism (Critical Idealism) is Kant's name for his doctrine that knowledge is a synthetic, relational product of the logical self (transcendental unity of apperception). Phenomenology is Husserl's name for the science that investigates the essences or natures of objects considered apart from their existential or metaphysical status.

Ethics. Any system of moral theory may be called Ethical Idealism, whether teleological or formal in principle, which accepts several of the following:

1. a scale of values, moral principles, or rules of action;
2. the axiological priority of the universal over the particular;
3. the axiological priority of the spiritual or mental over the sensuous or material;
4. moral freedom rather than psychological or natural necessity.

Aesthetics. Any system or program of fine art emphasizing the ideal (s.) is Aesthetic Idealism.

1. The view that the goal of fine art is an embodiment or reflection of the perfections of archetypal Ideas or timeless essences (Platonism).
2. The view of art which emphasizes feeling, sentiment, and idealization (as opposed to "literal reproduction" of fact).
3. The view of art which emphasizes cognitive content (as opposed to abstract feeling, primitive intuition, formal line or structure, mere color or tone).

History. Inasmuch as pure or basic Materialism has been an infrequent doctrine among major thinkers, the history of philosophy broadly understood, is largely the history of Idealism.

India. Intimations of advanced theism, both in a deistic and immanentistic form, are to be found in the Rig Veda. The early Upanishads in general teach variously realistic deism, immanent theism, and, more characteristically, mystical, impersonal idealism, according to which the World Ground (brahman) is identified with the universal soul (atman) which is the inner or essential self within each individual person. The Bhagavad Gita, while mixing pantheism, immanent theism, and deism, inclines towards a personahstic idealism and a corresponding ethics of bhakti (selfless devotion). Jainism is atheistic dualism, with a personalistic recognition of the reality of souls. Many of the schools of Buddhism (see Buddhism) teach idealistic doctrines. Thus a monistic immaterialism and subjectivism (the Absolute is pure consciousness) was expounded by Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu. The Lankavatarasutra combined monistic, immaterialistic idealism with non-absolutistic nihilism. Subjectivistic, phenomenalistic idealism (the view that there is neither absolute Pure Consciousness nor substantial souls) was taught by the Buddhists Santaraksita and Kamalasila. Examples of modern Vedantic idealism are the Yogavasistha (subjective monistic idealism) and the monistic spiritualism of Gaudapada (duality and plurality are illusion). The most influential Vedantic system is the monistic spiritualism of Sankara. The Absolute is pure indeterminate Being, which can only be described as pure consciousness or bliss. For the different Vedantic doctrines see Vedanta and the references there. Vedantic idealism, whether in its monistic and impersonalistic form, or in that of a more personalistic theism, is the dominant type of metaphysics in modern India. Idealism is also pronounced in the reviving doctrines of Shivaism (which see).

China. The traditional basic concepts of Chinese metaphysics are ideal. Heaven (T'ien), the spiritual and moral power of cosmic and social order, that distributes to each thing and person its alloted sphere of action, is theistically and personalistically conceived in the Shu Ching (Book of History) and the Shih Ching (Book of Poetry). It was probably also interpreted thus by Confucius and Mencius, assuredly so by Motze. Later it became identified with Fate or impersonal, immaterial cosmic power. Shang Ti (Lord on High) has remained through Chinese history a theistic concept. Tao, as cosmic principle, is an impersonal, immaterial World Ground. Mahayana Buddhism introduced into China an idealistic influence. Pure metaphysical idealism was taught by the Buddhist monk Hsuan Ch'uang. Important Buddhist and Taoist influences appear in Sung Confucianism (Ju Chia). a distinctly idealistic movement. Chou Tun I taught that matter, life and mind emerge from Wu Chi (Pure Being). Shao Yung espoused an essential objective idealism: the world is the content of an Universal Consciousness. The Brothers Ch'eng Hsao and Ch'eng I, together with Chu Hsi, distinguished two primordial principles, an active, moral, aesthetic, and rational Law (Li), and a passive ether stuff (Ch'i). Their emphasis upon Li is idealistic. Lu Chiu Yuan (Lu Hsiang Shan), their opponent, is interpreted both as a subjective idealist and as a realist with a stiong idealistic emphasis. Similarly interpreted is Wang Yang Ming of the Ming Dynasty, who stressed the splritual and moral principle (Li) behind nature and man.

Persia. The theology of Zarathustra was a realistic and dualistic personalism. Nature is assumed to be a plastic order controlled by Ahura Mazda, personalized spirit of Good, against whom struggles in vain Ahriman, the personalized spirit of Evil.

Israel. In the period of the written prophets Jewish thought moved to a personalistic and realistic theism, reaching maturity in Jeremiah and Genesis I. The cosmic "I Am" is a personal and righteous World Ground who fashions and controls both Nature and human history.

Greece. Homeric thought centered in Moira (Fate), an impersonal, immaterial power that distributes to gods and men their respective stations. While the main stream of pre-Socratic thought was naturalistic, it was not materialistic. The primordial Being of things, the Physis, is both extended and spiritual (hylozoism). Soul and Mind are invariably identified with Physis. Empedocles' distinction between inertia and force (Love and Hate) was followed by Anaxagoras' introduction of Mind (Nous) as the first cause of order and the principle of spontaneity or life in things. Socrates emphasized the ideological principle and introduced the category of Value as primary both in Nature and Man. He challenged the completeness of the mechanical explanation of natural events. Plato's theory of Ideas (as traditionally interpreted by historians) is at once a metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. Ideas, forming a hierarchy and systematically united in the Good, are timeless essences comprising the realm of true Being. They are archetypes and causes of things in the realm of Non-Being (Space). Aristotle, while moving in the direction of common-sense realism, was also idealistic. Forms or species are secondary substances, and collectively form the dynamic and rational structure of the World. Active reason (Nous Poietikos), possessed by all rational creatures, is immaterial and eternal. Mind is the final cause of all motion. God is pure Mind, self-contained, self-centered, and metaphysically remote from the spatial World. The Stoics united idealism and hylozoistic naturalism in their doctrine of dynamic rational cosmic law (Logos), World Soul, Pneuma, and Providence (Pronoia).

Alexandrian-Roman Period. Fed by Eastern ideas, later Alexandrian-Roman thought was essentially idealistic. In neo-Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic and Alexandrian Christianity, matter was identified with non-being, and placed at the metaphysical antipodes with respect to God or the Absolute. Early Christianity identified itself with the personalistic theism of Israel, Pauline spiritualism, and the neo-Platonism of Alexandria.

Medieval Period. Medieval Christian thought, axiomatically idealistic, united the personalism of Israel and the speculative idealism of neo-Platonism and Aristotle. Similarly, Islamic thought, centering at Bagdad and Cordova, attached Mohammedan religious idealism to neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism.

Modern Period. In the 17th century the move towards scientific materialism was tempered by a general reliance on Christian or liberal theism (Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi, Toland, Hartley, Priestley, Boyle, Newton). The principle of gravitation was regarded by Newton, Boyle, and others, as an indication of the incompleteness of the mechanistic and materialistic account of the World, and as a direct proof of the existence of God. For Newton Space was the "divine sensorium". The road to pure modern idealism was laid by the epistemological idealism (epistemological subjectivism) of Campanella and Descartes. The theoretical basis of Descartes' system was God, upon whose moral perfection reliance must be placed ("God will not deceive us") to insure the reality of the physical world. Spinoza's impersonalistic pantheism is idealistic to the extent that space or extension (with modes of Body and Motion) is merely one of the infinity of attributes of Being. Leibniz founded pure modern idealism by his doctrine of the immateriality and self-active character of metaphysical individual substances (monads, souls), whose source and ground is God. Locke, a theist, gave chief impetus to the modern theory of the purely subjective character of ideas. The founder of pure objective idealism in Europe was Berkeley, who shares with Leibniz the creation of European immaterialism. According to him perception is due to the direct action of God on finite persons or souls. Nature consists of (a) the totality of percepts and their order, (b) the activity and thought of God. Hume later an implicit Naturalist, earlier subscribed ambiguously to pure idealistic phenomenalism or scepticism. Kant's epistemological, logical idealism (Transcendental or Critical Idealism) inspired the systems of pure speculative idealism of the 19th century. Knowledge, he held, is essentially logical and relational, a product of the synthetic activity of the logical self-consciousness. He also taught the ideality of space and time. Theism, logically undemonstrable, remains the choice of pure speculative reason, although beyond the province of science. It is also a practical implication of the moral life. In the Critique of Judgment Kant, marshalled facts from natural beauty and the apparent teleological character of the physical and biological world, to leave a stronger hint in favor of the theistic hypothesis. His suggestion thit reality, as well as Mind, is organic in character is reflected in the idealistic pantheisms of his followers: Fichte (abstract personalism or "Subjective Idealism"), Schellmg (aesthetic idealism, theism, "Objective Idealism"), Hegel (Absolute or logical Idealism), Schopenhauer (voluntaristic idealism), Schleiermacher (spiritual pantheism), Lotze ("Teleological Idealism"). 19th century French thought was grounder in the psychological idealism of Condillac and the voluntaristic personalism of Biran. Throughout the century it was essentially "spiritualistic" or personalistic (Cousin, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Boutroux, Lachelier, Bergson). British thought after Hume was largely theistic (A. Smith, Paley, J. S. Mill, Reid, Hamilton). In the latter 19th century, inspired largely by Kant and his metaphysical followers, it leaned heavily towards semi-monistic personalism (E. Caird, Green, Webb, Pringle-Pattison) or impersonalistic monism (Bradley, Bosanquet). Recently a more pluralistic personalism has developed (F. C. S. Schiller, A. E. Taylor, McTaggart, Ward, Sorley). Recent American idealism is represented by McCosh, Howison, Bowne, Royce, Wm. James (before 1904), Baldwin. German idealists of the past century include Fechner, Krause, von Hartmann, H. Cohen, Natorp, Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey, Brentano, Eucken. In Italy idealism is represented by Croce and Gentile, in Spain, by Unamuno and Ortega e Gasset; in Russia, by Lossky, in Sweden, by Boström; in Argentina, by Aznar. (For other representatives of recent or contemporary personalism, see Personalism.) -- W.L.

1. Pertaining to the school of Condidillac and his French followers of the early 19th century.
2. Pertaining to theories determined by cultural environment or non-rational interests.
3. Idle, unrealistic, fanciful.

The term was used in a derogatory sense by Napoleon to denominate all philosophies whose influence was republican. In recent times the English equivalent has come to mean: (1) in some economic determinists, ineffectual thoughts as opposed to causally efficacious behavior, (2) any set of general ideas or philosophical program. -- G.B.

1. The Confucian doctrine of being true to the principles of one's nature (chung) and the benevolent exercise of them in relation to others (shu), by Confucius' pupil, Tseng Tzu.
2. The central principle of centrality and harmony (chung yung) by which all human affairs and natural phenomena may be understood. (Earlv Confucianism.)
3. "Man and things forming one organic unity," there being no discrimination between the self and the non-self. (Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107.)
4. Sincerity (ch'eng), which is the way of Heaven, indestructible, by which all things are in their proper places. Sincerity is the thread that runs through all affairs and things, and being true to the principles of one's nature and the benevolent exercise of them in relation to others is the way to try to be sincere. (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200.)
5. The "one" is the Great Ultimate in general and the "thread" is the Great Ultimate in each thing. (Chu Hsi.)

Medieval: Image and Similitude are frequently used by the medieval scholars. Neither of them needs mean copy. Sometimes the terms are nearly synonymous with sign in general. The alteration of the sense organs when affected by some external object is an image of the latter (species sensibilis); so is the memory image or phantasm. The intelligible species resulting from the operation of the active intellect on the phantasm is not less an image of the universal nature than the concept and the word expressing the latter is. Images in the strict sense of copies or pictures are only a particular case of image or similitude in general. The idea that Scholasticism believed that the mind contains literally "copies" of the objective world is mistaken interpretation due to misunderstanding of the terms. -- R.A.

1. The revival of sense images derived from earlier perceptions (the reproductive imagination), and
2. the combination of these elementary images into new unities (the creative or productive imagination.) The creative imagination is of two kinds:
   1. the fancy which is relatively spontaneous and uncontrolled, and
   2. the constructive imagination, exemplified in science, invention and philosophy which is controlled by a dominant plan or purpose.

1. In Medieval Scholasticism a cause is immanent whose effects are exclusively within the agent, as opposed to transient.
2. For Kant the immanent is experiential as opposed to non-experiential or transcendent.
3. In modern metaphysics and theology immanence signifies presence (of essence, being, power, etc.), as opposed to absence.

1. Contrasted with representation, immediacy is the direct presence to the mind of the object of knowledge. See Presentational immediacy.
2. Contrasted with mediation, immediacy consists in the absence or minimal and submerged presence of inference, interpretation and construction in any process of knowledge.

1. temporal immortality, the indefinite continuation of the individual mind after death and
2. eternity, ascension of the soul to a higher plane of timelessness.

Immortality is properly speaking restricted to post-existence (survival after death) but is extended by the theory of transmigration of souls. (See Metempsychosis) to include pre-exisence (life before birth).

The arguments for immortality fall into four groups:

1. Metaphysical arguments which attempt to deduce immortality from properties of the soul such as simplicity, independence of the body, its knowledge of eternal truth, etc.
2. Valuational and moral arguments seek to derive the immortality of the soul from its supreme worth or as a presupposition of its moral nature.
3. Empirical arguments which adduce as evidence of immortality, automatic writing, mediumship and other spiritualistic phenomena.

A ⊃ [B ⊃ C] to AB ⊃ C.

[p ⊃ [q ⊃ r]] ⊃ [pq ⊃ r].

The prohibition against impredicative definition was incorporated by Russell into his ramified theory of types (1908) and is now usually identified with the restriction to the ramified theorv of types without the axiom of reducibility. (Poincare, however, never made his principle exact and may have intended, vaguely, a less severe restriction than this -- as indeed some passages in later writings would indicate.) -- A. C.

H. Poincare, Les mathematiques et la logique. Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, vol. 14 (1906), pp. 294-317. R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, New York and London, 1937.

An expression A introduced by contextual definition -- i.e., by a definition which construes particular kinds of expressions containing A, as abbreviations or substitutes for certain expressions not containing A, but provides no such construction for A itself -- is an incomplete symbol in this sense. In Principia Mathematica, notations for classes, and descriptions (more correctly, notations which serve some of the purposes that would be served by notations for classes and by descriptions) are introduced in this way by contextual definition. -- A. C.

Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, vol. 1.

A set of propositional functions is inconsistent if there is some propositional function such that their conjunction formally implies (see Logic, formal, § 3) both it and its negation.

A set of sentences is inconsistent if there is some sentence A such that there is a valid inference from them to A and also from them to ∼A.

If the notion of possibility is admitted, in the sense of a modality (see Modality, and Strict implication), a set of propositions may be said to be inconsistent if their conjunction is impossible. -- A.C.

In a logistic system (q. v.), a primitive formula or a primitive rule of inference may be said to be independent if there are theorems of the system which would cease to be theorems upon omission of the primitive formula or primitive rule of inference. -- A.C.

Periods of despondency and inactivity or even degenency and depravity in India have kept pice with disastrous political developments. But a joy in life's pursuits is evident from the earliest Vedic period and is to be traced in the multifariousness of Indian culture and the colorful Indian history itself which has left the Hindus one of the ancient races still virile among nations and capable of assimilation without itself becoming extinct. Happiness may be enjoyed even in the severest penance and asceticism for which India is noted, while a certain concomitant heroism seems undeniable.

The ethical teachings of the Bhagavad Gita (q.v.). of the various religio-philosophical groups, of the Buddhists and Jainas of Greater India, are high; but if such ideals have not been attained generally in practice, or even if repulsive and cruel rituals and linga worship are prevalent, such phenomena are understandable if we consider the 340 millions of teeming humanity within the fold of Hinduism, from aborigines to a Gandhi, Tagore, and Sir Raman. Treatises dealing with practical morality are very numerous. They may be classed into those of a purely religious leaning among which we might count all religio-philosophical literature of the Vedic and non-Vedic tradition, including drama and epic literature, and those that deal specifically with practices of the nature of self-culture (cf. Yoga), religious observances (sacrifice, priest-craft, rites, ceremonies, etc.), household affairs and duties (Grhyasutras), and the science of polity and government (Arthasastras). -- K.F.L..

Philosophic speculations, heavily shrouded by "pre-logical" and symbolic language, started with the poetic, ritualistic Vedas (q.v.), luxuriating in polytheism and polyanthropoism, was then fostered by the Brahman caste in treatises called Aranyakas (q.v.) and Brahmanas (q.v.) and strongly promoted by members of the ruling caste who instituted philosophic congresses in which peripatetic teachers and women participated, and of which we know through the Upanishads (q.v.). Later, the main bulk of Indian Philosophy articulated itself organically into systems forming the nucleus for such famous schools as the Mimamsa and Vedanta, Sankhya and Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika, and those of Buddhism and Jainism (all of which see). Numerous other philosophic and quasi philosophic systems are found in the epic literature and elsewhere (cf., e.g., Shaktism, Shivaism, Trika, Vishnuism), or remain to be discovered. Much needs to be translated by competent philosophers.

All Indian doctrines orient themselves by the Vedas, accepting or rejecting their authority. In ranging from materialism to acosmism and nihilism, from physiologism to spiritualism, realism to idealism, monism to pluralism, atheism and pantheism, Hindus believe they have exhausted all possible philosophic attitudes (cf. darsana), which they feel supplement rather than exclude each other. A unnersal feature is the fusion of religion, metaphysics, ethics and psychology, due to the universal acceptance of a psycho-physicalism, further exemplified in the typical doctrines of karma and samsara (q.v.). Rigorous logic is nevertheless applied in theology where metaphvsics passes into eschatology (cf., e.g., is) and the generally accepted belief in the cyclic nature of the cosmos oscillating between srsti ("throwing out") and pralaya (dissolution) of the absolute reality (cf. abhasa), and in psychology, where epistemology seeks practical outlets in Yoga (q.v.). With a genius for abstraction, thinkers were and are almost invariably hedonistically motivated by the desire to overcome the evils of existence in the hope of attaining liberation (cf. moksa) and everlasting bliss (cf. ananda, nirvana). -- K.F.L.

In political philosophy, the doctrine that the state exists for the individual, not vice versa. In political economy, laissez faire system of competition.

(b) In a somewhat more restricted sense, individual psychology, in contrast to folk psychology, group psychology or social psychology is the investigation of the individual considered -- so far as possible -- apart from the influence of the social group of which he is a member,

(c) Finally the term "individual" psychologv has been appropriated by a special school of analytic psychology (see Psychoanalysts), namely that of Alfred Adler. See A. Adler, Problems of Neurosis; E. Wexberg, Individual Psychology. -- L.W.

See Logic, formal and Valid inference.

Locke's arguments against Descartes' belief in innate ideas (cf. Essay on the Human Understanding, bk. I) were the target of Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais, 1701 (publ. in 1765). -- M.F.

(a) Establishments. Relatively permanent group behavior patterns or established social practices, as distinguished from temporary practices or patterns.

(b) Socially established behavior patterns, authoritatively or legally enforced, as distinguished from Folkways which are merely taken-for-granted common but uncompelled ways of behavior and as distinguished from ''mores" which are enforced by group opinion rather than by legally authorized meant. -- A.J.B.

St. Augustine distinguished the intellect from reason, aliud est intellectus, aliud ratio. Intellection would be impossible without reason: Intelligere non valemus, nisi ralionem habeamus. The intellect is the soul itself: Non enim aliquid aliud est quam anima, sed aliquid animae est intellectus. It rules the soul: Intellectus animam regit, ad ipsam animam pertinens. Sometimes the intellectus is called intelligentia. Both the intellect and reason are innate in the mind, mens cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter inest. Reason seeks knowledge or science, scientia, while the intellect, which is higher, aims at wisdom, sapientia, or the contemplation of eternal things, and especially God. -- J.J.R.

Whence, in the typical Scholastic or medieval notion, intellect is an immaterial faculty of the soul, that is, its operations are performed without a bodily organ, though they depend on the body and its senses for the material from which they receive their first impulse. Nothing is in the intellect that has not been previously in the senses. The impressions received by the external senses are synthesized by the internal sensus communis which forms an image or phantasm; the phantasm is presented to the intellect by imagination, memory and the vis cogitativa co-operating. The internal senses are conceived as being bound to organic functions of the brain. The intellect operates in a twofold manner, but is only one. As active intellect (intellectus agens) it "illuminates" the phantasm, disengaging there from the universal nature; as passive intellect (int. possibilis) it is informed by the result of this abstractive operation and develops the concept. Concepts are united into judgments by combination and division (assertion and negation). Judgments are related to each other in syllogistic reasoning or by the abbreviated form of enthymeme. Aquinas denies to the intellect the capacity of becoming aware of particulars in any direct way. The intellect knows of them (e.g. when asserting: Socrates is a man) only indirectly by reflecting on its own operations and finally on the phantasm which served as starting point. Propositions, however, have no directly corresponding phantasm. Later Scholastics credit the intellect with a direct knowledge of particulars (Suarez). See Abstraction, Faculty. -- R.A.

b. "Intellectual Intuition" turned objective is esthetic intuition (Schelling). -- L.V.

In Dewey (q.v.), intelligence is the basic instrument, to be contrasted with fixed habit, traditional customs, and the sheer force of political or bureaucratic power as means of settling social issues. -- L.W.

1. Understandable; comprehensible; knowable; meaningful;
2. Orderly; logical; coherent; rational;
3. Communicable; expressible;
4. Having unity of principle; capable of complete rational explanation or understanding; capable of causal explanation;
5. Clear to natural or pure reason; apprehensible by the intellect (q.v.) only as against apprehensible through the senses; conceptual as against perceptual; conceptually describable or explainable;
6. Capable of being known synoptically or as it is in itself or in essence; capable of being known through itself as against by agency of something else; graspable by in tuition, self-explanatory;
7. Capable of being appreciated or sympathized with;
8. Super-sensible; of the nature of mind, reason, or their higher powers. .

The Port-Royal Logic, translated by T. S. Baynes (see Introduction by the translator).

Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic, New York and London, 1952. R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, New York and London, 1937.

This suggests the beginning of a simple hierarchy of types (see Logic, formal, § 6), but actually is not so, because no "third intentions" were separated out or distinguished from second. Thus the general concept of class is a second intention, although some particular classes may also be second intentions.

Thomas Aquinas (q. v.) defined logic as the science of second intentions applied to first intentions. -- A. C.

(Ger. Intentionalität) In Husserl:

1. (broadest sense) The character of anything as "intending" or pointing beyond itself, self-transcendence.
2. (most frequent sense) The character of consciousness as pointing; beyond itself, as consciousness of something, and as having its horizon of co-intendings: noetic intentionality.
3. The character of an object other than consciousness itself as pointing beyond itself, e.g., to its objective background or to something that it represents or indicates: objective intentionality.
4. The character of a modality as pointing back to the original of which it is intrinsically a modification.

1. In logic: compare intension.
2. In metaphysics: the doctrine of internal relations, that all relations are internal, that is, monism.
3. In epistemology: subjective. Opposite of external.

Epistemological theory of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley that the individual mind is confined to the circle of its ideas, and that it cognizes an external world and other minds only by an outward projection of its inner representations. The term was employed by Avenarius, (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888) who criticized the theory and proposed as an alternative his own theory of pure experience which emphasizes the essential solidarity between knowing subject and object known and has been introduced into English philosophy by Ward, Stout and others. -- L.W.

For the account given by Brouwerian intuitionism of the nature of mathematics, and the asserted priority of mathematics to logic and philosophy, see the article Mathematics. This account, with its reliance on the intuition of ordinary thinking and on the immediate evidence of mathematical concepts and inferences, and with its insistence on intuitively understandable construction as the only method for mathematical existence proofs, leads to a rejection of certain methods and assumptions of classical mathematics. In consequence, certain parts of classical mathematics have to be abandoned and others have to be reconstructed in different and often more complicated fashion.

Rejected in particular by intuitionism are

1. the use of impredicative definition (q. v.);
2. the assumption that all things satisfying a given condition can be united into a set and this set then treated as an individual thing -- or even the weakened form of this assumption which is found in Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom or axiom of subset formation (see logic, formal, § 9);
3. the law of excluded middle as applied to propositions whose expression lequires a quantifier for which the variable involved has an infinite range.

As an example of the rejection of the law of excluded middle, consider the proposition, "Either every even number greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers or else not every even number greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers." This proposition is intuitionistically unacceptable, because there are infinitely many even numbers greater than 2 and it is impossible to try them all one by one and decide of each whether or not it is the sum of two prime numbers. An intuitionist would accept the disjunction only after a proof had been given of one or other of the two disjoined propositions -- and in the present state of mathematical knowledge it is not certain that this can be done (it is not certain that the mathematical problem involved is solvable). If, however, we replace "greater than 2" by "greater than 2 and less than 1,000,000,000," the resulting disjunction becomes intuitionistically acceptable, since the number of numbers involved is then finite. The intuitionistic rejection of the law of excluded middle is not to be understood as an assertion of the negation of the law of excluded middle; on the contrary, Brouwer asserts the negation of the negation of the law of excluded middle, i.e., ∼∼[p ∨ ∼p]. Still less is the intuitionistic rejection of the law of excluded middle to be understood as the assertion of the existence of a third truth-value intermediate between truth and falsehood.

The rejection of the law of excluded middle carries with it the rejection of various other laws of the classical propositional calculus and functional calculus of first order, including the law of double negation (and hence the method of indirect proof). In general the double negation of a proposition is weaker than the proposition itself; but the triple negation of a proposition is equivalent to its single negation. Noteworthy also is the rejection of ∼(x)F(x) ⊃ (Ex)∼F(x); but the reverse implication is valid. (The sign ⊃ here does not denote material implication, but is a distinct primitive symbol of implication.) -- A.C.

L. E. J. Brouwer,

De onbetrnuwhaarheid der logische principes, Tijdsdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, vol 2 (1908), pp 152-158; reprinted in Brouwer's Wiskunde. Waarheid, Werketijkhetd. Groningen, 1919.

L. E. J. Brouwer,

Intuitionism and formalism. English translation by A. Dresden. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 20 (1913), pp 81-96.

H. Weyl,

Consistency in mathematics. The Rice Institute Pamphlet, vol 16 (1929), pp 245-265.

A. Heyting,

Mathematische Grundlagen-forschung, Intuitionismus, Beweistheorie, Berlin, 1934.

(1) In general: any philosophy in which intuition is appealed to as the basis of knowledge, or at least of philosophical knowledge.

(2) In ethics:

1. in the narrower traditional sense, intuitionism is the view that certain actions or kinds of action may be known to be right or wrong by a direct intuition of their rightness or wrongness, without any consideration of the value of their consequences. In this sense intuitionism is opposed to utilitarian and teleological ethics, and is most recently represented by the neo-intuitionists at Oxford, H. A. Prichard, E. F. Carritt, W. D. Ross. It is sometimes said to involve the view that the organ of ethical insight is non-rational and even unique. It takes, according to Sidgwick, three forms. Perceptual intuitionism holds that only judgments relating to the rightness or wrongness of particular acts are intuitive. Dogmatic intuitionism holds that some general material propositions relating to the rightness or wrongness of kinds of acts may also be intuited, e.g. that promises ought to be kept. Philosophical intuitionism holds that it is only certain general propositions about what is right or wrong that are intuitive, and that these are few and purely formal.
2. In the wider more recent sense, intuitionism includes all views in which ethics is made to rest on intuitions, particular or general, as to the rightness, obligatoriness, goodness, oi value of actions or objects. Taken in this sense, intuitionism is the dominant point of view in recent British ethics, and is represented in Europe by the phenomenological ethics of M. Scheler and N. Hartmann, having also proponents in America. That is, it covers not only the deontological intuitionism to be found at Oxford, but also the axiological and even teleological or utilitarian intuitionism to be found in J. Martineau, H. Sidgwick, H. Rashdall, G. E. Moore, J. Laird. Among earlier British moralists it is represented by tho Cambridge Platonists, the Moral Sense School, Clarke, Cumberland, Butler, Price, Reid, Whewell, etc.By saying that the basic propositions of ethics (i.e. of the theory of obligation, of the theory of value, or of both) are intuitive, the intuitionists mean at least that they are ultimate and underivative, primitive and uninferable, as well as synthetic, and sometimes also that they are self-evident and a priori. This implies that one or more of the basic notions of ethics (rightness, goodness, etc.) are indefinable, i.e. simple or unanalysable and unique; and that ethics is autonomous. Intuitionists also hold that rightness and goodness are objective and non-natural. Hence their view is sometimes called objectivism or non-naturalism. The views of Moore and Laird are also sometimes referred to as realistic.

See Deontological ethics, Axiological ethics, Teleological ethics, Utilitarianism, Objectivism, Realism, Autonomy of ethics, Non-naturalistic ethics. -- W.K.F.

In logic and mathematics, a relation between two systems such that there exists a one-one correspondence between their elements, and an identity of some relation that holds between any of the elements in one system and the corresponding elements in the other system. -- J.K.F.